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RAND report

I find that there is exceeding detail in the article attributed to the RAND report that could be summarized/merged with other information already in the article:

  • "According to a RAND Corporation policy report, while in Paris, Masoud Rajavi began to implement an "ideological revolution", which required members an increased study and devotion that later expanded into "near religious devotion to the Rajavis". After its settlement in Iraq, however, it experienced a shortfall of volunteers. This led to the recruitment of members including Iranian dissidents, as well as Iranian economic migrants in countries such as Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, through "false promises of employment, land, aid in applying for asylum in Western countries, and even marriage, to attract them to Iraq". MEK also gave free visit trips to its camps to the relatives of the members. According to the RAND report, the recruited members were mostly brought by MEK into Iraq illegally and then were asked to submit their identity documents for "safekeeping", an act which would "effectively trap" them. With the assistance of Saddam's government, MEK also recruited some of its members from the Iranian prisoners of the Iran-Iraq war."

  • "The RAND Corporation policy report on the group suggests that between 1979 and 1981 it was the most popular dissident group in Iran, however, the former reputation is diminished to the extent that it is now "the only entity less popular" than the Iranian government."

  • "According to a RAND Corporation policy report, the MEK initially acquired supporters and members through "its Marxist social policy, coeducational living opportunities, antipathy to U.S. influence, and—unlike traditional Leftist groups—support for a government that reflected Islamic ideals. The members, which primarily consisted of University students and graduates, were encouraged to live together and form close social bonds.

  • "As RAND Corporation policy reported, MEK supporters seek donations at public places, often showing "gruesome pictures" of human rights victims in Iran and claiming to raise money for them but funnelling it to MEK.

  • "The High Court ruled to close several MEK compounds after investigations revealed that the organization fraudulently collected between $5 million and $10 million in social welfare benefits for children of its members sent to Europe."

  • "after finding no "verifiable links between the money donated by the British public [approximately £5 million annually] and charitable work in Iran""

I propose summarizing this information and removing WP:EXCEPTIONAL claims; this is my proposal:

  • "According to a RAND Corporation policy report, while in Paris, Masoud Rajavi began to implement an "ideological revolution".Massoud Rajavi appointed Maryam Azodanlu as his co-equal leader. The announcement, stated that this would give women equal say within the organization and thereby 'would launch a great ideological revolution within Mojahedin, the Iranian public and the whole Muslim World'. It also required members increased devotion to the organization and its leaders."

    (I propose moving this to the section Ideological revolution and women's rights, where the "Ideological revolution" is discussed).
  • "According to a RAND Corporation policy report, the MEK initially acquired supporters and members through "its Marxist social policy, coeducational living opportunities, antipathy to U.S. influence, and—unlike traditional Leftist groups—support for a government that reflected Islamic ideals. The members, which primarily consisted of University students and graduates, were encouraged to live together and form close social bonds.

  • "According to a report by RAND Corporation policy reported, the MEK has engaged in fund raising, some of which have been found to be fraudulent."

Thoughts? Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 15:11, 30 November 2020 (UTC)

Looks like a fair enough proposal. Go ahead. Alex-h (talk) 10:07, 3 December 2020 (UTC)
Thanks Alex for the feedback. Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 12:17, 3 December 2020 (UTC)
I don't agree. Stefka, are you saying all of the claims you removed are WP:EXCEPTIONAL? Because multiple RS can be found for at least most of the claims you propose removing.VR talk 18:28, 4 December 2020 (UTC)
No, I'm saying that some were WP:EXCEPTIONAL, and some were just bloating details that could be summarised into main points (conforming to summary style and to WP:DUE). Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 08:53, 5 December 2020 (UTC)
I agree with this summary. The main points have been kept. Idealigic (talk) 11:13, 5 December 2020 (UTC)
Stefka Bulgaria so which ones do you think are WP:EXCEPTIONAL? I find the recent edits don't preserve all the main points.VR talk 21:12, 5 December 2020 (UTC)
Because it doesn't accurately summarize the content removed and it moves it out of the relevant section. For example, this edit removes completely MEK luring people into the organization under false pretenses and then trapping them. This is mentioned in many scholarly sources, so this content is no WP:EXCEPTIONAL.VR talk 18:21, 22 December 2020 (UTC)
Well, the idea here is that there is a lot of text being drawn from a single source (we've had much shorter sentences removed on the basis that they we taken from a single source); and we should indeed be editing in summary style. Can you please provide the other scholarly sources you mention? we could then determine a more suitable summary based on multiple sources. Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 14:40, 23 December 2020 (UTC)
These removals look far more than a summarization. They are not even exceptional. The recruitment methods along with other removed points from the RAND report should not be removed.--Seyyed(t-c) 09:20, 26 December 2020 (UTC)
Stefka Bulgaria I asked you which claims were exceptional, but you haven't specified them. So at this point your EXCEPTIONAL argument is unsupported and your edit should be reverted. As for sources about MEK luring members under false pretenses here are some scholarly sources:

...members from Iran who were lured to Iraq under the pretense that they were seeking job opportunities with a company based in the West. Prospective employees would usually first be brought to Turkey for job interviews, where they would then be told that their formal interview would take place at the company’s main office in Iraq, where the final decision would also be made on their employment. Upon their arrival, they would be informed that the company they were in contact with was in fact the MEK, their passports would be confiscated, and their indoctrination into the MEK would begin.
— Terronomics, p 71-72, Routledge

{{talkquote|The composition of the Mujahedin was rather varied as a result of numerous recruitment drives...Many were lured to Iraq under false pretences, such as the prospect of employment, study or resettlement.|source="From internment to resettlement of refugees: on US obligations towards MeK defectors in Iraq" (PDF). Melbourne Journal of International Law. 15 (1).
There are also many news sources that talk about this, but I think scholarly sources deserve higher weight.VR talk 17:54, 26 December 2020 (UTC)

Regarding the claim that MeK fraudulently collected between $5 million and $10 million in social welfare benefits, the RAND report cites two sources:

  • Krikorian, Greg, “Response to Terror; Five Tied to L.A. Case, Germany Alleges; Crime: Police Charge Suspects with Cheating the Government of Millions, Which Reportedly Went to a Group the U.S. Classifies as a Terrorist Entity,” Los Angeles Times, December 21, 2001, p. A4.
  • Moni, Karim Haggi, Dossier of Facts on the People’s Mojahedin Organisation of Iran, The Netherlands: Iran Peywand Association, 2003.

