Talk:Popper's three worlds

Penrose

Hmm, is this much the same as the three world view advanced by Roger Penrose in The Road to Reality and probably other books?

Penrose points out an interaction between world 1 and world 3 - that world 1 obeys physical laws which are objects of world 3. — Preceding unsigned comment added by ExtraBold (talk • contribs) at 23:56, 26 July 2005 (UTC)

Hmm, indeed. Let us assume Penrose's theory is as here suggested (without, unfortunately, any page reference or quotation in support, I found it difficult to check how this claim can be extracted from "The Road To Reality" - which is not to say it may not be in there somewhere in that big book, but I did not find relevant supporting material after looking, including consulting the index. For reasons explained below, I remain doubtful that a man as intelligent as Sir Roger Penrose is confused in the way here suggested - given the very basic confusion of thought in the claim "that world 1 obeys physical laws which are objects of world 3", as explained below).

If the above suggestion is right, however, then Penrose's view is not "much the same" but differs fundamentally and crucially in at least one major respect from Popper's theory i.e. part of Popper's theory is that there is no example of any direct interaction between any entity within World 1 and any entity within World 3.

To amplify this fundamental and crucial point:- Popper maintains there is no such direct interaction in either direction between World 1 and World 3

i.e.

(a) there is no example where (unmediated by World 2) an entity in World 1 has a direct causal affect on an entity in World 3;

(b) there is no example where (unmediated by World 2) an entity in World 3 has a direct causal affect on an entity in World 1.

We might then ask how Popper views a theory or thesis such as "world 1 obeys physical laws which are objects of world 3" - and the resulting claim that there is therefore direct interaction between World 1 and World 3 in these terms?

Popper's answer is that this claim rests on a confusion of categories - of the very sort his own theory avoids and helps avoid. There is a confusion of categories baked into the claim "that world 1 obeys physical laws which are objects of world 3". It is one thing, for Popper, to say that World 1 obeys physical laws - he agrees it does, and World 1 also obeys 'laws of nature' generally (i.e. physical, chemical and biological laws). But these 'laws of nature' - including 'physical laws' (or 'laws of physics') - belong to World 1 itself and are part of World 1 itself. So the obedience of World 1 to such laws does not involve any interaction with World 3 at all. And it is therefore quite another thing to claim that where World 1 'obeys' such 'laws of nature' it is obeying laws that are themselves entities within World 3. This last claim is clearly, at least for Popper, a confusion of categories.

In point of cosmological evolution, Popper's view is that World 2 and then World 3 only emerge from developments in life on earth (or perhaps, as might be the case, some World 1 equivalent elsewhere in the universe) - that is, World 2 only emerged after a series of particular developments in World 1, and World 3 only emerged after a series of particular developments in World 2. These World 1 developments include the emergence of a planet, like earth, that is neither too cold nor too hot for life to exist and evolve (bearing in mind many planets are either too cold or too hot for life), and where the planet has a mix of physical and chemical states and processes that can give rise to biological life and sustain its further evolution. That also means World 1 was obeying its own World 1 'natural laws' (or 'laws of nature') long before there was any World 2 or World 3 - whether these laws are laws of physics, chemistry or biology. It also means that World 3 plays no role in the direct effect of such World 1 structural laws on World 1.

The confusion arises perhaps from thinking that the "physical laws" which World 1 obeys "are objects of World 3" - they are not. What may be objects of World 3 are our theories as to the character of these "physical laws". Take the example of "e=mc2" ('2' meaning 'squared'). We may then distinguish Einstein's formulation of this law, his theory of it, from the physical law itself. In so far as this "e=mc2" is a "physical law" it is a law within World 1, and it exists within World 1 long before an Einstein struck on its formulation - in fact, it exists whether or not an Einstein ever discovers this 'law'.

It is the law as it exists within World 1 that World 1 'obeys' - World 1 does not 'obey' Einstein's formulation or theory as to the existence of such a law. In the light of this, we may see it is confused, and just invites further confusion, to claim "that world 1 obeys physical laws which are objects of world 3".

That, anyway, is how it looks in the light of Popper's theory. As indicated, it is unclear to me that Sir Roger Penrose is at all confused in the way claimed.

The conclusion, according to Popper's theory, is therefore as follows. Einstein's theory or linguistic formulation, "e=mc2", may be "an object of World 3" or a World 3 'object'. And this theory or formulation pertains to a "physical law" of that described character i.e. "e=mc2". But we should not confuse "e=mc2" as a formulated theory (which belongs within World 3) with "e=mc2" as a physical law (which exists within World 1). It is only "e=mc2" as a physical law within World 1 that is ever obeyed by World 1 - World 1 is not governed by, and does not 'obey', "e=mc2" when viewed as a formulated theory or object in World 3.

Once this confusion is understood and put aside, it becomes clear that the obedience of World 1 to its own structural laws is not a valid ground for arguing that there is direct interaction of any sort between World 1 and World 3.

Sadly, this confusion, attributed to Sir Roger Penrose in the first entry made in the talk pages and then offered as if some valid criticism of or alternative to Popper's theory, is only the first of many that have attended "Popper's three worlds". Any reader wanting a clear and accurate understanding of Popper's theory therefore should approach the truncated main entry (as it now stands after the January revert) with considerable caution. It is much shorter than the expanded entry before the revert, yet so full of unexplained abstractions that it may be barely comprehensible e.g. (1) how, for example, is a reader to understand what it means to say that "Popperian cosmology rejects this essentialism", and how therefore can a reader understand, from this highly abstract claim, how or why Popper opposes dualism in its Cartesian form? (2) how, for another example, is a reader to understand the highly abstract, unsourced and, in fact, inaccurate claim that "the intrinsic value of Hamlet as a world 3 object is embodied many times in world 1"?

My efforts during 2022 to expand and develop the main entry, in ways that removed and addressed various confusions and misunderstandings of Popper's theory, were almost entirely undone by the January revert. Anyone interested in these other confusions and misunderstandings is therefore advised to go further down into these talk pages to where the revert in January 2023 is called into question, and, if interested, to examine the reasons for calling the revert into question.

What I suggest they may find is this:- this entry, on a central plank of Popper's mature philosophy, was expanded greatly over the year 2022 - before some people's criticisms of lack of referenced sources led to a drastic revert in January 2023; unfortunately, however, this drastic revert replaced accurate, source-based information (in the "expanded" entry) with inaccurate information that is not source-based. The reverted, truncated entry also has fewer referenced sources than the expanded entry. In one striking case, the revert removed fully sourced and referenced material - a quotation from Popper himself - and reverted to an inaccurate and un-sourced version of his actual views.

Any reader of the entry as it now stands 23rd May 2023 should, I feel, be forewarned or cautioned about all this. It is not obvious from the entry itself. The administrators responsible for effecting such a drastic revert have not sought to explain or justify it terms or scope - or its paradoxical effect of replacing accurate source-based information with inaccurate and un-sourced. No administrator has stepped forward, for example, to explain or justify the revert in respect of it removing fully sourced and referenced material - a quotation from Popper himself - and reverting to an inaccurate and un-sourced version of his actual views ("meta-object").

Only by careful reading of the talk pages might a current reader learn that the expanded entry had been read, without stated objection to its accuracy, by a renowned scholar and expert on Popper's work. Yet, despite the January revert being followed up by a call-out for an "expert" to help, no "expert" has heeded the administrators' call - so the reverted entry does not appear to have passed muster with any expert in anything like the same way as the expanded entry.

The entry was expanded over 2022 partly to avoid confusions and misunderstandings such as the one in the claim "that world 1 obeys physical laws which are objects of world 3". But the revert has ensured that a confused, misleading, inaccurate and very limited understanding of Popper's theory is now back in full swing. A short list of such confusions is now given, with a short explanation of the confusion given in parentheses after each claim taken from the main entry as it stands 23rd May 2023:

(1) "The world 3 objects are embodied in world 1" (no - only some are ever "embodied", and never "embodied" by entering into or being "in" World 1, but instead by having an "embodied" World 1 vehicle - however, it is only the World 1 vehicle that is strictly speaking "embodied" and not the World 3 content conveyed by it, and the World 3 content is only conveyed by that vehicle for as long as that vehicle lasts or exists as its vehicle within World 1).

(2) "...the intrinsic value of Hamlet as a world 3 object is embodied many times in world 1" (no - Hamlet as a World 3 object should not be confused with its "intrinsic value" or with any form of "intrinsic value", and, more generally, its content should not be confused with its "value" [in Popper's philosophy, questions of content and of value are kept crucially distinct, and Popper does not subscribe to any theory of "intrinsic value"]; and while Hamlet may be "embodied" many times in the form of an edition of the play or a performance, its World 3 content is not embodied "in world 1" but instead is conveyed by way of World 1 vehicles).

(3) "this representation of an object of world 3 in world 1" (no - World 1 only provides vehicles for conveying World 3 content or objects, but those World 3 contents and objects are not ever "in world 1" - for this very reason, Popper uses the terminology of "World 3.1" objects to denote, for example, a book or artistic performance where World 1 states and processes may be used to convey World 3 content, but without that World 3 content 'becoming part of' or 'entering into' World 1).

[The points at (1), (2) and (3) are addressed in more depth below on these talk pages, in reply to Dominic Mayers, where I explain that it is only in a very stretched and loose sense that we can say that World 3 content is "embodied in" World 1 objects, or states or processes. A key aspect of Popper's theory is that World 3 content always retains its World 3 character, and that World 3 content is never converted into World 1 or World 2 content (in Popper's theory, each "World" may provide vehicles for content belonging to another of the "Worlds", but, crucially, without that content becoming changed or converted into the "World" of its vehicle). Its World 3 character is as a form of permanently abstract content. That permanently abstract World 3 content may be conveyed, sometimes, by way of World 1 vehicles - but it never as such becomes "embodied" or becomes, in a literal sense, "embodied in" its World 1 vehicle. An example might be the proposition "Snow is white": its World 3 content is not literally "embodied in" the World 1 symbolism used to convey it but may remain invariant even if we alter the World 1 symbolism in some way, say by increasing the font size or by changing to another language e.g. "Schnee ist weiss". This point is of fundamental importance to correct understanding of Popper's theory (and is no mere "straw man" or exercise in pedantry, contrary to what is suggested elsewhere on this talk page):- this point is crucial, for example, to Popper's account of how we engage with World 3 content. In Popper's account, it is not the sensory or cognitive systems that detect World 1 phenomena that give access to World 3 content (though such systems may provide a necessary underlay to accessing World 3 content, they are not sufficient for accessing it). Instead World 3 content is a kind of abstract content that can only be accessed by a sufficiently developed World 2 mind - one attuned to detecting and handling such content, especially by way of language (including both natural and mathematical language). That is why, Popper argues, only humans can access World 3 content. World 3 content is 'invisible' to, or undetectable by, other animals - even though many such animals have an elaborate and highly developed sensory and cognitive apparatus for detecting and 'handling' and 'navigating' World 1 objects, states and processes.]

(4) "Popperian cosmology rejects this essentialism" (no and no: yes Popper rejects "essentialism" but, no, he does not primarily do so on cosmological grounds or do so by offering a "Popperian cosmology"; and no again - his rejection of Cartesian dualism is not based on its essentialism (regarding mind and matter) but on its untenable theory that an immaterial mind can effect material push on brain matter).

(5) World 3 "corresponds to the current state of our knowledge and culture" (no, not in any precise way - in fact, only some of World 3 is part of current knowledge or culture: (a) by making clear he accepts there is a World 3 beyond those World 3 contents grasped by human minds or "embodied" by way of World 1 vehicles - a World 3.3, as might be called, that is not part of current knowledge or culture in any meaningful sense - Popper makes clear he does not identify World 3 with "the current state of our knowledge and culture" - rather his "World 3" transcends, or is greater than, whatever may be prevalent or current in terms of knowledge or culture; moreover, (b), there may be undiscovered artefacts that are not part of "the current state of our knowledge and culture" - as the Rosetta Stone once was - that are nevertheless vehicles for discoverable World 3 content, and where their World 3 content exists in World 3 though it is not part of "the current state of our knowledge and culture"; equally, there may be artefacts that have been forgotten, discarded or overlooked in terms of "the current state of our knowledge and culture" but where their World 3 content continues to exist in World 3).

These confusions were cleared up by the much more comprehensive and accurate account of "Popper's three worlds" that was given by the expanded entry before it was reverted (see archived history, with the expanded entry at 5th January 2023).

DM — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2A00:23C6:D119:F101:4043:A6D2:627:FA8C (talk) 16:00, 23 May 2023 (UTC)

I wish you would focus on what the article can become. If you focus on what the article can become, the starting point, whether it is the actual or the reverted version, is not that important, especially given that the content is still there in the history and one can easily do paste-and-cut while adding precise references for the reinserted material. I did not do the revert, but I agree with that decision because it seems easier to start with the shorter version. An even better starting point could be an empty page. Regarding your criticism of the current version, much of it is straw man arguments. For example, you wrote

"the intrinsic value of Hamlet as a world 3 object is embodied many times in world 1" (no - Hamlet as a World 3 object should not be confused with its "intrinsic value" or with any form of "intrinsic value; and while Hamlet may be "embodied" many times in the form of an edition of the play or a performance, its content is not embodied "in world 1" but instead is conveyed by way of World 1 vehicles).

