Human Terrain System

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to: navigation, search

The Human Terrain System (HTS) is a United States Army program employing personnel from the social science disciplines such as anthropology, sociology, political science, regional studies and linguistics to provide military commanders and staff with an understanding of the local population. The goal is to give commanders insight into the population and how they may react in order to enhance operational effectiveness, save lives, and reduce military and civilian conflict.

The program was prompted by cultural problems between local populations and American forces after their invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan.

HTS was controversial[1][2] with the American Anthropological Association in 2007 publishing a statement opposing it.[3][4]

The US House Armed Services Committee (HASC) suspended further funding for the program in 2010 due to "anecdotal reports in the media" and the AAA report referenced above. HASC mandated that an analysis of the program be undertaken by the Secretary of Defense. That task was turned over to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OSD/I). OSD/I contracted with the Center for Naval Analyses located in Alexandria, Virginia for a report. The Center for Naval Analyses completed its report in 2011[5] and subsequently posted its findings on the Defense Technical Information Center website. The document was removed shortly after its publication.[6][7]

Many critics of HTS were from within HTS.[8][9]

Contents

[edit] Background

The HTS concept was largely inspired by the lessons drawn from the United States experience in Vietnam.[10]:144 During the Vietnam War, the U.S. military failed to take steps to understand the context of the Vietnamese cultural environment. The Vietnam-era CORDS experience provides crucial lessons that guided the development of an effective cultural intelligence program that can support tactical and operational level commanders today.[10]:147 From July 2005 to August 2006, Captain Don Smith of the Foreign Military Studies Office, developed the HTS concept and implemented it in the form of a small FMSO HTS pilot project in response to deploying unit requests for support including an Operational Needs Statement from 10th Mountain Division. According to this concept, human terrain may be defined as the human population and society in the task force environment, characterized by cultural, anthropological, and ethnographic information about the local society.[11] The FMSO HTS pilot was specifically designed to determine the extent to which increased understanding of human terrain (social, ethnographic, cultural, economic, and political elements of the local population surrounding them) developed in accordance with US social science standards and applied in the unit's established military decision-making process would assist US Army Brigade Combat Team (BCT) and US Marine Corps Regimental Combat Team (RCT) Commanders and their staffs address cultural awareness shortcomings at the tactical level. The FMSO HTS pilot was to remain small (i.e., two experimental teams in Afghanistan and three in Iraq) for 18-24 months until their impact and operational performance standards could be established and the resultant adjustments to their methods, personnel selection, training, data management, and tools could be made. It is important to note that the FMSO HTS pilot project included independent academic review boards for social science methodological standards, personnel, training, data, and ethics in order to remain compliant with the ethical and methodological standards of academe and to protect human subjects. These boards were eliminated when the pilot was transitioned to TRADOC G2.

In July 2006, Colonel Steve Fondacaro (retired) was hired by TRADOC G2 to transition the pilot to TRADOC G2 and manage its significant and rapid expansion. At this point, the purpose of HTS was changed to explain to the commanders and soldiers the reasoning of the population and enemy, and reasons for hostility towards the US Army and forces. In response to a Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement from Central Command issued in April 2007, calling for HTS Team in every Army Brigade and Marine Corps Regiment in Iraq and Afghanistan,[12] US Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates in September 2007 authorized a $40 million expansion of the program.[13][14][13][15] Maxie McFarland, TRADOC G2, suddenly terminated Fondacaro's temporary position as HTS Program Manager in June 2010. After an initial announcement on USAJobs, the listing was cancelled and the manager position was filled by McFarland's executive officer, COL Sharon Hamilton. Her first tasks were to address personnel and recruiting issues, and restructure management practices, and address inter-agency Human Terrain needs. On 8 March 2011, the Center for Complex Operations hosted a conference titled Inter-agency Human Terrain Program and Requirements.[16] The Human Terrain System is no longer a proof-of-concept program though it is still under the auspices of United States Army Training and Doctrine Command. It was developed in response to identified gaps in commanders’ and staffs’ understanding of the local population and culture, the impact on operational decisions, and the poor transfer of specific socio-cultural knowledge to follow-on units.

