MIFARE is the NXP Semiconductors-owned trademark of a series of chips widely used in contactless smart cards and proximity cards. According to the producers, billions of smart card chips and many millions of reader modules have been sold. The technology is owned by NXP Semiconductors (spin off from Philips Electronics in 2006) with headquarters in Eindhoven, Netherlands, and main business sites in Nijmegen, Netherlands, and Hamburg, Germany.
- 1 Variants
- 2 History
- 3 Security of MIFARE Classic, MIFARE DESFire and MIFARE Ultralight
- 4 Considerations for systems integration
- 5 See also
- 6 Places that use MIFARE technology
- 7 References
- 8 Further reading
- 9 External links
The technology is embodied in both cards and readers (also referred to as a Proximity Coupling Device which is suitable to use).
The MIFARE name (derived from the term MIkron FARE Collection System) covers seven different kinds of contactless cards:
- MIFARE Classic
- employ a proprietary protocol compliant to parts (but not all) of ISO/IEC 14443-3 Type A, with an NXP proprietary security protocol for authentication and ciphering.
- MIFARE Ultralight
- low-cost ICs that employ a proprietary protocol compliant to ISO/IEC 14443-3 Type A.
- MIFARE Ultralight C
- the first low-cost ICs for limited-use applications that offer the benefits of an open Triple DES cryptography
- MIFARE DESFire
- are smart cards that comply to ISO/IEC 14443-4 Type A with a mask-ROM operating system from NXP.
- MIFARE DESFire EV1
- includes AES encryption.
- MIFARE DESFire EV2
- includes MIsmartApp, Transaction MAC, Unlimited Applications
- MIFARE Plus
- drop-in replacement for MIFARE Classic with certified security level (AES 128 based)
- MIFARE SAM AV2
- secure access module that provides the secure storage of cryptographic keys and cryptographic functions
The MIFARE Classic card is fundamentally just a memory storage device, where the memory is divided into segments and blocks with simple security mechanisms for access control. They are ASIC-based and have limited computational power. Thanks to their reliability and low cost, those cards are widely used for electronic wallet, access control, corporate ID cards, transportation or stadium ticketing.
The MIFARE Classic 1K offers 1024 bytes of data storage, split into 16 sectors; each sector is protected by two different keys, called A and B. Each key can be programmed to allow operations such as reading, writing, increasing value blocks, etc. MIFARE Classic 4K offers 4096 bytes split into forty sectors, of which 32 are same size as in the 1K with eight more that are quadruple size sectors. MIFARE Classic mini offers 320 bytes split into five sectors. For each of these card types, 16 bytes per sector are reserved for the keys and access conditions and can not normally be used for user data. Also, the very first 16 bytes contain the serial number of the card and certain other manufacturer data and are read only. That brings the net storage capacity of these cards down to 752 bytes for MIFARE Classic 1k, 3440 bytes for MIFARE Classic 4k, and 224 bytes for Mini. It uses an NXP proprietary security protocol (Crypto-1) for authentication and ciphering.
The Samsung TecTile NFC tag stickers use MIFARE Classic chips. This means, only devices with an NXP NFC controller chip can read or write these tags. At the moment BlackBerry phones, the Nokia Lumia 610 (August 2012), the Google Nexus 4 and Nexus 10 (October 2013) can't read/write TecTile stickers.
MIFARE Classic encryption has been compromised, see below for details.
MIFARE Ultralight and MIFARE Ultralight EV1
The MIFARE Ultralight has only 512 bits of memory (i.e. 64 bytes), without cryptographic security. The memory is provided in 16 pages of 4 bytes. Cards based on these chips are so inexpensive it is often used for disposable tickets for events such as the Football World Cup 2006. It provides only basic security features such as one-time-programmable (OTP) bits and a write-lock feature to prevent re-writing of memory pages but does not include cryptography as applied in other MIFARE based cards.
MIFARE Ultralight EV1  introduced in November 2012 the next generation of paper ticketing smart card IC for limited-use applications that offers solution developers and operators the maximum flexibility for their ticketing schemes and additional security options. It comes with several enhancements above the original MIFARE Ultralight
- 384 and 1024 Bits user memory product variants
- OTP, Lock Bits, configurable counters for improved security
- Three independent 24-bit-one-way counters to stop reloading
- Protected data access through 32-bit password
- NXP Semiconductors originality signature function, this is an integrated originality checker and is an effective cloning protection that helps to prevent counterfeit of tickets.
