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Under the communist regime[edit]

Under communism, for the sake of the nation and to further their socioeconomic and political goals, cooperation between the communist government and the Romanian Orthodox Church (ROC) was preferable to the Romanian Communist Party (RCP). The communist leadership was able to influence the ROC through mutual and informal support.[1] In turn, because the Church’s backed the communist regime, it was allowed to continue to perform traditional rituals such as baptisms, weddings, and burials, which allowed it to remain tied to the social body.[1] Therefore, the Church tied itself to the definition of “Romanianism,” which empowered it to strengthen itself as a moral and political authority.[1] Katherine Verdery’s concept of the “indigenization of Marxism” explains how public discourse during the communist period was meant to support the political center, and so, in Communist Romania, Marxism-Leninism coexisted alongside nationalist values since communist ideology was a product of the national discourse.[2] By using the Church as a vehicle for communist propaganda, the RCP reinforced the idea that Orthodoxy was inherently tied to Romanian national identity.[3]

Scott Long, US-born activist for international LGBTQ+ rights, wrote in the Human Rights Watch report on public scandals, that the appearance of Article 200 of the Penal Code (Art. 200 P.C.) coincided with increasing restrictions and presence of the state in the private sphere.[4]

Article 200 of the Penal Code and public opinion[edit]

Article 200 of the Romanian Penal Code (P.C.) delayed Romania's accession to the EU since both its application for membership and accession negotiations depended, among other requirements, on Romania guaranteeing human rights to its sexual minorities.[5]The Romanian government abrogated it in 2001 as a trade-off for EU membership and to deliver its economic advantages to Romanians rather than to improve the lives of homosexuals.[6] The clash between international standards of human rights and local cultural values was nothing unique to Romania.[6] As a result, measures aimed at improving inclusion and diversity were virtually a legal fiction. Gay and Lesbian worries, anxieties, and disappointments demonstrate the way in which they were persistently excluded from the prototypical post-socialist Romanian identity and continued to navigate a repressive space dominated by Christian Orthodox values.

The legacy of the communist regime in Romania includes, together with the centrality of national values in the public discourse (Verdery, 1993), a very unstable separation between the public and the private spheres. In the case of sexual minorities, this intervention of the state in private affairs was clear in the criminalization of same-sex sexual relations between consenting adults until 2001. The reluctance to decriminalize such relations can be explained by the presence of essentialist nationalist assumptions which denoted same-sex relations as alien and threatening to the family- and religion-oriented Romanian way of life.[6]

In 1918, Greater Romania recognized as legitimate the 1864 Penal Code inspired by the French Penal Code, which made no distinction made between homosexual and heterosexual relations. In 1936, under the influence of Romania’s fascist movement and The Iron Guard political party, King Charles II reformed the P.C. to apply stricter laws on social morality such as Article 431 that criminalized same-sex relations from six months to up to two years of prison.[7] These reforms equated sexual infractions with violations of morality, a correlation which stands to this day for the Romanian Orthodox Church (ROC). In 1968, the Great National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Romania revised the 1936 P.C. and placed a new emphasis on family values, as it was seen to be the microcosm of society, to which, homosexuals were posing a direct threat. The laws blurred the distinction between public and private: regardless of whether homosexual acts were performed in public or in private, individuals could be imprisoned from one year to up to five under the newly applied Article 200. Through the 1968 P.C. ****the communist government made it explicit*** that it would assert social control in which personal and sexual liberties would be curtailed and the intrusion of the state into private spaces became the modus operandi.[8] The heterosexual couple conceived through their reproductive capacities was then a model for the rest of society to conform to and a vehicle through which to exclude sexual minorities.[9] The focus of Ceaușescu’s regime was on reproductive policies to increase the birthrate, hence promoting a unified heterosexual populace that left no place for any other sort of identity. [what constitutes a form of social control] Additionally, the goal of the law was to maintain the queer community underground