In 2009, the US Congress directed that an independent assessment be performed to determine the state of the HTS Project. The task was sourced to the Center for Naval Analyses in Alexandria, Virginia by the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. The Center for Naval Analyses Assessment of the Human Terrain System contains the results of interviews of 19 out 71 commanders who were supported by the HTS Project. [17] The US Army conducted its own internal investigation of HTS as well but the results were not released.[18]

[edit] Funding

The initial funding for the Human Terrain System, which started off as the Cultural Operations Research - Human Terrain System (COR-HTS), came from the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO).[19]:29 With initial JIEDDO funding, HTS began a 5 team proof-of-concept effort that was to develop training curriculum, train and deploy teams (3 teams to Iraq/2 teams to Afghanistan) over a 2 year period. The objective of this effort was to validate the concept of expert civilian-military teams attached to deployed units in combat performing applied research to support optimal course of action development and selection by units, based on a more complete understanding of the local population. The enthusiastic support for HTS's approach in support of existing Operational Needs Statement by Army and Marine Corps units, US Central Command submitted a Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement (JUONS) in April, 2007 requesting HTS support for all Division-level headquarters, Army Brigades and Marine Corps Regiments deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. Later that month, the HTS JUONS was approved for funding by the DOD Joint Rapid Aquisition Cell. This action effectively increased the HTS mission from 5 teams over 2 years, to 26 teams as soon as possible. DOD provided HTS funding until 2009 when funding resposnibilities were asumed by Army G2.

[edit] HTS design

The approach is to place the expertise and experience of social scientists and regional experts, coupled with reach-back, open-source research, directly in support of deployed units engaging in military operations. HTS informs decision-makers at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. The HTS project is the first time that the military has done social science research and advising on a large scale, and at the brigade level.

The teams which deploy and support combat units are the Human Terrain Teams (HTT). They are supported by a Research Reachback Center (RRC) performing in-depth, long-term cultural research and analysis. The RRC is an element based in the United States consisting of cells of regionally focused social scientists and uniformed and civilian analysts providing access to a wide body of academic knowledge in order to rapidly address social, political, economic, historic and cultural issues in their area. After the transition from FMSO to TRADOC G2 in late 2006, Human Terrain & Analysis Teams (HTATs) were included to provide support at higher (e.g., Division) echelons in the field.

The Human Terrain System further advertises a network of Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) consisting of on-call, micro-regional focused academic and civilian sector experts. In theory, they provide specific support to the RRC including planning, training, role-playing and research.

The HTT's tool kit is mapping Human terrain (MAP-HT) software, an automated database and presentation tool that allows teams to gather, store, manipulate, and provide cultural data from hundreds of categories.[10]:150 HTS has developed the MAP-HT Toolkit, an integrated software suite provided to HTTs for data visualization and reporting. This includes software for Mapping (for e.g., spatial distribution of tribes and related social entities), Link Charts (for example, power structures and social networks in informal economies), and Timelines.[13][14] Some of the components in the toolkit include: ANTHROPAC, UCINET, Axis PRO, i2 Analyst's Notebook, and TerraExplorer—a 3D earth visualization application provided by Skyline Software Systems, Inc.. The data gathered assists with subjects such as key regional personalities, social structures, links between clans and families, economic issues, public communications, and agricultural production. The data will be compiled and stored in a larger archive, in order to be accessible for the military and other government agencies.[10]:150

[edit] Human Terrain Teams

Human Terrain Teams (HTT), [13] are social scientists and former/active military teams, embedded with deployed headquarters at Theater, Division, regional commands, and combat brigades in Iraq and Afghanistan to help military staffs in the field understand local cultures.[4] "Academic embeds" as the social scientists on teams are known,[20] help troops understand relevant cultural history, engage locals in a way they can appreciate, and incorporate knowledge about tribal traditions in conflict resolution.[4] In interviews, US military officers in Afghanistan have stated that the aim of the program is to improve the performance of local government officials, persuade tribesmen to join the police, ease poverty and protect villagers from the Taliban and criminals.

Human Terrain Teams consists of five members: a team leader, a cultural analyst, a regional studies analyst, a human terrain research manager, and a human terrain analyst. All act as experienced cultural advisers to the brigade commander. In order to further understand the responsibilities of each team member, one must comprehend the duties of each adviser:

