|WikiProject Philosophy||(Rated Start-class, High-importance)|
|WikiProject Linguistics||(Rated Start-class)|
'Geisteswissenschaften' is humanities or arts (in a university context) and not metaphysics. I'd strongly suggest that metaphysics is actually wrong. So the translation would be something like 'under the influence of the other humanities'. As the original poster invited people to correct her/his translation I did just that. There were some other mistakes that actually distorted the meaning of the original article. I also added a sentence at the end. -- valie 18:31, 6 Jun 2005 (UTC)
Edited to add: Actually when comparing withe original text I noticed that 'under the influence of the other humanities' is equally wrong as it should say something along the lines that the linguistic turn started with philosophy and under the influence of philosophy the other humanities also changed and started to consider language as a constitutive factor of reality. I hope my new translation actually says this. -- valie 20:13, 6 Jun 2005 (UTC)
This article is triumphalistic, does not reflect a neutral point of view and does not have any references. The basic issue here - a turn against realism about arbitrary universals - was the major philosophical trend of the middle ages - see the work William of Ockham for example. The idea that language *constitutes* reality is subjective idealism, which is hardly NPOV. 18.104.22.168 06:34, 2 October 2007 (UTC)
The article gives the impression that the linguistic turn is associated with the later Wittgenstein and the French post structuralists. This is certainly not the way Rorty and Gustav Bergmann use the word. They use it about the shift of focus in philosophy from mind and perception to analysis of language, a tendency that were prominent in Frege, Moore and Russell, and fully developed in the philosophy of the Vienna circle.
The late Wittgensteinian idea that that philosophical problems to a large extent stem from linguistic confusions, should be mentioned in the article, but not as the initiation of the linguistic turn.
I don’t think it is correct that all philosophers that focus on language are epistemological anti-realists. So the section about realism is confusing.
The definition of realism in the article looks like epistemological realism, while the article links to metaphysical realism.
Based on all these flaws and inaccuracies, I suggest that the whole article is rewritten.
- Agreed, Anonymous One. You've identified some important issues, so why not take a stab at expressing their resolution in the article? -- Rob C. alias Alarob 22:59, 10 July 2008 (UTC)
I don't think "Linguistic turn" should be part of a Wittgenstein series. The turn occurred long before Wittgenstein was active, and he is just one thinker affected by this turn. It's really like making "Capitalism" part of a Ronald Reagan series. Iairgo (talk) 20:39, 24 May 2013 (UTC)
"In the tradition of analytical philosophy, according to Michael Dummett the linguistic movement first took shape in Gottlob Frege's 1884 work The Foundations on Arithmetic, specifically paragraph 62 where Frege explores the identity of a numerical proposition[further explanation needed]. This concern for the logic of propositions and their relationship to "facts" was later taken up by the notable analytical philosopher Bertrand Russell in "On Denoting", and played a weighty role in his early work in Logical Atomism." doesn't quite hit the bullseye.
- In GdA para 62 Frege does not explore the identity of a numerical proposition, he sketches the program that exploring how two numerical propositions can express identical meanings is the way to developing a concept of "number", progressing to doing so in the subsequent paragraphs by first exploring the concept of "identity". Para 62 is otherwise noteworthy for containing one of the formulations of the context principle.
- Perhaps the original author intended to reference the context principle (since much is made out of this), and merely described the content of the para to give background. If so, the emphasis should be changed.
- The  reference contains no actual mention of para 62, nor, actually, of GdA, and should be stricken, or used to explain the Sense/Reference distinction. I have no access to , Dummett, but I suspect it would be useful to check it.
- Frege, IMO, does not so much express concern for the relationship between the logic of propositions and "facts" here, as he is concerned with the relationship of sign, signifying, and signified (nomenclature may vary).