Because of the communist regime and the puritanical stance it took on sexuality as solely meant for reproduction and the elimination or repression of all "divergent", homosexuals essentially became invisible to the general population, which explains why in the early 1990s, with the appearance of gay rights activists, international human rights organizations and the European Council's pressure on Romania to decriminalize homosexuality, conservative political elites and the Romanian Orthodox Church were arguing that sexual minorities did not exist in Romania before the fall of communism.[10] Homosexuality became to be perceived as an undesirable result of capitalism and as ultimately alien to Romanian identity. Same-sex relations were part of the perceived Western life style that was imported in Eastern Europe and that was trying to corrupt the heteronormative Romanian culture, based on family as the nucleus of society.

In June 1995, Romania applied for EU membership.[11] Rising international pressure for Romania to respect the human rights of its sexual minorities led to the amendment of the first paragraph of Art. 200, in 1996. The law was changed to make same-sex relations done in public or “creating a public scandal” punishable by 1-5 years of prison.[12] The notion of “public scandal” was an ambiguous formulation that enabled abusive interpretation of the law to ensue, hence perpetuating the institutionalized criminalization of homosexuality.[13] Simply witnessing or knowing of a homosexual relation could be construed as a “public scandal” under the law.[14] The freedoms of expression and of association of homosexuals were thus compromised as their meeting places, their interactions and their publications were susceptible to prosecution. Despite Romania’s purported opening to Western Europe and adoption of values of freedom, tolerance and democracy, homosexual identity and way of life remained, under the law, incompatible with the new national Romanian identity.

In a homophobic social environment, the idea that only legal changes in favor of equal family and social policy treatment for different and same-sex couples are sufficient has been contested because the idea is that the society is "not ready" or "mature enough" to provide full citizenship to LGBTQ+ citizens.[15] As the EU orientalized Central and Eastern Europe as “homophobic” and an “underdeveloped Other,” the Romanian state, trying to reconfigure its geopolitical identity as a “Western and democratic” country, needed to overcome at the legislative level their discriminatory policies.[16]Accession to the EU and to Westernization was solely meant on a symbolic and economic level.[17]

Influence of the Romanian Orthodox Church[edit]

The debate over the rights of sexual minorities in the 1990s was also a debate on national identity in which Romanian politicians, human rights activists and the Romanian Orthodox Church were involved and trying to create their own narrative for the post-socialist Romanian identity.[18] The narrative promoted by the ROC had sufficient power to influence bureaucratic policies; and the other, by secular groups supported the EU’s minority rights and challenged the Church’s political prominence. After the fall of Communism, the ROC enjoyed greater freedom and increased its presence in schools, on the radio and on television, which enabled it to portray itself in a positive light and to successfully appeal to the masses.[19] In 2000, the greater public appeal for the abrogation of Art. 200 P.C. and growing pressure from the EU, led the Holy Synod of the ROC to write a letter to the Romanian Parliament in which it declared: “The ROC assumed its responsible openness to support the process of European integration, but it disagrees with decisions that lead to moral and spiritual degradation of Romanian society.”[20] The ROC claimed that Romanian people was born Orthodox, that the interests of the Church and of the Romanian people converge, and that the ROC is responsible for safeguarding and furthering the interests of the nation.[21] Hence, being Romanian meant being Orthodox.[21]

In the nineties, the ROC was one of the most trusted institutions in Romania, which confirm its power and influence over the construction of a post-socialist Romanian identity: in 2000, in a national opinion poll, 69% of interviewees credited the ROC as a reliable institutions over government and Parliament that received 5%.[21]

Religion was used as a unifying vehicle after the fall of the communist regime and ultimately led to a formulation of nationalism that rejected homosexuality as an “appropriate” identity. In 1999, in The Orthodoxy’s Herald (Vestitorul Ortodoxiei), the monthly magazine of the Romanian Patriarchate, was written: “The Church for which homosexuality is a sin should take a stand in Romanian society” and in another article, “Homosexuality is a fall from normality.”[22] The ROC, portraying homosexuals as second-class citizens undeserving of protection, encouraged the political class to follow suit: “the State has the obligation to protect its citizens against a danger that of a contamination [homosexuality]” […] “A natural, political action to protect the national interests.”[23] Homosexuality, under this logic, was not only a threat to the sanctity of the marriage and family, and consequently to the survival of the nation-state, but more importantly to the authoritative discourse and to the place of the Church in Romanian society and politics. Religion was used as a unifying vehicle after the fall of the communist regime and ultimately led to a formulation of nationalism that rejected homosexuality as an “appropriate” identity.