But, in the criticized sentence "the intrinsic value of Hamlet as a world 3 object" belongs in one category and "world 1" contains objects of a different category. Therefore, the criticized sentence could not meaningfully be interpreted to mean that a world 3 object can belong in world 1. You criticized what the sentence could not possibly mean and was not intended to mean—this is what I call a straw man argument. Note that Popper wrote

Hamlet is embodied in all those physical volumes that contain an edition of Hamlet; and in a different way, it is also embodied or physically realized in each performance by a theatrical company.

— Popper, Three worlds, Tanner Lecture, 1978

The Hamlet that is being embodied is the Hamlet in world 3. It would be wrong or at the least pointless to say that a physical book Hamlet in world 1 is embodied in World 1. But, accept my apology to argue about this, because how much of the current version is correct or wrong is not that important. What is important is what the article can become by only having content that can be verified using precise references. It's a lot of work. It's not at all as when we write for a specialized journal or another encyclopedia. Every point that is made in the article must come with precise references where we can see this exact point being made by the sources in an appropriate context. This is not something natural at all for an expert that is used to write his own books or for journals. Dominic Mayers (talk) 18:06, 23 May 2023 (UTC)

Dominic’s final paragraph:- “But, accept my apology to argue about this, because how much of the current version is correct or wrong is not that important.” But it is important – important enough that most of his post is taken up with it. Dominic essentially argues the main entry is correct as it stands (though maybe capable of improvement), and that my detailed criticisms are “Much...straw man arguments”, based on completely unreasonable interpretations of words. Then Dominic ‘apologizes’ as if this is “not that important” (an odd self-defeating claim; much like “An even better starting point”, than the revert or expanded entry before the revert, “could be an empty page.”). Dominic’s latest post is not his first that clearly presents a challenge – somewhat superior-sounding, to my ears anyway, and certainly dismissive – to the worth of my posts on this talk page (and other pages) in relation to the revert. By alleging an “empty page” might be preferable, it also challenges the worth of the expanded entry. This reply looks into those challenges, especially the alleged “Much...straw man arguments”.

Dominic starts with an advantage because it typically takes longer to refute allegations than make them (as the history of trumped-up charges proves). Also unfortunately, some repetition becomes unavoidable when presenting different material and arguments that (repeatedly) demonstrate the same underlying but vital point i.e. that it is only in a quite specialised and somewhat peculiar sense that we can speak of World 3 content as at all “embodied in” World 1 objects, and that, strictly speaking, World 3 content itself is never as such “embodied” and so is never as such “embodied in” World 1. Fortunately, serious readers or contributors (or the ‘called-for’ “expert”) might nevertheless be interested – because the underlying issues are crucial to understanding Popper’s theory. Dominic and I differ on what it’s accurate or fair to say about Popper’s theory – unavoidably then, this post goes into why his various points are not fair or accurate. Dominic wants us to accept the ‘revert’ as an accomplished fact:- but should we ‘move on’ when it means accepting what is false and inaccurate and misleading? What ‘moving on’ would mean is that those responsible would no longer need to justify the drastic revert on its merits i.e. it means, for them, avoiding taking proper responsibility for their actions. But those responsible should not just be shrugging and walking away from the fact that, after the revert, half the sentences in the last four sections were inaccurate – as detailed elsewhere. The revert achieved a rare feat, at least for a competent editor:- a marked decrease in the amount of accurate information together with a marked increase in the amount of inaccurate information.

Some key differences between myself and Dominic arise over the natural and ordinary meaning of words, especially sentences using the expression “embodied in” – and what these words likely convey to the general reader. The gist of my view on “embodied in” is this. When a cowboy is conveyed by a horse we say he rode “on” a horse or travelled “by” horse:- for very good reason, we do not say he travelled “in” or was ever “in” a horse, or that he became ‘horsified’ or subject to ‘horsification’, or that he became or was “embodied in” a horse. It’s similarly misleading, even false, to describe permanently unembodied ‘abstract’ World 3 objects or contents, when conveyed by World 1 objects or states or processes, as having become “embodied in world 1” – and then just leave it at that. Though Popper sometimes uses the words “embodied in”, Popper’s broader discussion and elaboration show this is only in a very stretched and also loose sense of “embodied in”. Popper likely says “embodied in” to convey how World 3 objects are ‘reflected’ by constructs in our material world but Popper’s actual theory is that World 3 content always retains its World 3 character, and that World 3 content itself never as such becomes “embodied in” or within World 1. But there is no discussion or elaboration in the reverted entry, or in Dominic’s posts, which counteracts the misleading (even false) character of their unqualified use of “embodied in” and similar wording – wording only deployed by Popper in a highly specialized and somewhat artificial sense. As detailed below, this is no “straw man” point but is crucial to correct understanding of Popper’s theory.

My recent reply to the first post on this talk page, above, did not begin addressing the reverted entry but mostly addressed a point that Dominic’s reply entirely avoids – therefore not making clear whether he specifically alleges this is also just another “straw man”. The point centres on where “physical laws” belong within Popper’s three worlds? In Popper’s view “physical laws”, like a law of gravity, are not “embodied” – though, as with gravity, they can affect the behaviour of “embodied” objects – large like stars, planets and moons, or smaller like volcanoes, oceans and animals. Physical laws are therefore more ‘abstract’ in character than concretely “embodied” material objects. Perhaps that ‘abstractness’ makes it plausible to say they belong to an abstract World-3-type dimension? E.g. It is possible to conceive the universe as subject to different types of ‘abstract’ laws (logical, mathematical, physical etc.), with these ‘laws’ constituting the underlying structural rules or ground plan of the “embodied” World 1 yet inhabiting a separate ‘abstract’ World 3-type realm. Such a view, though, would be inaccurate and confused in terms of correct understanding of Popper’s theory of the three worlds, which is what concerns us here. The confusion was expressed by the following sentence:- “Penrose points out an interaction between world 1 and world 3 - that world 1 obeys physical laws which are objects of world 3.” Rephrased, this sentence claims as follows:- that the “physical laws” that govern World 1 “are objects of world 3”, and – these “laws” being in World 3 – that means the effect of these laws on World 1 is a direct effect of World 3 on World 1, and so constitutes a direct “interaction” of World 3 and World 1 (unmediated by World 2). In short, the error in this reasoning is treating an ‘object’ that, in Popper’s theory, only exists within World 1 (i.e. those ‘laws of nature’ or ‘universal laws’ that govern the behaviour of World 1) as if these laws are “in” World 3 instead. The point is important because it shows this is not a valid counter-example to Popper’s thesis that there is only direct interaction between World 1 and World 2 and between World 2 and World 3 i.e. there is no direct interaction between World 1 and World 3.

That this last point is Popper’s thesis is something on which the expanded entry and reverted entry do agree. The reverted entry puts it in two footnotes, 8&9, quoting Eccles then Popper. Below Popper is quoted making this claim in an expanded form at p.47 “The Self and Its Brain”. But before moving on to Dominic’s challenges, this point, and what Popper writes about it, perhaps illustrates two important things that are not well reflected in Dominic’s posts:- (1) it’s generally wrong to dismiss other, different opinions as “straw man arguments” rather than as reflecting disagreement on points of substance (e.g. my ‘rebuttal’ of the first talk post, above, does not allege it presents a “straw man argument”; in fact, it is indicated above how the ‘abstract’ unembodied character of “physical laws” might incline us to say these belong in a type of ‘abstract’ World 3; and Popper’s thesis is one of substance and not a “straw man”, so it can hardly be a “straw man” to explain why the first post misunderstands Popper’s theory and so does not provide a valid counter-example to his thesis); (2) it’s wrong to approach issues dogmatically or with undue certainty (my ‘rebuttal’ is that “physical laws” are not in World 3 in terms of Popper’s theory, about which we can be fairly certain, rather than proving for certain that we could not conceive of “physical laws” as belonging to some other theory of a World 3).

Whatever position eventually adopted, such discussions help ‘move on’ from thinking of reality in narrow materialist terms, given “physical laws” are not “matter” or “embodied”. A main reason for expanding the entry was to develop a related theme central to understanding and assessing Popper’s theory:- though “World 3” might look a somewhat strange, startling, counter-intuitive concept at first, it may look much less so, relatively, when we move beyond superficial assumptions about “World 1” (e.g. that it’s ‘mechanically clockwork’ in character) or “World 2” (e.g. that it obeys iron laws of ‘inductive reasoning’ or ‘association’) to understand these Worlds’ own strange, startling (e.g. counter-intuitive) and partly unfathomable character. For example, Popper argues World 1-World 2 interaction, and World 2-World 3 interaction, might seem very difficult to understand until we reflect how it is “very difficult to understand interaction within one world” (e.g. within World 1, or within World 2), and so “there is apparently not much greater difficulty in understanding interaction between two worlds than interaction within one world” [“The Self and Its Brain”, p.486].

Indicating how Popper’s philosophy is not written in a spirit of know-it-all dogmatism, there is a 1972 lecture, published as “Notes of a realist on the body-mind problem” in “All Life Is Problem Solving” Ch.2, where Popper seems to countenance the possibility of direct interaction of World 3 and World 1:- “I now claim that scientific theories, which belong to World 3, can have a direct or indirect effect upon the things of World 1.” Though on the same page (p.26), Popper edges towards what elsewhere is his firm thesis that World 3 only affects World 1 indirectly:- “Perhaps it is not only mostly but always the case that World 3 affects World 1 not directly but only via World 2” [Popper’s emphasis]. The view presented in the expanded entry is that Popper’s firmer thesis, that World 3 affects World 1 ‘only indirectly’ (i.e. “via World 2”), was embedded in his published philosophy (e.g. “The Self and Its Brain” [1977]) – p.47, “World 3 objects have an effect on World 1 only through human intervention, the intervention of their makers; more especially, through being grasped, which is a World 2 process, a mental process, or more precisely, a process in which World 2 and World 3 interact.” [Bold added.] What that 1972 lecture shows is how undogmatic Popper can be about certain arguable possibilities – and this is reflected elsewhere, for example where Popper accepts we could conceivably place certain entities in a notional World 4 or World 5. If ‘direct interaction’ between World 3 and World 1 were ever realized, it might arise from developments in artificial intelligence or machine learning – enabling World 3 content to be processed ‘intelligently’ by World 1 machines without any World 2 (perhaps in a parallel development to those machines that now help disabled persons move according to their ‘thoughts’ [though these work crucially via conscious brain activity]). Nevertheless such direct interaction would not ever arise from the effect of “physical laws” because, in Popper’s theory, these “physical laws” belong in or within World 1 itself and not in his World 3 – only the “scientific theories” describing such physical laws belong in World 3. So while the abstractness of “physical laws”, as with the relative ‘abstractness’ of gravity compared to material bodies, might incline some to consider these as belonging to an ‘abstract’ World 3, this is not Popper’s view and does not fit his schema of how World 2 evolved from World 1 and World 3 from World 2. As Popper’s ‘only indirectly’ thesis became embedded in his thinking, so did his view that machines could not process ‘intelligently’ or grasp World 3 content as such, and that ‘intelligent’ processing of World 3 content could only be by humans – or by way of the construction or creation of entities or beings that had similar characteristics of biological life and of active consciousness i.e. a form of “World 2” (see “The Self and Its Brain” pp.207-208). The following from Popper’s Schilpp Volume 2, p.1077, expresses the gist of Popper’s view on computers (summarised by points in the last section of the expanded entry), which no doubt reflects Popper’s attitude towards so-called ‘machine learning’ and ‘artificial intelligence’:- “Einstein once said, “My pencil is more intelligent than I”, meaning that armed with pencil and paper he obtained some results which he did not foresee. This is, I suppose, why he used pencil and paper. We use computers because they can do more than we can do without them, and more quickly. Otherwise, we should not spend enormous sums of money on them. In my view, a computer is nothing but a glorified pencil.” [Bold added.] In this vein, we might say that a computer-controlled pencil programmed to simulate an intelligent action, like sketching a ‘Mona Lisa’, is still an unintelligent pencil – it is its programme that simulates intelligent action, but the simulated intelligence owes to its programme, and the programme’s simulation of intelligent behaviour depends on the genuine intelligence of the human programmer.

Whatever anyone’s opinion on these issues, I suggest nothing in the above can be fairly dismissed as “straw man arguments”. I also suggest that further examination of the issues below does not rest on “straw man arguments”, and Dominic’s dismissive term would again be neither fair nor accurate.

Though Dominic alleges that “Much of it is straw man arguments” (meaning my criticisms of the content of the current main entry as reverted), he gives only a single example in support. This single example (“embodied in”) is examined in detail below, to show it is far from a “straw man”. It may become apparent, though, that the underlying substantive issues are not entirely easy or straightforward; and the interpretation issues are not entirely easy, because Popper’s meaning arises from his broader elaboration and discussion, not because it is clear and obvious from his every sentence taken in isolation.

