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User:Emma.Fagan/Angola-China Relations draft

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NOTE: Anything in italics is from the preexisting page.


Relations between Angola and China predate the former's independence. Today they are based on an emerging trade relationship. As of 2021, Angola was China's third-largest trading partner in Africa.

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History

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During Kenya's independence ceremonies in 1963, Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi told Jonas Savimbi, the Secretary-General of the Union of Peoples of Northern Angola, that his country would give the UPNA (a founding group of the FNLA) "large-scale military aid". Three years later, UNITA separatists formerly part of the FNLA, led by Savimbi, attacked Portuguese workers in Cassamba. Armed with only ten NATO 7.62 rifles, purchased with Chinese aid, the attack failed to stop timber operations and Portuguese colonial authorities killed several UNITA members.[2]

During Angola's independence movement against Portugal during the 1960s and 1970s, China provided assistance to Angola's nationalist movements. China initially backed the MPLA, but later began to support FNLA and UNITA as well. As China's relationship with the Soviet Union soured, the MPLA's relationship with the Soviet Union strengthened, and China pulled its support.[3] In 1974, China provided weapons and instructors to the FNLA, as well as arms to UNITA. After the Carnation Revolution in Portugal that effectively ended the colonizer's influence in Angola, China warned all of Angola's three liberation movements "against meddling by external forces." When Angola descended into civil war in 1975, China continued to back the FNLA and UNITA, but drew back as the MPLA gained power.[4]

Fissures

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On December 3, 1975, in a meeting with U.S. and Chinese officials, including Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping, Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua, President Gerald Ford, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and head of the U.S. Liaison Office in Peking George H. W. Bush Chinese entreaties about U.S. continued participation in Angola via South Africa, resulted in Kissinger responding that the US is prepared to "push out South Africa as soon as an alternative military force can be created". Yet, the Chinese still supported the FLNA[clarification needed] and UNITA against the MPLA.[clarification needed] Ford then said: "We had nothing to do with the South African involvement and we will take action to get South Africa out, provided a balance can be maintained for their not being in." He also said that he had approved US$35 million more in support of the north above what had been done before. Discussions entailed who should support FNLA or UNITA, by which means and in what manner, considering the sensitivities of the neighbouring countries.[5]

President of Angola Agostinho Neto condemned the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in February 1979.[6]

On August 25, 2012, 37 Chinese nationals, arrested in Angola due to their alleged involvement in criminal acts against fellow Chinese expatriates, were extradited and due to be tried in China.[7][8]

Political ties

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Following Angola's independence, China struggled to normalize relations with the new MPLA government throughout the 1970s, as tensions with the Soviet Union (who backed the MPLA) remained high. In 1982, however, the People's Republic of China announced its support of, and desire to normalize relations with, Angola's government.[4] The Angolan People's Republic established relations with the People's Republic of China in 1983.[9]

Economic ties

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The Angolan People's Republic first established formal trade relations with China in June 1984. This was followed by aid packages in 1984 and 1985, including a donation from China of equipment for Angola's ports.[4] As of 2007, Angola was China's biggest trading partner in Africa.[10] In 2009, Chinese private investment in Angola reached over $166 million USD.[11] Trade between the two countries was worth US$24.8 billion in 2010.[12] In 2011 and in the first 8 months of 2012 it was the second largest trading partner of China in Africa, after South Africa.[13] In 2016, trade between the two countries was worth US$15.6 billion. Chinese exports to Angola amounted to US$1.68 billion and Angolan exports to China amounted to US$13.97 billion[14]

Chinese Development Finance to Angola

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Angola first sought development money from China in 2002, after the Angolan Civil War had come to an end. Angola had initially turned to the International Monetary Fund for assistance in 2001, but was unwilling to accept the conditions placed on the aid money by the International Monetary Fund.[15]

Since the first Forum on China Africa Cooperation conference in 2000, Beijing has completed $465 million of official development finance projects in Angola (financial amounts normalized in 2009 dollars).[16] This includes a $90 million loan from the Exim Bank of China for the rehabilitation of the Luanda railway and the construction of a 45 km electricity distribution line between Quifangondo and Mabubas.[17] Angola has also received a $1 billion oil-back line of credit for the China Exim bank to repair the country's infrastructure.[18] Between 2000 and 2014, China loaned $21.2 billion USD to Angola, mostly in the form of resource-backed loans.[19]

Oil industry and infrastructure

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Since the early 2000s, Angola has consistently remained a key producer of oil for China. In 2006, Angola briefly became China's top supplier of oil, surpassing Saudi Arabia.[20] As of 2020, the country is the fifth-largest provider of oil imports to China.[21]

As part of its financial lending to Angola, China has used oil-backed loans (loans that are guaranteed to be repaid by the proceeds of Angola's oil sales from its state-owned oil company, Sonangol). These loans were primarily used for infrastructure development in Angola, with one agreement stipulating that 70% of the services used to build the infrastructure had to be contracted from China.[22] As of 2010, over four hundred state and private Chinese companies were operating in Angola.[23] This practice has been criticized by scholars as being "neo-imperial" in nature, or a new economic form of colonialism.[24]

These infrastructure projects funded by Chinese oil-backed loans triggered investment and growth in some domestic sectors of Angola's economy. As the domestic market grew during the 2010s, Angola's government moved to protect its local agricultural and food and beverage production industries in order to further enhance economic growth at home.[19]

Chinese Diaspora in Angola

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As of 2016, an estimated 53,000 Chinese citizens were living and working in Angola; other estimates fall in the range of 100,000 to 250,000 people. Angolan public opinion on China, as gleaned from an analysis of internet commentary in the early 2010s, is reportedly mixed. One study theorizes that singular negative incidents, however minor, have sometimes propagated negative stereotypes towards Chinese migrants living in Angola, particularly in regards to China becoming a neo-colonial power in Angola.[25]