MIFARE Ultralight C
Introduced at the Cartes industry trade show in 2008, MIFARE Ultralight C is part of NXP's low-cost MIFARE offering (disposable ticket). With Triple DES, MIFARE Ultralight C uses a widely adopted standard, enabling easy integration in existing infrastructures. The integrated Triple DES authentication provides an effective countermeasure against cloning.
- Fully compliant with ISO/IEC 14443 parts 1-3, Type A (including anti-collision)
- 1536 bits (192 bytes) EEPROM memory
- Protected data access via 3-pass Triple DES authentication
- Memory structure as in MIFARE Ultralight (pages of 4 byte)
- Backwards compatibility to MIFARE Ultralight due to compatible command set
- 16 bit one-way counter
- Unique 7 bytes serial number (UID)
Key applications for MIFARE Ultralight C are Public Transportation, Event Ticketing, Loyalty and NFC Forum Tag Type 2.
The MIFARE DESFire (MF3ICD40) was introduced in 2002 and is based on a core similar to SmartMX, with more hardware and software security features than MIFARE Classic. It comes pre-programmed with the general purpose MIFARE DESFire operating system which offers a simple directory structure and files. They are sold in four variants: one with Triple-DES only and 4 KB of storage, and three with AES (2, 4 or 8 KB; see MIFARE DESFire EV1). The AES variants have additional security features, e.g., CMAC. MIFARE DESFire uses a protocol compliant with ISO/IEC 14443-4. The card is based on an 8051 processor with 3DES/AES crypto accelerator, making very fast transactions possible.
The maximal read/write distance between card and reader is 10 centimetres (3.9 in), but actual distance depends on the field power generated by the reader and its antenna size.
In 2010 NXP announced the discontinuation of the MIFARE DESFire (MF3ICD40) after it had introduced its successor MIFARE DESFire EV1 late 2008. In October 2011 researchers of Ruhr University Bochum announced that they had broken the security of MIFARE DESFire (MF3ICD40), which was acknowledged by NXP., see DESFire Attacks
MIFARE DESFire EV1
(previously called DESFire8)
New evolution of MIFARE DESFire card, broadly backwards compatible. Available with 2 KB, 4 KB and 8 KB NV-Memory. Other features include:
- Support for random ID
- Support for 128-bit AES
- Hardware and Operating System is Common Criteria certified at level EAL 4+
MIFARE DESFire EV1 was publicly announced in November 2006.
MIFARE DESFire EV2
New evolution of MIFARE DESFire card, broadly backwards compatible. New features include:
- MIsmartApp enabling to offer or sell memory space for additional applications of 3rd parties without the need to share secret keys
- Transaction MAC to authenticate transactions by 3rd parties
- Virtual Card Architecture for privacy protection
- Proximity check against relay attacks
MIFARE DESFire EV2 was publicly announced in November 2013
MIFARE Plus is a replacement card for the MIFARE Classic. It provides an easy upgrade of existing infrastructures toward high security. Data management is identical to the MIFARE Classic, however the security management requires the modification of the installed reader base. Other features include:
- 2 Kbytes or 4 Kbytes of memory
- 7 or 4 bytes UID, with optional support for random UID
- Support for 128-bit AES
- Common Criteria certified at level EAL 4+
- MIFARE Plus S for simple migration or MIFARE Plus X with many eXpert commands
- Security upgrade with cards in the field.
It is less flexible than MIFARE DESFire EV1.
MIFARE Plus was publicly announced in March 2008 with first samples in Q1 2009.
MIFARE Plus, when used in older transportation systems that do not yet support AES on the reader side, still leaves an open door to attacks. Though it helps to mitigate threats from attacks that broke the Crypto-1 cipher through the weak random number generator, it does not help against brute force attacks and cryptoanalytic attacks. During the transition period from MIFARE Classic to MIFARE Plus where only a few readers might support AES in the first place, it offers an optional AES authentication in Security Level 1 (which is in fact MIFARE Classic operation). This does not prevent the attacks mentioned above but enables a secure mutual authentication between the reader and the card to prove that the card belongs to the system and is not fake.
MIFARE sam av2
MIFARE SAMs are not contactless smartcards. They are Secure access modules designed to provide the secure storage of cryptographic keys and cryptographic functions for terminals to access the MIFARE products securely and to enable secure communication between terminals and host (backend). MIFARE SAMs are available from NXP in the contact-only module (PCM 1.1) as defined in ISO/IEC 7816-2 and the HVQFN32 format.