Because he gives only one example, it is hard to discern the basis for Dominic’s generalised “Much...straw man” allegation. Addressing such an unsupported generalisation could become like nailing jelly to a plate. Ironically, Dominic elsewhere suggests it would help to take matters in clear point-by-point fashion:- but surely it undermines clear ‘point-by-point’ analysis to resort to broad brush dismissal of points as “straw man arguments”, without ‘point-by-point’ explaining of the basis for this? For example, is Dominic claiming – despite the material from Popper (quoted elsewhere on this talk page) that shows Popper expressly does not oppose Cartesian dualism because of its “essentialism” – that my objections, to “Popperian cosmology opposes this essentialism” in the reverted entry, are nevertheless just “straw man arguments”? In which case, it would seem even the clearest of words from Karl Popper won’t put off Dominic from alleging that what we have is just a “straw man argument”, and Popper himself must be indulging in “straw man arguments” when he goes to the bother of making clear that its “essentialism” is not why he opposes Cartesian dualism. My view on who is really using “straw man arguments” here seems very different to Dominic’s:- for example, whoever put “Popperian cosmology opposes this essentialism” in the reverted entry (for all I know it was Dominic) is offering a “straw man argument” – “straw man” because it goes directly against what Popper has clearly expressed in his writings as his actual arguments against Cartesian dualism. In talk pages, below, I tried to give a succinct set of points that explain why “essentialism” is (to use the term Dominic uses) a “straw man” in terms of understanding why Popper opposes the Cartesian version of mind-body dualism:- the crux of Popper’s actual argument is that Descartes’ resultant theory of causation (admittedly derived from his “essentialism”, as Popper explains) is untenable, because it posits an “immaterial” mind being able to materially ‘push’ on brain matter. The expanded entry detailed many more points to better explain both similarities and differences between Popper and Descartes. But rather than challenge this detailed work on its merits, Dominic resorts to a facile, unsupported general allegation that “Much of it is straw man arguments.”

In similar fashion, Dominic fails to make clear whether he includes my reply above, to the claim “that world 1 obeys physical laws which are objects of world 3”, within his general allegation of “straw man arguments”. But clearly this is not a “straw man” – far from it:- because the post in question clearly and unequivocally moves from the claim “that world 1 obeys physical laws which are objects of world 3” to the explicit conclusion that this is an example of World 3 directly interacting with World 1 (thus, it is suggested, disproving Popper’s ‘only indirectly’ thesis) – and it does so on the assumption that the relevant physical laws which govern World 1 “are objects of world 3” in the sense that these same “physical laws” exist in World 3. So this is not my confusion or misrepresentation and is not any “straw man” either:- it is an actual confusion or error given the indisputable meaning of the first post on this talk page. Or, to be more circumspect, it is a confusion or error in terms of Popper’s theory of the three worlds – because Popper’s theory (which may not be the same as Penrose’s for example) is that theories or formulations of universal laws may be “objects of World 3” but the relevant universal laws that govern World 1 are themselves always ‘objects’ or entities within World 1 itself.

How does such a fundamental error or confusion arise? Partly, I suggest, it arises because of a fatal ambiguity or shift in meaning in the seemingly simple phrase “that world 1 obeys physical laws which are objects of world 3”. The fatal ambiguity or shift in meaning is because the ‘objects’ which are the “physical laws” that World 1 does ‘obey’ are not “objects of world 3” – but the phrase makes it sound like they are, by packing them together in a compound expression.

Let’s now consider someone who gets indignant at this, as Dominic appears to get, and asserts, like Dominic, that no one could ever reasonably interpret the phrase that way i.e. to mean that the “physical laws”, as they govern World 1, are themselves “objects of world 3”. Why? Perhaps because they consider such a view wrong or absurd, or certainly wrong in terms of Popper’s theory? So they indignantly claim that no reasonable person would ever make the mistake of thinking that “physical laws” exist in abstract World 3. But clearly they would be wrong, and the first post on this talk page shows it – because that post makes exactly this claim. This is clear from how it moves from the phrase “that world 1 obeys physical laws which are objects of world 3” to the conclusion that this is an example of World 3 (directly) interacting with World 1. That is, by the following sentence that states that conclusion and then gives the phrase as the (sole) ground for it:- “Penrose points out an interaction between world 1 and world 3 - that world 1 obeys physical laws which are objects of world 3.” Those words were posted back in 2005. Yet despite not being reluctant to allege that my points are mere “straw man arguments” that twist the meaning of words, since 2005 Dominic hasn’t challenged this post’s use of the phrase “world 1 obeys physical laws which are objects of world 3”, or accused this contributor of setting up a “straw man”, or told this contributor they are basing their view on a ridiculous, confused or completely unreasonable interpretation of what it means to say “world 1 obeys physical laws which are objects of world 3”. In fact, in his recent post Dominic ducks the issues entirely – perhaps because they can’t be dismissed as “straw man arguments”?

That first post is clearly not putting an unreasonable interpretation on the phrase “world 1 obeys physical laws which are objects of world 3” – that phrase is clear enough in both its grammar and meaning. The obvious meaning of this phrase is precisely that it is claiming that the “physical laws”, of the sort World 1 ‘obeys’, “are objects of world 3”. That’s what it says. And this meaning is clearly how the first post treats those words. The fact the words are inaccurate, at least as an understanding of Popper’s theory, does not change their plain and obvious meaning.

I suggest there is a clear parallel between the slipperiness of the phrase “world 1 obeys physical laws which are objects of world 3” and the slipperiness of the phrase "the intrinsic value of Hamlet as a world 3 object is embodied many times in world 1”. The clear and obvious meaning of the first phrase is that “physical laws….are objects of world 3” (and that is shown by how the first post treats it, above); and I suggest the clear and obvious meaning of the second phrase is that “the intrinsic value of Hamlet...is embodied...in world 1.” We might say each phrase, given this interpretation, is making a parallel mistake, at least as far as Popper’s theory goes – one is wrongly categorising a World 1 ‘object’ (“physical laws”) as if these belong in World 3; the other is categorising a World 3 ‘object’ (“Hamlet” as a World 3 object, or its “intrinsic value”) as if these belong “in world 1.” Just because these phrases, so interpreted, show a fundamental misunderstanding of Popper’s theory, doesn’t change their ordinary and natural meaning. Meaning is not the same as truth. Meaning comes from interpretation, especially a reasonable view of the natural and ordinary meaning of words used, in the way they are used. It is precisely because those phrases are slippery, and liable to give rise to fundamental misunderstandings, that they merit careful criticism. It is unhelpful to dismiss careful criticism of their slippery and misleading character as mere “straw man arguments”, when those words are liable to confuse and mislead.

My drawing a parallel between these two slippery phrases is borne out by Dominic himself, because his reply reflects the confused and inaccurate understanding conveyed by the second slippery phrase. In one breath, as it were, Dominic asserts it would be completely unreasonable to think “a world 3 object can belong in world 1”, but in the next breath, as it were, he goes on to say “The Hamlet that is being embodied is the Hamlet in world 3.” So which is it? Since “being embodied” involves being in World 1 (i.e. something can only be “embodied” in World 1) then if the “Hamlet in world 3” is “being embodied” then the “Hamlet in world 3” must therefore be “embodied” in World 1 – in which case it must be the case that “a world 3 object can belong in world 1”, despite Dominic telling us this is ridiculous just sentences before. Dominic may think he has a clear understanding but plainly there is a problem here, and an apparent contradiction in what Dominic writes. The short answer – and the way out of Dominic’s confused account – is that Dominic is wrong to claim “The Hamlet that is being embodied is the Hamlet in world 3.” This claim may sound simple, just like “world 1 obeys physical laws which are objects of world 3” sounds simple, but both claims contain within them a confusion of categories. The key is to understand that “Hamlet” (like “physical laws”) is not a unitary ‘object’ for all purposes but may denote different kinds and categories of ‘object’ or content depending what we are talking about. The “Hamlet” that is “embodied” is never the “Hamlet in world 3” but is instead a physical object that conveys unembodied abstract content – where that unembodied, abstract content reflects or expresses the “Hamlet in world 3”. In this correct account, the “Hamlet in world 3” is itself never “embodied” as such but remains unembodied ‘abstract’ content - only the physical object that conveys “Hamlet in world 3” is “embodied”. This is no “straw man argument”, I suggest, but absolutely fundamental to correct understanding of Popper’s theory.

An example of why it is fundamental – not a “straw man” – is because the “unembodied” character of World 3 content is central to Popper’s account of how we “grasp” or understand such content (see e.g. “The Self and Its Brain”, “P2.12 Unembodied World 3 Objects”, “P2.13 Grasping a World 3 Object”, and “P2.14 The Reality of Unembodied World 3 Objects”, pp.41-47). Its “unembodied” character is central to many other implications of Popper’s World 3 (see e.g. Popper’s reply “21. Eccles on World 3 and the Mind-Brain Liaison”, Popper’s Schilpp Volume 2, pp.-1049-1053]. It is central to Popper’s view that the specific World 1 characteristics of the material embodiment may play little or no role in our grasping of the relevant World 3 content:- e.g. p.46 TSAIB, “Both these theories and their logical relations are World 3 objects, and in general it makes no difference, neither to their character as World 3 objects nor to our grasp of them, whether or not these objects are embodied.” That is because their intelligibility is not based on their “embodied” World 1 character but on their World 3 ‘abstract’ character – much as the intelligible content of “Snow is white” is the same whether we physically alter the font or change the language to “Schnee ist weiss”. By “Unembodied World 3 Objects” Popper here means objects in his “World 3.3” sense:- where the content is World 3 content that (as yet) only has World 3 as its ‘vehicle’ i.e. that has as yet acquired no World 1 ‘vehicle’ (unlike “World 3.1” content) and no mental ‘vehicle’ (unlike “World 3.2” content). But it becomes clear from Popper’s discussion that when we “grasp” World 3 content we are always ‘grasping’ something that exists in World 3 and not something that exists in World 1 or in World 2, and that what we are grasping is, in this fundamental sense, always “unembodied” – it is just its World 1 vehicles that may be “embodied”. That is why “in general it makes no difference, neither to their character as World 3 objects nor to our grasp of them, whether or not these objects are embodied.” [Bold added.]

Admittedly, the kind of fundamental ‘category’ issue being discussed does not usually raise issues for us. In ordinary speech we often speak of an ‘object’ without being explicit about which kind or category of ‘object’ we mean ‘metaphysically’ or in terms of the three worlds. Normally this does not create confusion or much of a problem. If someone says “Parliament has been dissolved”, we immediately think it is “Parliament” as an institution (in a “World 3” sense) that has ‘dissolved’ and not that “Parliament” as buildings (in “World 1”) has ‘dissolved’ (it might be different if ‘acid rain’ had become a menace capable of dissolving buildings). If someone says “Parliament has burnt down”, we immediately think of the relevant World 1 buildings burning down and do not think the World 3 institution of Parliament has burnt down. But a newspaper headline “Parliament’s Destruction!” might leave us in two minds whether it refers to the World 3 or World 1 sense of “Parliament”. Should someone ask me to return their copy of “Hamlet” both they and I may well understand, without any metaphysical or three worlds’ discussion, that I am being asked to return a physical object – and they won’t be satisfied if I just recite “Hamlet in world 3” back to them. If we discuss differences in content between versions of Shakespeare plays in different folios, we are likely discussing their differences “in world 3” terms, and not mere physical differences between folios. The “Hamlet” that becomes ‘dog-eared’, or scribbled over, or where the print fades, or where pages go missing, is never the “Hamlet in world 3” – it is the “Hamlet” that is a physical object which conveys the World 3 “Hamlet”. Conversely, the “Hamlet” that stays invariant through many different physical editions is not an “embodied” “Hamlet” but is the abstract, unembodied “Hamlet in world 3”. Dominic may say he knows all this, and may be he does. But Dominic’s bald statement that “The Hamlet that is being embodied is the Hamlet in world 3” is just as confused and misleading and false (in its ordinary and natural meaning) as the claim “world 1 obeys physical laws which are objects of world 3”. The truth (at least according to correct understanding of Popper’s theory) is (1) that the only “Hamlet” that is “embodied” is the World 1 object (or state or process) that conveys the World 3 “Hamlet” and (2) that the “Hamlet in world 3” is a form of permanently abstract unembodied content that is never itself “embodied”.

Perhaps because of this confusion, Dominic appears to take a very different view of the phrase “the intrinsic value of Hamlet...is embodied...in world 1”:- and he asserts, this “criticized sentence could not meaningfully be interpreted to mean that a world 3 object can belong in world 1”. Really? It couldn’t? Of course it could. Because, on the face of it, that is exactly what it’s saying – it is saying “the intrinsic value of Hamlet...is embodied...in world 1” (bold and emphasis added). Plain as day. And this ‘plain as day’ interpretation is encapsulated when Dominic himself similarly writes, “The Hamlet that is being embodied is the Hamlet in world 3”. It’s no good trying to get out of this by saying this ‘doesn’t really’ (or, as Dominic boldly asserts, “could not”) literally mean what it says i.e. that “the Hamlet in world 3...is being embodied” – that it instead means only that the physical object is “embodied” which conveys the permanently abstract, unembodied “World 3” content of Hamlet. Because the natural, ordinary meaning of the words used is that it literally “could” and indeed does happen that the “World 3” content of Hamlet/ “the Hamlet in world 3” becomes itself “embodied”.

