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It seems a straight-forward resolution of the paradox is, for example, to add the proposition "Sally does not believe Tully is Cicero." Surely there must be someone other than little old me to have proposed this resolution. Jim Bowery (talk) 20:16, 4 May 2016 (UTC)
Yes. It is entirely unclear as to what sort of reasoning one is allowed to do. Common sense reasoning? Something else? Can I make deductions about beliefs? Why or why not? Likewise, for the last example, can I not deduce that Pierre simply does not know that these two Paderewski's are the same? (The Paderewski of the first over-heard discussion and the Paderewski of the second conversation). Is there some implicit assumption of Identity of indiscernibles clouding the issue, even though the two Paderewskis are clearly distinguishable, since the are parts of different conversations? 22.214.171.124 (talk) 19:55, 22 July 2016 (UTC)