Talk:Epistemology/Archive 6

Bias toward (pragmatic) knowledge as justified true belief.

Definitions are not false or true, but they can be inadequate. If by "knowledge" we mean pragmatic knowledge such as when I know that I have two hands, the definition of knowledge as justified true belief (JTB) makes Hume's balanced scepticism looks ridiculous when viewed in light of our common background understanding. Therefore, it is pushing one point of view over another. Sceptics such as Hume only say that we do not have a logical justification for this knowledge. Hume who was a very pragmatical empiricist never meant to say that we do not know that we have two hands. However, in the JTB definition, this is what Hume says, because if there is no justification, then it is not knowledge. I am not saying that the sceptics view point is not presented in the article. It is presented, but it is done with a definition of knowledge that creates a bias. In accordance with the JTB definition, scepticism says that we cannot have knowledge, which is ridiculous. Reasonable scepticism acknowledges, of course, that we have knowledge, but only says that no logical justification is possible for growth of knowledge: knowledge is always required to justify knowledge and in a justification process there is no growth, because deduction is not adding to that which is already known, i.e., is not ampliative. The article does not discuss much the distinction between know-how and know-that, a distinction that is very much like the subjective knowledge versus objective knowledge distinction made by Hume and also by Popper and others, but in different manners. Growth of knowledge can be explained outside the realm of objective knowledge and thus of logic in terms of the connection between know-how and know-that. Know-how is primary. Animals have know-how, but not know-what (or very little).

Here are a few sources to show that JTB is controversial and, therefore, the article cannot be based on this definition. I suspect that a lot more can be found. Nicholas Rescher considered that induction must be accepted pragmatically without further justification and that knowledge is standardly justified true belief. Here the qualifier "standardly" makes an important difference.

Kevin Meeker and Frederick F. Schmitt argue that even in David Hume we can see a view that knowledge is justified true belief. However, Kenneth R. Merrill rather says that Hume adopted a point of view similar to Quine who saw epistemology as a part of psychology. Moreover, Schmitt's view on "justification" is not a logical justification: in this manner there is no contradiction.

Sven Bernecker and Fred Dretske wrote that after Edmund Gettier raised a problem with the JTB definition of knowledge no epistemologists found an acceptable variation on this definition. Similarly, Conee and Feldman wrote "Although epistemologists have learned much about knowledge from this research, no consensus has emerged about the solution to the problem raised by examples like Gettier’s. On the other hand, Paul Boghossian wrote that JTB is the standard, widely accepted Platonic definition of knowledge.

Rohit Parikh and Adriana Renero argued that the popular belief that plato adopted JTB as the definition of knowledge is incorrect. This is also a point made by Zina Giannopoulou. Dominic Mayers (talk) 14:12, 4 August 2021 (UTC)

Prominent argumentation theorist Douglas N. Walton also expressed an alternative to the JTB view in some of his publications. But Walton also said that this alternative to JTB pertained to argumentation theory and not to standard conceptions of knowledge in epistemology, so Walton's view could be taken to be a view outside of epistemology. Biogeographist (talk) 20:42, 12 August 2021 (UTC)

At first, I did not doubt that "traditionally" knowledge was JTB, though it was always clear to me that all philosophies that I studied were not a part of this traditional view on knowledge. My goal was then to find out who were the prominent modern or contemporary supporters of this "traditional view", which I did not know about. I did not want, of course, to remove this view, but wanted to clearly attribute it to prominent philosophers at the level of Russell, Quine, Wittgenstein, etc. I have not succeeded. I still have no idea from where this so called traditional view on knowledge comes from. We know the prominent supporter of empiricisms and those of rationalism, but we don't know the prominent supporters of the view that knowledge is JTB. We do not have any recent history for this view. It's weird. Well, the story goes that it was the view of Plato, Aristotle, etc. I immediately found this doubtful (and many have debunked this), but even if it was true, I would need to know who are the more recent prominent supporters and there are none. Here are more authors that debunk the view that traditionally knowledge is JTB and there must be much more than that. Some of them are more prestigious than others, but they are all qualified researchers in epistemology: Pierre Le Morvan, Julien Dutant, Maria Rosa Antognazza and Michael R. Ayers.

I would say the work of the scholars you mentioned in your last sentence should be addressed in all the prominent sections that address JTB: Belief § Epistemology, Epistemology § Justification, Epistemology § The Gettier problem, Gettier problem, and Justification (epistemology) § Justification and knowledge. Biogeographist (talk) 22:45, 12 August 2021 (UTC)

Above, Dominic wrote: The article does not discuss much the distinction between know-how and know-that, a distinction that is very much like the subjective knowledge versus objective knowledge distinction made by Hume and also by Popper and others, but in different manners. Growth of knowledge can be explained outside the realm of objective knowledge and thus of logic in terms of the connection between know-how and know-that. Know-how is primary. Animals have know-how, but not know-what (or very little). These claims are unsourced, and they may be original research [edit per ensuing discussion: and they would need an appropriate source, especially the first sentence], but I'm inspired to note that the philosopher Barry Allen disputed the (importance of the) distinction between know-how and know-that. In Allen's conception of knowledge:

Learning focuses on the agent: what skill, use, habit, is acquired. In the theory of knowledge, however, it is appropriate to focus on consequences, effects, artifacts. Knowledge begins as a quality of the artifact, its performance. ... It would be a misunderstanding to think I'm saying knowledge is about knowing how more than knowing that. This popular distinction is not as innocent, obvious, or neutral as it may seem. Indeed, it may be no more than a linguistic rationalization for the assumption that knowledge must divide along lines of intrinsic truth and mere instruments. ... Whether we speak of knowing that (such and such is true) or knowing how, we are qualifying capacities for performance at a high level with artifacts of some kind. Knowledge has much less to do with theory and truth than philosophers assume. What makes knowledge desirable and worth cultivating is the enhancement it brings to the effectiveness with which we operate in an artifactual environment. Knowing how and knowing that are not different kinds of knowledge. They are different kinds of use for different artifacts, all expressing the only kind of knowledge there is: superlative artifactual performance.

But Allen also considered himself an enemy of epistemology. He accused epistemology, in contrast to his own theory of knowledge, of exhibiting a number of "biases": the propositional bias, the discursive bias, and the analytic bias (if I'm not forgetting any others). Insofar as there are such "epistemological biases", they are on full display in this article, which is perhaps only appropriate. Such "biases" may help explain why the article shows little interest in know-how or in Allen's preferred artifactual account of knowledge. Biogeographist (talk) 22:45, 12 August 2021 (UTC) and 16:27, 13 August 2021 (UTC)

The part that you quoted in green has a typo: I used "know-what" to mean "know-that". The latter is often translated as propositional knowledge. The former is more about direct acquaintance with some reality. The fact that know-how is related to evolutionary epistemology can easily be sourced. I even remember that have seen it again yesterday in some paper. It is just that I do not always remember where. There is certainly not any original research in what I wrote: anything that has some common sense cannot be original research, because you can be certain that some philosophers would have made the point. Dominic Mayers (talk) 22:56, 12 August 2021 (UTC)

