User:Muwatallis II/sandbox/001
Invasion of Panama | |||||||
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Part of the War of Jenkins' Ear | |||||||
Map of the bay of Portobelo according to the "Relación de la América Meridional", a work published in 1748. | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
Great Britain | Spain | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Edward Vernon Edward Trelawny Thomas Wentworth |
Dionisio Martínez de la Vega Juan José Colomo | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
3,900 military personnel:
4 smaller warships 40 transport vessels |
Local Forces of Panama: 1,400 men from Peru 50 men from New Granada | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
1,000 British sicks and several deserters | None |
The Invasion of Panama, also known as Portobelo Fiasco, was a failed British invasion carried out in 1742 by Admiral Edward Vernon to conquer the Isthmus of Panama, during the War of Jenkins' Ear. After the British disasters under Vernon in Cartagena de Indias and Santiago de Cuba in 1741, the British admiral, persistent in fighting, had decided to invade the Isthmus of Panama from his base in the Caribbean, to capture the Spanish city from the same name. This would allow the British to control an important route that reached the Pacific Ocean, thus threatening the commerce of the Viceroyalty of Peru. The British occupied Portobelo unopposed, but after this, doubts began about how to advance towards Panama City. Vernon's hesitations, the lack of a coherent and coordinated plan, diseases and desertions, as well as the Spanish defensive disposition within the territory, caused the failure of the invasion and the British withdrawal. This event had important consequences for the American theater of war and also for the Isthmus of Panama itself.
Background
[edit]In October 1739, after several failed negotiations, Great Britain began hostilities against Spain and then declared war on it. Great Britain had set general objectives which were to conquer some main Spanish ports in the Caribbean Basin and to disrupt Spanish trade.[1][2][3][4] As for the ports to be captured, this would allow the British to control entry and exit routes from South America and limit access to Spain, as well as having footholds for future attacks against the rest of the Spanish Empire in America.[5] But these ambitious British conquest plans had collided with two realities to consider, the question of what would be the most appropriate objectives and the foreseeable high cost of defending these acquisitions.[4]
The British mobilized their naval and land forces to attack the Spanish possessions in America.[Note 1] Admiral Edward Vernon was sent with reinforcements to the Caribbean Sea to lead the attack on the Spanish Main.[7] One of Vernon's first serious attacks against the Spanish was the one he carried out on the Panamanian coast, against Portobelo in November of that year, easily managing to occupy that port due to the precarious defensive situation of the place.[8] The ease with which Vernon captured Portobelo made the British believe that it would not be difficult to capture the Spanish possessions in America.[Note 2] Vernon destroyed the facility and after a few days withdrew from the site. In April of the following year, he returned to Portobelo and successfully destroyed Fort San Lorenzo de Chagres, near the place.[11] Vernon's victories at Portobelo and Chagres earned him high praise from the British public, but he soon began to receive criticism, including from his political associates, for wasting military means on targets that were null and void to the outcome of the war.[12]
With the defenses of Portobelo and Chagres destroyed, Vernon sought a more attractive objective to capture and retain, so in March 1741 he attacked Cartagena de Indias with a large fleet and landing force, but after days of fighting he ended up suffering a harsh defeat.[13][14] The British had had in this engagement between 8,000 and 10,000 dead, 7,500 wounded, several ships seriously damaged and much material lost.[13] The Spanish, led by Viceroy Sebastián de Eslava and Admiral Blas de Lezo, had obtained a triumph that could be considered decisive in the American theater due to the number of British casualties, which conditioned new attacks. But Vernon, without giving up, attacked a new target, Santiago de Cuba, in August, albeit with fewer forces, and again suffered a defeat against the Spanish.[15][16] Vernon would continue to persist, and with a new reinforcement of 3,000 soldiers in Jamaica, he planned a new campaign in an area already visited previously.[17]
Prelude
[edit]Panama invasion project
[edit]As at the beginning of the war, the British once again debated which objective to attack after the disasters in Cartagena de Indias and Santiago de Cuba. British Admiralty was of the opinion to attack between Campeche and the coast of Honduras.[Note 3] Other options considered were Haiti or the Darién.[Note 4]
Spanish preparations
[edit]Vernon's invasion
[edit]Aftermath
[edit]Notes
[edit]- ^ Although the aggressor was Great Britain, while Spain adopted a more defensive posture, neither of them was better prepared for war.[6]
- ^ As in Portobelo, the British believed that all the Spanish fortresses in America were in poor condition. They also believed that the indigenous people of the area would join them and that the Spanish settlers themselves would rebel for a little money.[9] But the Spanish reacted quickly to defend themselves despite the shortcomings that afflicted them.[10]
- ^ In Campeche and Belize the British exploited the logwood and in Honduras they had the alliance of the Miskito people.[18]
- ^ The proposal to attack through the Darién was made by a former pirate who knew the area and trusted the support of the Kuna people.[18]
References
[edit]- ^ Pares, Richard (1963). War and Trade in the West Indies 1739-1763. Frank Cass & Co. pp. 66, 68, 92–93. ISBN 0-7146-1943-4.
- ^ Le Fevre, Peter; Harding, Richard, eds. (2000). Precursors of Nelson: British admirals of the eighteenth century. Stackpole Books. p. 168. ISBN 978-0811729017.
- ^ Richmond, Herbert (1920). The navy in the war of 1739–48. The Cambridge Naval and Military Series. Vol. I. Cambridge University Press. p. 16.
- ^ a b Hilton 2015, p. 292.
- ^ Ford, Douglas (1907). Admiral Vernon and the Navy: A Memoir and Vindication. London: T. Fisher Unwin. p. 140.
- ^ Castillero Calvo 2016, p. 425.
- ^ Marley 2008, pp. 382–383.
- ^ Castillero Calvo 2016, pp. 426–433.
- ^ Castillero Calvo 2016, p. 440.
- ^ Castillero Calvo 2016, pp. 424–425.
- ^ Castillero Calvo 2016, pp. 437–439.
- ^ Castillero Calvo 2016, pp. 434, 439.
- ^ a b Castillero Calvo 2016, p. 442.
- ^ Marley 2008, pp. 390–393.
- ^ Castillero Calvo 2016, pp. 442–443.
- ^ Marley 2008, p. 393.
- ^ Castillero Calvo 2016, pp. 423, 443.
- ^ a b Castillero Calvo 2016, p. 423.
Bibliography
[edit]- Castillero Calvo, Alfredo (2016). Portobelo y el San Lorenzo del Chagres: Perspectivas Imperiales, siglos XVI-XIX (in Spanish). Vol. II. Panamá: Editora Novo Art. ISBN 978-9962-706-08-3.
- Marley, David (2008). Wars of the Americas: A Chronology of Armed Conflict in the New World, 1492 to the Present. Santa Barbara, USA: ABC-CLIO. ISBN 978-1-59884-100-8.
- Fernández Duro, Cesáreo (1900). Armada Española desde la unión de los reinos de Castilla y Aragón (in Spanish). Vol. VI. Madrid, España: Instituto de Historia y Cultura Naval.
- Bautista Sosa, Juan (2017) [1911]. Compendio de Historia de Panamá (in Spanish). Panamá: Ediiciones LAVP.
- Chapman, Craig S. (2021). Disaster on the Spanish Main: The Tragic British-American Expedition to the West Indies During the War of Jenkins' Ear. USA: University of Nebraska Press. ISBN 978-1640124318.
- Hilton, Sylvia L. (2015). Las Indias en la diplomacia española, 1739-1759 (PDF) (Thesis) (in Spanish). Madrid, España: Departamento de Historia Moderna, Universidad Complutense de Madrid.