So such a claim can't be regarded as exceptional.VR talk 18:07, 26 December 2020 (UTC)

Ideological revolution and women's rights

I propose summarising some of the text in revolution and women's rights since there seems to be a lot of excessive details about marriages and divorces (mostly coming from a single source):

"Shortly after the revolution, Rajavi married Ashraf Rabii, an MEK member regarded as "the symbol of revolutionary womanhood". Rabii was killed by Iranian forces in 1982. According to a RAND Corporation policy report, while in Paris, Masoud Rajavi began to implement an "ideological revolution". On 27 January 1985, Massoud Rajavi appointed Maryam Azodanlu as his co-equal leader. The announcement, stated that this would give women equal say within the organization and thereby 'would launch a great ideological revolution within Mojahedin, the Iranian public and the whole Muslim World'. It also required members increased devotion to the organization and its leaders. Five weeks later, the MEK announced that its Politburo and Central Committee had asked Rajavi and Azondalu, who was already married, to marry one another to deepen and pave the way for the "ideological revolution. At the time Maryam Azodanlu was known as only the younger sister of a veteran member, and the wife of Mehdi Abrishamchi. According to the announcement, Maryam Azodanlu and Mehdi Abrishamchi had recently divorced in order to facilitate this 'great revolution'. According to Ervand Abrahamian "in the eyes of traditionalists, particularly among the bazaar middle class, the whole incident was indecent. It smacked of wife-swapping, especially when Abrishamchi announced his own marriage to Khiabani’s younger sister. It involved women with young children and wives of close friends – a taboo in traditional Iranian culture;" something that further isolated the Mojahedin and also upset some members of the organization. Also according to Ervand Abrahamian, "the incident was equally outrageous in the eyes of the secularists, especially among the modern intelligentsia. It projected onto the public arena a matter that should have been treated as a private issue between two individuals."[1] Many criticized Maryam Azodanlu's giving up her own maiden name (something most Iranian women did not do and she herself had not done in her previous marriage). They would question whether this was in line with her claims of being a staunch feminist."

This is a mess and needs to be summarised. Any feedback/suggestions as to what we could summarise it to would be great. Thanks. Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 12:56, 3 December 2020 (UTC)

Vice regent Do you wan to work with me on fixing this section through summary style? Just please remember that summary style requires some kind of summary. Thanks. Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 08:50, 5 December 2020 (UTC)
Stefka Bulgaria, yes absolutely! Do you want me to propose something?VR talk 21:20, 5 December 2020 (UTC)
Yes, please propose something. Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 17:23, 6 December 2020 (UTC)
Vice regent will you propose something? or should I? Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 14:33, 23 December 2020 (UTC)
Stefka Bulgaria seeing how you didn't approve of my summary below, why don't you go first this time?VR talk 17:54, 26 December 2020 (UTC)

Proposal of clean up / summary style of text concerning "Ideological revolution and women's rights"

I propose summarising this mess of redundant and repetitive text:

"According to Ervand Abrahamian, the MEK "declared that God had created men and women to be equal in all things: in political and intellectual matters, as well as in legal, economic, and social issues".[2] According to Tohidi, in 1982, as the government in Tehran led an expansive effort to limit women’s rights, the MEK adopted a female leadership."

"According to Ervand Abrahamian "the Mojahedin, despite contrary claims did not give women equal representation within their own hierarchy. The book of martyrs indicates that women formed 15 percent of the organization's rank-and-file, but only 9 percent of its leadership. To rectify this, the Mojahedin posthumously revealed some of the rank and file women martyrs especially those related to prominent figures, into leadership positions"."[3]

"Shortly after the revolution, Rajavi married Ashraf Rabii, an MEK member regarded as "the symbol of revolutionary womanhood".[4] Rabii was killed by Iranian forces in 1982. On 27 January 1985, Massoud Rajavi appointed Maryam Azodanlu as his co-equal leader. The announcement, stated that this would give women equal say within the organization and thereby 'would launch a great ideological revolution within Mojahedin, the Iranian public and the whole Muslim World'. Five weeks later, the MEK announced that its Politburo and Central Committee had asked Rajavi and Azondalu, who was already married, to marry one another to deepen and pave the way for the "ideological revolution. At the time Maryam Azodanlu was known as only the younger sister of a veteran member, and the wife of Mehdi Abrishamchi. According to the announcement, Maryam Azodanlu and Mehdi Abrishamchi had recently divorced in order to facilitate this 'great revolution'. According to Ervand Abrahamian "in the eyes of traditionalists, particularly among the bazaar middle class, the whole incident was indecent. It smacked of wife-swapping, especially when Abrishamchi announced his own marriage to Khiabani’s younger sister. It involved women with young children and wives of close friends – a taboo in traditional Iranian culture;" something that further isolated the Mojahedin and also upset some members of the organization. Also according to Ervand Abrahamian, "the incident was equally outrageous in the eyes of the secularists, especially among the modern intelligentsia. It projected onto the public arena a matter that should have been treated as a private issue between two individuals."[1] Many criticized Maryam Azodanlu's giving up her own maiden name (something most Iranian women did not do and she herself had not done in her previous marriage). They would question whether this was in line with her claims of being a staunch feminist."[1]