This flaw is compounded by the preceding sentence, so that the reverted entry more fully reads:- “The world 3 objects are embodied in world 1. For example, the intrinsic value of Hamlet as a world 3 object is embodied many times in world 1.” That preceding sentence is expressed without any qualification – accordingly, it might appear to assert all “The world 3 objects are embodied in world 1”, and permanently (otherwise why not write “Some...for a time” or “Only some World 3 objects are...for a time”?; would we accept similar unqualified claims in other Wikipedia entries though the claim is true only of “some” not “all”? e.g. “The Winter Olympics are held every four years in Canada.”). Without qualification, this general statement is contrary to Popper’s actual theory, which is that only some World 3 objects acquire a World 1 ‘vehicle’, and then only for the time that ‘vehicle’ continues to exist in World 1. The categorical-sounding assertion, “The world 3 objects are embodied in world 1”, therefore could be easily viewed as saying it is “intrinsic” to World 3 ‘objects’ that they are permanently “embodied”. And this reading might be reinforced by the next claim which suggests their “intrinsic value...is embodied many times in world 1” (e.g. with every World 1 expression of “Hamlet”). The combination of these two sentences is therefore liable to give the distinct impression (to anyone not otherwise “expert” enough in Popper’s theory to know better) that it is “intrinsic” to World 3 ‘objects’ that they are permanently “embodied”. It plays into the hands of the mistaken view that Popper’s theory is that World 3 and World 1 content is somehow conflated in material objects. It helps not a jot that there is not a dicky bird in the reverted entry about what Popper calls “Unembodied World 3 Objects”, “Grasping a World 3 Object”, and “The Reality of Unembodied World 3 Objects”(see “The Self and Its Brain”, “P2.12 Unembodied World 3 Objects”, “P2.13 Grasping a World 3 Object”, and “P2.14 The Reality of Unembodied World 3 Objects”, pp.41-47). Therefore it could hardly be guessed or imagined, just by reading the reverted entry or Dominic’s posts, that each of these link together as vital parts of Popper’s overall theory.

The natural meanings of “The Hamlet that is being embodied is the Hamlet in world 3” and of “the intrinsic value of Hamlet...is embodied...in world 1” are not altered or modified by any subsequent discussion or elaboration. This it very different to where Popper uses words, especially “embodied in”, that that might sound similar in meaning but where his further discussion and elaboration makes clear their actual sense. For example, Popper writes (“The Self and Its Brain”, p.41), “Many World 3 objects like books or new synthetic medicines or computers or aircraft are embodied in World 1 objects: they are material artefacts, they belong to both World 3 and World 1.” Taken in isolation Popper’s statement might be read in at least three ways, each way representing a distinct and incompatible ‘theory’ of how World 3 content is “embodied in” World 1:- as saying (1) the self-same “content” (e.g. of what constitutes an aircraft) is (somehow) both “World 3 and World 1” content at the same time, and therefore simultaneously “belong(s) to both World 3 and World 1” in this sense (i.e. the self-same content of an object, say an aircraft, is simultaneously both World 1 and World 3 content – within, as some philosophers might say, the same ‘logical space’ or ‘metaphysical space’); (2) that World 3 content can be “embodied” in the sense of ‘converted into’ World 1 content, and the result of this conversion “belong(s) to both World 3 and World 1” in this sense; (3) that World 1 provides ‘vehicles’ for World 3 content in objects that are a ‘hybrid’ or combination of World 1 and World 3 content, but in such ‘objects’ the relevant World 1 and World 3 content always remains in its own distinct category:- it is in that sense that such ‘objects’ or artefacts “belong to both World 3 and World 1”, while the object’s two distinct categories of content always belong, respectively, in World 1 and World 3; and, in this sense of permanently distinct categories, the World 3 content itself remains permanently “unembodied” as such – and only becomes “embodied” in the stretched and artificial sense that it has an “embodied” vehicle. So there are at least ‘three possible, incompatible theories of embodiment’. Of these three it is not the two shorter ones but the longest, most involved interpretation at (3) that turns out to be correct, as becomes clear from Popper’s further elaboration. But, I suggest, this only becomes clear because of Popper’s further discussion and elaboration – not because (3) is the only or most natural or obvious interpretation, or is the only possible or likely sense of the words “embodied in”. This is especially because this last interpretation depends on familiarity with the permanently “unembodied” character of World 3 content, which is not part of common sense or of ‘everyday or obvious’ knowledge (unlike, say, “An empty page could be used to write anything”), and so cannot be presumed of the general reader. It is not part of the natural and ordinary meaning of “embodied” that it refers to anything that exists outside of “World 1” (unless clearly used ‘metaphorically’ or ‘non-literally’ as in “Their decision to treat the election as ‘stolen’ embodied all that is wrong with their political outlook”:- but Popper’s theory is substantive metaphysics not extended metaphor). So I cannot agree that the ‘natural and ordinary’ meaning of “embodied” favours the meaning Dominic may wish to give it, never mind supports his much stronger contention that “embodied” or “embodied in” could only bear the meaning he may intend.

The natural meanings of “The Hamlet that is being embodied is the Hamlet in world 3”/ “the intrinsic value of Hamlet...is embodied...in world 1” are also not changed by these meanings misunderstanding Popper’s theory – because the fact they convey a misunderstanding of Popper’s theory does not show this is not the normal sense of the words used. Likewise, treating “physical laws” as “objects of World 3” is a misunderstanding of Popper’s theory, but (as the first talk post shows) this is nevertheless the obvious sense of saying “world 1 obeys physical laws which are objects of world 3”. Because of this, we cannot take Dominic’s view of ‘what Dominic thinks Dominic must mean’ as determining what words would likely mean to a general reader – it is ‘back-to-front’ to try to argue what these words mean by praying in aid correct understanding of Popper’s theory, when the point is whether those words taken by themselves would accurately express that theory to someone unfamiliar with it. None of these slippery phrases contain any qualification or additional words that might change their natural sense as written, and negate what is their clear and obvious meaning:- for example, it would be quite different to write “world 1 obeys physical laws – and physical laws in a very different sense, as the subject matter of theories, are objects of world 3” – in which case it would be clear enough from the sense of this that the “physical laws” that World 1 obeys are not the same as the “physical laws” theorised in World 3; likewise, it would be quite different to write "the intrinsic value of Hamlet is a world 3 object – but Hamlet in a very different sense, as the subject matter of a physical object like a book that conveys it, is embodied by the physical book many times in world 1”. But this is not what is written, or what is clearly implied by what is written. (Treating what is not written or clearly implied, as if it is somehow nevertheless definitely ‘there’, is a form of ‘re-writing’ of what is there. It is a type of “straw man argument” to ‘rewrite’ what is written and then, on the basis of that ‘re-write’, treat criticism of what is actually written as a “straw man argument”.)

As pointed out elsewhere, even if the reverted entry’s sentence were rewritten (e.g. to read "the intrinsic value of Hamlet is a world 3 object – but Hamlet in a very different sense, as the subject matter of a physical object like a book that conveys it, is embodied by books many times in world 1”) it would still be objectionable because fundamentally inaccurate. This is because Popper’s World 3 objects have no “intrinsic value” as such, and the existence of such objects does not depend on how they conform to a theory or measure of their “intrinsic value” (or any other kind of “value”). It is fundamentally inaccurate and misleading to speak of “the intrinsic value” of such objects in this context. In Popper’s philosophy, the value of a World 3 ‘object’ like “Hamlet” is a distinct and separate question from the question of its World 3 content: “Hamlet” is “Hamlet”, in World 3 terms, whether it is viewed as good, bad or indifferent in terms of its “value” (“intrinsic” or otherwise).

So here is another instance where something completely unsourced and lacking any valid basis in Popper’s writings is being allowed to stand in the reverted entry – yet Dominic defends it. Dominic is so fixated on the need for exact sources that he writes, “Every point that is made in the article must come with precise references where we can see this exact point being made by the sources in an appropriate context.” And Dominic supports the drastic revert because of his ‘source-everything-exactly’ approach. Yet here Dominic defends a claim that utterly violates his own stated strictures:- it has no referenced source at all, and its “exact point” could have no accurate or valid source – because Popper never talks of the “intrinsic value” of World 3 objects, and the correct view is that World 3 objects have ‘content’ but not “intrinsic value” (in fact, Popper doesn’t likely think there is any such thing as “intrinsic value”). Dominic’s ‘source-everything-exactly’ strictures are much stricter than Wikipedia’s, where the Wikipedia test is essentially whether it is reasonable to consider that a source could be provided for what is written – and where I contend the expanded entry passed such a test, properly applied (and where part of the problem is that administrators, who appear to know very little of Popper’s work or the “notability” of his theory, are nevertheless deciding they know enough to decide whether a source could be provided – a decision they might not be so ready to make if they knew getting it wrong meant they personally lost a significant amount of money or had to serve some jail time). But the question nevertheless arises why Dominic operates such a flagrant double-standard here:- perhaps Dominic can explain why his strictures are both vitally important, when he’s justifying why the expanded entry was reverted, but then “not that important” (or not important at all) when he’s justifying what’s in the reverted entry?

It was to avoid the sorts of difficulties and misunderstandings produced by the slippery phrases under discussion, that the expanded entry went into these issues in a more comprehensive and detailed way. For example, it more carefully set out how “Hamlet” is not a unitary ‘object’ within Popper’s theory of the three worlds but may variously be “Hamlet” in the sense of a World 3.1, a World 3.2 or even a World 3.3 ‘object’ – because, unless this is clearly understood, it is all too easy to make a ‘category-mistake’ in talking about these ‘objects’ – as the slippery phrases show. This way of explaining uses Popper’s own terminology of World “3.1”, “3.2” and “3.3” to better make clear (1) that content of one category can co-exist with, and co-relate to, content of another category; (2) that one category of content can provide a ‘vehicle’ for another; (3) that (1) and (2) happen, in Popper’s view, without the content of one category ever being ‘converted’ into, or becoming part of, content of another category. Accordingly, the expanded entry talks of how World 1 and World 2 states and processes provide ‘vehicles’ for World 3 content i.e. ‘vehicles’ by which World 3 content may be conveyed and perhaps processed – but avoids confusing and slippery talk of World 3 objects being “embodied in world 1” and leaving it at that. As earlier stated: when a cowboy is conveyed by his horse we do not say he was “in” a horse or became ‘horsified’ – and it is similarly misleading to describe World 3 objects or content as “embodied in world 1” and leave it at that, because World 3 content as such is permanently unembodied and ‘abstract’. While there is a valid sense in which physical objects are “embodied” in ways that convey World 3 content, it is equally important to understand that no World 3 content of any sort ever enters into or goes ‘inside’ World 1, and in this key sense World 3 content is never as such “embodied” or “embodied in” World 1.

An example might help make this less abstract (other examples are given in the expanded entry):- a simple road sign with the name of a place and the shape of the sign pointing like an arrow. An animal with vision like ours may see all the same World 1 properties of the sign as we do – the shape of the pointy side, the shape of lettering etc. But, in Popper’s theory, the World 3 meaning will be ‘invisible’ to them – the animal will not understand what the physical shapes that constitute the lettering ‘mean’, or what the pointy arrow-shape ‘means’ in terms of direction to a named place. That ‘meaning’ is conveyed by way of physical characteristics but it does not reside within those characteristics – it is not “in” World 1 at all. It is not detectable by World 1 optics alone but only by a World 2 mind that can access and interpret the relevant World 3 content.

Dominic refers to Popper’s Tanner Lecture and to Popper writing:-

“Hamlet is embodied in all those physical volumes that contain an edition of Hamlet; and in a different way, it is also embodied or physically realized in each performance by a theatrical company.”

Dominic then goes on to draw his own conclusion from this as follows:-

“The Hamlet that is being embodied is the Hamlet in world 3.”

Above it is explained why, in its natural and ordinary meaning, the conclusion Dominic draws is false. This conclusion does not follow from what Dominic selectively quotes of Popper – ‘selective quotation’ and cherry-picking comments being, of course, mainstays of “straw man arguments”. And the conclusion is shown to be false when we consider other things Popper says and take them in the round. Once it is appreciated that “Hamlet” is not a unitary ‘object’ in terms of Popper’s theory, then the question is in what sense of ‘object’ is Popper saying “Hamlet is embodied”? It becomes clear from other things that Popper says, including in that Tanner Lecture, that the “Hamlet” that “is embodied” is only the physical object (e.g. “those physical volumes”) by which a World 3 “Hamlet” is conveyed, and that Popper is not really saying “Hamlet as a World 3 object” “is embodied” as such, as Dominic wrongly concludes. (N.B. Popper writes “Hamlet is embodied”, Popper does not write “Hamlet as a World 3 object is embodied”, and Popper’s words do not assert or clearly imply Dominic’s conclusion). Dominic’s mistaken conclusion illustrates his confused understanding of Popper’s theory and of what Popper writes and what Popper means. Despite this confusion, Dominic is confident enough to make clear he prefers the drastic revert to the expanded entry and that “An even better starting point could be an empty page” (I suppose you can’t go wrong with an “empty page”). In other words, Dominic considers “an empty page” perhaps might improve on either the expanded entry or the current drastically reverted one. Again I disagree (even to the extent of preferring the revert to an “empty page”). In fact, much as I criticise Dominic’s posts, I think he writes in good faith (though some points did make me consider if he might just be putting us on):- I wouldn’t suggest an “empty page” would be better than what he writes – and suspect he might be insulted by such a suggestion as the one he makes.