I just read the passage that you quoted from Allen. It's this idea that I had in mind when I wrote that know-that can be explained by know-how. I understand that Allen goes further and says that we cannot even fruitfully separate these concepts. So, it seems to me that this passage shows that the point that I raised was not original research, but only that it needs to be phrased so that it matches more closely with sources, something that I always do. I am sure there are other sources beside Allen, some perhaps closer to what I wrote. Dominic Mayers (talk) 23:08, 12 August 2021 (UTC)

Regarding your idea that it's fine that epistemology represents a bias, I have no problem with that, as long as we can attribute this bias to some school of thought with prominent supporters. This is exactly why I was looking for prominent supporters for the view that knowledge is JTB. You might have missed this important point. The problem is that there is no indication at all of a bias in the article, so the bias is presented as if it was the truth and this is against WP:NPOV. The fact that epistemology has a bias opposed to Allen and perhaps many others have to appear right from the start or else the article should present a larger perspective on what is epistemolgy—we don't have to accept a limited definition of epistemology that is popular in a recent academic sphere, but not a universally accepted definition. Instead, it might be better for a Wikipedia article to adopt a more encompassing definition of epistemology. Maybe not, it depends on how clearly we can identify a school of thought with prominent supporters for this biased epistemology. I mean that, if we have no problem with Creationism because it is clearly identified as a religious view, in the same way we can certainly have an article on a biased epistemology, but it needs to be well identified with a school of thought so that we can see this epistemology within a bigger picture. Dominic Mayers (talk) 23:13, 12 August 2021 (UTC)

There are many good points in what you've said. Biogeographist (talk) 23:58, 12 August 2021 (UTC)

Though I must say that this sentence is no defense: There is certainly not any original research in what I wrote: anything that has some common sense cannot be original research, because you can be certain that some philosophers would have made the point. If I had thought it was common sense, I wouldn't have said it may be original research, and it should be obvious that simply to state that it's common sense is unsatisfactory to someone who does not see what is common-sense about the claim that the distinction between know-how and know-that [...] is very much like the subjective knowledge versus objective knowledge. Biogeographist (talk) 00:22, 13 August 2021 (UTC)

Thanks and, of course, your references to Walton and Allen are also very useful. Also, I might give the impression that I completely reject the article, but it's not the case. For example, I have noticed that there is a section on "Schools of thought" in the article. It's only that at many occasion the article is written as if the view of knowledge as beliefs that must be justified (and all the questions that this approach raises) is what defines epistemology. I see an analogy between this view of epistemology (seen in opposition to the more classical epistemology that makes no reference to beliefs as an object of study) and modal logic (seen in opposition to classical logic where formula do not involve an agent that is related to a formula by a belief, etc.). It's not that the questions raised by modal logic are not interesting, but we cannot use modal logic to ignore the basic questions of classical logic. In the same way, introducing the concept of beliefs is certainly fine and it raises a lot of interesting questions (and questions are important in academic research), but this does not erase the basic issues of epistemology that can be understood without considering beliefs as an object of study. In my view, these basic issues remain the most important ones. Dominic Mayers (talk) 00:31, 13 August 2021 (UTC)

Regarding the second paragraph, which I just now read, yes, when a point of view appears new and special, it also appears as original research. But, the judgment that it is new and special is very much dependent upon what we know and, in this manner, it is subjective. If we realize that, we should stop saying that a point of view expressed without sources is original research, because it conveys no more information than saying that it appears new and special to us. This also applies when it is a content inserted in the article, but the difference is that, typically, now you can read the offered sources. If no source is provided, you can only say that it's not verifiable, you cannot say it is OR, because it will be in reference to what you know, not to sources, and therefore subjective. It remains subjective when sources are provided, because your understanding of the sources also depends on what you already know, but it helps remove some subjectivity. Dominic Mayers (talk) 00:52, 13 August 2021 (UTC)

BTW, the analogy between modal logic and belief-based epistemology is not from me. The author made an argument based on this. It's also not OR. I just don't remember the details. Dominic Mayers (talk) 01:02, 13 August 2021 (UTC)

Thanks. Regarding your second paragraph, I said (I was thinking especially of the first two sentences of yours that I quoted) "may be original research", not "is original research". I could have said instead, without reference to original research: "Please provide a source for the claim that the distinction between know-how and know-that is very much like subjective knowledge versus objective knowledge." Perhaps I should have said that, since what I really wanted was a source instead of some philosophizing about the nature of "original research"! If you still didn't provide a source, I might have thought to myself: "He didn't provide a source. What he said may only be something that he thought up by himself (original research)." In fact, I did think something like that. Sure, this assessment was based on the information available to me. I could search for more information elsewhere. But if it's true that someone has described in a source how the distinction between know-how and know-that is very much like subjective knowledge versus objective knowledge, and if you presented that source or if I found it myself, then I would no longer think to myself that what you said may be original research. My "theory" that it may be original research would be falsified. I could also ask you: "Dominic, did you just make that up?" And you might respond, "Yes, I just made it up, but it's a cool idea, no?", thereby corroborating my "theory", but not proving it conclusively for all time, because you might have been lying when you said that you made it all up! So we can't avoid fallibilism, but that is no problem; for our purposes, a source would be good enough to settle the question. Biogeographist (talk) 02:32, 13 August 2021 (UTC)

It is only that "doing OR" is something bad in WP. It's as bad as "stealing" in a super market. Would you say to someone in a super market "Perhaps you are stealing" if you can avoid it? I would, even if, if I am responsible to prevent stealing and I cannot know that the person is not stealing and, indeed, the person might be stealing. And, if ever I say "perhaps you are stealing", I would expect the reply "obviously I am not stealing." Dominic Mayers (talk) 03:11, 13 August 2021 (UTC)

No, original research is not a misdemeanor when it's on a talk page, so there is nothing criminal about it (even in an article I am not sure that the analogy between Wikipedia content policies and criminal statues is a good one), but if you thought that I was accusing you of a misdemeanor, that would explain the defensiveness. Pointing out that it may be original research is basically equivalent to a request for a reference. Biogeographist (talk) 12:34, 13 August 2021 (UTC) and 13:28, 13 August 2021 (UTC)

Very often, before I can include in the article an idea that I express in a talk page, I need to improve it so that it better corresponds to the sources. This is not OR in anyway. It is just the natural process of reading sources and getting closer to a required synthesis of the many sources that we have, a task that is far from obvious in this particular topic. I disagree with your interpretation of the technical term OR in Wikipedia, which always refers to non verifiable content in the article. Outside Wikipedia, OR is never used to mean that something needs to be modified so that it matches with sources or else rejected. On the contrary, outside WP, OR is a good thing that must be kept. I could not possibly think that you were trying to compliment me for having an original idea. So, I took the WP meaning, which, again, refers to non verifiable content in the article. (ec) Both, inside and outside WP, OR does not refer to a point in the talk page that might need to be adapted so that it matches better with sources. Let us focus on the article with the big picture in mind and if the specific point that I made comes back naturally, we will clarify the content that will be useful for the article using sources as needed. However, there might be many other points such as global organizational aspects that will come naturally to us as more important at this stage. Dominic Mayers (talk) 15:35, 13 August 2021 (UTC)

Right, this is quite a diversion since I don't really disagree with you. But if there is anything useful in the point I was making, it is that what I said may be OR (though I should have said it might be OR if it were in the article without an appropriate source) indicates an idea that would need an appropriate source if it were added to the article. Biogeographist (talk) 15:42, 13 August 2021 (UTC) and 16:22, 13 August 2021 (UTC)