"According to a RAND Corporation policy report, while in Paris, Masoud Rajavi began to implement an "ideological revolution", which required members an increased study and devotion that later expanded into "near religious devotion to the Rajavis". After its settlement in Iraq, however, it experienced a shortfall of volunteers. This led to the recruitment of members including Iranian dissidents, as well as Iranian economic migrants in countries such as Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, through "false promises of employment, land, aid in applying for asylum in Western countries, and even marriage, to attract them to Iraq". MEK also gave free visit trips to its camps to the relatives of the members. According to the RAND report, the recruited members were mostly brought by MEK into Iraq illegally and then were asked to submit their identity documents for "safekeeping", an act which would "effectively trap" them. With the assistance of Saddam's government, MEK also recruited some of its members from the Iranian prisoners of the Iran-Iraq war.[5] During the second phase of the ideological revolution, all members were forced to surrender their individuality to the organization, an incident which Masoud Banisadr described as changing into "ant-like human beings", i.e. following orders by their instinct."[6]

Into this:

"According to Tohidi, in 1982, as the government in Tehran led an expansive effort to limit women’s rights, the MEK adopted a female leadership. Ervand Abrahamian notes that the MEK "declared that God had created men and women to be equal in all things: in political and intellectual matters, as well as in legal, economic, and social issues". Abrahamian also notes that "the Mojahedin, despite contrary claims did not give women equal representation within their own hierarchy. The book of martyrs indicates that women formed 15 percent of the organization's rank-and-file, but only 9 percent of its leadership. To rectify this, the Mojahedin posthumously revealed some of the rank and file women martyrs especially those related to prominent figures, into leadership positions". Massoud Rajavi married Ashraf Rabbii (an MEK member regarded as "the symbol of revolutionary womanhood", but she was killed in 1982 by Iranian forces). On 27 January 1985, Massoud Rajavi appointed Maryam Azodanlu (Maryam Rajavi) as his co-equal leader, announcing that this would give women equal say within the organization. According to a report by RAND, Rajavi's ideological revolution required an increased study and devotion to the MEK leadership, which led to a shortfall of volunteers."

My proposal aims to keep the major points while removing redundant/repetitive/trivial text.

Thoughts/objections/support? Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 11:32, 29 December 2020 (UTC)

Just explain sentence by sentence why the removal should be carried out.--Mhhossein talk 19:20, 29 December 2020 (UTC)
Mhhossein thank you for your input. I'm proposing a summary style of this text (meaning removing redundancies/POV/trivialities and keeping the most important points so that we can clean up the section). If there is a particular text that I removed that you'd like to keep, please indicate why you think it needs to be kept. From my end, the text I removed was deemed trivial/unrelated to the MEK (a lot of it was about relationships between the leadership and not the MEK per se). Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 05:40, 30 December 2020 (UTC)
No, your explanation is too vague given your proposed wholesale removal of content. Please go based on sentence by sentence basis. Otherwise I am going to propose a restriction banning the users from such mass removals (which has already made the whole TP an endless vortex). Let everyone know, in details, why each sentence has to be removed. --Mhhossein talk 05:46, 30 December 2020 (UTC)
Mhhossein what do you mean by "Otherwise I am going to propose a restriction banning the users from such mass removals "? Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 05:58, 30 December 2020 (UTC)
This means that users HAVE TO respond to every single change they make. You can't just say all of these are "trivial/unrelated to the MEK" without even showing how and why. --Mhhossein talk 06:02, 30 December 2020 (UTC)
Mhhossein please note that Wikipedia is a voluntary project; we're here because we want to make a better online encyclopedia, that's all. You can ask for further clarification about a proposed edit, but there is no need to make "restriction banning" threats. I was nothing but cool to you here, so there was no need for that. Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 06:08, 30 December 2020 (UTC)
The "restriction banning" notion is not a threat, rather a due scheme which I am thinking on devising to "to make a better online encyclopedia". --Mhhossein talk 06:14, 30 December 2020 (UTC)
Saying that you'll be "banning users" that you don't agree with is a threat; and it was uncalled for. Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 06:16, 30 December 2020 (UTC)
@Mhhossein: making threats is not how consensus is built in talk pages. @Stefka: can you give more detailed explanation why you request this text reduction? Idealigic (talk) 09:49, 31 December 2020 (UTC)
Ok. Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 11:01, 31 December 2020 (UTC)
References

References

  1. ^ a b c Abrahamian 1989, p. 251–253.
  2. ^ Abrahamian 1989, p. 233.
  3. ^ Abrahamian 1989, p. 233–234.
  4. ^ Ervand Abrahamian (1989), Radical Islam: the Iranian Mojahedin, Society and culture in the modern Middle East, vol. 3, I.B.Tauris, p. 181, ISBN 9781850430773
  5. ^ Cite error: The named reference RAND was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  6. ^ Cite error: The named reference Barker was invoked but never defined (see the help page).

Source restriction

Based on this ANI discussion, what do others think about implementing a restriction that involves generally avoiding media outlets and mainly sticking to academic/scholarly sources?

Here are some examples that Alex-h provided at ANI of "third-tier" journalism that could be removed from the article on that basis:

  • "The Intercept published that Bob Menendez, John McCain, Judy Chu, Dana Rohrabacher and Robert Torricelli received campaign contributions from MEK supporters.[2]
  • "According to Hersh, MEK members were trained in intercepting communications, cryptography, weaponry and small unit tactics at the Nevada site up until President Barack Obama took office in 2009."[3]
  • "According to the Intercept, one of Alavi's articles published by Forbes was used by the White House to justify Donald Trump Administration's sanctions against Iran."[4]
  • "Karim Sadjadpour believes the MEK is a "fringe group with mysterious benefactors that garners scant support in its home country", and that the population of its supporters in Iran "hovers between negligible and nill"."[5]

Anyone else have more such examples? What do others think about implementing source restriction in the article as a whole? Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 07:19, 24 December 2020 (UTC)