In a research conducted in 2019 by Judit Takasc and Ivett Szalma on whether a main religious denomination can influence social attitudes towards homosexuality. Their research revealed that belonging to the Orthodox Church has a more negative impact on social attitudes than belonging to the Catholic one.[15] Regardless of whether Romanians actively go to Church and observe religious rituals and traditions, they are more influenced by the church when it comes to having a negative attitude towards homosexuality than in other Eastern European countries, because the Romanian Orthodox Church is seen as a credible moral authority.[24] Along with religious and cultural , other factors such as democratic traditions and conceptions about traditional gender roles.[25] The proportion of Romanians belong to the Orthodox Church since 1990 to 2019 has remained relatively stable, however, attendance to religious services has increased by more 10 percent.[26] The correlation found by the research shows that those who do not belong to any religious denomination become increasingly more tolerant than those who do.[27] In Romania, more than half of the population still rejects the idea of having LGBTQ+ neighbors, however those with less traditional gender roles attitudes are more likely to be acceptant of LGBTQ+ people.[28]

One of the most ferocious opponents of the full legalisation of homosexuality in Romania has been the Romanian Orthodox Church. Its leaders have campaigned publicly to keep Article 200 in the penal code. 80% of Romanians identify themselves as Orthodox Christians, but as elsewhere in the continent, the church’s role in society is decreasing. Adrian Coman believes that the Romanian authorities’ refusal to acknowledge gays and lesbians as full-fledged citizens in society lies in the legacy of 50 years of totalitarian, communist rule. [all paragraph][29]

Communism wanted to create this type of model person to be followed by others. Unfortunately, this thing hasn’t changed yet in our mentality and actually is the problem of the mentality of the authorities since they are making the law. Of course, it’s also our responsibility as part of the civil society to try to change this, but it has been and it will be very difficult. Apart from this, in this current moment, the whole attention is focused on the economic problems. So there is no time and money left for other issues.[29]

Public opinion on homosexuality in the 1990s[edit]

in 1989, Ceausescu's communist regime fell. The collapse of Communism, however, did not coincide with the elimination of discrimination against homosexuality.[30] With the disappearance of the Romanian Communist Party emerged a political vaccum that was filled by rival political forces with arrival of democratization.[31] Among those forces were the ones under the influence of the Romanian Orthodox Church that upheld "Romanian exceptionalism" invoked through cultural and religious elements to prove that Romanians were "different" from the rest of Europe and so, could not unilaterally accept all the requirements of the EU.[32]

In an opinion poll in November 2000, 86 percent of respondents selected homosexuals as a group that they would not like as neighbors, which could be explainable by the fact that many Romanians before the nineties had never met homosexuals given the existence of Art. 200 P.C. and the hostile environment that made coming out an uncommon practice. Another survey by Accept in May 2001 for which members of the LGBT community were interviewed showed that 52 percent of them hid their sexual orientation from the family and 18.7 percent kept it secret from everybody.[33] Accept considers the fact that the survey sample was small and included an unusually large number of politically aware members of the LGBT community, and so the number of people who hid their sexuality must have been higher.[33]

