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2008-02-12 Automated pywikipediabot message

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--CopyToWiktionaryBot (talk) 00:42, 12 February 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Collaberative work

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I have posted a collaberative work that was generated as a group class assignment in "Theories of Motor Control" at the University of Maryland, College Park taught by J. Jeka, PhD. A future post will include a list of all contributors. Easportz (talk) 22:21, 24 June 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Listed below are the contributors to the work that I have posted:

J. Jeka, PhD; T. Kiemel, PhD; M. Costanzo; M. Stolen; M. Scherer, PT; G. Dickey; E. Anson, PT; B. Baum; K. Amenabar; D. Logan; A. Linberg, PT; J. Hsu; Easportz (talk) 12:48, 25 June 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Figures

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Figures are in the process of being uploaded and will be added shortly. Easportz (talk) 12:27, 25 June 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Nice work

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The recent additions make this a vastly better article, on a rather important topic. Can I suggest adding a bit of discussion of efference copy in a non-motor framework? For example, the fact that it is impossible to tickle yourself because the tickle-detectors receive an efference copy of the motor commands that act to suppress their responses. Looie496 (talk) 17:35, 20 September 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Internal models

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I suggest splitting the "Modern View" section into a new article

  • while it is important to modern ideas about efference copies, it was not in the first ones by von Holst, Mittelstaedt, and Sperry ,
  • evidence for this is that the lead does not deem it necessary to mention internal models.
  • the idea of internal models is important in its own right separate from its involvement with efference copies,
  • the section is self-contained and the other ones (providing a short mention of internal models replaces it) do not require it.--LittleHow (talk) 16:37, 1 May 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Definition "efference copy" // article pass.

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  • The article as of now defines an efferent copy as "an internal copy […] of its predicted movement and its resulting sensations". If I don't misinterpret the meaning of the definitional sentence, this is not correct. The article contains other descriptions that seem better specifications to me e.g. "The efference copy is used to generate the predicted sensory feedback (corollary discharge) which estimate the sensory consequences of a motor command (top row)" under the control diagram.
  • However, the diagram seems to identify the use of efference copies as corollary dicharge with the predicted sensory feedback.
  • Also, under "Corollary discharge, I read: "Corollary discharge is characterized as an afference copy of an action command"—maybe a specific distinction eludes me, but shouldn't it read "efferent"?
  • Under "Tickling", I read "the predicted sensory feedback (efference copy)"—again, is the efferent copy actually to be identified with the predicted feedback?

// I am under the impression that at least some clarification is indicated.
Following ad hoc-definitions from standard sources, an efference copy is "information from ongoing motor neuron activity sent to other regions of the nervous system" (Bingman, Verner P.: Navigation and Homing, Neural Basis of, In: Lynn Nadel (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, p. 1) or "a copy of the motor command responsible for the electric discharge (“efferent copy” or “corollary discharge”)" (Jeannerod, Marc (2003): Action Monitoring and Forward Control of Movements. In: Michael Arbib (Ed.), The Handbook of Brain Theory and Neural Networks. Second Edition. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, pp. 83–85, here: p. 83).
This copy should then serve as input to a forward model (for purpose of prediction, error correction etc.) — thus, the efferent copy/corollary discharge should not be identified with predicted movements, resulting sensations, predicted sensory feedback, afference copies etc.
What do you think? Best, Morton Shumwaytalk 19:37, 7 September 2010 (UTC).[reply]

You've obviously thought deeply about this, but I'm having difficulty telling whether there is some specific change you'd like to make to the article, and if so what it is. Looie496 (talk) 01:35, 12 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]
Specifically, the definitional part of the lede, and respective phrasings throughout the article might be clarified, and if they are flawed, corrected. Morton Shumwaytalk 14:00, 12 September 2010 (UTC).[reply]
From the section on von Holtz it would seem that von Holtz differentiated between efference copy and corollary discharge. Efference copy for him was an algebraic correction of the expected sensory input so that, if it matched the prediction, the sensory input would be cancelled out, hence there would be no sensation and no correction. If it did not match, because the input was experimentally reversed in the case of the fly, the two would add, leading to correction - and in that experiment to over-correction. By corollary discharge, on the other hand, he seems to want to indicate the possibility that sensory input was being suppressed as an action was being executed, with the experimental expectation that optokinetic responses would be inhibited, regardless of the sensory signal. He, therefore, favoured the interpretation of the efference copy rather than the corollary discharge. I am not certain that the two terms are generally seen as signifying separate mechanisms. It is possible they were at that time, and perhaps it should be said somewhere that these terms are not or were not always regarded as synonymus.

Contribution of Dr. Purkyne (Purkinje) is missing

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""With the rediscovery of Aristotle's observation of eye-movement-related afterimage movement, however, interaction theory reappeared towards the beginning of the 19th century, and sensory physiologists were asking why the world is perceived as stable despite the fact that its image shifts continuously across the retina (Erasmus Darwin, Stembuch, Purkyneě, Bell). The idea of ‘cancellation’ between afferent visual movement signals and corollary signals evoked by the motor compounds of gaze movement (now called efference copy signals) was first proposed by Purkyně. It was further developed during the 19th century by leading sensory physiologists such as Hering, Helmholtz, Mach and their pupils. The first block diagrams of this idea were presented by Mach (1906) and Von Uexküll (1920/1928). These concepts led to the ‘reafference principles’ of Von Holst and Mittelstaedt (1950) and Sperry (1950)."" More info here, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0001691886900399 Can we develop a small paragraph if consensus is reached. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Sudhee26 (talkcontribs) 06:56, 19 July 2018 (UTC)[reply]

Corollary Discharge Theory

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I'm doing some research for my undergrad. I was looking for information on the Corollary Discharge theory. Obviously the efferent copy is an important part of the corollary discharge theory, however, to my understanding it does not cover it completely. Does anyone know of a related page for Corollary Discharge Theory or should I begin creating a new article? Zyskes (talk) 21:48, 4 March 2020 (UTC)[reply]

Fully Personhooded Digital Person (not a philosophical zombie = pseudoperson)

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Mimicking all the Brodmann regions (not exactly but their function, connections, combined functions, directivity of connections) is very important on creating a Fully Personhooded Digital Person (it should also have drives, feel pleasure/desire etc.).

A Fully Personhooded Digital Person would be biased due to true emotions, thus we necessarily must have "philosophical zombie chatbots" and "digipersons". They shouldn't be confused because for example we need unbiased science lessons, and we need true love and emotions experienced by the other (if that's what we want). Dishonesty can be proven if functional mechanisms are present when they're not supposed to or missing.

A very huge program doesn't guarantee personhood without the necessary personhood-yielding architecture. It's like claiming that mass alone guarantees mechanisms not existent in that mass.

Nicholas Humphrey has very good ideas on the hypernymic/superordinate thinking and personhooded sentiment being (biological, digital, etc.). But more rigorous and specific elaborations are necessary.

The digiperson should walk, receive parenting, have a good education, work, have hobbies (even as simulations), otherwise it might be problematic (because personhood is gradient; it might not develop a functional personality within society to have full and healthy selfhood (psychology)).