Talk:Theodore Stark Wilkinson

Why Ping?

Does anyone happen to know why his name was "Ping?"

V. Joe 20:00, 31 October 2006 (UTC) I can answer that question. While in boarding school (St. Paul's School in Concord, NH), Wilkinson had taken up the game of squash, introduced into the US from England in the 1880's. He promoted the game at the Naval Academy subsequently and is said to have have convinced the athletic department to have squash courts installed at Annapolis. The nickname came from the sound of squash balls striking the walls of the court. Tswilk3 (talk) 16:25, 27 August 2009 (UTC)tswilk3Tswilk3 (talk) 16:25, 27 August 2009 (UTC)

Wilkinson Photo with Lt. Gen. Harmon

The man shown in this photo, inserted in the bio in May 2009 by JWilbur, is actually not RAdm. Wilkinson. Instead, judging from checking other photos of him, it is almost certainly RAdm. Richmond Kelly Turner, who appears to have been present on the same ship as Wilkinson when the photo was taken. It is no fault of JWilbur. The photo appears in the official "US Army in WW II" history with the same incorrect caption. It appears to originate in a set of photos entited "The New Georgia Campaign" (source unclear) that can be found in the wikipedia commons. The photo should be taken out of this bio. In its place it might be possible to substitute the preceding photo in the New Georgia set, which does correctly show Wilkinson, together with three other senior officers (including Turner).Tswilk3 (talk) 14:32, 2 September 2009 (UTC)

I have replaced the photo, as you suggested. It originally came from this website, which in turn came from this book. The website gives the same incorrect caption (identifying the man on the left as Wilkinson), I don't have access to the book so I don't know if it is incorrect there also. — jwillbur 15:58, 4 September 2009 (UTC)

Appreciate the correction. Tswilk3 (talk) 20:42, 4 October 2009 (UTC)

TSW Role Before Pearl Harbor

Wilkinson's role as Naval Intelligence Director before Pearl Harbor is discussed in three paragraphs under "World War II." Important editing was inserted here by "wikihw" on August 28, 2007. Wilkinson's role was indeed significant and should be covered in his bio. The joint investigative committee of Congress spent five days hearing his testimony and that of Adm. Richmond Kelly Turner, who also played a central role. The testimony covers 300 pages in the multi-volume committee product. It can scarcely be read to support a conclusion that Wilkinson was "outmaneuvered" by Turner, who as Director of War Plans had claimed control of operationally significant intelligence being sent to the fleet a year before Wilkinson took over of intelligence director. Moreover, the quote that follows from a biography of Turner is probably a good picture of Turner, but devotes more space to Turner that perhaps warranted in a TSW bio sketch. Finally the subsequent quote from the same source about Turner's talks with Wilkinson comes from Turner's testimony (p.1983 of the commitee hearings record, part IV). For his part, Wilkinson did not recall that he had specifically talked with Turner about the possibility of an air attack on Hawaii (p. 1869). He did recall that Turner was "not confident [the Phillippines] would be attacked." (p. 1758)

Accordingly, I would like to suggest the following revision of the first three paragraphs under "World War II," but would like to hear comments from "wikihw" or any others before making the proposed changes:

Detached from that duty in September 1941 and promoted to Rear Admiral, Wilkinson became the director of the office of Naval Intelligence on October 15. His new responsibilities inevitably embroiled him in the subsequent controversy over whether the US Pacific Fleet Commander at Pearl Harbor was sufficiently warned of the danger of a Japanese attack before December 7 -- a complex issue on which he testified for three days before a congressional committee in December 1945.

According to his testimony and others', ONI was responsible for collecting and evaluating intelligence, but RADM. Richmond Kelly Turner, Director of War Plans, had been given the responsibility in 1940 to control information sent to the fleet on "enemy intentions" and "the strategic picture." Exercising this authority, Turner prepared messages to fleet commanders on November 24 that "a surprise aggressive movement on the Philippines or Guam is a distinct possibility," and on November 27 stating that: "this is a war warning....an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days....indicates an amphibious expeditionagaisnt either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo....execute apprpriate defensive deployment." Wilkinson had followed these messages up on December 2 with a message to the commanders reporting that Japanese consuls were instructed to destroy their codes. No further warnings were sent until just before the attack on December 7, when hostilities had become even more clearly imminent from overnight decryption of Japanese "purple code" intercepts.

When asked for his opinion at the time about japanese intentions, Turner said he had always thought there was a 50-50 chance that they would attack Pearl harbor at the outset. The committee notes that he was "the only officer in Washington in the higher echelons who thought so." <ref> 79th Congress, Second Session, Report of the Joint Committee on the Invstigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, p. 233<ref> Wilkinson in contrast admitted that he believed it was more likely that Japan would strike first somewhere in the Southwest Pacific and avoid an immediate direct confrontation with the US -- an opinion which the committee found to be widely shared by senior naval officers before the attack. AnomieBOT⚡ 03:35, 16 April 2016 (UTC)

Addition to TSW in World War II

The following was dropped from the previous editing proposal:

Wilkinson in contrast admitted that he believed it was more likely that Japan would strike first somewhere in the Southwest Pacific and avoid an immediate direct confrontation with the United States -- an opinion which the committee report found to have been widely held at the time by senior US naval officers.

Addition to TSW in World War II

The following was dropped from the previous editing proposal:

Wilkinson in contrast admitted that he believed it was more likely that Japan would strike first somewhere in the Southwest Pacific and avoid an immediate direct confrontation with the United States -- an opinion which the committee report found to have been widely held at the time by senior US naval officers.AnomieBOT⚡ 03:35, 16 April 2016 (UTC)

Addition to TSW in World War II

The following was dropped from the previous editing proposal:

Wilkinson in contrast admitted that he believed it was more likely that Japan would strike first somewhere in the Southwest Pacific and avoid an immediate direct confrontation with the United States -- an opinion which the committee report found to have been widely held at the time by senior US naval officers.AnomieBOT⚡ 03:35, 16 April 2016 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Tswilk3 (talk • contribs) 00:29, 5 October 2009 (UTC)