Voichita Nachescu explains how homosexuals were deemed “nonexistent” and were rejected from society; the only way in which they were invoked was through criminalization under Art.200 P.C. or through blackmailing that enabled the police to arrest more people suspected of engaging in same-sex sexual relations.[34] The denial of the existence of homosexuality throughout the communist period had a lingering effect into the nineties as conservative political elites and the ROC characterized non-heterosexual minorities as a foreign product that had no root in Romanian society, and which had been brought by capitalism, along with drugs, AIDS, and unemployment.[34] Decriminalizing homosexuality was characterized as a moral and religious offence to the majority of the population.[35]

It’s very difficult to be different in this country. All minorities have problems from this point of view. It is the same case of Hungarians or the Roma people, and homosexuality seems to be the most delicate issue at this very moment. So it isn’t surprising that there isn’t actually a gay community and a gay and lesbian movement in Bucharest. What we are doing is to offer a space for express themselves, a space where they can feel free, where they can be themselves. Through this, little by little, to try to change society’s mentality because it is not only the law which is a problem. It’s also the mentality.[29]

Reactions to first LGBTQ+ conference and queer disappointments:

Nonetheless, gays and lesbians in Romania are trying to bring the issue to the attention of the authorities, the media and the general public. In late October, Romania’s first conference on homosexuality was held at the state-run University of Cluj in Transylvania. The conference was widely reported in the local and national press, though much of the coverage was negative. A local radio station also organised a 3-hour live call-in programme with several Romanian and foreign gays to discuss homosexuality and answer listeners’ questions. The fact that the conference and the call-in programme took place, despite Article 200, is a sign that the situation in Romania may finally be changing. But many gays and lesbians, like Daniel Yorga, are disappointed that their struggle for recognition and acceptance has made so little progress, particularly when other countries in the region were able to put their past behind them and open the closet door. [all paragraph[29]]