  • Leader: a principal human terrain adviser who is responsible for the entire team and must support the team's mission as well as efforts to improve the decision process. Must have spent time as a principal brigade staff officer and be a standing major or lieutenant colonel.
  • Cultural analyst: deals with conducting and managing ethnographic and social-science research and analysis for the brigade staff's area of operations. Must be a qualified social scientist. Preference goes to those with knowledge of geographical imaging software as well as strong fluency in the language of the local community. Preference will be given to those who have an outstanding background in the region through past studies, living and teaching experiences.
  • Regional studies analyst: Similar qualifications and skills as the cultural analyst.
  • Research manager: integrates the human terrain research plan with unit intelligence collection effort, debriefs patrols, and interacts with other agencies and organizations. Must have a background in tactical intelligence.
  • Human terrain analyst: acts as the primary human terrain data researcher by debriefing patrols and interacting with other agencies and organizations. Must have a background in military intelligence and be a trained debriefer.[10]:149-50

Actual teams have ranged from three to eight members, and have ranged from entirely civilian to entirely military. Social scientists generally have come from fields other than anthropology. AnnaMaria Cardinalli, for example, who attracted attention for her report on sexual practices in Afghanistan,[21] was a musician and theologian.[22] The teams are fully integrated into unit staffs, providing advice on how to interact productively with the local population and represent the “human terrain” in planning, preparation, execution and assessment of operations.

HTT tours of duty are intended to bridge unit unit replacement cycles, ensuring a smooth and complete transfer of local area Human Terrain knowledge and cultural understanding as new units replace old ones. Subsequent to redeployment, many members of deployed HTTs return to function on the staff of HTS in various capacities, from research and analysis to training.

The HTT are responsible for three deliverables:

  • A constantly updated, user-friendly ethnographic and socio-cultural database of the area of operations that composes data maps showing specific ethnographic or cultural features.
  • The ability to raise points on cultural or ethnographic issues of specific concern to the commander.
  • Establishing a connection to a central research facility in the United States that draws on government and academic sources to answer any cultural or ethnographic questions the deployed task force might have.[10]:150

[edit] Efficacy and success

[edit] Efficacy

The approach was first applied in Afghanistan in 2006[23] and has since won the praise of officers who see concrete results in improved understanding of social connections in the tribal cultures encountered during phase iv operations (operations aimed at stabilizing an area of operations in the aftermath of major combat).[13][14][24] According to Col. Martin Schweitzer, commander of the 4th BCT, 82nd Airborne, the unit’s combat operations in Afghanistan had been reduced by 60 percent over a period of eight months.[13][25]

[edit] Success

HTS should be acknowledged for advising a US military unit in Iraq on proper mealtime etiquette, i.e., not only how to properly eat, but also the gestures during the meal, and especially how to observe the Ramadan feast.[19]:15

[edit] Expansion

In September 2007 US Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates authorized a $40 million expansion of the program.[13][14] Teams of anthropologists and social scientists are expected to be assigned to each of the 26 US combat brigades in Iraq and Afghanistan.[13][14] As of October 2007, the number of teams in Baghdad was expanded from one to six.[13][14]

[edit] Methods

Teams are composed of five members:[13][26] two civilians and three military personnel, according to Stars and Stripes.[26] Military Review defines embeds as "experienced cultural advisors" familiar with the area of operations.[24] Embeds also work within the framework of an overall Human Terrain System which includes a relationship mapping schema called MAP-HT.[24]

To map relationships, teams create databases of:

  • local leaders
  • tribes
  • political disputes
  • economic issues
  • social problems

as well as using mapped knowledge and cultural insights to advise brigade commanders.[13][14] Embeds must also note and respond to the attitudes of US military culture, which values a "can do" attitude.[14]

[edit] Criticisms

HTS is controversial amongst academic anthropologists, many of whom perceive it as an attempt to "weaponize" anthropology.[27]

In 2007, the American Anthropological Association published a statement opposing the Human Terrain System.[28] They denounced HTT in October 2007, concerned it could lead to compromise of ethics, disgrace to anthropology as an academic discipline, and the endangerment of research subjects.[4] Some academics denounce the program as “mercenary anthropology” that exploits social science for political gain, fearing HTT could cause all anthropologists to be viewed as intelligence-gatherers for the US military.[13][25] Some academics draw comparisons to the Phoenix Program and Project Camelot during the Vietnam War. According to Richard Shweder, "Anthropologists feel almost polluted by contact with certain parts of the government. There's a breach-of-trust issue there that hasn't been repaired."[14] Conversely, these expressions of opinion from academic anthropologists has not precluded the participation by applied anthropologists in the program since 2006. David Matsuda, an academic embed from California, counters the reaction in the anthropology community: "I came here to save lives, to make friends out of enemies."[4]