Dominic has helpfully provided a link to the Tanner Lecture, which is worth reading in full. It would be cumbersome to go through it all, but two small sections may be worth quoting.

(1) Popper also writes in the Tanner Lecture (p.147):-

“One can, if one wishes, say that the world 3 objects themselves are abstract objects, and that their physical embodiments or realizations are concrete objects.” [Popper’s emphasis.]

Which raises the question:- do these ‘abstract’ objects exist “within” or “in” the ‘concrete’ ones – and if so, how? And if not, how does the existence of the ‘abstract’ object relate to the existence of a ‘concrete’ one?

The answer to the first question is that they do not exist within or in the concrete ones – any more than the ‘meaning’ of the road sign is ‘within’ or ‘in’ the physical characteristics by which it conveys World 3 content. (And yet, as emphasised by Wittgenstein, e.g. in "Philosophical Investigations", we may be wrongly tempted to treat material objects as if their cultural meaning is materially embodied, perhaps as part of a wrong assimilation of the language of mental objects to the language of material objects [; Popper’s view is that he does not so much disagree with “Philosophical Investigations” as view the later Wittgenstein’s work, e.g. “On Certainty”, as crucially lacking an explicit theory of World 3 and of ‘objective knowledge’]). When, for example, we talk about ‘friction’ or ‘tension’ between different ideas or theories we are merely using metaphors rather than committing ourselves to the view that the relevant World 3 content has acquired World 1 or World 2 properties. It is not as if World 3 content ever gets secreted somehow within the World 1 of states and processes that convey it. When the British wanted to break the Nazi war codes they did not send for physicists to find the code secreted somewhere in the World 1 of things, they sent (after a foolish detour where they tried using cunning linguists with a First in Greats or Classics – see Bryan Magee, “Confessions of a Philosopher”) for mathematicians and logicians like Turing – because cracking the code was not about finding a World 1 object but finding the correct World 3 formulation of the translation-rules that convert one kind of abstract ‘code’ to another (and where those rules would be like a formula with a logical or mathematical character). In this fundamental sense, World 3 content never enters into World 1:- Popper’s term “World 3.1” indicates this, because it is positing that the “3” remains a distinct category of content from the “1” even where they co-exist as different aspects of one ‘object’, like a printed copy of “Hamlet”. As the expanded entry went to some lengths to explain, Popper’s theory is that World 3 content always retains its World 3 character and is never converted into another kind of content.

The answer to the second question is much more complex, but it is clear Popper puts forward World 1 and World 2 states and processes as ‘vehicles’ for World 3 content but without World 3 content ever residing ‘within’ the ‘vehicle’ in any materialist or physicalist or even ‘mentalist’ sense.

(2) “[L]anguages have, of course, also a physical aspect, while the content of what has been thought or said is something abstract. We may say that the content is that which we aim to preserve, and to retain invariant, in a translation from one language to another.” [Popper’s emphasis, Tanner Lecture, p.159.] The clear implication of this is that while the physical aspect may convey the “something abstract”, that abstract content is not contained in or within the World 1 of the “physical aspect” but instead is conveyed by it. The other clear implication is that “translation” may change the World 1 of the relevant vehicle a great deal while leaving the World 3 content unchanged.

These simple remarks from Popper, properly understood, refute Dominic’s claim (in its natural and ordinary meaning) that “The Hamlet that is being embodied is the Hamlet in world 3”:- because unembodied ‘abstract’ content (e.g. “Hamlet in world 3”) is never “embodied” in ‘concrete’ objects (though it may be conveyed by them). Instead “embodied” ‘concrete’ objects may convey ‘abstract’ content, without the ‘abstract’ content residing within them or ever being “embodied”. Dominic may insist ‘concrete objects can convey abstract content’ is what he intends or means by saying “The Hamlet that is being embodied is the Hamlet in world 3.” But my objection is that his way of putting it does not have that natural and ordinary meaning – the natural and ordinary meaning of “The Hamlet that is being embodied is the Hamlet in world 3” (as opposed to talking of the book “Hamlet” in World 1 “being embodied”) is that “the Hamlet in world 3” is itself coming to exist in a bodily form – that its unembodied ‘abstract’ content, “being embodied”, becomes a material entity.

The problem here is more serious than a “straw man” for other reasons. We have seen how the first post above treats “physical laws” as World 3 objects – however much this is a mistake or misunderstanding in terms of Popper’s theory. The tendency to treat physical artefacts as if they “embody” what Popper calls “World 3 content” is arguably much stronger and more prevalent than the tendency to consider physical laws as existing in an abstract World 3 e.g. it may be tempting to view the content of a painting or sculpture as identical with (or ‘the same as’) the particular World 1 arrangement of matter that constitutes them in World 1 terms.

This is indicated within the Tanner Lecture when, for example, Popper outlines a fundamental difference between his position and that of many anthropologists (p.166):-

“Mention should also be made of the close relationship between what I call world 3 and what the anthropologists call 'culture'. The two are very nearly the same. Both can be described as the world of the products of the human mind; and the term 'cultural evolution’ covers very much the same as I should call 'world 3 evolution’. However, the anthropologists are inclined not to distinguish the world 1 embodiments of world 3 objects from the world 3 objects themselves. This leads to a great difference between their outlook and mine, and between our two views of the universe.”

By “inclined not to distinguish”, Popper means that anthropologists tend to consider the import or content of a cultural object as somehow residing within characteristics of the object itself (or, perhaps more broadly, within how it is treated within World 1) – without positing a distinct World 3. And so, in Popper’s terms, they are wrongly identifying the World 3 content with its “world 1 embodiments” (or, perhaps more broadly, also with the World 1 treatment or handling of those “embodiments”; or, more broadly still, also with World 2 attitudes or beliefs in respect of those “embodiments”, which underpin how they are treated or handled in World 1). The essential point Popper makes here is that distinct World 3 contents (“world 3 objects themselves”) do not play an acknowledged role in the anthropologist’s view “of the universe.”

Popper’s distinction here, between “the world 1 embodiments of world 3 objects...[and] the world 3 objects themselves”, again raises the question whether he thinks “the world 3 objects themselves” are ever literally “embodied” or should be identified with their “world 1 embodiments” – that is, it raises questions similar to those discussed above in terms of ‘three incompatible theories of embodiment’. And this problem attends other parts of the lecture:- for example p.152 asks, “Are these theories themselves unreal, and only their embodiments real?” Popper answers ‘No’. This answer makes clear Popper does not identify the World 3 content of the theories with the World 1 of “their embodiment”, but it does not tell us, for example, which of the ‘three theories of embodiment’ underlies Popper’s thinking. It requires deeper reading into Popper’s work, and reflection on that work, in order to understand that Popper is not saying that World 3 content is itself ever “embodied”, and his view is that it is only ever “embodied” in the stretched, artificial sense that it may have an “embodied” ‘vehicle’ – but then it is only the ‘vehicle’ that is strictly “embodied” and not the World 3 content itself. Part of that deeper reading is Popper’s paper, “Language and the Body-Mind Problem”, discussed below – which argues, in effect, that World 3 content cannot ever be “realized” within World 1.

Before looking at that paper, it is worth considering reasons why the ‘identification’ of World 3 content with its World 1 vehicles, or the blurring of World 3-World 1 distinctions, is liable to occur. One reason has been already mentioned – that we generally speak and talk and act without paying much attention to World 1, 2 or 3 distinctions. Another reason is explained in the Tanner Lecture and elsewhere by Popper (e.g. “The Self and Its Brain”), and was also set out in the expanded entry – that from childhood our sense of reality is in the first place essentially a ‘materialistic’ one, based on treating as ‘real’ the material objects in our immediate surroundings (including foodstuffs). Only then, gradually, do we extend the scope of what is admitted to be ‘real’, especially making extensions needed to explain the material world and its behaviour (so ‘thoughts’, ‘radio waves’ and ‘train time tables’ may be considered ‘real’ as we get older, though they are not consciously considered ‘real’ by very young infants, even by infants who hear radios while seated on a time-tabled train). In other words, there is a strong materialistic bias in much of our thinking (a bias that generally serves us well, and probably has an evolutionary function and basis). Because of this strong bias, a bald statement like “The Hamlet that is being embodied is the Hamlet in world 3” is very likely to be understood by most people as stating that the (abstract) “Hamlet in world 3” thereby comes to exist in a bodily form i.e. it becomes a form of matter. It is far-fetched (a) that most people would instead understand this bald statement to mean that the World 3 content of “Hamlet”/“Hamlet in world 3” is always in fact unembodied ‘abstract’ content, and (b) that Dominic’s sentence instead only means, and clearly means, that the permanently unembodied abstract content of “Hamlet in world 3” may be temporarily conveyed by way of an embodied physical object.

Being only too aware of this ‘materialist’ bias and how it stands in the way of accepting a theory of World 3, Popper may have sometimes chosen words that convey as strongly as possible how the material world, as constructed by humans, reflects World 3 ‘objects’ and ‘contents’ – to emphasize that the reality of a World 3 might be understood as strongly reflected in our material surroundings, and so not just seem like some hi-falutin’ ‘intellectualization’ or “hypostatization”. (The need for a World 3 to explain the character of some of World 1, e.g. a nuclear reactor, is one of Popper’s strongest arguments for the reality of a World 3; incidentally, Popper regards “hypostatization” as central to World-3 based thinking because “we have somehow to hypostatize all our abstract ideas because otherwise we cannot come back to them again and again” [“The Self and Its Brain”, Dialogue IV, p.463].) But if we go beyond the surface of this way of presenting things to Popper’s underlying “theory”, we see it is only in the extremely stretched, artificial sense explained, above, that it “can be said” that World 1 can “embody” World 3 ‘objects and ‘contents’. It becomes quite clear that Popper’s theory of World 3 content “being embodied” is that it is never actually ‘converted into’ anything “embodied” and never truly becomes “embodied” in the natural or literal sense i.e. it never exists in the nooks and crannies of World 1 somewhere, as a ‘body’, but always remains in its distinct World 3, even when it is conveyed by objects that are embodied in World 1.

To help counteract this materialist bias and another prevalent bias – treating cultural items as psychological constructs that reflect beliefs and attitudes – the expanded entry contained, for example, the following (now removed by the revert):-

“Popper recognises that some form of World 1 and of World 2 is accepted by most people, but that his "World 3" goes beyond what is generally accepted as a matter of common sense. While humans may be widely considered to have developed many forms of "culture", it may often be assumed that these forms can be entirely explained in terms of World 1 and/or World 2 e.g. in terms of physical artefacts, or dispositions to act or memories physically encoded in the brain; or in terms of subjective knowledge or psychological dispositions within World 2. Whereas, in Popper's theory, those physical and mental entities which embody or represent cultural forms should be understood as vehicles for the relevant World 3 content e.g. the cultural content of a painting or a musical composition or a book does not reside in their characteristics in World 1 terms (i.e. their physical, chemical or biological aspects as studied by the natural sciences), or in their World 2 affects on the human mind (as perhaps studied by psychology), but in their distinctive World 3 content - which, Popper argues, is not identical with, or reducible to, any World 1 or World 2 states or processes.”

It is fair to note that Popper begins part of the Tanner Lecture with words that seem close to Dominic’s slippery “The Hamlet that is being embodied is the Hamlet in world 3”.

Popper writes (p.149, Popper’s emphasis):-

“Of most though not of all world 3 objects it can be said that they are embodied, or physically realized, in one, or in many, world 1 physical objects.”

This sentence – which may not be one of Popper’s best or most lucid – is an introductory sentence to a lecture audience and it uses the expression “can be said”, which often indicates a somewhat loose formulation is being used. The sentence itself does not explain the sense in which “it can be said that” “world 3 objects” “are embodied, or physically realized, in one, or in many, world 1 physical objects.” And so it raises the question of the sense in which Popper means this? Popper’s subsequent remarks, for example about ‘concrete’ and ‘abstract’ objects, make clear that it is not the ‘abstract’ World 3 object as such that is ever “embodied” but rather the only relevant entity that is “embodied” is the ‘concrete’ physical object that conveys that ‘abstract’ content. Nevertheless, it may be fair to say that this single sentence, taken out of context, could be misunderstood as saying that world 3 objects themselves can be “embodied” or “physically realized” in their “world 1 embodiments” – even though we have seen that later in the Tanner lecture, for example when stressing his differences with anthropologists and contrasting the ‘concrete’ and ‘abstract’, Popper seems to reject these views.

