|Born||Stanislav Yevgrafovich Petrov
c. 1939 (age 74–75)
|Known for||1983 Soviet nuclear false alarm incident|
|Service/branch||Soviet Air Defence Forces|
Stanislav Yevgrafovich Petrov (Russian: Станисла́в Евгра́фович Петро́в; born c. 1939) is a retired lieutenant colonel of the Soviet Air Defence Forces. On September 26, 1983, he was the duty officer at the command center for the Oko nuclear early-warning system when the system reported that a missile was being launched from the United States. Petrov judged the report to be a false alarm, and his decision is credited with having prevented an erroneous retaliatory nuclear attack on the United States and its NATO allies that could have resulted in large-scale nuclear war. Investigation later confirmed that the satellite warning system had indeed malfunctioned.
There are questions about the part Petrov's decision played in preventing nuclear war, because, according to the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation, nuclear retaliation requires that multiple sources confirm an attack. In any case, the incident exposed a serious flaw in the Soviet early warning system. Petrov asserts that he was neither rewarded nor punished for his actions.
Had Petrov reported incoming American missiles, his superiors might have launched an assault against the United States, precipitating a corresponding nuclear response from the United States. Petrov declared the system's indication a false alarm. Later, it was apparent that he was right: no missiles were approaching and the computer detection system was malfunctioning. It was subsequently determined that the false alarm had been created by a rare alignment of sunlight on high-altitude clouds and the satellites' Molniya orbits, an error later corrected by cross-referencing a geostationary satellite.
Petrov later indicated that the influences on his decision included: that he was informed a U.S. strike would be all-out, so five missiles seemed an illogical start; that the launch detection system was new and, in his view, not yet wholly trustworthy; and that ground radar failed to pick up corroborative evidence, even after minutes of delay. However in a 2013 interview, Petrov said at the time he was never sure that the alarm was erroneous. He felt that his civilian training helped him make the right decision. His colleagues were all professional soldiers with purely military training and, following instructions, would have reported a missile strike if they had been on his shift.
Petrov underwent intense questioning by his superiors about his judgment. Initially, he was praised for his decision. General Yury Votintsev, then commander of the Soviet Air Defense's Missile Defense Units, who was the first to hear Petrov's report of the incident (and the first to reveal it to the public in the 1990s), states that Petrov's "correct actions" were "duly noted." Petrov himself states he was initially praised by Votintsev and promised a reward, but recalls that he was also reprimanded for improper filing of paperwork under the pretext that he had not described the incident in the war diary.
He received no reward. According to Petrov, this was because the incident and other bugs found in the missile detection system embarrassed his superiors and the influential scientists who were responsible for it, so that if he had been officially rewarded, they would have had to be punished. He was reassigned to a less sensitive post, took early retirement (although he emphasizes that he was not "forced out" of the army, as is sometimes claimed by Western sources), and suffered a nervous breakdown.
In a later interview, Petrov stated that the famous red button has never worked, as military psychologists did not want to put the decision about a war into the hands of one single person.
The incident became known publicly in the 1990s upon the publication of Votintsev's memoirs. Widespread media reports since then have increased public awareness of Petrov's actions.
There is some confusion as to precisely what Petrov's military role was in this incident. Petrov, as an individual, was not in a position where he could single-handedly have launched any of the Soviet missile arsenal. His sole duty was to monitor satellite surveillance equipment and report missile attack warnings up the chain of command; top Soviet leadership would have decided whether to launch a retaliatory attack against the West. But Petrov's role was crucial in providing information to make that decision. According to Bruce Blair, a Cold War nuclear strategies expert and nuclear disarmament advocate, formerly with the Center for Defense Information, "The top leadership, given only a couple of minutes to decide, told that an attack had been launched, would make a decision to retaliate."
Petrov later said "I had obviously never imagined that I would ever face that situation. It was the first and, as far as I know, also the last time that such a thing had happened, except for simulated practice scenarios."
Awards and commendations
On May 21, 2004, the San Francisco-based Association of World Citizens gave Petrov its World Citizen Award along with a trophy and $1000 "in recognition of the part he played in averting a catastrophe."
In January 2006, Petrov traveled to the United States where he was honored in a meeting at the United Nations in New York City. There the Association of World Citizens presented Petrov with a second special World Citizen Award. The next day, Petrov met with American journalist Walter Cronkite at his CBS office in New York City. That interview, in addition to other highlights of Petrov's trip to the United States, is included in the documentary film The Man Who Saved the World.
For his actions in averting a potential nuclear war in 1983, Petrov was awarded the Dresden Preis 2013 (Dresden Prize) in Dresden, Germany, on February 17, 2013. The award included €25,000 ($32,000; £21,000). On February 24, 2012, he was honored with the 2011 German Media Award, presented to him at a ceremony in Baden-Baden, Germany.
