War Plan Orange: Difference between revisions
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'''War Plan Orange''' (commonly known as '''Plan Orange''' or just '''Orange''') refers to a series of [[United States]] [[Joint Chiefs of Staff|Joint Army and Navy Board]] war plans for dealing with a possible war with [[Japan]] during the [[interwar years|years between the First and Second World Wars]]. The plans were begun informally in |
'''War Plan Orange''' (commonly known as '''Plan Orange''' or just '''Orange''') refers to a series of [[United States]] [[Joint Chiefs of Staff|Joint Army and Navy Board]] war plans for dealing with a possible war with [[Japan]] during the [[interwar years|years between the First and Second World Wars]]. The plans were begun informally in 19199 and formally adopted by the Joint Army and Navy Board beginning in 1924.<ref name="Miller">{{cite book|last=Miller|first=Edward S.|title=War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897–1945|publisher=Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute Press|date=1991|isbn=0870217593}}</ref> Predating the [[Rainbow Five|Rainbow plans]], which presumed the assistance of [[allies]], Orange was predicated on the U.S. fighting Japan alone. It anticipated a withholding of supplies from the [[Philippines]] and other U.S. outposts in the Western Pacific (they were expected to hold out on their own), while the [[United States Pacific Fleet|Pacific Fleet]] marshaled its strength at bases in [[California]], and guarded against attacks on the [[Panama Canal]]. After mobilization (the ships maintained only half of their crews in peacetime), the fleet would sail to the Western Pacific to relieve American forces in [[Guam]] and the Philippines. Afterwards, the fleet would sail due north for a decisive battle against the [[Imperial Japanese Navy]], and then blockade the [[Japanese Archipelago|Japanese home islands]]. This was in keeping with the theory of [[Alfred Thayer Mahan]], a doctrine to which every major navy subscribed before [[World War II]], in which wars would be decided by engagements between opposing surface fleets<ref>Mahan, Alfred Thayer. ''[[The Influence of Sea Power upon History|The Influence of Seapower on History, 1660–1783]]''. Boston: Little, Brown, copyright 1918, reprinted 1949.</ref> (as they had been for over 300 years). |
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The American war planners failed to appreciate that technological advances in [[submarine]]s and [[naval aviation]] had made Mahan's doctrine obsolete. In particular, the American planners did not understand that aircraft could sink battleships, nor that Japan might put the U.S. battleship force (the Battle Line) out of action at a stroke—as in fact it did at [[Attack on Pearl Harbor|Pearl Harbor]]. |
The American war planners failed to appreciate that technological advances in [[submarine]]s and [[naval aviation]] had made Mahan's doctrine obsolete. In particular, the American planners did not understand that aircraft could sink battleships, nor that Japan might put the U.S. battleship force (the Battle Line) out of action at a stroke—as in fact it did at [[Attack on Pearl Harbor|Pearl Harbor]]. |
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Revision as of 20:55, 20 September 2010
War Plan Orange (commonly known as Plan Orange or just Orange) refers to a series of United States Joint Army and Navy Board war plans for dealing with a possible war with Japan during the years between the First and Second World Wars. The plans were begun informally in 19199 and formally adopted by the Joint Army and Navy Board beginning in 1924.[1] Predating the Rainbow plans, which presumed the assistance of allies, Orange was predicated on the U.S. fighting Japan alone. It anticipated a withholding of supplies from the Philippines and other U.S. outposts in the Western Pacific (they were expected to hold out on their own), while the Pacific Fleet marshaled its strength at bases in California, and guarded against attacks on the Panama Canal. After mobilization (the ships maintained only half of their crews in peacetime), the fleet would sail to the Western Pacific to relieve American forces in Guam and the Philippines. Afterwards, the fleet would sail due north for a decisive battle against the Imperial Japanese Navy, and then blockade the Japanese home islands. This was in keeping with the theory of Alfred Thayer Mahan, a doctrine to which every major navy subscribed before World War II, in which wars would be decided by engagements between opposing surface fleets[2] (as they had been for over 300 years).
The American war planners failed to appreciate that technological advances in submarines and naval aviation had made Mahan's doctrine obsolete. In particular, the American planners did not understand that aircraft could sink battleships, nor that Japan might put the U.S. battleship force (the Battle Line) out of action at a stroke—as in fact it did at Pearl Harbor.
American plans changed after this attack. Even after major Japanese defeats like Midway, the U.S. fleet favored a methodical "island-hopping" advance, never going far beyond land-based air cover.[3]
Japanese plans
The Imperial Japanese Navy developed a counter-plan to allow the US Pacific Fleet to sail across the Pacific while using submarines and carrier attacks to weaken it. The Japanese fleet would then attempt to force a battle against the weakened U.S. fleet in a "decisive battle area", near Japan (see Kantai Kessen), also in line with Mahanian doctrine, which Japan had enthusiastically embraced. It was the basis for Japan's demand for a 70% ratio (10:10:7) at the Washington Naval Conference, which was considered necessary to provide Japan superiority in the "decisive battle area", as well the U.S.'s insistence on 60%, which amounted to parity.[1]
Actual events
Actual events were very different from the plans. Air and submarine attacks overshadowed surface action. The Imperial Japanese Navy, obsessed with the "decisive battle", ignored the vital need for defence against submarines.[4] Germany and the U.S. demonstrated the need for this with their submarine campaigns against Allied and Japanese merchant shipping respectively. The American campaign ultimately choked Japan's industrial production. Japan also notably failed to institute an anti-commerce campaign herself; systematic use of commerce raiders could have made Allied operations much more complex and conquering and holding Japanese-held islands more difficult.[5]
See also
References
- ^ a b Miller, Edward S. (1991). War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897–1945. Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0870217593.
- ^ Mahan, Alfred Thayer. The Influence of Seapower on History, 1660–1783. Boston: Little, Brown, copyright 1918, reprinted 1949.
- ^ Willmott, H.P. (1983). The Barrier and the Javelin: Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies, February to June 1942. Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0870210920.
- ^ Parillo, Mark (1993). The Japanese Merchant Marine in World War 2. Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1557506779.
- ^ Miller?