I will answer yes about some usefulness so that we can move ahead without you feeling bad about this single incident, but you should know that even if I insisted that this single incident is not to be seen at all as an example to be repeated, it does not mean that I am not globally positive about the work that we can accomplish together. Dominic Mayers (talk) 16:00, 13 August 2021 (UTC)

I can see how OR is not the right term for what I was trying to indicate, so I won't use that term again for the issue I raised. Biogeographist (talk) 16:13, 13 August 2021 (UTC)

I have been reading more about knowing-how and knowing-that, and I learned that there is considerable recent controversy in the philosophical literature about what they are and how they relate, summarized in this review article, for example: Cath, Yuri (July 2019). "Knowing how" (PDF). Analysis. 79 (3): 487–503. doi:10.1093/analys/anz027. The controversies are also summarized to some degree in Carlotta Pavese's new article on knowledge-how in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. It would be great to have a section about all this in this article, but it's a complex subject. Biogeographist (talk) 16:53, 26 August 2021 (UTC)

References

• Allen, Barry (2004). "What Was Epistemology?". Knowledge and Civilization. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press. pp. 11–59. ISBN 0813341345. OCLC 52542619.
• Allen, Barry (May 2007). "Turning Back the Linguistic Turn in the Theory of Knowledge". Thesis Eleven. 89 (1): 6–22. doi:10.1177/0725513607076129.
• Almeder, Robert (2005). "Rescher, Nicholas (1928–)". Encyclopedia of Philosophy. encyclopedia.com.
• Antognazza, Maria Rosa (2015). "The Benefit to Philosophy of the Study of Its History". British Journal for the History of Philosophy. 23 (1).
• Ayers, Michael; Antognazza, Maria Rosa (2019). "Knowledge and Belief from Plato to Locke". Knowing and Seeing: Groundwork for a new empiricism. Oxford University Press.
• Bernecker, Sven; Dretske, Fred I., eds. (2000). Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
• Boghossian, Paul (2006). Fear of Knowledge: Against relativism and constructivism. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780199287185.
• Conee, Earl; Feldman, Richard (1996). "Epistemology". In Borchert, Donald M. (ed.). Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2 ed.). Thomson Gale (published 2006).
• Dutant, Julien (2015). "The legend of the justified true belief analysis". Philosophical Perspectives. 29: 95–145. Retrieved August 12, 2021.
• Giannopoulou, Zina (2021). "Plato: Theaetetus". The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved July 31, 2021.
• Hylton, Peter; Kemp, Gary (2020). "Willard Van Orman Quine". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
• Le Morvan, Pierre (2017). "Knowledge before Gettier". British Journal for the History of Philosophy. 25 (6): 1216–1238.
• Meeker, Kevin (2013). Hume’s Radical Scepticism and the Fate of Naturalized Epistemology. Palgrave Macmillan.
• Merrill, Kenneth R. (2008). Historical Dictionary of Hume’s Philosophy. The Scarecrow Press.
• Parikh, Rohit; Renero, Adriana (2017). "Justified True Belief: Plato, Gettier, and Turing". Philosophical Explorations of the Legacy of Alan Turing. Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science. pp. 93–102.
• Schmitt, Frederick F. (2014). Hume’s Epistemology in the Treatise: A Veritistic Interpretation. Oxford University Press.
• Walton, Douglas N. (2002). Legal Argumentation and Evidence. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press. ISBN 0271021772. OCLC 48376253.
• Walton, Douglas N. (January 2005). "Pragmatic and Idealized Models of Knowledge and Ignorance". American Philosophical Quarterly. 42 (1): 59–69. JSTOR 20010182.
• Walton, Douglas N. (September 2011). "Reasoning About Knowledge Using Defeasible Logic". Argument & Computation. 2 (2–3): 131–155. doi:10.1080/19462166.2011.637641.
• Walton, Douglas N. (2016). Argument Evaluation and Evidence. Law, Governance and Technology Series. Vol. 23. Cham; New York: Springer-Verlag. pp. 210–240. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-19626-8. ISBN 9783319196268. OCLC 919080389.
• Walton, Douglas N.; Godden, David (June 2007). "Redefining Knowledge in a Way Suitable for Argumentation Theory". In Hansen, Hans V.; Tindale, Christopher W.; Blair, J. Anthony; Johnson, Ralph H. (eds.). Dissensus and the Search for Common Ground: Proceedings of the 7th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), Windsor, 6–9 June 2009. Proceedings of the OSSA Conference. Vol. 7. Windsor: Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation. pp. 1–13.
• Walton, Douglas N.; Zhang, Nanning (May 2013). "The Epistemology of Scientific Evidence". Artificial Intelligence and Law. 21 (2): 173–219. doi:10.1007/s10506-012-9132-9.

Strong vs weak knowledge in the Philosophical scepticism section

The distinction between strong and weak knowledge plays a fundamental role in the section Epistemology#Philosophical skepticism, but this distinction is not defined in the article. Moreover, if this concept is really needed as it seems it is, it should not be verified in a single source and certainly not a tertiary source as it is the case now. NOR says "Wikipedia articles should be based on reliable, published secondary sources and, to a lesser extent, on tertiary sources and primary sources". In addition, this tertiary source is 24 years old (1997) and is not easily accessible. The section should be based on more recent sources and not only tertiary sources. In fact, a strong dependence on tertiary sources is a problem for the entire article. Dominic Mayers (talk) 20:41, 3 August 2021 (UTC)

I read a lot about epistemology and in particular about scepticism since I wrote that comment and I have not found the distinction between strong and weak knowledge mentioned once. It does not seem to be a fundamental ingredient in scepticism and it's not clear what is the role of this distinction from the paragraph. If anyone can clarify and provide secondary sources, that will be great. Otherwise, at some point, it should be removed. Dominic Mayers (talk) 04:38, 27 August 2021 (UTC)

Wiki Education Foundation-supported course assignment

This article was the subject of a Wiki Education Foundation-supported course assignment, between 28 August 2019 and 20 December 2019. Further details are available on the course page. Student editor(s): Sadbarg.sharifiy79. Peer reviewers: Moriskume, Ramcharitar30, Roshelle.Firdman05.

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The diagram does not have the justification circle.

An Euler diagram representing the traditional definition of knowledge as justified true belief. The Gettier problem gives us reason to think that not all justified true beliefs constitute knowledge.

This diagram represents true beliefs only, not justified true beliefs. Dominic Mayers (talk) 20:51, 7 August 2021 (UTC)

The intersection of truths and beliefs is true beliefs. A subsection of true beliefs are justified true beliefs. This is what the diagram shows. Hopefully that helps to explain the diagram. Alduin2000 (talk) 21:42, 12 August 2021 (UTC)

OK, I haven't seen the part written in black. I did not see "justified" in the diagram. So, I didn't see that it represents "justified true belief". Without the part written in black, it only says that it is (a kind of) true beliefs. Dominic Mayers (talk) 21:57, 12 August 2021 (UTC)

Still, I see a problem with this diagram. It is incorrect to say that beliefs are propositions. We believe propositions, but beliefs are not propositions. The concept of justified true beliefs is built within the perspective that knowledge is not the same thing as the object of knowledge. Truths are propositions. This part is fine. However, a truth and a belief do not belong in the same category: the former is a proposition that is true whereas the latter is a relationship with a proposition that may be true or false, but is not a proposition itself. Well, we might have the formula "x believes p", which might be true even if p is false, but this is a different story. Dominic Mayers (talk) 18:50, 13 August 2021 (UTC)

I agree with this yeah, beliefs are generally thought of as a propositional attitudes I believe. I do think the diagram is useful for understanding though. Alduin2000 (talk) 19:26, 13 August 2021 (UTC)

An Euler diagram representing the traditional definition of knowledge as justified true belief. The Gettier problem gives us reason to think that not all justified true beliefs constitute knowledge.