- Compatible with MIFARE portfolio solutions
- Supports MIFARE, 3DES and AES cryptography
- Key diversification
- Secure download and storage of keys
- 128 key entries
- ISO/IEC 7816 baud rate up to 1.5 Mbit/s
- X-mode functionality
Integrating a MIFARE SAM AV2 in a contactless smart card reader enables a design which integrates high-end cryptography features and the support of crypto authentication and data encryption/decryption. Like any SAM, it offers functionality to store keys securely, and perform authentication and encryption of data between the contactless card and the SAM and the SAM towards the backend. Next to a classical SAM architecture the MIFARE SAM AV2 supports the X-mode which allows a fast and convenient contactless terminal development by connecting the SAM to the microcontroller and reader IC simultaneously.
MIFARE SAM AV2 offers AV1 mode and AV2 mode where in comparison to the SAM AV1 the AV2 version includes Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), Hash functions like SHA-1, SHA-224, and SHA-256. It supports MIFARE Plus and a secure host communication. Both modes provide the same communication interfaces, cryptographic algorithms (Triple-DES 112-bit and 168-bit key, MIFARE Crypto1, AES-128 and AES-192, RSA with up to 2048-bit keys), and X-mode functionalities.
- 1994 — MIFARE Classic 1k contactless technology introduced.
- 1996 — First transport scheme in Seoul using MIFARE Classic 1k.
- 1997 — MIFARE PRO with Triple DES coprocessor introduced.
- 1999 — MIFARE PROX with PKI coprocessor introduced.
- 2001 — MIFARE UltraLight introduced.
- 2002 — MIFARE DESFire introduced, microprocessor based product.
- 2004 — MIFARE DESFire SAM introduced, secure infrastructure counterpart of MIFARE DESFire.
- 2006 — MIFARE DESFire EV1 is announced as the first product to support 128-bit AES
- 2008 — MIFARE Plus is announced as a drop-in replacement for MIFARE Classic based on 128-bit AES
- 2008 — MIFARE Ultralight C is introduced as paperticket IC featuring Triple DES Authentication
- 2010 — MIFARE SAM AV2 is introduced as secure key storage for readers AES, Triple DES, PKI Authentication
- 2012 — MIFARE Ultralight EV1 introduced, backwards compatible to MIFARE Ultralight but with extra security.
- 2013 — MIFARE DESFire EV2 is announced with improved performance, security&privacy and multi-application support
MIFARE was developed by Mikron; the name stands for MIkron FARE-collection System. It was acquired by Philips in 1998. Mikron sourced silicon from Atmel in the US, Philips in the Netherlands, and Siemens in Germany.
Infineon Technologies(then Siemens) licensed MIFARE from Mikron in 1994  and developed both stand alone and integrated designs with MIFARE compatible functions. Infineon currently produces various derivatives based on MIFARE technology including 1K memory (SLE66R35) and various microcontrollers (8 bit (SLE66 series), 16 bit (SLE7x series), and 32 bit (SLE97 series) with MIFARE emulations, including devices for use in USIM with Near Field Communication.
Motorola tried to develop MIFARE-like chip for wired-logic version but finally gave up. The project expected one million cards per month for start, but that fell to 100,000 per month just before they gave up the project.
In 1998 Philips licensed MIFARE to Hitachi  Hitachi licensed MIFARE for the development of the contactless smart card solution for NTT's IC telephone card which started in 1999 and finished in 2006. In the NTT contactless IC telephone card project, three parties joined: Tokin-Tamura-Siemens, Hitachi (Philips-contract for technical support), and Denso (Motorola-only production). NTT asked for two versions of chip, i.e. wired-logic chip (like MIFARE Classic) with small memory and big memory capacity. Hitachi developed only big memory version and cut part of the memory to fit for the small memory version.
The deal with Hitachi was upgraded in 2008 by NXP ( by then no longer part of Philips) to include MIFARE Plus and MIFARE DESFire to the renamed semiconductor division of Hitachi Renesas Technology.
Security of MIFARE Classic, MIFARE DESFire and MIFARE Ultralight
The encryption used by the MIFARE Classic card uses a 48 bit key.
A presentation by Henryk Plötz and Karsten Nohl at the Chaos Communication Congress in December 2007 described a partial reverse-engineering of the algorithm used in the MIFARE Classic chip. Abstract and slides are available online. A paper that describes the process of reverse engineering this chip was published at the August 2008 USENIX security conference.
