User:Dukon/PAIV
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Paper Anchored Internet Voting (PAIV) is a paper anchored internet voting protocol developed in order to eliminate the risks of internet voting by anchoring electronic- and screen-ballots to paper-ballots, and electronic- and optical scanner-counts to paper-counts, thus binding the new technology form factors to the familiar as an improvement to protect against vote tampering as traditional voting practices are painfully susceptible.[1]
Overview
[edit]The PAIV protocol delivers open accountability and public transparency in elections. PAIV moreover potentially solves the internet voting security problem by imposing voter intent on three types of redundant Paper-Anchored ballots. Election staff directly conduct three types of redundant Paper-Anchored counts the results of which are strictly independent of the software (with its attendant security risks) used to generate them.
Eternal vigilance on the part of both voters and election staff secures accuracy in the vote balloting and counting processes, respectively, while the Paper Anchors open both to public discovery at every level of result tabulations. The use of the internet allows voters and election staff at the precinct to manipulate (mark, print) ballots in a Phase-1, to print their own ballots anywhere in a Phase-2 which reduces time spent at, and hence reduces the voter queue lengths, at the polls thus delivering effciency improvements in the voting experience for all Americans. Data taking and experience during Phase-1 and Phase-2 roll outs provide crucial risk measurements for security assessments. Once such measurements allow community consensus, a transition to a proposed Phase-3 roll out offering the use of electronic submission of ballots expands the very conception of elections in unimaginable ways.
At all times, the output Paper Anchored ballots and counts are paramount, the technology (software) used to generate them peripheral. Output focused results render technology and software insecurities minimized drastically eliminating risks from internet voting generally and from PAIV in particular.
Paper Anchored Internet Voting
[edit]Paper-Anchored-Internet Voting (PAIV) is a Paper Voting system which enables that public transparency exists throughout. This is a publically transparent system since the Paper Ballot (p-ballot) is paramount which always provides for voter-marked primary level evidence at all times. All else proposed is secondary and introduced only for double and triple checks, for triplicate verification to match new ballots and new counts to the paramount Paper Ballots (p-ballot) and Paper Counts (p-count).
Next, the problem and fear with internet voting are the hacker and malware intruders changing votes and/or counts or both. Since blocking hackers is next to impossible, or if possible is prohibitively expensive, the proposal is to allow the intruders, still use low security cheap PCs which town precincts and municipalities already have. The effort to solve the internet voting security problem must either block intruders or let them in. PAIV explicitly lets them in (which eliminates the cost of impossible security enhancements) since their hacks can be detected and reversed via the proposed protocol of triplicate verification. Paper voting on internet machines can still be successful even with hackers by this verification protocol.
This proposal is a "paper voting system that all voters must use" but it has new internet technology-assists at the precincts (Phase-1) as described below, at printers everywhere including libraries and homes (Phase-2) and ultimately enabling electronic submission via a specially secure portal (Phase-3). This portal is proposed to be used from the start of Phase-1 in the precincts, with later phase roll outs after suitable data taking during the earlier phases allows for the necessary characterization and measure- ment of risks.
This proposal is a paper voting system which therefore includes all the human count and primary evidence required by Bev Harris of the BlackBoxVoting.org NGO. The pub- lic transparency that is generally deemed necessary is being designed into the proposal from its inception. This proposal will have a paper-only aspect and an internet-assist but anchored-by-paper-and-humans aspect.
The proposal is presented in THREE phases. A Phase-1 for the Precinct Voter and Phases-2 & -3 for the Internet voter. It is expected that the Phase-1 precinct voter will see only minor changes from what they have seen for nearly 400 yrs. They still see a booth, they vote, they still deal with election sta?, who process their paper ballots. This proposal will introduce technology inside the booth but this will only be peripheral to the OUTPUT of the technology which the voter directly observes at all times. While technology assists in the ballot generation only the OUTPUT paper-ballots (p-ballots) matter and provide the anchor to which other ballots are inextricably bound by the voter directly himself.
The innovations presented for the Phase-1 precinct voter, which can be successful even with hacker risk, then give rise to the possibility for Phases-2 & 3 paper-anchored- internet voting described below.
Phase 1: The Precinct Voter
[edit]Phase 2: The Internet Voter (print only)
[edit]Phase 3: The Internet Voter (electronic submission)
[edit]Vulnerabilities of PAIV
[edit]Summary
[edit]References
[edit]- ^ For numerous examples spanning centuries of American History, see Andrew Gumbel, Steal This Vote, Nation Books, 2005.
References
[edit]External links
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