User:Unidel/Visual Intermodal Protection and Response (VIPR)
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Visual Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR), was established in 2005 by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), an agency of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in accordance with Article 49 of the United States Code, to enhance security by working in mass transit, aviation, rail and other transportation modes alongside local law enforcement agencies. VIPR Teams are comprised of personnel with expertise in inspection, behavior detection, security screening, and law enforcement for random, unpredictable deployments throughout the transportation sector to deter potential terrorist and criminal acts.
There are approximately 37 VIPR Teams made up of Federal Air Marshals, Surface Transportation Security Inspectors, Transportation Security Officers, Behavior Detection Officers and Explosive Detection Canine teams, including liasons from local law enforcement agencies. The teams provide a random high-visibility surge into a transit system and work with state and local security, and law enforcement officials to expand the unpredictability of security measures to detect, deter, disrupt or defeat potential criminal and/or terrorist operations. Within the teams only the local transit officers and the air marshals have arrest authority.
During 2010, TSA conducted over 3,750 VIPR operations in the various modes of surface transportation.
Criticisms
[edit]The VIPR unit has been widely criticized as a breach of the fourth amendment superfluous to better trained and readily available regional police forces. VIPR cost $110 million in the first fiscal year, with requests for an additional $24 million in funding for 2012. Between bus stop, train stations, malls, and public gatherings, VIPR threatens to cast further unwarranted searches upon the public without probable cause or traditional lines of accountability. Notably, many of the venues planned for VIPR checkpoints have no history of independent terrorist threats to justify the added expense or inconvenience to taxpayers.
References
[edit]http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/testimony/testimony_1274286402388.shtm http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/testimony/testimony_1238610092655.shtm http://articles.latimes.com/2011/dec/20/nation/la-na-terror-checkpoints-20111220
External links
[edit]www.dhs.gov