On December 2, 2009, two years after denouncing HTS publicly, the American Anthropological Association released a report[29] based on a year long research project that interviewed several dozen selected individuals associated with HTS and HTS critics. Notably, the research plan did not include any onsite visits to HTS training locations, HTS headquarters or military units where HTS teams have served, nor did the interviews include the HTS program manager, senior social scientist or any other members of the HTS program staff. The report supported its 2007 denouncement of HTS, concluding that HTS was such a poorly conceived and executed program that “When ethnographic investigation is determined by military missions, not subject to external review, where data collection occurs in the context of war, integrated into the goals of counterinsurgency, and in a potentially coercive environment -- all characteristic factors of the [Human Terrain System] concept and its application -- it can no longer be considered a legitimate professional exercise of anthropology.” The AAA assessment and what they consider their detailed accounts of how Human Terrain has not addressed ethical problems, plus the report’s finding that HTS data is used as intelligence by the military, served as the basis for their conclusion that the program is a severe distortion of anthropological research and principles. HTS leadership contended that the study's lack of discipline, inadequate research, and conclusions in support of an organizational statement made years prior were predictable, spoke for itself and did not warrant further comment.

[edit] Media

George Packer, award winning author of The Assassin's Gate: America in Iraq and New Yorker Magazine staff writer writes of the use of social science by the Pentagon in its counterinsurgency efforts, interviews Dave Killcullen, Montgomery McFate and Steve Fondacaro. He analyzes in detail the use of social science in support of military operations, commenting "At a moment when the Bush Administration has run out of ideas and lost control, it could turn away from its “war on terror” and follow a different path—one that is right under its nose."[30]

David Rohde two time Pulitzer prize winner with extensive experience in Afghanistan and Pakistan reports in the New York Times about the enlistment of social scientists in the counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan. Quoting a cavalry squadron commander Call it what you want, it works, said Colonel Woods, a native of Denbo, Pa. It works in helping you define the problems, not just the symptoms.[13]

Ann Marlowe, a writer who has written about Afghanistan, wrote a piece about HTT for the Weekly Standard in November 2007 stating that "there are some things the Army needs in Afghanistan, but more academics are not at the top of the list." Notably, she did not speak with the HTT directly.[31]

Some academics denounce the program as "mercenary anthropology" that exploits social science for political gain, fearing HTS could cause all anthropologists to be viewed as intelligence gatherers for the US military.[13][25] Some academics attempt to draw comparisons to the Phoenix Program and Project Camelot during the Vietnam War. According to Richard Shweder, "Anthropologists feel almost polluted by contact with certain parts of the government. There's a breach-of-trust issue there that hasn't been repaired."[14]

Audrey Roberts an HTT social scientist who spent close to two years on the ground supporting US Army Brigade at FOB SALERNO near Khost, Afghanistan expressed her clear reflection that operationally relevant understanding of the problems within the population leads to resolution of the underpinnings of the insurgency. [32]

In 2009, the University of Chicago Press published American anthropologist Roberto Gonzalez's book, American Counterinsurgency: Human Science and the Human Terrain, which criticized the historical roots, methodologies and ethics of the Human Terrain program. In April 2009, anthropologist David Price published a list of ten critical flaws in the Human Terrain program that the press have failed to seriously address.[33]

David Matsuda, an HTT Ph.D serving in Iraq, counters the reaction in the anthropology community: "I came here to save lives, to make friends out of enemies."[4] Furthermore, Michael Bhatia, an embedded anthropologist killed while serving in Afghanistan, contended that the social science community at large had a lack of understanding of what the HTT did.[34]

[edit] Deaths

On November 4, 2008, HTT member Paula Loyd was surveying the village of Chehel Gazi with a US Army platoon. She was doused with gasoline disguised in a jar of cooking oil and lit on fire by Abdul Salam, an Afghan national. Loyd was severely burned over 60 percent of her body.[19]:110 Salam ran immediately, running 50 meters towards Don M. Ayala, another member of the HTT. U.S. Army personnel and Ayala captured Salam as he tried to escape.[19]:112 About ten minutes later, after learning of the severity of Loyd's injuries, Ayala shot Salam in the head, killing him instantly. Loyd, 36, died at Brooke Army Medical Center in San Antonio on January 7, 2009.[35] Ayala pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter in federal court in Alexandria, Virginia in February 2009. On May 8, 2009, he was sentenced to five years probation and a $12,500 fine.[36][37][38][39][40][41] On September 1, 2010, the Times-Picayune of Louisiana posted a documentary video of friends and family speaking in support of Ayala at sentencing.[42]

