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De facto independence

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I have added the words "de facto" to India's treatment of Tibet's independence, using a quote from Van Eekelen. I am not convinced that Mehrotra's treatment of the subject is conclusive. Better sources are needed. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 12:11, 9 October 2020 (UTC)[reply]

Mehrotra's gung-ho treatment of the Kurukshetra mythology is also quite dubious. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 12:13, 9 October 2020 (UTC)[reply]
Please suggest a source. DTM (talk) 13:23, 11 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]
I don't believe that India had a position on whether Tibet should be an independent country. But it was independent when India became independent, and so India was ready to deal with it on that basis.
On the other hand, India did believe that Tibet should be autonomous, just like British India did. Both British India and independent India were ready to accept Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, but not Chinese occupation. (Possibly, in India's view, this "autonomy" was enough to guarantee the validity of the McMahon Line, even though the Dalai Lama had other views.)
On the question of suzerainty, sovereignty etc., one of the best sources is:
  • The Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law (PDF), Geneva: International Commission of Jurists, 1959
-- Kautilya3 (talk) 17:38, 11 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]
From Srinath Raghavan:

Closely related to the boundary issue was the question of Tibet. During their rule in India the British had sought to maintain Tibet as a buffer state free of external influence, particularly Russian. They had only acknowledged China’s “suzerainty”—as opposed to sovereignty— over Tibet. In practice this meant that British India maintained direct diplomatic ties with Lhasa and enjoyed other privileges, such as trading rights and armed detachments, in Tibet.[1]

Independent India’s policy towards Tibet was under sporadic consideration even before the Chinese civil war ended.... The assumption that a strong Chinese government would seize Tibet and advance claims to the region below the McMahon Line appears to have been widely accepted.[4: See, for example, Embassy in Nanking to FO, 18 August 1948, FO 371/ 70043, TNA.][2]

The present day Chinese accusations that independent India wanted to continue the maintenance of Tibet as a "buffer state" are not corroborated by scholars. From Dorothy Woodman:

Nehru was convinced that China and India must remain on good terms and genuinely thought that the Chinese would clarify their relations with Tibet by peaceful means. He told a press conference in March 1950 that he did not want to interfere in Tibet, and Krishna Menon, his High Commissioner in London, told journalists that talks were going on 'in the hope of moderating Chinese action in Tibet' The Indian Government, he said, "fully recognised the validity of Chinese claims but wished simply to advise against precipitate action. He believed that China would listen when asked not to take a strictly legalistic view on India's recognition of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet.[3]

-- Kautilya3 (talk) 11:43, 18 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]


References

  1. ^ Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India (2010), p. 230.
  2. ^ Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India (2010), pp. 230–233.
  3. ^ Woodman, Himalayan Frontiers (1970), p. 217.

Vajpayee

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Wonder of the wonders that it was NDA that gave up the suzerainty policy. Was there any debate about this within India? China claims that "India recognised Tibet as a part of China", whatever that means.[1] What exactly did the joint declaration say? -- Kautilya3 (talk) 12:23, 18 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Powers & Templeton:

A treaty signed on 23 June 2003 by India and China that pledged both countries to peaceful and harmonious relations. In it India reasserted its policy of recognizing China’s sovereignty over Tibet. One paragraph states, “The Indian side recognizes that the Tibet Autonomous Region is part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China and reiterates that it does not allow Tibetans to engage in anti-China political activities in India.”[2]

To me, the quoted paragraph doesn't imply sovereignty or suzerainty or any other form of relationship. It is completely ambiguous. Nor does it imply any change in India's policy. Shivshankar Menon, who was the ambassador in Beijing at that time, says absolutely nothing about it in his book. It looks like "sovereignty" is the gloss some newspapers have come up with for it. BBC Zhonwen's gloss on it is a bit more accurate than either Indurthy or Powers & Templeton.
Pretty much all informed scholars use the term "country" to refer to Tibet. Tibetans are not regarded as "Chinese", nor are any Chinese regarded as "Tibetan". If China were to be treated as a "nation state", Tibet would not be a part of it. Being a part of its "territory" says no more than calling it "Chinese-administered". The keyword part was obviously inserted to appease the Chinese without really saying anything of substance. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 08:22, 19 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Made a few adjustments to the text on the basis of this. DTM (talk) 09:01, 3 March 2021 (UTC)[reply]

References

  1. ^ 帝国遗梦:中国印度的三段边境争议 (The Last Dream of an Empire: Three Border Disputes between China and India), BBC News Zhonwen, 27 May 2020: "India did not recognize Tibet as part of China for the first time until 2003."
  2. ^ Powers, John; Templeman, David (2012), Historical Dictionary of Tibet, Scarecrow Press, p. 184, ISBN 978-0-8108-7984-3