On the same day that Petrov was honored at the United Nations in New York City, the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations issued a press release contending that a single person could not have started or prevented a nuclear war, stating in part: "Under no circumstances a decision to use nuclear weapons could be made or even considered in the Soviet Union (Russia) or in the United States on the basis of data from a single source or a system. For this to happen, a confirmation is necessary from several systems: ground-based radars, early warning satellites, intelligence reports, etc." But Bruce Blair has said that at that time the U.S.–Soviet relationship "had deteriorated to the point where the Soviet Union as a system—not just the Kremlin, not just Andropov, not just the KGB—but as a system, was geared to expect an attack and to retaliate very quickly to it. It was on hair-trigger alert. It was very nervous and prone to mistakes and accidents. ... The false alarm that happened on Petrov's watch could not have come at a more dangerous, intense phase in U.S.–Soviet relations." At that time, according to Oleg D. Kalugin, a former KGB chief of foreign counterintelligence, "The danger was in the Soviet leadership thinking, 'The Americans may attack, so we better attack first.'"
Petrov has said he does not know that he should regard himself as a hero for what he did that day. In an interview for the documentary film The Red Button and the Man Who Saved the World, Petrov says, "All that happened didn't matter to me—it was my job. I was simply doing my job, and I was the right person at the right time, that's all. My late wife for 10 years knew nothing about it. 'So what did you do?' she asked me. 'I did nothing.'"
References to Petrov and the Incident in Other Media and Theories Based on the Implications and Outcomes
In Ian Morris's 2013 book War! What is it Good For?: Conflict and the Progress of Civilization from Primates to Robots, Petrov's aversion of global thermonuclear war between the superpowers was referenced as the quintessential example of the culminating point (and absurdity) of modern warfare. Petrov's situation is characterized as the epitome of war envisioned as humanity's endless propensity for senseless violence with ever more powerful weapons and technologies, and the phrase "getting to Petrov" is used to refer to the path human history took to go from primitive bands of hunter-gatherers engaging in disorganized (and often unfocused) violence against each other, to the fate of a billion people resting in the split-second decision of a single man caught in the middle of a standoff between two states so large and powerful that each stood astride half the world. This notion is used as the starting point and antithesis from which the author lays out his own thesis that warfare over the long view of human history has, indirectly, actually lead to a drastic decrease in overall violence and violent death rates for homo sapiens due to "productive war" having the tendency to produce "leviathans" (centralized, powerful state societies which monopolize the legitimacy of the use of violence) and eventually the stabilizing force of global superpowers that constrain and control the actions and ambitions of other states, reducing the overall level of conflict between states, and further reducing violence within states, overall. "Getting to Petrov" is used many times by Morris in the book to return to the antithesis and explain how war can have such long-term benefits on the macro scale, yet bring humanity to a point where it is paradoxically capable of the madness of destruction on unfathomable scales (and potentially complete self-destruction) so quickly and seemingly senselessly, as in the the nuclear war that Petrov narrowly averted.
- 1961 Goldsboro B-52 crash, for another nuclear accident which narrowly missed widespread destruction
- Vasili Arkhipov, for another nuclear war-averting incident during the Cuban Missile Crisis
- Able Archer 83 – a NATO military exercise involving nuclear weapons that formed the backdrop for the nuclear war scare involving Petrov in November 1983
- Norwegian rocket incident
- The NORAD incidents of 1979/1980
- WarGames, a fictional Hollywood movie about a similar incident
- "The Man Who Saved the World Finally Recognized". Association of World Citizens. Archived from the original on July 21, 2011. Retrieved June 7, 2007.
- Long, Tony (September 26, 2007). "The Man Who Saved the World by Doing ... Nothing". Wired. Retrieved December 1, 2011.
- "On Presentation of the World Citizens Award to Stanislav Petrov" (Press release). Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations. 19 January 2006.
- В Нью-Йорке россиянина наградили за спасение мира. Lenta.ru (in Russian)
- (26 September 2013) Stanislav Petrov: The man who may have saved the world BBC News Europe, Retrieved 26 September 2013
- Molniya orbit
- David Hoffman (February 10, 1999). "I Had A Funny Feeling in My Gut". Washington Post.
- Тот, который не нажал. Moskovskiye Novosti (in Russian)
- BBC TV Interview, BBC Moscow correspondent Allan Little, October 1998
- "Der rote Knopf hat nie funktioniert". FAZ. February 18, 2013.
- "Important Insight". Bright Star Sound.
- "War Games". Burrelle's Information Services (Dateline NBC), November 12, 2000.
- "Stanislav Petrov Averts a Worldwide Nuclear War". Bright Star Sound. Retrieved September 27, 2006.
- "Russian Colonel Who Averted Nuclear War Receives World Citizen Award". Moscow News. January 20, 2006. Retrieved September 27, 2006.
- "Statement Film website". Statement Film ApS.
- "The Nuclear War that Almost Happened in 1983". Baltimore Sun.
- Ewa Pieta. "The Red Button & the Man Who Saved the World" (Flash). logtv.com. Retrieved September 27, 2006.
- BrightStarSound.com a tribute website, multiple pages with photos and reprints of various articles about Petrov
- Nuclear War: Minuteman
- The Nuclear War that Almost Happened in 1983 (posted 9-5-03)
- Wired.com Sept. 26, 1983: The Man Who Saved the World by Doing ... Nothing
- The Man Who Saved the World at the Internet Movie Database
- By Dawn's Early Light at the Internet Movie Database, a fictional American television film from HBO about a nuclear exchange and the attempt of both sides to prevent an escalation to a full scaled war, aired first May 19, 1990.