In March 2008 the Digital Security research group of the Radboud University Nijmegen made public that they performed a complete reverse-engineering and were able to clone and manipulate the contents of an OV-Chipkaart which is a MIFARE Classic card. For demonstration they used the Proxmark device, a 125 kHz / 13.56 MHz research instrument. The schematics and software are released under the free GNU General Public License by Jonathan Westhues in 2007. They demonstrate it is even possible to perform card-only attacks using just an ordinary stock-commercial NFC reader in combination with the libnfc library.
The Radboud University published three scientific papers concerning the security of the MIFARE Classic:
- A Practical Attack on the MIFARE Classic
- Dismantling MIFARE Classic
- Wirelessly Pickpocketing a MIFARE Classic Card
In response to these attacks, the Dutch Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations stated that they would investigate whether the introduction of the Dutch Rijkspas could be brought forward from Q4 of 2008.
NXP tried to stop the publication of the second article by requesting a preliminary injunction. However, the injunction was denied, with the court noting that, "It should be considered that the publication of scientific studies carries a lot of weight in a democratic society, as does informing society about serious issues in the chip, because it allows for mitigating of the risks."
Both independent research results are confirmed by the manufacturer NXP. These attacks on the cards didn't stop the further introduction of the card as the only accepted card for all Dutch public transport the OV-chipkaart continued as nothing happened but in October 2011 the company TLS, responsible for the OV-Chipkaart announced that the new version of the card will be better protected against fraud.
The MIFARE Classic encryption Crypto-1 can be broken in about 200 seconds on a laptop, if approx. 50 bits of known (or chosen) key stream are available. This attack reveals the key from sniffed transactions under certain (common) circumstances and/or allows an attacker to learn the key by challenging the reader device.
The attack proposed in recovers the secret key in about 40 ms on a laptop. This attack requires just one (partial) authentication attempt with a legitimate reader.
Additionally there are a number of attacks that work directly on a card and without the help of a valid reader device. These attacks have been acknowledged by NXP. In April 2009 new and better card-only attack on MIFARE Classic has been found. It was first announced at the Rump session of Eurocrypt 2009. This attack was presented at SECRYPT 2009. The full description of this latest and fastest attack to date can also be found in the IACR preprint archive. The new attack improves by a factor of more than 10 all previous card-only attacks on MIFARE Classic, has instant running time, and it does not require a costly precomputation. The new attack allows to recover the secret key of any sector of MIFARE Classic card via wireless interaction, within about 300 queries to the card. It can then be combined with the nested authentication attack in the Nijmegen Oakland paper to recover subsequent keys almost instantly. Both attacks combined and with the right hardware equipment such as Proxmark3, one should be able to clone any MIFARE Classic card in not more than 10 seconds. This is much faster than previously thought.
In October 2011 David Oswald and Christof Paar of Ruhr-University in Bochum, Germany, detailed how they were able to conduct a successful "side-channel" attack against the card using equipment that can built for nearly $3,000. called "Breaking Mifare DESFire MF3ICD40: Power Analysis and Templates in the Real World,"  They stated that System integrators should be aware of the new security risks that arise from the presented attacks and can no longer rely on the mathematical security of the used 3DES cipher. Hence, in order to avoid, e.g. manipulation or cloning of smartcards used in payment or access control solutions, proper actions have to be taken: on the one hand, multi-level countermeasures in the backend allow to minimize the threat even if the underlying RFID platform is insecure," In a statement  NXP said that the attack would be difficult to replicate and that they had already planned to discontinue the card at the end of 2011. NXP also stated "Also, the impact of a successful attack depends on the end-to-end system security design of each individual infrastructure and whether diversified keys – recommended by NXP – are being used. If this is the case, a stolen or lost card can be disabled simply by the operator detecting the fraud and blacklisting the card, however this operation assumes that the operator has those mechanisms implemented. This will make it even harder to replicate the attack with a commercial purpose,"
In September 2012 a security consultancy Intrepidus  demonstrated at the EU SecWest event in Amsterdam, that MIFARE Ultralight based fare cards in the New Jersey and San Francisco transit systems can be manipulated using an Android application, enabling travelers to reset their card balance and travel for free in a talk entitled "NFC For Free Rides and Rooms (on your phone)". Although not a direct attack on the chip but rather the reloading of an unprotected register on the device, it allows hackers to replace value and show that the card is valid for use. This can be overcome by having a copy of the register online so that values can be analysed and suspect cards hotlisted. NXP have responded by pointing out that they had introduced the MIFARE Ultralight C in 2008 with 3DES protection and in November 2012 introduced the MIFARE Ultralight EV1  with three decrement only counters to foil such reloading attacks.