Let that discussion reach a conclusion then we will discuss the proposed changes. --Mhhossein talk 07:45, 24 December 2020 (UTC)
That discussion is about if we should implement source restriction in the article or not. You, Mhhossein, seem to be in favor of using scholarly sources over journalistic sources. So, what do you say? should we remove the journalistic sources that Alex-h pointed to, or are you just interested in removing the journalistic sources saying the Iranian regime is running a disinformation against MEK? Idealigic (talk) 08:54, 24 December 2020 (UTC)
@Idealigic, Alex-h and Stefka Bulgaria: I really think you are missing critical points from the AN discussion. I ask you follow the comments, specially those by Levivich and El_C. As opposed to your understanding, "source restriction" does not necessarily mean source removal. --Mhhossein talk 10:46, 24 December 2020 (UTC)
Mhhossein can you then please clarify, to your own accord, what "source restriction" implies? Please be clear about what "critical points" I've may have missed. Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 11:03, 24 December 2020 (UTC)
It implies that scholarly sources be given higher weight than news media sources. This is especially critical when they contradict. In case of cult statements you used news sources as a counterbalance to scholarly sources. Is that the case here? For example, do any scholarly sources contradict Bob Menendez, John McCain, Judy Chu, Dana Rohrabacher and Robert Torricelli received campaign contributions from MEK supporters?VR talk 13:05, 24 December 2020 (UTC)
Well, you are talking about different things here. About the RFC itself, the news sources are not in direct contradiction to the scholarly sources; the news sources just add a different POV (that isn' in the scholarly sources or the article). About the other news sources listed above, according to your own argument, if there isn't a scholarly source directly contradicting it then that means it merits inclusion? There will be many instances where scholarly sources have no business debunking trivialities published in fringe media outlets. That doesn't mean that those trivialities published by such outlets should be included in the article. Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 13:32, 24 December 2020 (UTC)
Stefka Bulgaria you said, the news sources just add a different POV (that isn' in the scholarly sources or the article). If something can't be found in scholarly sources then it should be given much less weight than material that is in scholarly sources.VR talk 17:54, 26 December 2020 (UTC)
The news sources listed above are not found in scholarly sources. Shall we summarize them according to their weight? Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 11:06, 31 December 2020 (UTC)
I think that we should start by removing things that are only supported by single non-academic sources. Barca (talk) 14:32, 27 December 2020 (UTC)
References

References

  1. ^ Hersh, Seymour M. "Our Men in Iran?".
  2. ^ Ali Gharib, Eli Clifton (26 February 2015), "Long March of the Yellow Jackets: How a One-Time Terrorist Group Prevailed on Capitol Hill", The Intercept, retrieved 30 March 2018
  3. ^ Kelly, Michael (10 April 2012). "US special forces trained foreign terrorists in Nevada to fight Iran". Business Insider.
  4. ^ Hussain, Murtaza (9 June 2019). "An Iranian Activist Wrote Dozens of Articles for Right-Wing Outlets. But Is He a Real Person?". The Intercept. Retrieved 13 June 2019.
  5. ^ Ainsley, Julia; W. Lehren, Andrew; Schapiro, Rich. "Giuliani's work for Iranian group with bloody past could lead to more legal woes". NBC News. Retrieved 28 October 2019.

Undue weight given to anti-HRW views

In the section #Human rights record there is mention of a report by the HRW named 'No Exit', and while there is little said about the content of the report (cases are only briefly named, with zero depth), there is an extensive coverage of opposition to the report, which comes from a political arena (from parliamentary advocates of the MEK) rather than human right activists.

The article currently reads:

In May 2005, Human Rights Watch (HRW) issued a report named "No Exit: Human Rights Abuses Inside the MKO Camps", describing prison camps run by the MEK and severe human rights violations committed by the group against its members, ranging from prolonged incommunicado and solitary confinement to beatings, verbal and psychological abuse, coerced confessions, threats of execution, and torture that in two cases led to death.[437] However, disagreements over this provided evidence has been expressed.[298]

The report prompted a response by the MEK and four European MPs named "Friends of a Free Iran" (FOFI), who published a counter-report in September 2005.[438] They stated that HRW had "relied only on 12 hours [sic] interviews with 12 suspicious individuals", and stated that "a delegation of MEPs visited Camp Ashraf in Iraq" and "conducted impromptu inspections of the sites of alleged abuses". Alejo Vidal-Quadras Roca (PP), one of the Vice-Presidents of the European Parliament, said that Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) was the source of the evidence against the MEK.[438] In a letter of May 2005 to HRW, the senior US military police commander responsible for the Camp Ashraf area, Brigadier General David Phillips, who had been in charge during 2004 for the protective custody of the MEK members in the camp, disputed the alleged human rights violations.[439] Former military officers who had aided in guarding the MEK camp in Iraq said "its members had been free to leave since American military began protecting it in 2003." The officers said they had not found any prison or torture facilities.[294]

Human Rights Watch released a statement in February 2006, stating: "We have investigated with care the criticisms we received concerning the substance and methodology of the [No Exit] report, and find those criticisms to be unwarranted". It provided responses to the FOFI document, whose findings "have no relevance" to the HRW report.[440]

There are several issues here:

  1. As you can see from above, HRW positions is written in less than 5 lines, 118 words, 759 characters (in green) while the anti-HRW views is in more than 7 lines, 192 words 1,181 characters (in red). This is not even a false balance, the latter view is clearly given an undue weight. This WP:NPOV problem should be solved.
  2. The part it says Former military officers who had aided in guarding the MEK camp in Iraq said "its members had been free to leave since American military began protecting it in 2003." The officers said they had not found any prison or torture facilities is NOT what the source says. I thoroughly read the article by Patrick Kingsley, in which he says "After I left, the group put me in touch with three former American military officers who had helped guard an M.E.K. camp in Iraq after the American invasion." It later adds "But other records and witnesses gave a more complex account... Capt. Matthew Woodside, a former naval reservist who oversaw American policy at the Iraqi camp between 2004 and 2005, was not one of those whom the M.E.K. suggested I contact. He said that in reality American troops did not have regular access to camp buildings or to group members whose relatives said they were held by force. The M.E.K. leadership tended to let members meet American officials and relatives only after a delay of several days, Captain Woodside said. “They fight for every single one of them,” he said. It became so hard for some members, particularly women, to flee that two of them ended up trying to escape in a delivery truck, he recalled." Looks like a one-sided story, and a cherry-picked narrative, from what the source says.
  3. The book used for the view of General Phillips (not surprisingly the same official that was put in touch Patrick Kingsley of The New York Times) is published by New Generation Publishing, a leading UK book publisher dedicated to self publishing your book, and is a violation of WP:SPS for this controversial article. That being said, the opinion of Phillips is already cited twice in the article (only one time under his own name), and while it is rebuffed by another official. Pahlevun (talk) 18:04, 24 November 2020 (UTC)