There is an important paper Popper published in “Conjectures and Refutations” (before he published on his three worlds’ theory), which bears on all this. The paper is “Language and the Body-Mind Problem”, Ch.12, C&R. Popper never resiled from the arguments presented in it. Though expressed without recourse to ‘the three worlds’, its arguments could be recast using his later ‘three worlds’ theory. Among those arguments is one about the “name-relation”, perhaps the simplest relation in language, where a word is used to stand for (or represent, or designate) an object e.g. saying “table” to identify or speak of a table. Popper argues a range of points about this “name-relation”, but the gist of his argument is this – the naming ‘word-object’ relationship is an ‘abstract’ one, and it cannot be “realized” by a causal or physical model (what Popper might later call a “World 1” model). One reason is that whatever causal chains exist in and around using the word “table” and the existence of a table it refers to, examination of those causal chains can never tell us that “table” refers to the table rather than to something else (or indeed to nothing – or perhaps to an “empty page”). “Our thesis is that a causal realization of the name-relation cannot exist” (C&R, p.297). To link “table” as an utterance to an object ‘table’ requires a feat of mental “interpretation”, Popper argues – only by “interpretation” can we ‘slice into’ World 1 chains of events in a way that understands “table” as an utterance that denotes (or refers to, or ‘picks out’) the physical object ‘table’ and not something else (conversely, there is no principle of causality or physics, or World 1 model, by which we could reach this interpretation). Popper then generalises (p.298):- “naming is by far the simplest case of the descriptive use of words. Since no causal realization of the name-relation is possible, no causal physical theory of the descriptive or argumentative functions of language is possible.” [Popper’s emphasis.] Popper goes on to say:- “If we act through being influenced by the grasp of an abstract relationship, we initiate physical causal chains which have no sufficient physical causal antecedents. We are then ‘first movers’, or creators of a physical ‘causal chain’.” In other words, Popper is arguing there can be no causal-physical “realization” of the “name-relation” and, by extension, of the descriptive or argumentative functions of language. We can now recast this in terms of Popper’s three worlds’ theory. In so far as the name-relation and the descriptive and argumentative functions of language are (in terms of the three worlds) dependent on using the relevant words as World 3 constructs, Popper’s argument here is effectively this:- that the content of World 3 constructs can never be “realized” by any merely causal or physical or World 1 model (instead their meaning, as we understand it, depends on our World 2 grasping or “realizing” that World 3 content – and the links between this content and the reality to which it refers). That means “Hamlet as a world 3 object”, like any other World 3 object or construct, cannot ever be “realized” within or in World 1.

Is Popper really saying something different, and inconsistent, in his Tanner Lecture? On the face of it there might appear to be contradiction between (1) Popper’s argument in Ch. 12 C&R that is to the effect that no abstract World 3 object or World 3 abstract relationship (e.g. the “name-relation”) can ever be “realized” within World 1 (or by a World 1 model), and (2) Popper writing in the Tanner Lecture that “Of most though not of all world 3 objects it can be said that they are embodied, or physically realized, in one, or in many, world 1 physical objects.” The answer, I suggest, is that when various subsequent remarks in the Tanner Lecture are brought into play it becomes clear that (2) does not actually mean world 3 objects as such are ever literally “embodied” or “physically realized” “in...world 1 physical objects” – (2) instead is talking about the sense in which ‘concrete’ “world 1 physical objects” may be embodied in ways that convey permanently disembodied, ‘abstract’ World 3 content.

The crucial difference between what Popper says at (2) and both Dominic’s “The Hamlet that is being embodied is the Hamlet in world 3” and the reverted entry’s “the intrinsic value of Hamlet...is embodied...in world 1”, is that Popper just doesn’t say (2) and leave it at that. Popper goes on to explain things that show that (2) does not mean what it might ordinarily be taken to mean. (2) in isolation may be a potentially misleading statement and, in a natural and ordinary interpretation of it, false – indeed inconsistent with Popper’s ‘cannot be realized’ argument in Ch.12 C&R. That is why in the expanded entry I preferred to use the language of ‘vehicles’ as Eccles does i.e. explaining how World 3 content may be conveyed by World 1, or World 2, ‘vehicles’. The term ‘vehicles’ is relatively clear – and less problematic than potentially misleading and even inaccurate talk about how World 3 ‘objects’ are “embodied” or “physically realized”, which only gives rise to problems understanding the particular, peculiar, specialised sense in which we may at all say abstract content is “embodied in” concrete objects. Eccles’ ‘vehicle’ language also has Popper’s implicit approval:- “In fact we can state that in World 3 are all arguments and discussions and records of human intellectual efforts, and in particular there are the records preserved in libraries and museums either as written records or as paintings, sculptures, ceramics, ornaments, tools, machines, etc. However, it is important to recognize that in World 3 there is only the objective knowledge that is coded symbolically in the actual structures that serve as vehicles for this knowledge. The material structures carrying the codes such as books, pictures, plastic art forms, films and even computer memories would be of course in World 1.” [John Eccles, “The World of Objective Knowledge”, Popper’s Schilpp Volume 1, Ch.10, p.351.] Popper’s reply [“21. Eccles on World 3 and the Mind-Brain Liaison”, Popper’s Schilpp Volume 2, pp.-1049-1053] implicitly accepts this “vehicles” usage, including by Popper’s own explicit use of the terms “3.1”, “3.2” and “3.3” for World 3 content classified according to whether or not it has a vehicle in World 1 or World 2, but where in each case the World 3 content always retains its World 3 character. It is worth noting that the gist of Popper’s reply to Eccles is to warn against over-stating the “close relationship” between the Worlds:- because too close a relationship between World 1 and World 2 would lead to a form of materialist ‘identity theory’ or to ‘epiphenomenalism’; and too close a relationship between Worlds 2 or 1 and World 3 would undermine the scope of World 3’s autonomy, and the reality of World 3’s autonomous impact on World 1 and World 2. For even stronger reasons, therefore, World 3 content is not to be identified with its World 1 or World 2 vehicles.

The Tanner Lecture is not the only place Popper mentions “Hamlet”. Popper refers to “Hamlet” in “Knowledge: Objective and Subjective”, Ch.1 of “Knowledge and the Body-Mind Problem” (which Dominic also uses as a reference, though not I think very accurately). Popper writes (p.6): “Although its reproductions may be said to belong to both the world 1 of physical things and to the world 3 products of the mind, the play, Hamlet itself, belongs only to the third world.” [Popper’s emphasis throughout; “third world” = “world 3”.] Popper’s emphatic “only” means “the Hamlet in world 3”/ “Hamlet itself” never belongs anywhere except World 3; and, properly understood, this also means it is only the world 1 aspect of its “reproductions” that is “embodied” in World 1, and that “the Hamlet in world 3” is never itself “embodied”. This is confirmed by Popper’s term “World 3.1”, which denotes hybrid objects – like “reproductions” – that combine two distinct categories of content i.e. their World 1 content (the 1 in “3.1”) and the World 3 content conveyed by this World 1 content (the 3 in “3.1”), without the World 3 content being converted or blended into World 1 content. Accordingly it is false, or at best highly misleading, for Dominic to write “The Hamlet that is being embodied is the Hamlet in world 3” – when, properly understood, only Hamlet’s World 1 ‘vehicle’ is ever “embodied”.

Of course, part of me feels like apologizing for going through this in so much detail it is bound to feel repetitive – but without careful, detailed explanation, the charge of “straw man arguments” might stick – at least for some. It was to avoid misunderstandings around ‘embodiment’ that the expanded entry went to some lengths to address the underlying issues – rather than rest matters on a short, misleading and arguably false statement like “the intrinsic value of Hamlet...is embodied...in world 1”. Anyone suggesting this is all “straw man arguments” is putting forward a “straw man” given (1) the serious issues at stake (philosophically speaking) i.e. understanding Popper’s theory of ‘embodiment’, and its role, is crucial to correct understanding of his overall theory; (2) it is false to claim “the intrinsic value of Hamlet...is embodied...in world 1” “could not” reasonably be interpreted in a way that would make it untrue as a statement about Popper’s theory. Just as it is a serious misunderstanding of Popper’s theory to suggest World 3 acts directly on World 1 because the “physical laws” that World 1 ‘obeys’ are “objects of world 3”, so it is seriously misleading and promotes misunderstanding to suggest that World 3 objects or content ever exist “embodied in” World 1 (rather than always and “only” exist in World 3, albeit sometimes as conveyed by World 1 ‘vehicles’).

So fundamental differences between Dominic and myself remain:- I argue there are misleading and inaccurate statements in the reverted main entry as it stands, and criticise them, whereas Dominic argues there is nothing misleading or inaccurate to concern anyone. The explanation for this is perhaps the same as the explanation for why Dominic’s ‘source-everything-exactly’ strictures are vitally important, when justifying why it was right and proper to revert the expanded entry, but then “not that important” (or at all important) when he’s justifying what’s in the reverted entry (e.g. in respect of a sentence that has no referenced source and could have none) – because while he did not contribute that much to the expanded entry, Dominic is responsible for misleading and false words in the reverted entry? That might also explain his urge to deflect criticism of the reverted entry as just “straw man arguments” – even though its content badly suffers from being unsourced at points, inaccurately sourced at other points and, most critically and importantly, being often misleading and/or inaccurate in its substance. (After the revert, half the sentences in the last four sections were inaccurate – as I have detailed elsewhere.) That level of error is too significant and serious that we should be waved away from it or asked to ‘move on’, like by a policeman cajoling “Move along, nothing to see here.” It is not just a question of accuracy – though that is fundamental – there is the question of interest: because the stripped-down revert presents a watered-down inaccurate version of Popper’s theory that is nothing like as interesting as the theory set out in the expanded entry.

There remain serious editorial questions raised by the ‘sledge-hammer-to-crack-a-nut’ revert (I suspect those responsible have acted because, so to speak, they rather enjoy their power to use an editorial ‘sledge-hammer’, and rapidly moved on to find more ‘nuts’ – not because they’ve much interest in the ‘nuts’ or what’s in them; this is borne out by their lack of response or concern about the resulting state of the “nuts”; their lack of apparent expertise with Popper’s work, including doubting the “notability” of his theory, must call directly into question their competence to decide whether sourced references could be provided). These editorial issues may seriously concern readers, and actual or potential contributors to this particular entry, or to other entries on Wikipedia, and also any sought “expert” tempted to consider the state of this entry (or any other entry). What correctly applied Wikipedia policy justifies the replacement of accurate, source-based information with information that is not accurate or source-based (and justifies removal of sourced and referenced accurate material, and reverts to material that is inaccurate and has no referenced source)? Waving these concerns away is in the likely interests only of those responsible for the revert (e.g. “OhNoItsJamie”, “Tacyarg”/Graycat); or indifferent to the quality of the reverted material (perhaps who like an “empty page” better than accurate information, or who think, in Dominic’s words, “how much of the current version is correct or wrong is not that important” but sourced references are all-important); or with a vested interest in defending the reverted material. The central problem is dealing with people who are not that concerned about truth and accuracy but who appear to have other agendas that they consider more important. Dominic may wish we all simply ‘move on’, but I suggest, before that, we need better understanding of what is true and accurate.

Six months have passed since the revert. Misleading, inaccurate, unsourced and ‘un-sourceable’ material still sits without sign of improvement in the reverted entry. Supporters of the revert have notably failed to address its serious errors (perhaps they expect other people to do the work/fix the damage?). “Gutting” an expanded entry, not responding properly to detailed criticisms of the revert, then calling for an “expert” to help, then departing the scene entirely, may be as much standard practice for some administrators as having made-up names– it’s also a cop-out in terms of acting responsibly. A “gutting” revert may show a large amount of editorial power but requires little skill, effort, knowledge or understanding. Here power has been exercised indiscriminately, with apparent indifference to the quality of content that results. The call for an “expert” suggests those responsible lack sufficient expertise to themselves gauge whether or not it is reasonably likely the expanded entry was closely based throughout on authoritative sources – which calls into question their competence to exercise the necessary editorial judgment to justify a drastic revert in the first place. Hoping an “expert” gives the entry their attention may turn into a wait longer than for Godot. Administrators should be able to defend reverts on their specific merits – not hide behind a call for an “expert” to come to the rescue, their general appetite for “gutting”, a crude metric like ‘reference-per-sentence-ratio’, or false claims that detailed criticism of the revert is “Much...straw man arguments”.

Meantime those who care to read the expanded entry in the archived history (as it stood 5th January 2023 before the revert) may have Dominic’s misgivings about it assuaged by the following. Unlike the reverted entry, the expanded entry has been read without expressed objection to the accuracy of its content by a professional academic in the field, who is a renowned and published expert on Popper’s work, and one of the most highly regarded expositors and developers of “critical rationalism”. Who knows – that expert may even have read this?