Considerations for systems integration
For systems based on contactless smartcards (e.g. public transportation), security against fraud relies on many components, of which the card is just one. Typically, to minimize costs, systems integrators will choose a relatively cheap card such as a MIFARE Classic and concentrate security efforts in the back office. Additional encryption on the card, transaction counters, and other methods known in cryptography are then employed to make cloned cards useless, or at least to enable the back office to detect a fraudulent card, and put it on a blacklist. Systems that work with online readers only (i.e., readers with a permanent link to the back office) are easier to protect than systems that have offline readers as well, for which real-time checks are not possible and blacklists cannot be updated as frequently.
Places that use MIFARE technology
|Compass Card||Canada (Metro Vancouver)||NXP's Mifare DESFire EV1||Used for public transit (TransLink). $6 refundable deposit.|
|Efesur||Argentina (Bariloche)||MIFARE Ultralight||Control de accesos orientado al turismo |
|EYCON e-Bus||Argentina (Bahía Blanca)||MIFARE Classic 1K||Planned to be used on buses and taxis.|
|SUBE card||Argentina (Buenos Aires)||MIFARE Classic 1K||Metro, trains and buses|
|Red Bus||Argentina (Córdoba, Mendoza, Salta)||MIFARE Classic 1K|
|Tarjeta Sin Contacto||Argentina (Rosario)||MIFARE DESFire EV1 SAM V2||Ente de la Movilidad de Rosario|
|Adelaide Metro metroCard||Australia (Adelaide)||#MIFARE DESFire EV1||Adelaide Metro network (Bus, Train and Tram) |
|TransLink Go card||Australia (Brisbane)||MIFARE Classic 1K|
|ACTION MyWay||Australia (Canberra)||MIFARE Classic 1K|
|Metro Green Card||Australia (Hobart)||MIFARE Classic 4K|
|SmartRider||Australia (Perth)||MIFARE Classic 1K|
|Myki||Australia (Victoria)||MIFARE DESFire|
|Baku metrocard||Azerbaijan (Baku)||MIFARE Classic 1K, MIFARE Plus S 1K|
|tri||Brazil (Porto Alegre)|
|RioCard||Brazil (Rio de Janeiro)|
|Bilhete Único||Brazil (São Paulo)||MIFARE Classic 1K|
|Orovale||Brazil (Teresopolis)||Viação Dedo de Deus (buses)|
|ETS Blue||Canada (Edmonton, Alberta)|
|OPUS card||Canada (Montreal)||Société de transport de Montréal|
|M-Card||Canada (St. John's)||MIFARE Classic 1K||Used on the Metrobus Transit system.|
|Presto Card||Canada (Toronto, Ottawa and Hamilton, Ontario)||MIFARE DESFire|
|Tarjeta Metroval||Chile (Valparaíso)||MIFARE Classic 1k||Valparaíso Metro uses a this card as unique payment method|
|Tarjeta Bip!||Chile (Santiago de Chile)||MIFARE Classic 1k and 4k (if bank bip or university bip are used)||Metro de Santiago, Transantiago|
|Yang Cheng Tong||China (Guangzhou)|
|In Karta||Czech republic (nationwide)||MIFARE DESFire, DESFire EV1||, new cards issued since 07/2012 are DESFire EV1, older ones are DESFire|
|opencard||Czech republic (Prague)||MIFARE DESFire EV1|
|Rejsekort||Denmark||MIFARE Classic 4K|
|Ühiskaart||Estonia (Tallinn)||MIFARE Classic||Works also in Harju County.|
|Matkakortti||Finland (Helsinki)||MIFARE DESFire||Can be used with all forms of public transport systems within Helsinki Metropolitan Area.|
|Indian Railways||India||MIFARE DESFire||Indian railways (five major cities)|
|Cardz Me||India (Karnataka)||Issued to students in the Indian state of Karnataka by Cardz Middle East|
|SmartCard||Ireland (Dublin)||MIFARE Classic 1K||Iarnród Éireann|
|Leap card||Ireland (Dublin)||probably Mifare Plus||replaces the individual Luas, Dart and Dublin Bus smartcards|
|Luas Smart-card||Ireland (Dublin)||Mifare Classic||being replaced by the Leap card|
|Dublin Bus Smart-card||Ireland (Dublin)||Mifare Classic||being replaced by the Leap card|
|DART Smart-card||Ireland (Dublin)||Mifare Classic||being replaced by the Leap card|
|AltoAdige/Südtirol Pass||Italy (Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol)||MIFARE DESFire EV1||Southern Tirol network (Bus, Train and Cable-cars) |
|Touch 'n Go||Malaysia|
|OV-chipkaart||Netherlands||MIFARE Classic 4K||Currently being introduced as a single payment system for public transportation in the Netherlands|