I am looking for suggestions for any of the three points raised above. Pahlevun (talk) 18:01, 24 November 2020 (UTC)

Pahlevun: Thanks for being so precise. I think there should be some cleanings.--Mhhossein talk 04:14, 5 December 2020 (UTC)
I think we should clean up that whole section, keeping only the main points. I will propose something shortly. Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 08:54, 5 December 2020 (UTC)

Proposal of clean up / summary style of text concerning Human rights information

I propose a summary style of the following text:


In 2006, Iraqi Prime Minister Al-Maliki told the MEK it had to leave Iraq, but the MEK responded that the "request violated their status under the Geneva Convention". Al-Maliki and the Iraqi Ministry of Justice maintained that the MEK had committed human rights abuses in the early 1990s when it aided Saddam Hussain's campaign against the Shia uprising.[1] According to Time magazine, the MEK has denied aiding Saddam in quashing Kurdish and Shia rebellions.[2] In a 2004 public release, Amnesty International stated it continues to receive reports[by whom?] of human rights violations carried out by the MEK against its own members.[3] In 2018, Amnesty International also condemned the government of Iran for executing MEK prisoners in 1988 and presented the MEK as being mainly peaceful political dissidents despite reports that they have killed thousands of Iranians and Iraqis since 1981.[4]

In May 2005, Human Rights Watch (HRW) issued a report named "No Exit: Human Rights Abuses Inside the MKO Camps", describing prison camps run by the MEK and severe human rights violations committed by the group against its members, ranging from prolonged incommunicado and solitary confinement to beatings, verbal and psychological abuse, coerced confessions, threats of execution, and torture that in two cases led to death.[5] However, disagreements over this provided evidence has been expressed.[6]

The report prompted a response by the MEK and four European MPs named "Friends of a Free Iran" (FOFI), who published a counter-report in September 2005.[7] They stated that HRW had "relied only on 12 hours [sic] interviews with 12 suspicious individuals", and stated that "a delegation of MEPs visited Camp Ashraf in Iraq" and "conducted impromptu inspections of the sites of alleged abuses". Alejo Vidal-Quadras Roca (PP), one of the Vice-Presidents of the European Parliament, said that Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) was the source of the evidence against the MEK.[7] In a letter of May 2005 to HRW, the senior US military police commander responsible for the Camp Ashraf area, Brigadier General David Phillips, who had been in charge during 2004 for the protective custody of the MEK members in the camp, disputed the alleged human rights violations.[8] Former military officers who had aided in guarding the MEK camp in Iraq said "its members had been free to leave since American military began protecting it in 2003." The officers said they had not found any prison or torture facilities.[9]

"Human Rights Watch released a statement in February 2006, stating: "We have investigated with care the criticisms we received concerning the substance and methodology of the [No Exit] report, and find those criticisms to be unwarranted". It provided responses to the FOFI document, whose findings "have no relevance" to the HRW report.[10]

In July 2013, the United Nations special envoy to Iraq, Martin Kobler, accused the leaders the group of human rights abuses, an allegation the MEK dismissed as "baseless" and "cover-up". The United Nations spokesperson defended Kobler and his allegations, stating: "We regret that MEK and its supporters continue to focus on public distortions of the U.N.'s efforts to promote a peaceful, humanitarian solution on Camp Ashraf and, in particular, its highly personalized attacks on the U.N. envoy for Iraq.[11]

Hyeran Jo, in her work examining humanitarian violations of rebel groups to international law, states that the MEK has not accepted International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) visits to its detention centers.[12] According to Ronen A. Cohen, the MEK controlled their people most importantly by "abuse of women".[13] According to criticism of Human Right groups, marriage had been banned in the camp.[14] Upon entry into the group, new members are indoctrinated in ideology and a revisionist history of Iran. All members are required to participate in weekly "ideologic cleansings".[15]

Journalist Jason Rezaian remarked in his detailing the connections between John R. Bolton and the MEK that "the few who were able to escape" were "cut off from their loved ones, forced into arranged marriages, brainwashed, sexually abused, and tortured".[16][17] Members who defected from the MEK and some experts say that these Mao-style self-criticism sessions are intended to enforce control over sex and marriage in the organization as a total institution.[18] MEK denied the brainwashing claims and described the former members as Iranian spies,[9] also saying that "any cult' comparisons were coming from the Iranian regime as part of its 'misinformation campaign.'"[19]

Some MEK defectors have accused the MEK of human right abuses,[20][21] while the MEK has denied these claims saying they are part of a misinformation campaign by the Iranian regime.[22]

In March 2019 a Hamburg court ruled that Der Spiegel had "acted illegally in publishing false allegations of 'torture' and 'terrorist training' by the MEK in Albania". In July 2020 a German court ordered the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung to remove false information about the MEK including untrue reports of human right abuses by the MEK against its members.[23][24]

The MEK has barred children in Camp Ashraf in an attempt to have its members devote themselves to their cause of resistance against the Iranian regime, a rule that has given the MEK reputation of being "cultish"."[25][26] Various sources have also described the MEK as a “cult”,[27][28] “cult-like",[29][30] or having a “cult of personality”,[31][32] while other sources say the Iranian regime is running a disinformation campaign to label the MEK a "cult".[33][34][35]