DM 2A00:23C6:D119:F101:F0EB:9031:E085:A53 (talk) 13:09, 14 June 2023 (UTC)

I should not have used the expression "straw man arguments". I meant it relative to my understanding of the text about embodiments. I meant to say that you criticized one interpretation, but not my interpretation. I see your point that the text could be easily misinterpreted and that, therefore, the arguments were important, irrespective of my interpretation. This unfortunately made you misunderstand the most important of what I said. Even the person who did the revert (who is not me), I am sure, would be very happy that you edit the article to put back some material that was easily verifiable through precise references that you provided (with the pages in the case of books) and add more material of this kind. The only concern of people here is that a lot of material in the reverted version was perhaps from sources, but it was not easy to verify it, unless you are an expert. Perhaps, for you, this requirement is artificial, because one could easily add precise references and yet misinterpret the sources. Conversely, very little or imprecise references could be given and yet an expert could see that it respects the sources. Precise references for every single reasonably important point made in the article is nevertheless a minimal requirement in Wikipedia. I believe the decision to revert was taken in the hope that it is the best starting point to have an article that is verifiable. If you add material that is not verifiable using references that you provide, it would be reverted, but you are welcome to add material that have the required references. I will continue this discussion in my PdD, because I want to go into the details of my understanding of world 3 and it would be too much details here. Dominic Mayers (talk) 15:16, 14 June 2023 (UTC)

Popper, Eccles, and Rev. Moon

Popperian cosmology dovetails neatly with Unification Church theology, which posits:

a material world - containing the earth, our physical bodies, and the computer I'm typing this on

a spirit world - where your soul lives, even before you "enter the afterlife"

the "outer sung-sang" or world of ideas (see Unification Thought and the theory of the original mind.

Sorry if there are a lot of red links in the above. I'm not a philosopher, just a layman who has an abiding interest in the pratical uses of philosophy. Uncle Ed 15:36, 6 October 2005 (UTC)

• It is rather gross to identify mental events with spirits. --ExtraBold 12:21, 7 October 2005 (UTC)

• Yeah, I agree to above. Although it goes beyond a dualist and monist view like Popper, it doesn't commute. (NRL)

Title

Would it make more sense to call this article Popper's (or Popperian) ontology? SlimVirgin ^{talk|contribs} 08:58, 3 August 2009 (UTC)

Imre Lakatos essentially equates World 3 with Frege's Third Realm - discussion of translations is on another talk page

"Frege's 'third realm' ('drittes Reich') and Popper's 'World 3' are alike in so far as they contain thought contents, mathematical objects and other abstracta" - from Imre Lakatos and Theories of Scientific Change, Frege and Popper, p 417.

There is a discussion about redirecting Dritte Reich away from Nazi Germany. Discussion is here. ParkSehJik (talk) 16:33, 26 November 2012 (UTC)

Popper mentions, in Objective Knowledge, that his theory is also similar to FR Leavis notion of a third world of culture. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 155.192.33.250 (talk) 08:36, 22 October 2017 (UTC)

Lack of exact references

I like very much this article and I do believe that most if not all its content is verifiable, but I cannot say that I know that it is verifiable. Many sections contain no reference at all. Inside the text, we need inline references to specific pages or sections in books that are secondary sources. Dominic Mayers (talk) 17:39, 29 November 2020 (UTC)

In the process of finding specific references, I had to change my mind with regard to the verifiability of the article. The global idea is OK, but the devil is in the details. The most important content that is not verifiable is the description of the second and third worlds. A key aspect of the second world is that it is made of individual mental processes, like individual perceptions, feelings and thoughts, things that we experience directly and that we can only infer in others. The description of the second world in the article misses this individual aspect. A key aspect of the third world is that it corresponds to our growing collective knowledge and culture. One can say that it is the knowledge and culture that we inherited from past civilizations and which we use to learn and gain new experiences. It differs from the second world by the fact that it is owned by the collectivity and has support in the first world outside the human brain, in books, museums, etc. though neuroscientists such as Eccless in Facing Reality say that it is also supported in parts of the brain that memorize knowledge. The description of the third world in the article suggests that anything created collectively by human beings is part of the third world, which is not false in a way, because we can learn from every thing we created, cities, etc., but it is important to bring out that the third world is about knowledge, skills to explore knowledge, mental experiences, etc. Eccless, who is cited by Popper himself as a valid source on the subject, wrote:

In their material composition of paper and ink, books are in World 1, but the codified knowledge conveyed in the print is in World 3.

— Eccless, Facing Reality

Dominic Mayers (talk) 20:21, 29 November 2020 (UTC)

OK, reading again the article, only the brief descriptions in the first section are misleading. This can easily be taken care of. So, I am going to do that and then add specific references.

Dominic Mayers (talk) 22:15, 29 November 2020 (UTC)

Section about the relation between the three worlds in terms of geography

There is an entire (but brief) section that mentions that the relation between the three worlds is seen in the discipline of geography. It would not be surprising at all that the three worlds are seen in this specific discipline or in any other discipline for that matter. But, the way it is inserted suggests that a three ways relationship, in contrast to two ways relationships as in the previous sections, is seen in this discipline. If that is the case, then secondary sources are missing, because it is special. In fact, I have no idea what it could be. My guess is that it is simply that the three worlds are seen in this discipline as they can be seen in any discipline. In this last case, it might deserve a mention in the article, but not an entire section. Since I cannot verify the content and the way it is currently inserted makes no sense, I am going to remove the section. Dominic Mayers (talk) 04:50, 30 November 2020 (UTC)

Robinson Crusoe

This is not directly related to the article, but indirectly related because it is about a point made in the main secondary source for this article, Heller's book. Heller wrote "Robinson Crusoe on an uninhabited island cannot have objective knowledge." But this is based on an analogy used by Popper in 1945 in The Open Society and its Enemies to explain the importance of critical analysis in objective knowledge. It is an anachronism, because Popper used the concept of three worlds much later in 1967. It is not obvious that Popper would have used this analogy to define the third world. He might have said that the quality of the third world of Robinson Crusoe is very low, because the scientific method used missed the social aspect, but without saying that there is no third world for Robinson Crusoe. I mean, if we insist to equate third world with objective knowledge, we must still consider the possibility that Popper has reconsidered the definition of objective knowledge between 1945 and 1967. Popper himself often said that he was not a fanatic of definitions. One must always consider the meaning of a word in its context. It's related to the article, because it says to me that it is useful to consider many sources to be certain not to base the article only on a specific thesis. Dominic Mayers (talk) 16:54, 30 November 2020 (UTC)

Just to add that the absence of a third world for Robinson Crusoe contradicts one of the main criteria used by Popper to argue for the independent existence of the third world. Popper considers a thought experiment in which all the technology is destroyed, but not the representation of the third world. He compares it to the situation where the representation of the third world is also destroyed. He says that we can infer the independent existence of the third world because the technology will be rebuilt much faster with the help of the third world representation. This thought experiment applies in the same way to Robinson Crusoe alone on his island. Dominic Mayers (talk) 01:01, 1 December 2020 (UTC)

Recent edits of 92.22.53.131

The recent edits of 92.22.53.131 are not vandalism, but I see two important problems with these modifications. First, the claims are not sourced and they are controversial enough to require sources. Second, the text added does not integrate well with the existing text and the result is a badly organized article with useless repetitions. The original organization was good and the modifications should have tried to respect it. There is also a third problem: The very short descriptions of the three worlds were not incorrect. They were useful and should not have been removed. A lot of work is needed to correct these problems. It's not vandalism, it's clear, because the added introduction seems very useful, though it needs to be sourced (and modified if needed so that it matches better with the sources). Dominic Mayers (talk) 14:39, 17 August 2021 (UTC)

OR

This article has become bloated and looks to be 99% WP:OR William M. Connolley (talk) 16:11, 6 December 2022 (UTC)

Because there is almost no sources and no attributions, it might feel as if it is OR, but we cannot reject the possibility that the editor (an IP) understanding and thus the content reflects a view point in sources. It's not as if it is some weird idea that cannot possibly exists in sources. I did not have the courage to read it through the entire article, but when I read the RI, I don't see that there is a thesis there that cannot be found in sources. Perhaps you mean that much of the content in the article is the understanding of the IP that has written it. Yes, but it can at the same time be a view point found in sources. The only problem that I am certain of is that there is a lack of sources and attributions. If it is what you mean by "OR", then I agree. I also agree that it is a serious issue. I almost feel that, despite that a lot of expertise might have been deployed in writing this article, it might be better to start from scratch to write a shorter and well sourced article. Dominic Mayers (talk) 18:12, 6 December 2022 (UTC)

Yes, I meant unsourced. I too haven't actually read through it all, and I too am reluctant to simply remove a pile of potentially valuable material William M. Connolley (talk) 19:49, 6 December 2022 (UTC)

This is exactly how I feel. It's too bad that people don't take the extra time needed to provide the sources for the content that they include. It is a lot more work, because even if you know that you have read the material in sources, you might not remember in which book or article. Yet, it is worth it, because WP is a collective work. Perhaps each editor individually is much less efficient, because it takes a lot of time to find the sources, but the collective work becomes much more efficient and eliable when the exact sources (with the page or the chapter in the case of a book) are provided. This article is not that useful, because it might be easier to start from scratch. Dominic Mayers (talk) 20:59, 6 December 2022 (UTC)

I've just been pointed here from the Teahouse, where I went to ask how to proceed on seeing this painfully lengthy and unsourced article. I have left a message on the most recent IP editor's Talk page asking if they can provide sources, and asking them not to add more unsourced material. My current inclination is to revert to this version from two years ago, as at least it's clearer what sources back up the information given. Tacyarg (talk) 20:02, 7 December 2022 (UTC)

Would it be a good idea to first put the article under protection so that no ip can edit it? This might attract the attention of the ip, which might not even be aware that we try to communicate with him. Dominic Mayers (talk) 20:27, 7 December 2022 (UTC)

Good suggestion, I have requested PP. Tacyarg (talk) 14:58, 4 January 2023 (UTC)

And have added a template message to the most recent IP editor's Talk page. Tacyarg (talk) 15:08, 4 January 2023 (UTC)

I'm in favor of gutting it down to a simple summary with a few inline sources. OhNoitsJamie ^Talk 19:27, 4 January 2023 (UTC)

Anything that is neutral and verifiable would be fine with me. Dominic Mayers (talk) 20:39, 4 January 2023 (UTC)

Hi to Dominic and anyone else following on this talk page.

To the best of my knowledge, I am the person responsible for most of the content in the greatly 'expanded' version of "Popper's three worlds" before it was reverted a few weeks ago (some of my contributions remain in the reverted entry in the "Worlds 1, 2 and 3" section, despite absence of referenced sources).

Until today I did not realise this entry had its own talk page all along, and only then realised this may have been a better forum for points I wished to raise regarding the recent reversion.

Predictably I spent considerable time on this entry over the past year or more - and have, admittedly, something of a vested interest in my efforts. I also readily admit it would be unreasonable to expect everyone to have anything like the same level of interest in Popper's ideas and the accurate statement of them (my impression is that 'OhNoItsJamie' doesn't have a great interest); and it is unlikely that everyone will have an equally firm basis from which to judge what is likely accurate (and what is not) in the material presented - especially as a firm basis might mean having to carefully read and digest all the various works used in developing the 'expanded' entry.

These works include Popper's contributions to "The Self And Its Brain" (in Parts I & III), to his 'Schilpp' Volumes in 'The Library of Living Philosophers' (2 Volumes) [this is where Popper's "theorem" "World 3 > World 3.2 + World 3.1" is stated and explained], his "Objective Knowledge", and then material in various published lectures and in his "Postscript" (3 volumes), especially "The Open Universe".

I also admit that what may stick out to others - especially those who have not read all (or any) of the works listed above - is how the 'expanded' entry contains a lot of material without referenced sources provided in support. The "unsourced" objection certainly raises a real issue with the expanded entry - where it is unsatisfactory as it stands. The "unsourced" issue may also contribute to an impression the expanded article is "bloated" and contains "original research" and/or "personal analysis". However, my own view is along the lines of the two contributors above who, after discussion, seem to agree the problem with the expanded/"bloated" entry is essentially that is largely "unsourced".

Nevertheless, a question raised here for discussion is whether this admitted problem or issue justifies such an extensive reversion to the entry as it now stands - especially in its last four sections.

For as well as the issue of referenced sources there is the fundamental question of accuracy and of fairness in editorial intervention. My questioning of the revert is because it effectively replaces accurate material with inaccurate, and source-based material with material that is not sourced or source-based. This seems to me a very questionable result. I am unsure it is a result demanded by correct application of Wikipedia policies and strictures.

As I understand it, an article entirely lacking referenced sources may comply with Wikipedia's strictures because the test is not whether a source has been provided but whether there is a "reasonable expectation" that a suitable source could be provided.

So, in the context of the recent "revert", the issue may become whether the reverted article complies better than the expanded entry in terms of Wikipedia's 'strictures' - using the key tests of (a) accuracy and (b) of whether there is a reasonable expectation that a proper source could be given for what is stated.

In the light of the points and analysis posted on my IP talk page in three recent posts, and the content of the expanded entry itself and its having been read by one of Popper's former research assistants, my suggestion for discussion is that the expanded entry is more "Wikipedia compliant" than the reverted entry because

(a) it is more accurate (I would argue significantly more accurate, and more comprehensive), and

(b) there is a greater "reasonable expectation" that sources could be provided for the material presented.