Here is another one that does not mix different categories. Dominic Mayers (talk) 21:13, 13 August 2021 (UTC)

But your new version doesn't show the Gettier problem. Biogeographist (talk) 21:23, 13 August 2021 (UTC)

The previous version is not better on this respect. The Gettier problem is not that there are poorly justified beliefs. If it was that, it would not be a problem with the definition. We would only say that there are poorly justified beliefs and these are not knowledge, because they are not truly justified beliefs. If it helped, we could add a circle in the red area that says "poorly justified true beliefs", but I think it would only be confusing. Dominic Mayers (talk) 21:37, 13 August 2021 (UTC)

It's just that the Gettier problem is mentioned in the caption. And Gettier played an important role in creating the JTB account(/myth), if I'm not mistaken. So it makes sense to represent the Gettier problem in the diagram. Biogeographist (talk) 21:56, 13 August 2021 (UTC)

But you are missing my point. Both diagrams fail to represent the Gettier problem. What makes you think that one is better than the other on this respect? If you think that the note "Poorly justified true beliefs" helps to understand the Gettier problem, then you are mistaken. On the contrary, we could easily add a circle in the red area of the new diagram that says "Poorly justified true beliefs", but it would be misleading as a way to represent the Gettier problem. In fact, this note might create a confusion in the current diagram given that it might be interpreted that way. Dominic Mayers (talk) 22:07, 13 August 2021 (UTC)

But if you're correcting one aspect of the diagram, you might as well correct the representation of the Gettier problem too. What about labeling the purple area "Justified true beliefs that are not knowledge" and put a circle in that area labeled "Knowledge"? Biogeographist (talk) 22:19, 13 August 2021 (UTC)

That's a good idea ! But it might be OR—just joking. Indeed, the Gettier problem is that there are justified true beliefs that are not knowledge. We are getting somewhere. Dominic Mayers (talk) 22:25, 13 August 2021 (UTC)

LOL. This whole diagram is probably OR, I cannot deny! Also, "true beliefs" would probably be a better label than "beliefs of truth"; the latter is rare. Biogeographist (talk) 22:30, 13 August 2021 (UTC)

I know "true beliefs" is more common and I can go with this, but formally beliefs of truth is way more accurate, because "true" in "true belief" could be interpreted as the "true" in the following sentence (taken on the web): "Symptoms that are unique to TMJ and don't occur when your pain is a true headache include: ...". But we don't mean a true belief as in a true headache. We mean an (ordinary) belief of a truth. Dominic Mayers (talk) 22:39, 13 August 2021 (UTC)

There really should be a separate circle for justification, so JTB is the intersection of 3 circles. Propositions that are justified and true, but not believed, are an important category. 2601:648:8202:350:0:0:0:C115 (talk) 19:05, 10 March 2022 (UTC)

Epistemic logic

Epistemic modal logic probably deserves a mention in the article, and there is even epistemic temporal logic used for problems like the blue-eyed islanders puzzle. Most of the stuff in this current article seems very old fashioned. Does anyone familiar with contemporary philosohpy also get that impression? It's not my subject at all, so I can't propose significant revisions other than a few additions here and there. Thanks. 2601:648:8202:350:0:0:0:C115 (talk) 19:23, 10 March 2022 (UTC)

PAC learning

[1] (reversion) This topic does seem to belong in an article about theories of knowledge, and the Bayesian epistemology section seemed like the most appropriate place, since PAC learning is about probabilistic estimates. The wiki about it is only about the AI part of the topic, but Valiant's book treats it as an explanation of biological evolution. I haven't read much of the book yet though, so leaving this here for now. 2601:648:8202:350:0:0:0:C115 (talk) 18:51, 10 March 2022 (UTC)

• Book review (parking link here for possible later use) 2601:648:8202:350:0:0:0:C115 (talk) 22:19, 10 March 2022 (UTC)
• Epistemology and AI 2601:648:8202:350:0:0:0:C115 (talk) 22:37, 10 March 2022 (UTC)
• [2] (About learning theory). This looks good, and discusses PAC learning. 2601:648:8202:350:0:0:0:C115 (talk) 21:41, 10 March 2022 (UTC)
• Epistemic insouciance (APA blog). Refers to article in journal of philosophical research, will try to look at that. 2601:648:8202:350:0:0:0:97FC (talk) 03:46, 16 March 2022 (UTC)

Our article is on epistemology in general. The section on Bayesian epistemology gives a succinct overview of the Bayesian approach to epistemology. According to your argument, PAC is at best vaguely related to Bayesian epistemology in that both talk about probabilities. This is not a sufficient reason to include it in such an overview. Phlsph7 (talk) 06:10, 11 March 2022 (UTC)

The current section on Bayesian epistemology is vague and imprecise. PAC tries to answer the question "what is knowledge?" with "knowledge is info that the person considers to be PAC". E.g. Wikipedia is supposed to be a repository of knowledge, but most of it is PAC at best. I thought of PAC learning as a topic within Bayesian epistemology rather than related to it. I guess that needs sourcing though, since idk how practitioners think of it.

I was struck by the requirement in the other descriptions that for something to be knowledge, it has to be true (rather than only subjectively probably true). By that notion, the brain in a vat parable tells us that we can't be sure that anything is knowledge. I linked a few instances of philosophers connecting epistemology with PAC, but you probably know better than I do if that connection is anywhere near widespread. I'll keep reading the book too. 2601:648:8202:350:0:0:0:C115 (talk) 23:02, 11 March 2022 (UTC)

Polyani?

Am I the only person surprised that Michael Polyani isn't mentioned at all? 2601:246:5700:3570:211D:D7AA:13B9:834E kbachler (talk) 01:14, 10 October 2022 (UTC)

I assume you mean Michael Polanyi. Neither the epistemology article in the Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy nor the one in the Encyclopedia Britannica mention his name. This indicates that he is not among the most important philosophers in relation to the topic of epistemology at large. But Polanyi already gets mentioned in our knowledge section. Phlsph7 (talk) 07:39, 10 October 2022 (UTC)

"Larrys Text/Epistemology" listed at Redirects for discussion

An editor has identified a potential problem with the redirect Larrys Text/Epistemology and has thus listed it for discussion. This discussion will occur at Wikipedia:Redirects for discussion/Log/2022 December 16 § Larrys Text/Epistemology until a consensus is reached, and readers of this page are welcome to contribute to the discussion. Steel1943 (talk) 21:49, 16 December 2022 (UTC)

"Henry and the barn façades" listed at Redirects for discussion

An editor has identified a potential problem with the redirect Henry and the barn façades and has thus listed it for discussion. This discussion will occur at Wikipedia:Redirects for discussion/Log/2022 December 16 § Henry and the barn façades until a consensus is reached, and readers of this page are welcome to contribute to the discussion. Steel1943 (talk) 21:52, 16 December 2022 (UTC)

Articles around épistémologie/epistemologia/epistemology

I am expressing myself in english also I am french to coordinate differente wikis around the épistémologie/epistemologia/epistemology articles.