Into this:


Iraqi Prime Minister Al-Maliki and the Iraqi Ministry of Justice accused the MEK of committing human right abuses in the early 1990s against the Shia uprising,[36] an accusation the MEK denied.[37] Other MEK defectors have also made allegations of human right abuses.[38][39][21] In 2004, Amnesty International said it continues to receive reports[by whom?] of human rights violations carried out by the MEK against its own members.[40] In 2018, Amnesty International presented the MEK as being mainly peaceful political dissidents.[41]

According to Christopher C. Harmon, MEK defectors and some experts say the organization carries out "Mao-style self-criticism sessions, and total organizational control over sex and marriage."[18] The MEK have denied the brainwashing claims and described the former members as Iranian spies,[9] also saying that "any cult' comparisons were coming from the Iranian regime as part of its 'misinformation campaign.'"[42][22]

In May 2005, Human Rights Watch (HRW) issued a report named "No Exit: Human Rights Abuses Inside the MKO Camps". The report described interviewing former MEK members who were held in Abu Ghraib prison. Their testimonies included incommunicado and solitary confinement, beatings, verbal and psychological abuse, coerced confessions, threats of execution, and torture that, according to defectors, in two cases led to death.[43] However, disagreements over this provided evidence has been expressed.[6] A 2007 edition of he U.S. Department of State country reports, said that upon entry into the MEK, new members are indoctrinated in ideology and a revisionist history of Iran. All members are required to participate in weekly "ideologic cleansings".[44] According to criticism of Human Right groups, marriage had been banned in camp Ashraf.[45]

The MEK and four European MPs, named "Friends of a Free Iran" (FOFI), published a counter-report in September 2005 stating that HRW had "relied only on 12 hours [sic] interviews with 12 suspicious individuals", and stated that "a delegation of MEPs visited Camp Ashraf in Iraq" and "conducted impromptu inspections of the sites of alleged abuses".[7] Alejo Vidal-Quadras Roca (PP), one of the Vice-Presidents of the European Parliament, said that Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) was the source of the evidence against the MEK.[7] Brigadier General David Phillips and other former US military officers also disputed the alleged human rights violations.[46][9] In February 2006, Human Rights Watch released a statement saying they had "investigated with care the criticisms we received concerning the substance and methodology of the [No Exit] report, and find those criticisms to be unwarranted".[47]

In July 2013, Martin Kobler accused the MEK leadership of human rights abuses, an allegation the MEK dismissed as "baseless" and "cover-up". A United Nations spokesperson said "We regret that MEK and its supporters continue to focus on public distortions of the U.N.'s efforts to promote a peaceful, humanitarian solution on Camp Ashraf and, in particular, its highly personalized attacks on the U.N. envoy for Iraq".[48]

The MEK has barred children in Camp Ashraf in an attempt to have its members devote themselves to their cause of resistance against the Iranian regime, a rule that has given the MEK reputation of being "cultish"."[49][50] Various sources have also described the MEK as a “cult”,[51][52] “cult-like",[53][54] or having a “cult of personality”,[55][32] while other sources say the Iranian regime is running a disinformation campaign to label the MEK a "cult".[56][57][58]

In March 2019 a Hamburg court ruled that Der Spiegel had been publishing false allegations of 'torture' and 'terrorist training' by the MEK in Albania". In July 2020 a German court also ordered the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung to remove false information about the MEK including untrue reports of human right abuses by the MEK against its members.[59][60]

My proposal aims to keep the major points while removing redundant/repetitive/trivial text.

Thoughts/objections/support? Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 10:54, 31 December 2020 (UTC)

Look, this is not a proposal. You need to elaborate on your points including those so-called "redundant/repetitive/trivial text"s. Why do you think they should be removed (with details)? --Mhhossein talk 07:16, 3 January 2021 (UTC)
You need to give the discussions/consensus building process their due time to develop. I first throw the idea out there to see if I get any initial feedback, like you here asking for more details, or perhaps others saying this is overall a good/bad idea, etc. I will elaborate on my points, but stop making absurd accusations against me for initiating these discussions, like you've done here. Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 08:53, 3 January 2021 (UTC)
There's no accusation in my well evidenced comment. Moreover, please be careful not to just "throw" absurd ideas of mass trimmings with zero attempt at showing why a vast amount of longstanding text should be removed. I already explained how this method would is against the betterment of the page. --Mhhossein talk 06:29, 8 January 2021 (UTC)
What would you say is a method for "betterment of the page" that we all can follow? Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 16:38, 9 January 2021 (UTC)
Stop super-trim RFCs/discussions followed by blind comments by users who follow you. LOL! --Mhhossein talk 13:19, 18 January 2021 (UTC)
References

