User:Dillydingdillydong/sandbox
Feminist Philosophy of Science is a branch of philosophy that seeks to understand how the acquirement of knowledge through scientific means has been influenced by notions of gender and gender roles in society.Feminist philosophers of science question how scientific research and scientific knowledge itself may be influenced and possibly compromised by the social and professional framework within which that research and knowledge is established and exists. It has been described as being located "at the intersections of the philosophy of science and feminist science scholarship"[1], and has attracted considerable attention since the 1970s.
Feminist epistemology often emphasises "situated knowledge"[2] that hinges on one's individual perspectives on a subject. Feminist philosophers often highlight the under-representation of female scientists in academia and the possibility that science currently has androcentric biases. Scientific theory has been accused of being more compatible with male cognitive styles and reasoning. Feminist epistemology suggests that integrating feminine modes of thought and logic that are undervalued by current scientific theory will enable improvement and broadening of scientific perspectives. Advocates assert that it may be guide in creating a philosophy of science that is more accessible to public. Practitioners of feminist philosophy of science also seek to promote gender equality in scientific fields and greater recognition of the achievements of female scientists.
Critics have argued that the political commitments of advocates of feminist philosophy of science is incompatible with modern-day scientific objectivity[3], emphasising the success of the scientific method due to it's lauded objectivity and "value-free"[4] methods of knowledge-making.
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/0c/Barbara_Askins%2C_Chemist_-_GPN-2004-00022.jpg/220px-Barbara_Askins%2C_Chemist_-_GPN-2004-00022.jpg)
History
[edit]The feminist Philosophy of science was born out of feminist science studies in the 1960’s. It would however be the 1980's before Feminist Philosophy of Science would develop its own unique identity. One of the first and most important publications released was from a women’s academic journal called “Signs” with a piece titled: “Women, Science, and Society”[5] This piece was published in August 1978 by Catherine Stimpson and Joan Burstyn. "This first collection of what today would be recognizable as "feminist science studies" featured scholarship in three areas: critiques of gender bias in science, history of women in science, and social science data and public policy considerations on the status of women in the science".[6] These three topics have remained prominent issues in feminist science studies of modern day.
Feminist science studies had become more philosophical and more ambitious by the 1980’s and even pursued to redefine the core epistemological concepts. The reason for this shift in feminist science studies was due to a corresponding shift in many fields of academic feminism. This shift led to a parting of ways between scholarship on “women in science” and “feminist critiques of science”. This was documented by feminist scholars; Helen Longino and Evelynn Hammonds in their book published in 1990 titled; “Conflicts and Tensions in the Feminist Study of Gender and Science”.
By the late nineties, feminist science studies had become well-established had had many prominent scholars within its field of study. Philosopher John Searle characterized feminism in 1993 as a “cause to be advanced” more so than a “domain to be studied”.[7]
Feminist Philosophy of Science
[edit]Objectivity and Values
[edit]Some have questioned the objectivity of Feminist Philosophy of Science. Feminists however argue that rather than undermine objectivity, incorporating feminist values could help create more robust and sophisticated research methods which in turn may well produce better balanced results.[8]
Standpoint and Knowledge
[edit]Feminist Philosophy of Science has traditionally been highly critical of the lack of access and opportunities for women in science and believe science can, and has been "distorted by sexist values"[9] Sharon Crasnow highlights how the "exclusion of women as researchers and subjects"[10] in scientific research, studies and projects can lead to questionable methods and methodologies and ultimately unreliable or inaccurate results. Feminists have come up with a new concept, one of a ‘successor science’[11], a "different feminist science". As it is not yet complete, the methodology is still up for debate as it mixes the subjectivity with the objectivity of science. What this successor science is quite hard to imagine especially when considering how successful modern science is. Some feminist philosophies of science revolve around asking if this success is due to objectivity which includes "impartiality, neutrality, autonomy, and indifference to political positions and the values". Feminists in this field discuss whether the objectivity in science is true and rational, independent of social and political factors. Feminist epistemology asks about the scientific method, standards of rationality, and the role gender plays in shaping knowledge. According to these feminists, this challenges the traditional view of objectivity.
Relating to Objectivity; Epistemology is can give a fuller understanding of the nature of scientific knowledge. Feminist epistemology is one of a group of approaches in science studies that urges us to recognize the role of the social in the production of knowledge. Feminist epistemology directs people to consider features of themselves and culture as beings of knowledge that had been outside what was considered appropriate. The goals of researchers and the values that shape the choice of goals are relevant to the knowledge we arrive at. This has implications both for how we train scientists and for how we educate everyone about science. If science is seen as more connected to application, more related to human needs and desires, traditionally underrepresented groups will have greater motivation to succeed and persist in their science courses or pursue scientific careers. Motivation will be greater as members of underrepresented groups see how science can produce knowledge that has value to their concerns in ways that are consistent with good scientific methodology. Feminist epistemology urges a continued exploration of science in this way and so has much to offer science education.
Challenges and Contributions
[edit]One of the major challenges facing feminist philosophers of science lies in convincing some skeptics in the fields of philosophy and science that Feminist Philosophy of Science is in fact a legitimate and objective field of academic research and study rather than an agenda driven ideology. Sarah S. Richardson points out that those who level this accusation at Feminist Philosophy of Science completely misunderstand its motivations and ambitions.[12] Richardson describes how many feminist philosophers of science are involved in "ambitious constructive projects to build a better science".[13] Case studies have played a major role in furthering and advancing feminist philosophy of science. For example a study conducted by Lloyd in 2005 on the function female orgasm. She explores how evolutionary biologists made false assumptions as to the function of the female orgasm.[14] They believed that it must have reproductive purpose in females simply because it does in males. They went as far as to ignore clear evidence as it went against their initial beliefs. This critique caused extensive debate as it attacked the core beliefs held by evolutionary biologists. Work like this has and is currently being conducted by feminist philosophers of science as they challenge traditional philosophical questions such as pluralism, objectivity and background assumptions.