In english en:epistemology is the term used to refer to the branch of philosophy studying knowledge. But in some other languages fr:épistémologie, it:epistemologia, es:epistemologia, pt:epistemologia the same word doesn't have this meaning and is rather focused on science solely.

On the other side equivalents to en:epistemology exist in those other languages : es:gnoseologia, fr:théorie de la connaissance, it:Gnoseologia, pt:gnoseologia

Currently item Q9471 is a wikidata stew of a bunch of different articles that might have nothing to do with eachother.

I had previoulsy linked the fr:épistémélogie to other wikipedia articles that have an article with the same specific meaning under the item Q116930361 but this modification was deleted. I am now trying to coordinate the different wikis to do it again but letting know everyone so we don't revert this change every sunday.

the discussion can be found here D Cat laz (talk) 19:00, 28 April 2023 (UTC)

I responded on Wikidata, which is where this conversation should happen. But I will note here that D Cat laz's claim above that item Q9471 is a wikidata stew of a bunch of different articles that might have nothing to do with each other is surely overstated (exaggerated). They are related; it is just a question of how best to indicate their relationships. Biogeographist (talk) 20:40, 28 April 2023 (UTC)

Complete misunderstanding of the history regarding the meaning of epistemology

The following sentence is a misunderstanding of the history of the word.

The French term épistémologie is often used with a different and narrower meaning than the English term "epistemology", being used by many French philosophers to refer solely to philosophy of science in contrast to general theory of knowledge (théorie de la connaissance).

At the time of the translation, epistemology and its German equivalents, Erkenntnistheorie and Wissenschaftslehre, were all very much related to science. It is certainly true for Erkenntnistheorie, because the neo-kantisme in which the term was introduced criticized the German idealism for not respecting science. It is also true for Wissenschaftslehre. Otherwise, it could not have been criticized for not respecting science and, besides, some modern analyses conclude that science was reasonably respected by the German idealism. The Institute of Metaphysics did not consider any specific science, except epistemology which Ferrier viewed as a science, but it clearly made a distinction between common knowledge and scientific knowledge and Ferrier's epistemology was concerned with scientific knowledge (in a very general manner). Because Ferrier was considering scientific knowledge in a very general manner, Pierre Wagner wrote about Ferrier's definition:

It seems that the English word epistemology has never designated anything other than that part of philosophy which deals with the nature of knowledge, its scope and the ways of justifying what one claims to know (“claims to knowledge”), even if the ways of solving this family of problems have obviously changed. Question much more general than the problems raised by science or by particular sciences.

— Pierre Wagner 2002

Here is the key point. The important distinction that is at stake here is not between science and common knowledge, but between the general nature of the approach versus the regional nature of the approach to science or knowledge. This is clearly seen in Jean-Claude Simard paper, used as a source in fr:Épistémologie. At the beginning, he writes

When one approaches epistemology for the first time, it must take note of the variations of the term. For the Anglo-Saxons, the term epistemology generally evokes a branch specialized in philosophy, the theory of knowledge. In France, it rather refers to the study of scientific theories. We can reconcile these two acceptances without undue artifice. by assimilating, in a very general way, epistemology to the theory of scientific knowledge. We will use mainly this sense here, closer to the French-speaking side.

The key point to note here is that Simard in the above paragraph does not refer at all to the distinction between the unified or general approach to knowledge and the regional approach. He refers to the distinction between an epistemology that does not focalise on science and a different kind of epistemology that focalises on science. He says that his paper only considers this second meaning of the word, closer to the French-speaking side. This is made very clear by the fact that the central point of his paper is the distinction between the unified or general approach (which he illustrates with Popper's philosophy) and the regional approach (which he illustrated with Kuhn's philosophy), both philosophers being philosophers of science. Wagner also recognizes that and, in fact, says explicitly that it is the source of the confusion. He wrote

The last sentence explains the impression of confusion that emerges from this text for us who read it after more than a hundred years: in the neo-Kantian context, the theory of knowledge is constituted in a critical study of the sciences, it is that is, a study that seeks the conditions of possibility of scientific knowledge.

The last sentence in question is this sentence from Couturat :

In summary, Epistemology is the theory of knowledge based on the critical study of the Sciences, or in a word, Critique as Kant defined and founded it.

So, he explains that the confusion comes from the fact that we misunderstand that at the time epistemology and erkenntnistheorie (as well as wissenschaftslehre) were all oriented toward science. Dominic Mayers (talk) 21:46, 10 May 2023 (UTC)

There was also a lengthy recent discussion of a related issue at wikidata. I'm not sure that the relation to the French term épistémologie is important enough to be mentioned in our article. Given that their exact relation seems to be a controversial issue, the best approach may just be to remove the claim. Phlsph7 (talk) 07:35, 11 May 2023 (UTC)

That would only make sense if the subject is clearly centered on the "English meaning", but there must be a clarification of what this means. "English meaning" nowadays is not clear enough. If we decide that the subject is the traditional analysis of knowledge and only define this by a word and a short definition and even say that it started with Plato, it can quickly become anything as it starts to become here. Identifying the philosopher(s) that concretely raised the field as can be seen in sources without having to cherry pick sentences is a natural way to clearly identify the subject. If it is the analysis of knowledge, we have many sources that say it started with Gettier. This does not prevent connections with previous philosophies, but it explains the weight given to the different views. It is not the first time that a new philosophical approach is attributed to a more ancient and notorious philosopher. Russell attributed epistemology (as he defined it - the analytic view or the linguistic turn) to Kant, but, of course, the analytic view did not start with Kant. The same can be said about the "traditional" analysis of knowledge. By the way, even if the subject is the traditional analysis of knowledge (which started with Gettier), a connection with regional/historic epistemology could be included. It seems to me that the contrast might help clarify what the subject is. It's good to put a subject in a larger context in as much as it helps the readers to understand the subject, but the larger context should clearly be presented as such. Dominic Mayers (talk) 11:31, 11 May 2023 (UTC)

The passage you criticized is found in the section "Etymology" so I'll only focus on that issue for now. I don't have much familiarity with the etymology of the term "epistemology". If the French term "épistémologie" has an important role to play in it, then it should be mentioned. If we mention the French term, should we also mention the Spanish term "epistemología"? The easiest way to decide whether to mention them and what to write about them would be to find a reliable source on the etymology of the term "epistemology". The current source is Meyerson 1908. It is in French. Does it discuss these issues pertaining to the etymology of the term "epistemology"? Phlsph7 (talk) 18:30, 11 May 2023 (UTC)

You assume that the subject is attached to the word "epistemology" and that the meaning of the french word "épistémologie" is not a part of the subject. Wikipedia is not a dictionary and if the subject is epistemology at large, including French epistemology, then the meaning of "épistémologie" is also very much relevant to that subject. (Whether that should be part of the etymology section is another question—I believe that it should not, but the original question remains.) This is why I repeat that the first step is to clarify the subject. This sentence is only one example of the need to clarify the subject. It's needed for the entire article. Dominic Mayers (talk) 19:44, 11 May 2023 (UTC)

I assume that the etymology section of an article with the title "epistemology" should discuss the etymology of the term "epistemology". If the French term "épistémologie" or the German term "Erkenntnistheorie" are relevant in this regard then they should be discussed as well. I assume the article is about epistemology at large. I don't see a reason why French epistemology or German epistemology should be excluded.