References

  1. ^ Anthony H. Cordesman, Emma R. Davies (2008), "Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington, D.C.)", Iraq's Insurgency and the Road to Civil Conflict, Iraq's Insurgency and the Road to Civil Conflict, vol. 2, Greenwood Publishing Group, p. 635, ISBN 978-0-313-35001-6
  2. ^ At Tehran's Bidding? Iraq Cracks Down on a Controversial Camp By Rania Abouzeid, Time magazine, retrieved 11 October 2019
  3. ^ Further Information on UA 318/03 (EUR 44/025/2003, 5 November 2003) "Disappearance" / fear for safety /forcible return New concern: fear of execution/unfair trial (PDF), Amnesty International, 20 August 2004, retrieved 11 June 2017
  4. ^ Blood-Soaked Secrets: Why Iran's 1988 prison massacres are ongoing crimes against humanity (PDF), Austria: Amnesty International, retrieved 4 December 2018
  5. ^ No Exit: Human Rights Abuses Inside the MKO Camps (PDF), Human Rights Watch, May 2005, retrieved 11 June 2017
  6. ^ a b Cite error: The named reference hoc was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  7. ^ a b c d "People's Mojahedin of Iran – Mission report" (PDF). Friends of Free Iran – European Parliament. 2005. Archived from the original (PDF) on 20 June 2010. Retrieved 29 August 2006.
  8. ^ Tahar Boumedra (2013), The United Nations and Human Rights in Iraq, The Untold Story of Camp Ashraf, New Generation Publishing, pp. 16–23, ISBN 978-1-909740-64-8, I directed my subordinate units to investigate each allegation. In many cases I personally led inspection teams on unannounced visits to the MEK facilities where the alleged abuses were reported to occur. At no time over the 12 month period did we ever discover any credible evidence supporting the allegations raised in your recent report. (...) Each report of torture, kidnapping and psychological depravation turned out to be unsubstantiated.
  9. ^ a b c d Cite error: The named reference NYT_MEK_Albania_2020Feb was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  10. ^ Statement on Responses to Human Rights Watch Report on Abuses by the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO), Human Rights Watch, 14 February 2006, retrieved 11 June 2017
  11. ^ Louis Charbonneau (16 July 2013), Mohammad Zargham (ed.), "U.N. envoy accuses Iran group's leaders in Iraq of rights abuses", Reuters, retrieved 11 June 2017
  12. ^ Hyeran Jo (2015). Compliant Rebels: Rebel Groups and International Law in World Politics. Cambridge University Press. p. 288. ISBN 978-1-107-11004-5.
  13. ^ Cohen 2009.
  14. ^ Foreign and Commonwealth Office (March 2011). Human Rights and Democracy: The 2010 Foreign & Commonwealth Office Report. The Stationery Office. ISBN 978-0101801720.
  15. ^ Anthony H. Cordesman; Adam C. Seitz (2009), Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Birth of a Regional Nuclear Arms Race?, Praeger Security International Series, ABC-LIO, p. 334, ISBN 978-0-313-38088-4
  16. ^ Rezaian, Jason (24 March 2018). "John Bolton wants regime change in Iran, and so does the cult that paid him". The Washington Post. Retrieved 15 April 2019.
  17. ^ R. Pillar, Paul (13 November 2018). "The MEK and the Bankrupt U.S. Policy on Iran". nationalinterest.org. National Interest. Retrieved 15 April 2019.
  18. ^ a b Harmon & Bowdish 2018, p. 170.
  19. ^ "Who are the People's Mujahedeen of Iran?". Fox News.
  20. ^ Pressly and Kasapi, Linda and Albana (11 November 2019). "The Iranian opposition fighters who mustn't think about sex". BBC.
  21. ^ a b Merat, Arron (9 November 2018). "Terrorists, cultists – or champions of Iranian democracy? The wild wild story of the MEK". News agency. theguardian.com. theguardian. Retrieved 9 February 2019.
  22. ^ a b Cite error: The named reference Security 2012, p. 26 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  23. ^ "Iran's Fake News Campaign Suffers A Heavy Blow". Tsarizm.
  24. ^ "Volksmojahedin Iran & FAZ". Freitag.de.
  25. ^ "Iranian dissidents plot a revolution from Albania". Japan Times.
  26. ^ "An Iranian mystery: Just who are the MEK?". BBC.
  27. ^ Cronin, Stephanie (2013). Reformers and Revolutionaries in Modern Iran: New Perspectives on the Iranian Left. Routledge/BIPS Persian Studies Series. Routledge. p. 274. ISBN 978-1-134-32890-1.
  28. ^ Buchta, Wilfried (2000), Who rules Iran?: the structure of power in the Islamic Republic, Washington DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, The Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, p. 144, ISBN 978-0-944029-39-8
  29. ^ "France lashes out at Iranian opposition group" The Associated Press, June 27, 2014
  30. ^ Elizabeth Rubin (13 July 2003). "The Cult of Rajavi". The New York Times. Retrieved 9 March 2016.
  31. ^ Ervand Abrahamian (1989), Radical Islam: the Iranian Mojahedin, Society and culture in the modern Middle East, vol. 3, I.B.Tauris, p. 139, ISBN 9781850430773
  32. ^ a b Clark, Mark Edmond (2016). "An Analysis of the Role of the Iranian Diaspora in the Financial Support System of the Mujahedin-e-Khalq". In Gold, David (ed.). Terrornomics. Routledge. p. 65. ISBN 978-1-317-04590-8.
  33. ^ Arab News
  34. ^ IntPolicyDigest
  35. ^ National Interest
  36. ^ Anthony H. Cordesman, Emma R. Davies (2008), "Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington, D.C.)", Iraq's Insurgency and the Road to Civil Conflict, Iraq's Insurgency and the Road to Civil Conflict, vol. 2, Greenwood Publishing Group, p. 635, ISBN 978-0-313-35001-6
  37. ^ At Tehran's Bidding? Iraq Cracks Down on a Controversial Camp By Rania Abouzeid, Time magazine, retrieved 11 October 2019
  38. ^ R. Pillar, Paul (13 November 2018). "The MEK and the Bankrupt U.S. Policy on Iran". nationalinterest.org. National Interest. Retrieved 15 April 2019.
  39. ^ Pressly and Kasapi, Linda and Albana (11 November 2019). "The Iranian opposition fighters who mustn't think about sex". BBC.
  40. ^ Further Information on UA 318/03 (EUR 44/025/2003, 5 November 2003) "Disappearance" / fear for safety /forcible return New concern: fear of execution/unfair trial (PDF), Amnesty International, 20 August 2004, retrieved 11 June 2017
  41. ^ Blood-Soaked Secrets: Why Iran's 1988 prison massacres are ongoing crimes against humanity (PDF), Austria: Amnesty International, retrieved 4 December 2018
  42. ^ "Who are the People's Mujahedeen of Iran?". Fox News.
  43. ^ No Exit: Human Rights Abuses Inside the MKO Camps (PDF), Human Rights Watch, May 2005, retrieved 11 June 2017
  44. ^ Anthony H. Cordesman; Adam C. Seitz (2009), Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Birth of a Regional Nuclear Arms Race?, Praeger Security International Series, ABC-LIO, p. 334, ISBN 978-0-313-38088-4
  45. ^ Foreign and Commonwealth Office (March 2011). Human Rights and Democracy: The 2010 Foreign & Commonwealth Office Report. The Stationery Office. ISBN 978-0101801720.
  46. ^ Tahar Boumedra (2013), The United Nations and Human Rights in Iraq, The Untold Story of Camp Ashraf, New Generation Publishing, pp. 16–23, ISBN 978-1-909740-64-8, I directed my subordinate units to investigate each allegation. In many cases I personally led inspection teams on unannounced visits to the MEK facilities where the alleged abuses were reported to occur. At no time over the 12 month period did we ever discover any credible evidence supporting the allegations raised in your recent report. (...) Each report of torture, kidnapping and psychological depravation turned out to be unsubstantiated.
  47. ^ Statement on Responses to Human Rights Watch Report on Abuses by the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO), Human Rights Watch, 14 February 2006, retrieved 11 June 2017
  48. ^ Louis Charbonneau (16 July 2013), Mohammad Zargham (ed.), "U.N. envoy accuses Iran group's leaders in Iraq of rights abuses", Reuters, retrieved 11 June 2017
  49. ^ "Iranian dissidents plot a revolution from Albania". Japan Times.
  50. ^ "An Iranian mystery: Just who are the MEK?". BBC.
  51. ^ Cronin, Stephanie (2013). Reformers and Revolutionaries in Modern Iran: New Perspectives on the Iranian Left. Routledge/BIPS Persian Studies Series. Routledge. p. 274. ISBN 978-1-134-32890-1.
  52. ^ Buchta, Wilfried (2000), Who rules Iran?: the structure of power in the Islamic Republic, Washington DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, The Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, p. 144, ISBN 978-0-944029-39-8
  53. ^ "France lashes out at Iranian opposition group" The Associated Press, June 27, 2014
  54. ^ Elizabeth Rubin (13 July 2003). "The Cult of Rajavi". The New York Times. Retrieved 9 March 2016.
  55. ^ Ervand Abrahamian (1989), Radical Islam: the Iranian Mojahedin, Society and culture in the modern Middle East, vol. 3, I.B.Tauris, p. 139, ISBN 9781850430773
  56. ^ Arab News
  57. ^ IntPolicyDigest
  58. ^ National Interest
  59. ^ "Iran's Fake News Campaign Suffers A Heavy Blow". Tsarizm.
  60. ^ "Volksmojahedin Iran & FAZ". Freitag.de.