|AT Hop||New Zealand (Auckland)||MIFARE DESFire EV1||Introduced as the regional integrated ticketing card. The existing HOP card aka "Snapper/HOP" uses the JCOP standard and is due to be completely phased out by the end of 2013.|
|Kolumbuskort||Norway (Rogaland)||MIFARE DESFire EV1||Bus, Boat. http://www.kolumbus.no|
|Ruter reisekort||Norway (Oslo and Akershus)||MIFARE DESFire EV1 (MF3ICD41)||Bus, boat, tram, subway and trains. Ruter and NSB|
|Białostocka Karta Miejska||Poland (Białystok)||MIFARE Classic 1K||Used on buses|
|Warszawska Karta Miejska||Poland (Warsaw)||MIFARE Classic 1K||Used on buses, trams, subway and railroad|
|eBilet||Poland (Gdynia)||MIFARE Classic 1K||Used on trolleybuses and buses|
|RATB Activ||Romania (Bucharest)||MIFARE Classic 1K||Used on all public surface transportation and also available for subway|
|Moscow Metro||Russia (Moscow)||MIFARE Ultralight||Disposable ticket|
|EMcard||Slovakia||Used by almost every public transport system in Slovakia and some in Czech Republic. In most cases only referred to as BCK - Bezkontaktná cipová karta (contactless smart card)|
|Urbana||Slovenia (Ljubljana)||MIFARE DESFire EV1||Used by buses, parking spaces, libraries, museums, the Ljubljana Castle funicular, sports institutes and cultural events.|
|Mybi, T-money, Upass||South Korea|
|Consorcio de Transportes de Madrid||Spain (Madrid)||MIFARE DESFire EV1 MF3ICD41||Metro, trains and buses|
|Resekortet||Sweden||MIFARE Classic 1K|
|Skånetrafiken JoJo||Sweden||MIFARE Classic 1K|
|Karlstadsbuss||Sweden||MIFARE Classic 4K||Karlstadsbuss Resekort|
|SL||Sweden||MIFARE Classic 4K||Stockholms lokaltrafik (Stockholm public transit card)|
|Västtrafik||Sweden||MIFARE Classic 1K/4K, MIFARE Plus, MIFARE Ultralight||Västtrafikkortet|
|EasyCard||Taiwan||MIFARE Classic, MIFARE Plus|
|KGS Card||Turkey||MIFARE Classic 1K, MIFARE Plus 2K (in Classic compatibility mode)||Toll Highways, KGS (acronym for Contactless Card Toll System)|
|Muzekart||Turkey||MIFARE Classic 1K, MIFARE Plus 2K|
|Istanbulkart||Turkey (Istanbul)||MIFARE DESFire EV1||Buses, ferry boats, metro, light metro, trams and overground trains|
|KentKart||Turkey (Izmir)||Metro, bus, passenger ship|
|Iff card||United Kingdom (Cardiff)||MIFARE DESFire EV1||Used on Cardiff Bus services.|
|SmartTech Production||Hong Kong||NXP Mifare Golden Partner|
|Oyster card||United Kingdom (London)||MIFARE DESFire EV1||Migrating from MIFARE Classic to MIFARE DESFire EV1|
|EasyRider||United Kingdom (Nottingham)||Nottingham City Transport|
|Breeze Card||USA (Atlanta, Georgia)||MIFARE Ultralight and MIFARE Classic|
|CharlieCard||USA (Boston, Massachusetts)||MBTA v. Anderson - Civil case related to the responsible disclosure of flaws in the system|
|MetroQ||USA (Houston, Texas)||MIFARE Classic 1K|
|Go-To Card||USA (Minneapolis, Minnesota)||MIFARE Classic 1K|
|ConnectCard||USA (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania)||Mifare Classic|
|Clipper card||USA (San Francisco Bay Area, California)||MIFARE DESFire||Replacing TransLink, which used a Motorola Card.|
|PATH SmartLink||USA (New York/New Jersey)||MIFARE DESFire|
|ORCA Card||USA (Seattle, Washington)||MIFARE DESFire EV1|
|Easy Card||USA (South Florida, Florida)||MIFARE Ultralight||Used on Metrobus, Metrorail, Tri-Rail, City of Hialeah Transit, and Conchita Transit Express.|
|Compass Card||USA (San Diego)||MIFARE Classic 1K||Used on buses, trolleys, Coaster and Sprinter trains in SDMTS and NCTD|
|SmarTrip||USA (Washington Metropolitan Area, Washington, D.C.)||MIFARE Plus X||Used on the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority and neighboring transit systems|
|Rabbit Card||Thailand||MIFARE DESFire EV1||Used on BTS Skytrain, Bangkok BRT, restaurants, shops and cinemas that accept Rabbit Card|
|Smart Purse||Thailand||MIFARE Classic 1k||Used on Metrobus (buses), 7-Eleven, shops and restaurants that accept Smart Purse|
|Bangkok Metro Smart card||Thailand||MIFARE Classic 1k||Bangkok Metro|
- Linkoping university, Sweden - Student/staff ID, access control, library, copy/print, student discount, payments
- London School of Economics - Access control (Unprotected Mifare Classic 1k)
- New College School in Oxford - Building access.