It seems we are in agreement that the etymology section is not the right place for the criticized passage. I'm not sure what to do with it. Making a separate section for French epistemology could be considered undue weight. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:04, 12 May 2023 (UTC)

You talk too much in some jargon that is difficult to understand (JTB, IEB, IFB ??? What the heck??!). I also don't like the changes you have made so far the lede of the article, and I would prefer we restart this discussion based on that original version of the lede, and what changes you are suggesting we make in it. Thank you, warshy ^(¥¥) 20:12, 11 May 2023 (UTC)

I did not touch the lede at all. JTB = Justified True Belief. I did not use IEB, IFB. IEP = Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. SEP = Stanford Encyclopedia of philosophy and the links were provided when I introduced these two acronyms. Dominic Mayers (talk) 20:24, 11 May 2023 (UTC)

Please clarify the subject so that people can work together.

I don't mind what is the plan for the article and I am not interested in fighting for one or another, but it cannot be something improvised as we go and it has to allow us to respect NPOV. For example, we cannot claim that the subject of an article is Evolution and have its content be the same as in Creationism : the content might respect due weight within Creationism, but not within Evolution. Right now, the article presents itself as all forms of philosophy of knowledge or science, but actually is has mostly a JTB content. This is not acceptable. If the subject is the traditional analysis of knowledge, then it should be clear. The emphasis on JTB is very strong. The entire lead section is based on sources centered on the "traditional" analysis of knowledge. The only source not centered on JTB for the lead is Scientific epistemology: How scientists know what they know, but it is used for its JTB content. The lead has only a few sentences at the end that refer to specialized forms of epistemology, suggesting that JTB is the central view and these are some peripheral views. It is not neutral at all. Some people are questioning the traditional analysis of knowledge, especially the very fact that it is "traditional". The perspective on Plato, etc. presented in the article is entirely biased. Many authors do not agree with this perspective on ancient Greek philosophy. It would be much better to have an article on this subject (which it is already, but in a non neutral manner) and make it neutral. Meanwhile, I will proceed as if the subject is epistemology in the very acceptable sense of the "traditional" analysis of knowledge, but I will not mind if we propose clearly to switch to another subject. BTW, I do not worry that there is an article on JTB, no more that I worry that there is an article on critical rationalism and another one on falsifiability, Dominic Mayers (talk) 18:02, 10 May 2023 (UTC)

Hello Dominic Mayers and thanks for cleaning up the section "Etymology". While I do not agree with your general outlook, I think you make some valid points. If I remember correctly, Plato discusses the JTB conception but does not ascribe to it himself. The current version of our history section gives the impression that it is Plato's view. This should probably be clarified. Phlsph7 (talk) 07:26, 11 May 2023 (UTC)

I've been reading these discussions trying to get a foot on it, but please clarify to me what the jargon being used here "JTB" means? I have no idea what it means and never heard of it. In general, I am surprised to hear that the French meaning of the term "Epistemology" is closer to the "Theory of Science" side than to the "Theory of Knowledge" one. That was not my impression all these years after reading much of the early Foucault very closely (unfortunately, in English, of course). Thank you, warshy ^(¥¥) 17:51, 11 May 2023 (UTC)

JTB means Justified True Belief. In the three main sources SEP, IEP and Borchert used for the lead, justified true belief is discussed. The acronyme JTB is used in SEP and IEP. Borchert is particularly enlightening, because its entry "Epistemology" is centred on JTB with no mention of Kant, Descartes, Popper, etc., but it has other entries with the word epistemology such as "History of Epistemology" that cover Descartes, Kant, etc. (but not Foucault, which is interesting, because Foucault gave a special meaning to the word Épistémè). Regarding the fact that we refer to the regional/historic epistemology as the "French epistemology", I agree that it can be misleading. Indeed, for example, Foucault was not a philosopher of science and yet a notorious French philosopher. He has been interested in the epistemology of medecine and this can be considered a part of fr:Épistémologie historique (which, by the way, is matched with the totality of French philosophy when one switches language), but Foucault was primary a philosopher engaged in social aspects such as LGBT, feminism, etc. Dominic Mayers (talk) 19:25, 11 May 2023 (UTC)

@Warshy: you are right that the discussion so far is too jargon-heavy for most editors. Thanks for pointing this out. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:05, 12 May 2023 (UTC)

Step by step discussion of the suggested changes

Thank you for restoring the original version. Can we now restart the discussion of your suggested changes to be made step-by-step? Thank you, warshy ^(¥¥) 20:40, 11 May 2023 (UTC)

We would have to first agree, it seems to me, that highly abstract philosophical concepts which are discussed in different languages, can very easily be misinterpred when translated or discussed in a new language, such as English in this case. That's because modern philosophy starts with the Italian Renaissance in the renewed Latin language of the 15th, 16th and 17th centuries. But from there on, at the end of the 17th century, the renewed Greek philosophy being now discussed in Latin, it starts to be discussed in the local/national vernaculars, such as French, German, and English. Thank you, warshy ^(¥¥) 21:46, 11 May 2023 (UTC)

These points seem to be historical aspects that secondary sources must consider. It might be needed to understand some of these aspects to understand these sources, but the bottom line is that we read the modern sources and try to understand what they say.

The example would only be important in a context of a thesis about ancient Greeks

For example, consider the ancient Greek word episteme. It is important here to not violate NPOV when we give its ancient Greek meaning. This might be different from the meaning that Ferrier attributed to the word, because, as you what you say suggests, perhaps Ferrier (mentioned in the Etymology section) had little knowledge of ancient Greek, but that is a different question. The ancient Greek meaning of episteme will be used in a section about the ancient Greek philosophy. In that context, it is the ancient Greek meaning as conveyed in the modern sources that must be given. It's best to do it right in the Etymology section as well. We need to read the sources that are centered on the question and make sure we respect what they say in the context of the article. In that context, it is important that the readers know whether episteme includes common knowledge such as the knowledge that one will get the job after his interview. This is the kind of "knowledge" considered in the so called traditional analysis of knowledge, which is the main focus of the article. There is overwhelming evidence from the sources that episteme did not include common knowledge of that sort, but meant practical knowledge, knowledge with a skill. This is consistent with the view that episteme is opposed to doxa. It is also consistent with the view that it is distinct from techne, but distinct from it does not mean that it is opposed to it. On the contrary, for example, this source perfectly centred on the question, clearly says that the two words were closely related in ancient Greek, in fact, often one used in replacement of the other. I am not cherry picking here. This source is highly reliable and completely centered on the question. Moreover, it's consistent with all the sources centered on the question. Respecting NPOV, given that this aspect is very much relevant to the subject, means that we must convey that aspect that is very clear from the sources, not just cherry pick one source and claim that we can say episteme is knowledge because it is verifiable in a reliable source. Here is what another source that is centered on the subject (not just a short dictionary entry) says about episteme versus skill:

The word episteme, 'knowledge', was thus very close in meaning to the word tekhne, 'skill'. The basic use of the corresponding verb i:1tlmUllat (epistamai) is said to be to express, in connection with an infinitive, an ability or a skill, i.e., 'knowing how to do something'.