My next point may be a delicate one but may be too important to be avoided - views on (a) and (b) might greatly vary depending on how extensively acquainted a person is with Popper's writings. For example, a person who has only a passing acquaintance with Popper's writings may be in no real position to form a "reasonable expectation", one way or another, as to whether a source could be provided for a given statement in respect of Popper's theory. Accurate editorial judgment should perhaps defer to those who know Popper's writings best - and the lack of stated objection from Popper's former research assistant, who read over the entry as it stood last December (extremely close to how it was before the revert in January), should perhaps give pause to anyone who hasn't read the listed works above.

I would of course be grateful if anyone wishing to contribute to a discussion of this would read those three posts on my IP talk page (despite their typos and sundry other errors, and despite their level of detail). But, for those who have not the time or who might want some idea of whether reading those posts might be worth their time, the gist of the main points are summarised directly below.

By way of preliminary, my three recent posts were sent by replying to my IP talk page (in response to the revert) because I thought, perhaps wrongly, this was the correct way to reply - being also unaware that this talk page existed. These posts on my IP page (the same as the one for this post) were by pressing "reply" to 'Tacyarg' and 'OhNoItsJamie' in respect of their messages - which expressed a preference for using talk pages. I understood them to be administrators. To date neither has replied on that talk page - to my knowledge they have not replied to any of the points raised with them by way of reply, beyond having referred me to Wikipedia policies and strictures.

These three recent posts contained a range of points that centre on the following:-

(1) that the expanded (or "bloated") entry is nevertheless accurate and closely based on sources (and had been read in December 2022, without any serious objection in terms of its content, by a former research assistant of Popper's who is also a published and renowned expert on Popper's work);

(2) the reverted entry contains a large number of inaccurate and/or misleading statements in its last four sections:- to be more exact, the lengthiest of my three recent posts (on my IP "talk" page, as mentioned) went through half the sentences in the last four sections of the reverted article with careful explanation of why these sentences are inaccurate and/or misleading, and pointing out that in each case these claims are not properly sourced (no sources in 6 of the 7 examples, and an irrelevant source cited in the other case);

(3) the 'expanded' entry preserved the accurate claims and footnotes that are contained in the last four sections of the reverted entry;

(4) the 'expanded' entry added a referenced and sourced explanation from Popper - "I am not offering what is sometimes called an ontology" (p.4 "The Self And Its Brain) - for why the reverted article is inaccurate/misleading in describing a World 3 entity as a "meta-object" or "form of being"; and why the reverted entry is therefore offering material that is quite contrary to Popper's stated position - with the consequence that the revert here replaces accurate, properly sourced and referenced material with inaccurate and unsourced material;

(5) as an indication of how the 'expanded' entry adhered closely to sources and how the reverted entry is unsourced and inaccurate:- the lengthiest post quoted and sourced material from Popper's work that shows the reverted entry is clearly wrong to say/imply that Popper rejects Cartesian dualism because "Popperian cosmology rejects [Cartesian] essentialism". This is because, referring to "The Self And Its Brain" pp.181-2, Popper's crucial objection to Cartesian dualism is "only" (Popper's emphasis) that it is impossible to see how an immaterial mind/spirit could materially 'push' anything i.e. the problem with Cartesian dualism, in Popper's view, is not its "essentialism" regarding an essential difference between mind and body (after all, Popper argues for mind-body interaction despite also arguing a categorical World 1 and World 2 distinction) but because of Descartes' resulting theory of causation.

For some the level of detail used in the expanded entry, and involved in defending it, may be off-putting. My own view is different. There is a level of detail that is unavoidable in reaching an accurate understanding of a theory like Popper's "three worlds", and of the cluster of related ideas and arguments that he builds around it.

For example, to suggest Popper's rejects Cartesian dualism because "Popperian cosmology rejects [Cartesian] essentialism" is crucially and deeply inaccurate and misleading because

(1) it is nothing specific to any "cosmology" that explains Popper's opposition to Cartesian dualism;

(2) it is not Popper's opposition to "essentialism" that explains it, because even if Cartesian dualism were stripped of its "essentialism" it would still lack a convincing explanation for how an immaterial entity could 'push' a material one, when 'push' is, for Descartes, only a material form of contact;

(3) Popper regards "essentialism" as at its most plausible as a theory of mind, and as having a kernel of truth in this context, saying, for example, that he believes in "something that may be called the quasi-essential (or quasi-substantial) nature of the self" - "The Self And Its Brain", p.105 fn.2.

So it is not a trivial matter (to those who want accuracy rather than shortform inaccuracy) that Popper's actual opposition to Cartesian dualism is explained, as Popper explains it at pp.181-2, because there is a clash between Descartes' view of mind as 'immaterial' and Descartes' view that this 'immaterial' mind acts causally by material 'push'. (If I were here permitted a little "personal analysis", I think Popper would regard the expression "Popperian cosmology" in this context as not just misconceived and misleading but as quite pretentious - indeed it is to avoid such pretentious but empty talk that Popper goes out of his way, at the outset of "The Self And Its Brain", to make clear he is "not offering an "ontology"", so that the revert's reference to "meta-object" and "form of being" are also crucially and deeply misleading given Popper's actual stated views and approach).

As the expanded entry sought to more comprehensively convey, though Popper may disagree with much of Cartesianism (e.g. Cartesian views of causality, of ultimate "essentialist" explanation, of the divide between humans and animals), in terms of Cartesian dualism it is really "only" Descartes' theory of causation that is a fundamental stumbling-block - according to Popper's own quoted words. And this makes sense because Popper's position could be described as broadly Cartesian in that Popper's categorical distinction between World 1 and World 1, and his description of himself as a dualist, accepts that Descartes is right in claiming a fundamental dualism of mind and body. As to sources for this Cartesian strain in Popper's thought, the best source is probably Popper himself:- e.g. (1) there is a published discussion with other philosophers where Popper suggests that discussion of mind and body (always eventually) takes us "back to Cartesianism" (i.e. to the validity of a fundamental mind-body distinction) [I am writing from memory and cannot here cite the exact source]; and (2) (perhaps a clearer example in terms of source material), Popper's discussion of Ryle's anti-Cartesian "The Ghost in the Machine" in section 30 of that title in "The Self And Its Brain". In section 30, Popper endorses the "simile" of mind as pilot of the ship, and then makes clear he agrees with the "simile...so much so that I can say of myself "I believe in the ghost in the machine."[p.105]." This clear and forthright statement shows how closely Popper explicitly allies himself with Descartes against Ryle's explicit "ghost-in-the-machine" attack on Cartesianism.

What this example also shows, I think, is that Popper's position need careful, expanded development to do it justice - and to locate his position fairly and accurately in relation to other thinkers and lines of thought. It is not a fair or accurate depiction to claim Popper opposes Cartesian dualism using merely broad brush terms like "essentialism" or by setting up a so-called "Popperian cosmology": Popper uses carefully detailed rational considerations that involve careful separation of distinct issues, as would be expected from a significant philosopher. In my view, the reverted entry remains highly inaccurate and misleading in claiming that Popper rejects Cartesian dualism because so-called "Popperian cosmology rejects [Cartesian] essentialism". I don't think this is an acceptable level of inaccuracy, especially given Popper's own clear words, as quoted. For those interested, 6 other such examples are set out in the lengthiest of the posts on my IP talk page.

So I hope this post indicates why I find the revert highly questionable - because it has the consequence that accurate material is replaced by inaccurate, and that carefully source-based material is replaced by material that is not source-based.

I also hope it helps explain why the entry gradually expanded over the last year - because short-form statements without elaboration cannot give an accurate understanding of Popper's actual "theory" and his careful thinking.

Kind regards,

DM 88.110.55.20 (talk) 01:16, 22 January 2023 (UTC)

Though it's not a requirement, it is appreciated when a user that contributes significantly creates an account. I would appreciate that. You can still remain anonymous. I would not display here what I read about Popper's philosophy, from Popper and others, because what matters is how others can verify what I wrote in sources and they don't need to know the details of what I have read to appreciate that. Regarding your statement Nevertheless, a question raised here for discussion is whether this admitted problem or issue justifies such an extensive reversion to the entry as it now stands - especially in its last four sections., my view is that, if we focalize on the final result that is expected, it does not really matter, because, either way, the amount of work required to achieve the goal is the same. If we focalize on the process, I find something useful in only having at every step only sourced contents. I haven't read the remainder of your post, but one thing you should know is that, for collaboration in wikipedia, at the least with me, it is best to only make a single point at a time, starting with the most important ones, because usually the replies received for each point that one makes have an impact on subsequent points. Dominic Mayers (talk) 01:59, 22 January 2023 (UTC)

DM, I noticed that amongst your many points you pointed to an unsourced sentence and this caught my attention. I added a reference. Of course, it does not mean that all the problems have been addressed, but focusing on the article and sources, making one point at a time, we can progress more efficiently. I am not suggesting that every point has to focalize on a detail. We can consider global issues, but one at a time in a brief manner. The common goal should be to have a well sourced article. Dominic Mayers (talk) 04:04, 22 January 2023 (UTC)

Thanks for this response and for adding a footnote. I also agree with your "one at a time" suggestion (though maybe sometimes this might be stretched to 'one or two at a time'). Certainly, the validity of content typically breaks down into a point-by-point analysis. But, in my view, adding sources will not likely solve the problems raised as to how half the sentences in the last four sections of the reverted entry are inaccurate and/or misleading. Best, DM. 88.110.55.20 (talk) 10:29, 22 January 2023 (UTC)

Dominic, reading previous material on the talk page I noticed you wrote as follows:-

Eccless, who is cited by Popper himself as a valid source on the subject, wrote:

In their material composition of paper and ink, books are in World 1, but the codified knowledge conveyed in the print is in World 3. [Bold added].

You then reference the book source, "Facing Reality", but not the page number (this is not a criticism btw).

This quotation supports the accuracy of relevant material in the expanded entry, which treats this point as crucial to correct understanding of Popper's theory, and develops from this crucial point a range of other points - the crucial point being that World 3 content does not ever 'become part of' World 1 or become 'converted' into World 1 content but always retains its World 3 character.

In the expanded entry, this crucial point is taken as supported by Popper's quoted "theorem" - "World 3 > World 3.2 + World 3.1" - and by various other points Popper makes about the character of World 3 content (e.g. about a Beethoven symphony as World 3 object not being identical with its "World 3.1" expression as a written score or physical performance, and that these "World 3.1" expressions of the symphony are themselves 'hybrid' objects of World 1 and World 3 content).

Equally this quotation from Eccles supports the relevant points made on "my" IP talk page, especially in the longest post there, which explains how statements in the reverted entry remain inaccurate and/or misleading on this crucial point - and so the reverted entry remains inaccurate and/or misleading on a point that is absolutely central to correct understanding of Popper's theory.

Moving onto to the issue of "sources", and taking this point in one-at-a-time fashion in line with your suggested approach, I also suggest that there is no reliable or proper source or reference that could here be given to substantiate the reverted entry in relation to this crucial point - and that there can be no "reasonable expectation" that it could be properly sourced in this respect.

By contrast, the Eccles' quotation you cited does make "reasonable" the expectation that the contrasting, carefully developed material in the expanded entry could be "sourced" and does support the view that it is source-based.

This is one example of what I meant by saying that I don't think adding "sources" can or will remedy serious specified defects in the content of the reverted entry - in 7 out of 14 of the sentences in its last four sections.

DM 88.110.55.20 (talk) 11:56, 22 January 2023 (UTC)

I agree that the view of world 3 that you describe above can be sourced and moreover is most likely consensual to some extent in the literature―there is rarely full agreement between distinct philosophers. If there is a passage in the current version (after the revert) that contradicts this view and is not sourced, please boldly replace it by something that is sourced and provide the sources with footnotes (say using the {{sfn}} model), ideally with the relevant section. From what I understand, this view hold even without the theorem "World 3 > World 3.2 + World 3.1" , which I am not yet familiar with (I might have read it quickly in the past, but did not focalize on it) and is perhaps a restatement of other arguments. BTW, I would have discussed the passage in question and see whether it was only a bad formulation and something else what meant, but I am not sure what passage you refer to. Dominic Mayers (talk) 15:47, 22 January 2023 (UTC)

The points are set out in the response to the revert I made on my talk page - with these points part of an overall demonstration that the reverted entry contains inaccurate or misleading material that has no proper source.

These points include referring to the following words in the reverted entry:- "But, this representation of an object of world 3 into an object of world 1...." (emphasis added). The criticism of this is that it is not absolutely clear what this is meant to mean (there is no source given for it; and Popper does not speak of the "representation of an object of World 3" in this way); and, second, that the language of "into an object of world 1" is strongly suggestive of the view that the World 3 content 'becomes part of' or is 'converted into' or 'enters into' some form of World 1 content - and this absolutely is not Popper's theory but a misunderstanding of it.

For anyone interested in understanding why I argue the revert is questionable the material is set out at the IP talk page - perhaps I should copy it over to this talk page.

DM 88.110.55.20 (talk) 18:53, 22 January 2023 (UTC)

I modified the text "slightly" (but maybe in an important manner for you), added a reference and a footnote. Let me know if this solves this specific concern. There are certainly many other things to be improved and much more to say on the subject. This short version is definitively only a first outline. Dominic Mayers (talk) 00:02, 23 January 2023 (UTC)