- Imperial College London - Staff and student ID access card in London, UK.
- Cambridge University - Student/Staff ID and access card, library card, canteen payments in some colleges
- University of Warwick - Staff and student ID card and separate Eating at Warwick stored value card in Coventry, UK.
- Regent's College, London - Staff and student ID access card in London, UK.
- Bucknell University - Student ID access card in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania.
- University of New South Wales - Student ID access card.
- University of Alberta - Staff OneCard trial currently underway.
- Northumbria University - Student/Staff building and printer access.
- City University of Hong Kong - Student/Staff building, Library, Amenities Building.
- Hong Kong Institute of Vocational Education - Student ID card, attendance, library, printers and computers access.
- University of Bayreuth - Student ID card and canteen card for paying.
- University of Ibadan, Nigeria - Student ID card and Examination Verification and Attendance.(Solutions Colony Ltd)
- BOWEN University,Iwo, Nigeria - Student ID card and Examination Verification and Attendance.(Solutions Colony Ltd)
- Afe Babalola University, Ado-Ekiti, Nigeria - Student ID card and Examination Verification and Attendance.(Solutions Colony Ltd)
- Achievers University, Owo, Nigeria - Student ID card and Examination Verification and Attendance.(Solutions Colony Ltd)
- Adekunle Ajasin University, Akungba, Ondo State, Nigeria - Student ID card and Examination Verification and Attendance.(Solutions Colony Ltd)
- Auchi Polytechnic, Auchi, Nigeria - Student ID card and Examination Verification and Attendance.(Solutions Colony Ltd)
- University College Hospital, Ibadan (UCH), Nigeria - Student ID card and Staff Attendance.(Solutions Colony Ltd)
- Federal University of Technology, Minna, Niger State (FUTM), Nigeria - Student ID card and Examination Verification and Attendance.(Solutions Colony Ltd)
- Benson Idahosa University, Benin City, Edo State (BIU), Nigeria - Student ID card and Examination Verification and Attendance.(Solutions Colony Ltd)
- Federal University of Technology, Akure, Ondo State (FUTA), Nigeria - Student ID card and Examination Verification and Attendance.(Solutions Colony Ltd)
- Covenant University, Nigeria - Student ID card and Examination Verification and Attendance.(Solutions Colony Ltd)
- Lead City University, Nigeria - Student ID card and Examination Verification and Attendance.(Solutions Colony Ltd)
- Hogeschool-Universiteit Brussel, Belgium - Student ID card, canteen card for paying, library and building access.
- Southampton University - Student ID card, library and building access - Mifare Classic 4K.
- Delft University of Technology, Netherlands - Student/Staff ID card, staff coffee machines, lockers, printers and building access.
- Dresden University of Technology, Germany - Building access, canteen card for payment
- Chemnitz University of Technology, Germany - Student ID card
- Leipzig University, Germany - Student ID card, canteen card for payment
- Freiberg University of Mining and Technology, Germany - Student ID card, building access, canteen card for payment
- University of Jena, Germany - Student/Staff ID card, building access, canteen card for payment
- Technical University of Denmark, Denmark - Student ID card, building access
- University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany - Student/Staff ID card, library access, canteen card for payment
- Disney Infinity - figure and power disc bases
- Walt Disney World Resort - used for tickets, Disney Dining Plan, and room key access
- University of Northampton - Car park access, building access - Mifare Classic 1K.
- Assumption University (Thailand), Thailand - Student/Staff ID card, library and computers access, canteen, transportation and parking payment, election verification - Mifare Classic 4K
- MIFARE (2009-12-18). "The success of MIFARE".
- "nfc tags". nfc-phones.org. Retrieved 5 August 2012.