Nicole Suveges, a HTT IZ3 member, was killed on June 24, 2008, along with 11 other Soldiers, Iraqi government official and US Embassy personnel when a bomb exploded at the District Council building in Sadr City.[35][19]:9

Michael V. Bhatia, a member of HTT AF1, was killed along with two other Soldiers while riding in a unit Humvee vehicle in Khost, Afghanistan in May 2008.[43]

Both deaths were the result of command detonated mines/improvised explosive devices.[19]:17

[edit] Notable operations

[edit] Operation Khyber

During a 15-day drive in late summer of 2007, 500 Afghan and 500 US soldiers tried to:

  • clear an estimated 200 to 250 Taliban insurgents out of much of Paktia Province
  • secure southeastern Afghanistan’s most important road
  • halt a string of suicide attacks on US troops and local governors

An HTT anthropologist, Tracy St. Benoit,[44] identified an unusually high concentration of widows in poverty, creating pressure on their sons to join the well-paid insurgents. Citing St. Benoit’s advice, US officers developed a job training program for the widows. She also interpreted the beheading of a local tribal elder as an effort to divide and weaken the Zadran, rather than mere intimidation. As a result, Afghan and US officials focused on uniting the Zadran, one of southeastern Afghanistan’s most powerful tribes, thereby hindering the Taliban's operations in the area.[13]

[edit] Operation Maiwand

800 Afghan soldiers, 400 U.S. soldiers and 200 Afghan policemen took part in the operation, in which Afghan soldiers raided houses of suspected militants.[45]

Stars and Stripes reported that in one Pashtun village, Kuz Khadokhel, HTT made it possible for negotiator Captain Aaron White to understand body language in the context of the culture, to identify leaders during negotiations, and to reinforce a perception of leadership by not conferring with fellow officers and by demonstrating good faith through projects facilitated by the Ghazni Provincial Reconstruction Team, including roads, a visit by the PRT’s mobile medical clinic, the construction of a deep well for irrigation, and the beginnings of a road to Afghanistan’s main Highway 1.[26]

[edit] Notable academic embeds

  • Michael V. Bhatia (killed while serving with a HTT in Khost, Afghanistan in May 2008)
  • Robert Holbert[46]
  • Fouad Lghzaoui[14]
  • Paula Loyd (doused with fuel and set alight by an Afghan male on November 2008; died two months later in Brooke Army Medical Center)
  • David Matsuda[47]
  • Nicole Suveges (killed on duty as HTT-member on June 24, 2008 when a bomb exploded at the District Council building in Sadr City)