  1. ^ a b c Tarta, 34-35.
  2. ^ Katherine Verdery National Ideology Under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceauşescu's Romania. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.
  3. ^ Nicholas Spina, “The Religious Authority of the Orthodox Church and Tolerance Toward Homosexuality,” in Problems of Post-Communism 63, no. 1 (2016): 41.
  4. ^ Scott Long, Public Scandals: Sexual Orientation and Penal Law in Romania, Human Rights Watch, IGLGRC, New York, Bucharest, 1998, 13.
  5. ^ Voichita Nachescu, “Hierarchies of Difference: National Identity, Gay and Lesbian Rights, and the Church in Postcommunist Romania,” in Sexuality and Gender in Postcommunist Eastern Europe and Russia, ed. A. Štulhofer and T. Sandfort (New York: Haworth Press, 2005), 132.
  6. ^ a b c Voichita Nachescu, “Hierarchies of Difference: National Identity, Gay and Lesbian Rights, and the Church in Postcommunist Romania,” in Sexuality and Gender in Postcommunist Eastern Europe and Russia, ed. A. Štulhofer and T. Sandfort (New York: Haworth Press, 2005), 58.
  7. ^ Sinziana Carstocea, “Repères D’une Identité Clandestine: Considérations Historiques Sur L’homosexualité en Roumanie,” in Revue D’histoire Moderne et Contemporaine, no. 53–54 (2006): 194.
  8. ^ Carstocea, 196.
  9. ^ Voichita Nachescu contends by asserting that the intervention of the state in private sexual matters dates back from the communist period; the state’s mediation of national morality through sexual discrimination in the nineties was a legacy of the past regime (Nachescu, “Hierarchies of Difference,” 134)
  10. ^ Viviana Andreescu, “From Legal Tolerance to Social Acceptance: Predictors of Heterosexism in Romania,” in Revista Română De Sociologie 22, no. 3-4 (2011): 212
  11. ^ "Chronology of Romania-EU relations". Permanent Representation of Romania to the European Union.
  12. ^ "LEGE Nr. 140 din 5 noiembrie 1996: pentru modificarea și completarea Codului penal" [Law Nr. 140 of November 5, 1995: for the modification and completion of the Penal Code]. Legislative Portal, Government of Romania, Ministry of Regional Development and Public Administration. MONITORUL OFICIAL NR. 289. November 14, 1996.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: location (link)
  13. ^ Lavinia Stan and Lucian Turcescu, “The Romanian Orthodox Church and Post-Communist Democratisation,” in Europe-Asia Studies 52, no. 8 (2000): 1479.
  14. ^ Carstocea, 203.
  15. ^ a b Takács, Judit, and Ivett Szalma. “Social Attitudes towards Homosexuality in Hungary and Romania: Does the Main Religious Denomination Matter?” In Intersections East European Journal of Society and Politics 5, no.1 (2019): 72.
  16. ^ Tarta, 37; Sremac and Ganzevoort, 2
  17. ^ Tarta, 40.
  18. ^ Voichita Nachescu, “Hierarchies of Difference: National Identity, Gay and Lesbian Rights, and the Church in Postcommunist Romania,” in Sexuality and Gender in Postcommunist Eastern Europe and Russia, ed. A. Štulhofer and T. Sandfort (New York: Haworth Press, 2005), 60.
  19. ^ Stan and Turcescu, 1471
  20. ^ AQANP, Teoctist, “Apelul Sfintului Sinod al Bisericii Ortodoxe Romane adresat Senatorilor și Deputaților din Parlamentul României.” In Observator Cultural. 26 October- 2 November 2000.
  21. ^ a b c Voichita Nachescu, “Hierarchies of Difference: National Identity, Gay and Lesbian Rights, and the Church in Postcommunist Romania,” in Sexuality and Gender in Postcommunist Eastern Europe and Russia, ed. A. Štulhofer and T. Sandfort (New York: Haworth Press, 2005), 67.
  22. ^ Father Constantin Coman, “Cuvantul Bisericii ar trebui sa fie perceput ca un cuvant de dragoste,” newspaper article, 15 June 1999, 9.
  23. ^ Father Ionel Durlea, “Eu, ca duhovnic, stau marturie ca scaperea din aceasta incercare este posibila,” 15 June 1999, 12,
  24. ^ Takács, Judit, and Ivett Szalma. “Social Attitudes towards Homosexuality in Hungary and Romania: Does the Main Religious Denomination Matter?” In Intersections East European Journal of Society and Politics 5, no.1 (2019): 73.
  25. ^ Takács, Judit, and Ivett Szalma. “Social Attitudes towards Homosexuality in Hungary and Romania: Does the Main Religious Denomination Matter?” In Intersections East European Journal of Society and Politics 5, no.1 (2019): 79.
  26. ^ Takács, Judit, and Ivett Szalma. “Social Attitudes towards Homosexuality in Hungary and Romania: Does the Main Religious Denomination Matter?” In Intersections East European Journal of Society and Politics 5, no.1 (2019): 81.
  27. ^ Takács, Judit, and Ivett Szalma. “Social Attitudes towards Homosexuality in Hungary and Romania: Does the Main Religious Denomination Matter?” In Intersections East European Journal of Society and Politics 5, no.1 (2019): 82.
  28. ^ Takács, Judit, and Ivett Szalma. “Social Attitudes towards Homosexuality in Hungary and Romania: Does the Main Religious Denomination Matter?” In Intersections East European Journal of Society and Politics 5, no.1 (2019): 84; 94.
  29. ^ a b c d Beauchemin, Eric (1997-12-10). "The struggle for gay rights in Romania". Radio Netherlands Archives. Retrieved 2023-01-11.
  30. ^ Florin Buhuceanu, Homoistorii: ieşirea din invizibilitate (Bucharest: Humanitas, 2022), 193.
  31. ^ Buhuceanu, 193.
  32. ^ Buhuceanu, 194.
  33. ^ a b Accept (2001). Sexual orientation discrimination in Romania. A survey of violence, harassment and discrimination against Romania’s lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender community, by Accept in cooperation with ILGA Europe, May.
  34. ^ a b Nachescu, “Hierarchies of Difference,” 135
  35. ^ Buhuceanu, 195.