- "nfc tags". Retrieved 11 August 2013.
- Some ISO/IEC 7816-4 commands are used by MIFARE DESFire EV1, including a proprietary method to wrap native MIFARE DESFire commands into a ISO/IEC 7816 APDU.
- "German Researchers Crack Mifare RFID Encryption". Slashdot.
- "Security of MF3ICD40".
- "NXP introduces new security and performance benchmark with MIFARE Plus" (Press release). NXP. 2008-03-10.
- "MIFARE Classic 1K specification". 2009-02-22.
- Karsten Nohl homepage at the University of Virginia
- Nohl, Karsten; Henryk Plötz. "Mifare: Little Security, Despite Obscurity". Chaos Communication Congress.
- Nohl, Karsten; David Evans (2008-08-01). "Reverse-Engineering a Cryptographic RFID Tag". Proceedings of the 17th USENIX Security Symposium.
- Radboud University Nijmegen Digital Security
- Digital Security Group (2008-03-12). "Security Flaw in Mifare Classic". Radboud University Nijmegen.
- "Proxmark". Retrieved 2011-01-25.
- "Dutch Page". Retrieved 2012-03-24.
- Arnhem Court Judge Services (2008-07-18). "Pronunciation, Primary Claim". Rechtbank Arnhem.
- "Judge denies NXP's injunction against security researchers". The Standard. 2008-07-18. Retrieved 2010-02-13.
- "mifare.net :: Security". Retrieved 2011-01-25.
- Webside id-nee: Preparations continue as normal, visited 7 July 2012
- Webwereld: New OV chip prevents fraude, 6 October 2011. Visited 7 July 2012
- Courtois, Nicolas T.; Karsten Nohl; Sean O'Neil (2008-04-14). "Algebraic Attacks on the Crypto-1 Stream Cipher in MiFare Classic and Oyster Cards". Cryptology ePrint Archive.
- Garcia, Flavio D.; Gerhard de Koning Gans; Ruben Muijrers; Peter van Rossum, Roel Verdult; Ronny Wichers Schreur; Bart Jacobs (2008-10-04). "Dismantling MIFARE Classic". 13th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS 2008), LNCS, Springer.
- Garcia, Flavio D.; Peter van Rossum; Roel Verdult; Ronny Wichers Schreur (2009-03-17). "Wirelessly Pickpocketing a Mifare Classic Card". 30th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P 2009), IEEE.
- Third and fourth bullet points under "MIFARE Classic vulnerabilities" at http://mifare.net/security/mifare_classic.asp
- Courtois, Nicolas T. (2009-04-28). "Conditional Multiple Differential Attack on MIFARE Classic". Slides presented at the rump session of Eurocrypt 2009 conference.
- Courtois, Nicolas T. (2009-07-07). "The Dark Side of Security by Obscurity and Cloning MiFare Classic Rail and Building Passes Anywhere, Anytime". In SECRYPT 2009 – International Conference on Security and Cryptography, to appear.
- Courtois, Nicolas T. (2009-05-04). "The Dark Side of Security by Obscurity and Cloning MiFare Classic Rail and Building Passes Anywhere, Anytime". IACR Cryptology Preprint Archive.
- "Adquisición de un Sistema de Bicicletas Públicas para Rosario" (PDF). Proyecto de Transporte Sostenible y Calidad del Aire - Secretaría de Transporte del Ministerio del Interior y Transporte a través de la Unidad Ejecutora de Proyecto (UEP). 2013. Archived from the original on 2013.
- LOT ltd. "Integrator's web site (subway solutions)".
- Steve Ragan - The Tech Herald. "Replacement suggested for NXP chips used in OV-Chipkaart".
- Enotna mestna kartica URBANA
- Resekortet i Sverige AB. "RKF-specifikationen - Svensk Kollektivtrafik".
- Contactless Smartcard Technology Needs More Security
- SmartTech Production. "Card Manufacturer - NXP Mifare Golden Partner".
- Breezecard homepage
- Dayal, Geeta, "How they hacked it: The MiFare RFID crack explained; A look at the research behind the chip compromise, Computerworld, March 19, 2008.
- MIFARE official website.
- 24C3 Talk about MIFARE Classic Video of the 24C3 Talk presenting the results of reverse engineering the MIFARE Classic family, raising serious security concerns
- Presentation of 24th Chaos Computer Congress in Berlin Claiming that the MIFARE classic chip is possibly not safe
- Demonstration of an actual attack on MIFARE Classic (a building access control system) by the Radboud University Nijmegen.