[edit] See also

[edit] References

  1. ^ BBC News, "US Army enlists anthropologists"
  2. ^ "‘Human Terrain’ Chief Ousted", Noah Shachtman, June 15 2010, wired.com
  3. ^ American Anthropological Association’s Executive Board Statement on the Human Terrain System Project American Anthropological Association
  4. ^ a b c d e f "U.S. Military, Oblivious of Iraqi Culture, Enlists Anthropologists for Occupation". Middle East Online. January 19, 2008. http://www.alternet.org/waroniraq/74326/. Retrieved 2008-02-11. 
  5. ^ Sri Lanka Guardian: CNA Report
  6. ^ Cryptome: Removed HTS assessment
  7. ^ Public Intelligence: Retracted assessment of HTS
  8. ^ Cryptome: HTS commentary
  9. ^ Pravda: Cryptome story 28 September 2011.
  10. ^ a b c d e f Pilon, edited by Juliana Geran (2009). Cultural Intelligence for Winning the Peace (1st ed.). Washington, D.C.: The Institute of World Politics Press. ISBN 0982488807. 
  11. ^ "The Human Terrain System: A CORDS for the 21st Century". http://www.army.mil/professionalWriting/volumes/volume4/december_2006/12_06_2.html. Retrieved 2 May 2011. 
  12. ^ CENTCOM JUONS dated 7 Apr 2007
  13. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o David Rohde (October 5, 2007). "Army Enlists Anthropology in War Zones". New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/05/world/asia/05afghan.html?incamp=article_popular_4&pagewanted=all. Retrieved 2008-02-12. 
  14. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k The Culture Warriors - US News and World Report
  15. ^ Geller, Adam, "Odyssey Took Man From Campus To Combat", Arizona Republic (Associated Press), March 8, 2009, p. 1.
  16. ^ Center for Complex Operations
  17. ^ Public Intelligence
  18. ^ http://openanthropology.files.wordpress.com/2011/02/gettrdoc.pdf
  19. ^ a b c d e f Stanton, John (2009). General David Patraeus' Favorite Mushroom: Inside the U.S. Army's Human Terrain System. Wiseman Publishing. pp. 189. ISBN 978-90-8963-019-3. 
  20. ^ 'Academic Embeds': Scholars Advise Troops Abroad : NPR
  21. ^ HTT AF-6 Pashtun Sexuality Research Update and Findings, www.imagesoflife-online.co.uk/HTTAF6.doc
  22. ^ "APU Faculty Member: AnnaMaria C Cardinalli". Apu.apus.edu. http://www.apu.apus.edu/academic/faculty-members/bio/2949/annamaria-c-cardinalli. Retrieved 2011-11-20. 
  23. ^ US Army's strategy in Afghanistan: better anthropology | csmonitor.com
  24. ^ a b c The U.S. Army Professional Writing Collection
  25. ^ a b c RFI - Les anthropologues aux armées
  26. ^ a b c Stars and Stripes: Cultural advisers give U.S. teams an edge
  27. ^ BBC News, "US Army enlists anthropologists"
  28. ^ American Anthropological Association’s Executive Board Statement on the Human Terrain System Project American Anthropological Association
  29. ^ AAA Commission on the Engagement of Anthropology with the US Security and Intelligence Communities (CEAUSSIC), "Final Report on The Army’s Human Terrain System Proof of Concept Program" (Submitted to the Executive Board of the American Anthropological Association October 14, 2009)
  30. ^ New Yorker Magazinehttp://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/12/18/061218fa_fact2#ixzz1bytdTVKw
  31. ^ "Anthropology Goes to War", The Weekly Standard
  32. ^ Jim Landers, Dallas Morning News, 13 March, 2009 http://www.leatherneck.com/forums/showthread.php?t=80629
  33. ^ Counterinsurgency's Free Ride: The Press and Human Terrain Systems - CounterPunch
  34. ^ [1] Professor' pays a heavy price[dead link]
  35. ^ a b HTS Memoriam
  36. ^ Weil, Martin, "Afghanistan Contractor Pleads Guilty To Killing Man Who Burned Co-Worker", Washington Post, February 4, 2009, p. 6.
    "News in Brief: Social-science programme hit by murder charge" (Subscription required.). Nature 456 (435): 435. 26 November 2008. doi:10.1038/456435a. ISSN 1744-7933. http://www.nature.com/news/2008/081126/full/456435a.html. Retrieved 2009-02-18. 
  37. ^ Stockman, Farah, "Anthropologist's War Death Reverberates", Boston Globe, February 12, 2009, p. 1.
  38. ^ Constable, Pamela, "A Terrain's Tragic Shift: Researcher's Death Intensifies Scrutiny Of U.S. Cultural Program in Afghanistan", Washington Post, February 18, 2009, p. C1.
  39. ^ White, Josh, "No Jail Time In Retribution Killing Overseas", Washington Post, May 9, 2009, p. B4.
  40. ^ Zeroanthropology.net, Maximilian Forte, "The Unreported Death of Staff Sgt. Paula Loyd of the Human Terrain System: Third Researcher to Die", January 8, 2009
  41. ^ Zeroanthropology.net, Maximilian Forte, "On the conduct of military “contractors” in Afghanistan: In the words of Paula Loyd (1.7)", November 28, 2008
  42. ^ Ayala Sentencing Documentary
  43. ^ Geller, Adam, "Professor Pays Ultimate Price In Country He Loved", Arizona Republic (Associated Press), March 9, 2009, p. 1.
  44. ^ Cleaning Up US Army/TRADOC's Human Terrain System (HTS): Terminate Current Management, Move HTS to Civil Affairs* - John Stanton
  45. ^ International Herald Tribune, Afghan army plans, executes first big operation, taking step forward in US exit strategy, 2007
  46. ^ Daily Nebraskan[dead link]
  47. ^ http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/05/28/this_week_at_war_no_18 (registration required)

[edit] External links

[edit] Articles

[edit] Blogs by Anthropologists in Iraq

Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Human_Terrain_System&oldid=478747352"
Personal tools
Namespaces
Variants
Actions
Navigation
Interaction
Toolbox
Print/export