—  Hintikka 1974, Chap. 2

Dominic Mayers (talk) 01:39, 12 May 2023 (UTC)

Dominic Mayers (talk) 23:18, 11 May 2023 (UTC)

My first edit

I don't think it makes sense that I have to argue for every edit that I do. It's you that should explain any problem that you see in my edits, not just say "I don't like it", so please undo the whole thing. But, I do an exception for my first edits. In the first edit, I change

The word epistemology is derived from the ancient Greek epistēmē, meaning "knowledge", and the suffix -logia, meaning "logical discourse" (derived from the Greek word logos meaning "discourse").

for

The word epistemology is derived from the ancient Greek epistēmē, meaning "knowledge", and the English suffix -ology, meaning "the science or discipline of (what is indicated by the first element)".

The explanation is that this is what the source actually says. The visible sentence in the source says epistēmē is knowledge, not scientific knowledge, but one can click on epistēmē in the source to have more details. Then the source says scientific knowledge. The sources of quality that address the question are unanimous that episteme refers to knowledge that has a corresponding techne, skills. The footnote is part of the edit. It must be mentioned. Dominic Mayers (talk) 02:09, 12 May 2023 (UTC)

I don't see a severe overall problem with Dominic Mayers' edits. The better approach is probably to only undo the problematic edits. This should be done with a short explanation of why they are problematic.

I don't have access to the source but the explanation makes sense. If the source does not cover the original claim then it's better to replace with something that is supported by the source. An alternative would be to add a source that supports the original claim. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:08, 12 May 2023 (UTC)

This edit had two purposes. The first is that, even though I knew that there were sources for the current formulation, I thought if we give a source, then we must be consistent. The second, perhaps more important, is that actually the formulation in the source is easier to understand, because it refers to a suffix in English, which was known at the time Ferrier constructed the word. But, it's not that important. The important aspect is whether the ancient Greek meaning of episteme is knowledge or scientific knowledge. It might not be a coincidence that the English article Episteme says that it means knowledge (in general), though it does say that the literal translation from ancient Greek is science, whereas the French article fr:Épistémè says that it means science. Moreover, mostly short English dictionary entries or articles in the modern analysis of knowledge contexte suggest that episteme in ancient Greek can be knowledge in general, including common knowledge such as knowing that a person will get the job after an interview. Whenever the source is centred on ancient Greek and provide an analysis of the question, not biased by any modern philosophy, the conclusion is always (to my knowledge) that episteme in ancient Greek meant knowledge with a skill, science or scientific knowledge. Dominic Mayers (talk) 13:38, 12 May 2023 (UTC)

So you made your point now that episteme in ancient Greek "meant knowledge with a skill, science or scientific knowledge." It does not change a lot the subject of the entry "Epistemology" in the English WP, in my view. What I don't understand is why we needed all these walls of text, with long titles, to make such a simple point. The point could have been simply made in a separate note discussing the original meaning of the word episteme in ancient Greek. But OK, never mind. You made your point and you made a little change. I still don't see how all this concerns NPOV or "complete misunderstandings" of anything. Thank you, warshy ^(¥¥) 18:29, 12 May 2023 (UTC)

References

The passage about the French word épistémologie

I reply to this comment from Phlsph7. The new subsection for the French word was not a final decision. I thought it was an improvement to remove this from the Etymology section: it was just a displacement of the content. Whether a small subsection for French epistemology is undue weight depends on the actual subject. If the subject is epistemology at large, you will need to explain to me in which way it is undue weight, because it does not seem undue weight to me. More importantly, there is a need for a serious discussion whether the subject is epistemology at large, because, if it is epistemology at large (including the French view, etc.), then the lead is completely undue weight, given that it uses only sources centered on the modern analysis of knowledge (in which knowledge is justified true belief or at the least true belief). Dominic Mayers (talk) 14:36, 12 May 2023 (UTC)

If we had subsections for "German epistemology", "Spanish epistemology", "American epistemology", "Indian epistemology",... then adding one more subsection on "French epistemology" wouldn't be undue weight. But having a history section that has "French epistemology" as its only subsection seems to be undue weight. Why do only the French get their own subsection? By the way, I don't think it would be a good idea to try to fix the problem by adding all the subsections listed above.

The sources cited in the lead seem to be reliable. For example, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is highly regarded for its comprehensiveness and scholarly rigor. Its article aims to discuss epistemology in general. From what I can tell, it does in no way restrict itself to the JTB conception of knowledge. Phlsph7 (talk) 18:14, 12 May 2023 (UTC)

I agree that German, English, French, Greek, etc. are not a good way to distinguish between philosophies. There are different German philosophies, different English philosophies, different Greek philosophies as well as different French philosophies. Piaget and Foucault can not easily be put in a same basket. But, we do speak of German idealism. That is just a name for a well identified school of thought represented by Fichte, Hegel, Schelling and others. In the same way, we speak of French epistemology and that is also just a name for a well identified school of thought represented, as mentioned in many sources, by Bachelard, Canguilhem and others (the list of names is less fixed than in the case of German idealism, but Bachelard and Canguilhem are almost always mentioned). French epistemology emphasises ruptures between the different sciences and time periods. This is why it is also called regional or historical epistemology. It also emphasizes a rupture between common knowledge and scientific knowledge, but this distinction was recognized by many philosophers before, including Ferrier in his Institutes of metaphysics. So, the argument that it would be inappropriate to have sections for German epistemology", "Spanish epistemology", "American epistemology", "Indian epistemology is well understood and accepted, but it still makes perfect sense to have small sections for different notorious schools of thought such as German idealism in the background section. Dominic Mayers (talk) 19:16, 12 May 2023 (UTC)

Yes, I agree with you here. I think that the so-called French "structuralists," such as Sartre, Levy-Strauss, and Foucault put an unprecedented stress on the centrality of epistemology for philosophical thinking. warshy ^(¥¥) 19:36, 12 May 2023 (UTC)

More importantly, if really the subject is epistemology at large, having French epistemology (the school of thought also called regional epistemology) only in the background section is clearly a violation of due weight in the opposite direction. It deserves more than only be in a background section. Besides, it is not a really a background for the modern traditional analysis of knowledge that is the main content of the article. (Though, even if the subject is the "traditional" analysis of knowledge, it could still be useful to mention it : the contrast between these two schools of thought, traditional analysis of knowledge and regional epistemology, must have been discussed by secondary sources.) So, please, let us have this much needed discussion about the subject of the article with a clear understanding of what "epistemology at large" means. In particular, it means that regional epistemology does not fit in a background section and deserves more weight than that. Dominic Mayers (talk) 19:48, 12 May 2023 (UTC)

Why don't you just try to define to us in some simple 2 or 3 sentences (not a wall of text) what "the 'traditional' analysis of knowledge" means for you? Thank you, 20:41, 12 May 2023 (UTC)