  1. ^ Mureithi, Carlos. "Trade between Africa and China reached an all-time high in 2021". Quartz. Retrieved 2022-04-08.
  2. ^ Walker, John Frederick (2004). A Certain Curve of Horn: The Hundred-Year Quest for the Giant Sable Antelope of Angola. p. 147. ISBN 9780802140685.
  3. ^ Jurenczyk, Lukasz (2020-11-01). "Analysing China's "Angola Model": A Pattern for Chinese Involvement in Africa?". Strategic Review for Southern Africa. 42 (2): 43–62.
  4. ^ a b c Taylor, Ian (1997). "Mainland China-Angola Relations: Moving from Debacle to Détente". Issues and Studies - Institute of International Relations. 33: 64–81.
  5. ^ "Document obtained by National Security Archive, from National Archives Record Group 59. Records of the Department of State, Policy Planning Staff, Director's Files (Winston Lord), 1969-1977, Box 373" (PDF). Gwu.edu. Retrieved 2016-10-01.
  6. ^ Winrow, Gareth M. (1990). The Foreign Policy of the GDR in Africa. p. 115.
  7. ^ "Angola deports China 'gangsters'". BBC. 2012-08-25. Retrieved 2012-08-25.
  8. ^ "Angola extradites suspected Chinese gangsters". Al Jazeera English. 2012-08-26. Retrieved 2016-10-01.
  9. ^ "China in Angola: An emerging energy partnership". The Jamestown Foundation. 2006. Archived from the original on 2007-11-28. Retrieved 2007-12-27.
  10. ^ Lucy Ash (2007-12-04). "China in Africa: Developing ties". BBC News. Archived from the original on 7 December 2007. Retrieved 2007-12-27.
  11. ^ Ovadia, Jesse Salah (2013-06-01). "Accumulation with or without dispossession? A 'both/and' approach to China in Africa with reference to Angola". Review of African Political Economy. 40 (136): 233–250. doi:10.1080/03056244.2013.794724. ISSN 0305-6244.
  12. ^ "China pledges $20bn in credit for Africa at summit". BBC News Online. BBC. 2012-07-19. Retrieved 2012-07-19.
  13. ^ "Mozambique-China Trade Continues to Grow". allafrica.com. 2012-12-09. Retrieved 2012-12-09.
  14. ^ "China Products Exports by country 2019 | WITS Data".
  15. ^ Lucy., Corkin, (2016). Uncovering African Agency : Angola's Management of China's Credit Lines. Taylor and Francis. ISBN 978-1-317-00538-4. OCLC 1018163324.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: extra punctuation (link) CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  16. ^ Austin Strange, Bradley C. Parks, Michael J. Tierney, Andreas Fuchs, Axel Dreher, and Vijaya Ramachandran. 2013. China's Development Finance to Africa: A Media-Based Approach to Data Collection. CGD Working Paper 323. Washington DC: Center for Global Development.
  17. ^ Austin Strange; Bradley C. Parks; Michael J. Tierney; Andreas Fuchs; Axel Dreher; Vijaya Ramachandran (2013). "China's Development Finance to Africa: A Media-Based Approach to Data Collection. CGD Working Paper 323. Washington DC: Center for Global Development". Aiddatachina.org. Retrieved 2016-10-01.
  18. ^ Austin Strange; Bradley C. Parks; Michael J. Tierney; Andreas Fuchs; Axel Dreher; Vijaya Ramachandran (2013). "China's Development Finance to Africa: A Media-Based Approach to Data Collection. CGD Working Paper 323. Washington DC: Center for Global Development". Aiddatachina.org. Retrieved 2016-10-01.[permanent dead link]
  19. ^ a b Wolf, Christina (2017-04-17). "Industrialization in times of China: Domestic-market formation in Angola". African Affairs. 116 (464): 435–461. doi:10.1093/afraf/adx015. ISSN 0001-9909.
  20. ^ CAMPBELL, HORACE; CHAULIA, SREERAM (2009). "Unequal Equals: Angola And China". World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues. 13 (1): 44–83. ISSN 0971-8052.
  21. ^ Zhou, Oceana (2021-01-20). "China's 2020 crude imports from US surge 211% to 396,000 b/d, valued at $6.28 bil". www.spglobal.com. Retrieved 2022-03-21.
  22. ^ Alves, Ana Cristina (2013-03-01). "Chinese economic statecraft: a comparative study of China's oil-backed loans in Angola and Brazil". Journal of Current Chinese Affairs. 42 (1): 99–131.
  23. ^ Schmitz, Cheryl Mei‐ting (2021-05-01). "Making Friends, Building Roads: Chinese Entrepreneurship and the Search for Reliability in Angola". American Anthropologist. 123 (2): 343–354. doi:10.1111/aman.13558. ISSN 0002-7294.
  24. ^ Rapanyane, Makhura B. (2021-12-01). "Neocolonialism and New imperialism: Unpacking the Real Story of China's Africa Engagement in Angola, Kenya, and Zambia". Journal of African Foreign Affairs. 8 (3): 89–113. doi:10.31920/2056-5658/2021/v8n3a5.
  25. ^ Jura, Jaroslaw; Kaluzynska, Kaja; De Carvalho, Paulo (2018-09-01). "'The big brother we appreciate' or a 'mafioso'? The emergence of stereotypes concerning China and the Chinese in Angola". Journal of African Media Studies. 10 (3): 251–271. doi:10.1386/jams.10.3.251_1. ISSN 2040-199X.
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