Marina Halac

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Marina Halac
BornNovember 17, 1979
Alma materUniversidad del Cema, University of California at Berkeley
AwardsElaine Bennett Research Prize, 2016
George S. Eccles Research Award, 2017
Scientific career
FieldsEconomics
InstitutionsColumbia Business School, University of Warwick
Doctoral advisorsBenjamin Hermalin
Steven Tadelis
Shachar Kariv
Websitehttps://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/mhalac/
https://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/mchalac/

Marina Halac (born November 17, 1979) is a Professor of Economics at Columbia Business School. She is also an Associate Editor of Econometrica and a member of the Editorial Board of the American Economic Review.[1] She was the 2016 recipient of the Elaine Bennett Research Prize, which is awarded biennially by the American Economic Association to recognize outstanding research by a woman within the first seven years after completing her PhD.[2] In 2017, she was named one of the "Best 40 under 40 Business School Professors" by Poets and Quants.[3]

Halac was born and raised in Buenos Aires and studied economics at the University of CEMA, where her professors encouraged her to pursue an advanced degree in the United States. Following their graduation in 2001, she and her husband, Guillermo Noguera, became research assistants at the World Bank in Washington, DC, and then both earned doctoral degrees in economics at the University of California at Berkeley.[4]

Her research focuses on theoretical models of how to optimally delegate decision making, such as optimal rules for firms that need to delegate investment decisions to managers with competing incentives,[3] problems of how to motivate experimentation and innovation, the design of fiscal rules to constrain government spending, and the role of reputation in maintaining productivity. Her work on relational contracting, which studies how best to design contracts in a principal-agent setting where the value of the relationship is not mutually known, suggests new ways to approach dynamic contracting problems with bargaining.[2]

Selected works

  • Halac, Marina (2012). "Relational Contracts and the Value of Relationships". American Economic Review. 102 (2): 750–79. JSTOR 23245433.
  • Halac, Marina; Kartik, Navin; Liu, Qingmin (2016). "Optimal Contracts for Experimentation" (PDF). Review of Economic Studies. 83 (3): 1040–1091.
  • Halac, Marina; Yared, Pierre (2014). "Fiscal Rules and Discretion under Persistent Shocks". Econometrica. 82 (5): 1557–1614. JSTOR 24029290.
  • Halac, Marina; Prat, Andrea (2016). "Managerial attention and worker performance" (PDF). The American Economic Review. 106 (10): 3104–3132.
  • "Marina Halac". EconPapers.

References