This school of thoughts exists independently of me. Therefore, you are as much responsible as I am to know about it. Perhaps, you ask me because you view me as more expert than you are. If that is the case, here is what I have to say. It's not possible to identify a school of thoughts using a few sentences. We can give a few sentences, but in itself this will accomplish very little. Philosophers within one school of thought do not raise the question, because they already communicate among them, read each other, etc. But we or philosophers that consider (other) schools of thoughts need a way to identify them. Typically, this is done by making a connection with something concrete. For example, a real institution such as the Vienna Circle for the logical positivism or its founders such as Fichte, Hegel and Schelling for German idealism. A few sentences are then helpful to summarize the key aspects of the school of thoughts. The traditional analysis of knowledge started with an issue raised by Edmund Gettier in 1963. The story goes that the tradition existed since Plato, but many consider this as a myth. The important point is that a flood of papers followed to try to answer Gettier's challenge. That identifies concretely the school of thoughts. Now, a few sentences can be useful. The starting point in this school of thoughts is that knowledge is a belief in the form of a proposition that comes with some justification. People also consider that it makes no sense to say a false proposition can be knowledge. So, the starting point is that knowledge is justified true belief. The key question in the field is what is a justification. Of course, there are different approaches that make different assumptions about the source of a justification. It becomes quickly very complicated. I am not expert, so I will not make a judgment, but the fact is that it is a very important school of thoughts as can be seen from the encyclopedia articles such as SEP, IEP and Borchert that are centered on the subject (while naming it epistemology). Dominic Mayers (talk) 23:02, 12 May 2023 (UTC)

I had a look at the following 3 overview articles on epistemology: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, and Britannica Encyclopedia. None of them mention the term "French epistemology". A google search didn't bring up much either. Are you sure that "French epistemology" is a technical term for one of the major schools of thought? If so, the right section would be "Schools of thought in epistemology", not "History of epistemology".

Another problem is that the subsection "French epistemology" does not contain any information about the school of thought described by you. If this subsection should be included in the article, we would need high-quality reliable sources that establish the importance of French epistemology as a major school of thought in epistemology. Additionaly, the section should describe this school of thought. Until then, it would be better to remove it.

I'm not sure that the subject of the article is as much of a problem as you make it out to be. We could look at how reliable sources define epistemology. But this does not seem to be relevant to the change discussed above. The problems pointed out so far with the subsection "French epistemology" do not depend on how we define epistemology. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:26, 13 May 2023 (UTC)

As I already pointed out, the 3 overview articles on epistemology with the title epistemology, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, and Borchert, clearly present the "traditional" analysis of knowledge. (I don't know why you point out the Britannica article given that it is not much followed in the article.) This certainly can be an argument to use the title "Epistemology" to present that subject. I have no problem with that. In fact, I even wrote that, in the absence of a discussion and an agreement on the subject, I will assume that the subject is Epistemology as defined by these three encyclopedia articles. Of course, I will also respect NPOV and make sure opposite views, as presented in notorious sources, will also be included. With that subject, you will be right that French epistemology has little place, unless some reliable sources explicitly make the connection. I am just saying that we need to know concretely what is the subject. One cannot claim at the same time that the subject is the one fixed by these three encyclopedia articles (which would be fine) and also claim that it is "epistemology at large", meaning that it includes French epistemology, and perhaps Popper's view on epistemology, "Epistemology without a knowing subject", etc. Dominic Mayers (talk) 12:34, 13 May 2023 (UTC)

I've removed the section "French epistemology" for the reasons cited above. I'm not categorically against including it. But the problems would have to be addressed first. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:50, 13 May 2023 (UTC)

I am not sure what is the correct order, discuss first or remove first. Anyway, if there is no satisfactory agreement on the subject, I will simply edit the article under the assumption that the subject is the one that is defined by the three encyclopedia articles that inspired the lead : SEP, IEP and Borchert, i.e., the traditional analysis of knowledge, with its view on scepticism, fallibilism, etc. Here is a thought about the French epistemology: it has inspired the Feminist perspectives in epistemology and perhaps much of the feminist epistemology and yet it is ignored in the article whereas the feminist epistemology is not. However, this is a detail at this stage. It's the entire article that violates NPOV until it is clear that the subject is the traditional analysis of knowledge and other schools of thought are only included because notorious sources relate them to that subject. It's totally unacceptable to be in between: to somehow pretend that it is epistemology at large, yet have a lead that is centred on the traditional analysis of knowledge and put other schools of thought at the end as if they were less important and even ignore some important schools of thought. This is not neutral at all. Dominic Mayers (talk) 18:13, 13 May 2023 (UTC)

The traditional analysis of knowledge : a bubble

Phlsph7's claim that "French Epistemology" (also called "Historical epistemology" or "Regional epistemology") cannot be found in a Google search made me nearly fall of my chair. If it is true, it is only a consequence of Google algorithm that is known to keep people in their own bubble. There are other bubbles. For example, in Québec, a classical course in epistemology such as the one described by Jean-Claude Simard, will not even mention the traditional analysis of knowledge, not a word about justified true belief, Gettier's problem, etc. Instead, the paper mentions Bachelard, Popper, Kuhn, etc. Every culture has its own bubble. The translation of "épistémologie française" is "French epistemology". It exists in English. It's not a question of language. It's only a cultural bubble. Another bubble that takes a different angle on epistemology and yet is presented in English is the Feminist perspectives in epistemology. The book was, of course, influenced by the French epistemology, which you say almost does not exist. I have looked the 30 or so philosophers mentioned in the Borchert article (Laurence BonJour, William Alston, David Malet Armstrong, Alvin Goldman, Ernest Sosa, Hilary Putnam, ...) to see if any of these 30 philosophers is mentioned in this other book. None of them are mentioned. (Well Putnam is mentioned, but that's because he wrote a book on the philosophy of science, so it does not count.) In contrast, Foucault is mentioned 68 times. Popper is also mentioned. I am not saying that the article should not be about the traditional analysis of knowledge bubble (which is totally ignored in other bubbles). On the contrary, it is indeed an important bubble represented in many books and some encyclopedia articles under the title epistemology. I am not arguing against that. I am just saying that we cannot choose that subject (bubble) and claim that it is epistemology at large. Dominic Mayers (talk) 16:15, 13 May 2023 (UTC)

This is all much ado about nothing (not to mention the enormous walls of text every time). This WP article explains what epistemology is following the same pattern or template used in the other three encyclopedias, which is what you have been calling here 'traditional.' I don't see anywhere where the article states that it is about "epistemology at large." This is again just your own jargon. (This whole story about "NPOV" does not belong here at all, in my view.) This article is about epistemology, period. And any WP article can be expanded with news sections, as long as there is consensus between the editors. In the current situation here, I am so far completely behind everything that Phlsph7 has said and done. Thank you, warshy ^(¥¥) 18:50, 13 May 2023 (UTC)

OK, NPOV is important, but I agree that there is no reason for it to become an issue between editors at this stage, especially if we do agree that the subject is epistemology as in the three encyclopedias (SEP, IEP and Borchert). I just want to make sure that all concerned editors, not only Phlsph7, you (warshy) and me, agree that the subject is epistemology as covered by the three encyclopedia articles (SEP, IEP and Borchert) and we can add a few sources on epistemology from key authors such as Laurence BonJour, William Alston, David Malet Armstrong, Alvin Goldman and Ernest Sosa to really clarify what is the subject. These are authors mentioned by almost all sources on the subject. Let's view this as a starting point. The minimum that we must accomplish together is to make sure that epistemology as described by these authors and by the encyclopedia articles is well explained to the readers. Can we agree on this and then hopefully have other editors, not only the three of us, agree on this? Dominic Mayers (talk) 03:46, 14 May 2023 (UTC)