One of the greatest challenges faced by female philosophers is marginalization within the academic field of philosophy according to Sarah .S. Richardson[15]. They face exclusion in scientific fields and are marginalized and vastly unrepresented similarly to minorities in the field of philosophy. Their critiques of many topics such as gender bias are often changed, distorted and ineffectively translated by scientists and therefore by the general public.
Key Thinkers
[edit]Alison Wylie
[edit]Alison Wylie believes that the standards of objectivity should be applied to the methods and values shaping the scientific activity itself. She notes that objectivity is used to demonstrate a connection between theory and the world[16]. This is one of the properties that knowledge or information has. Instead of analyzing this property, Wylie proposes that objectivity in a claim means that it conform epistemology such as: empirical adequacy, explanatory power, internal coherence and consistency with other established bodies of knowledge. Wylie acknowledges that there could be disputes over one or more of these proposed properties and the degree to which it is important. This is not her concern. Empirical adequacy stands to be one of the most important, but philosophers of science such as Wylie believe that empirical adequacy is ambiguous. Empirical adequacy is either one of two things: fidelity to a collection of limited evidence (empirical depth) or the ability to push claims in question through many different situations, such as various applications and other scientific areas (empirical breadth). Wylie considers legitimization to be resolved considering logical esteems, incorporating those unequivocally associated with the relevant stance. These values don't tell us whether to accept the theory, however they figure out the epistemic virtues that are the most important and allow theory acceptance. Wylie believes that if this epistemic standpoint is achieved, it can result in evidence that otherwise might have gone unnoticed.
Sandra Harding
[edit]According to Sandra Harding, there is a problem with objectivity because it denies that contextual values should have any epistemic power that may play a positive role but that is not accounted for. Harding gives the example that it is frequently claimed that democratic values are more conducive to knowledge than non-democratic values. 'Strong objectivity’[17] as Harding puts it, need the subject of knowledge to be placed on the same critical plane as the objects of knowledge. This is because culture-wide beliefs function as evidence at every stage in scientific inquiry: in the selection of problems, the formation of hypotheses, the design of research, the collection of date, the interpretation and sorting of data, decisions about when to stop research, the way results of research are reported, and so on.
References
[edit]- ^ The Blackwell guide to the philosophy of science. Machamer, Peter K., Silberstein, Michael. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell. 2002. ISBN 0631221077. OCLC 50661258.
{{cite book}}
: CS1 maint: others (link) - ^ Kurki, Milja (May 2015). "Stretching Situated Knowledge: From Standpoint Epistemology to Cosmology and Back Again". Millennium: Journal of International Studies. 43.
- ^ Crasnow, Sharon (2008-11-01). "Feminist philosophy of science: 'standpoint' and knowledge". Science & Education. 17 (10): 1089–1110. doi:10.1007/s11191-006-9069-z. ISSN 0926-7220.
- ^ Crasnow, Sharon (2013-04-01). "Feminist Philosophy of Science: Values and Objectivity". Philosophy Compass. 8 (4): 413–423. doi:10.1111/phc3.12023. ISSN 1747-9991.
- ^ Stimpson, Catharine R.; Burstyn, Joan N. (October 1978). "Editorial". Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society. 4 (1): 1–3. doi:10.1086/493565. ISSN 0097-9740.
- ^ Richardson, Sarah S. (2010-12-01). "Feminist philosophy of science: history, contributions, and challenges". Synthese. 177 (3): 337–362. doi:10.1007/s11229-010-9791-6. ISSN 0039-7857.
- ^ Searle, John R. (1993). "Rationality and Realism, What Is at Stake?". Daedalus. 122 (4): 55–83.
- ^ Crasnow, Sharon (4 August 2013). "Feminist Philosophy of Science: Values and Objectivity". Philosophy Compass: 413–423.
- ^ Crasnow, Sharon (4 August 2013). "Feminist Philosophy of Science: Values and Objectivity". Philosophy Compass: 413–423.
- ^ Crasnow, Sharon (4 August 2013). "Feminist Philosophy of Science: Values and Objectivity". Philosophy Compass: 413–423.
- ^ Crasnow, Sharon (2008-11-01). "Feminist philosophy of science: 'standpoint' and knowledge". Science & Education. 17 (10): 1089–1110. doi:10.1007/s11191-006-9069-z. ISSN 0926-7220.
- ^ Richardson, Sarah S (26 October 2010). "Feminist Philosophy of Science: history, contributions and challenges". Springer Science + Business Media: 337–362.
- ^ Richardson, Sarah S (26 October 2010). "Feminist Philosophy of Science: history, contributions and challenges". Springer Science + Business Media: 337–362.
- ^ Lloyd, Elisabeth A. (2006). The case of the female orgasm : bias in the science of evolution. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. ISBN 9780674022461.
- ^ Richardson, Sarah S. (26 October 2010). "Feminist philosophy of science: history, contributions, and challenges". Synthese. 177 (3): 337–362. doi:10.1007/s11229-010-9791-6.
- ^ Crasnow, Sharon (2008-11-01). "Feminist philosophy of science: 'standpoint' and knowledge". Science & Education. 17 (10): 1089–1110. doi:10.1007/s11191-006-9069-z. ISSN 0926-7220.
- ^ Crasnow, Sharon (2008-11-01). "Feminist philosophy of science: 'standpoint' and knowledge". Science & Education. 17 (10): 1089–1110. doi:10.1007/s11191-006-9069-z. ISSN 0926-7220.