Confused

I think there is a general feeling of confusion in this talk page about how to clean up the POV in this article. Vanamonde93 suggested not adding more POV or allegations to it, but instead summarise what is already in the article. Some editors have tried to do this, but it seems this is not working since there are disagreements about how much should be trimmed and what points should be kept and what points should be removed. I think it would be helpful if an administrator established some basic ground rules about how to clean up POV in this controversial article. At first this might be a work-in-process, but it might later develop into a way we can all agree is the best way to fix this article. Thank you. Barca (talk) 13:39, 14 January 2021 (UTC)

I think that having the requirement that every RfC be closely moderated by an admin is a really good suggestion. I have found many RfCs initiated by Stefka to contain policy violations and to sometimes not make any sense. His supporters support him without critically examining the proposal. He rarely listens to his opponents, but does listen to admins like Vanamonde93, TonyBallioni etc. (I can provide diffs to back this up).VR talk 16:39, 14 January 2021 (UTC)
I'm not really sure what precisely is being asked here, but I get the sense that whatever it is, it goes beyond the purview of an admin's role. It may be best for participants to refine what "ground rules" they, themselves, wish to see applied to this page, rather than wait for a kind of edicts from up high. The general notion of being respectful by not coming across as trying to railroad the opposing side ought to probably serve as a guiding tenant, though. El_C 14:11, 15 January 2021 (UTC)
Stefka Bulgaria is a good editor. VR please stop turning these discussions into battleground. My question is on how we can all work better together. Barca (talk) 14:20, 15 January 2021 (UTC)
In fairness, when I wrote above about being respectful by not coming across as trying to railroad the opposing side, I did mostly have Stefka (and their RfCs) in mind. I was even more blunt in the section directly above. My sense is that there has been a recent degradation in the quality of collaboration on this page, with a good brunt of it falling on their shoulders. El_C 14:52, 15 January 2021 (UTC)
There has been a degradation in the collaboration in this page for a long time, and it's not due to Stefka's RfCs. There has been so much stonewalling on this page that RfCs have become the only available means of making any improvement to the article. Opening RfCs is what was encouraged in this talk page, so bashing an editor for doing just what was suggested is very disappointing. You may not agree with the RfCs, but several have received consensus, and that is perfectly within policy. MA Javadi (talk) 22:51, 15 January 2021 (UTC)
If you think super-trim RfCs that cut 800 words to 40 words can serve as some sort of a shortcut for you to get what you want, I may, indeed, end up becoming quite the disappointment for you. El_C 09:05, 18 January 2021 (UTC)

El_C, I'm asking an admin to actively examine every RfC to ensure it doesn't violate policy. Let me give you two examples.

  1. For a previous RfC on reducing cult section, Stefka proposed the text "falsified information traceable to the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence". Eight users came and supported this - eight! Clearly none bothered to actually check Stefka's references. I checked the source, didn't find the quote, so I politely asked twice to get the page number. Then admin L235 noticed the same issue and also asked. No response. It wasn't until TonyBallioni intervened that the text was removed.
  2. For the RfC that reduced the cult section, Stefka initially proposed the text "other sources have dismissed these claims." Just like #1 this was a violation of WP:V. I pointed out that the sources said no such thing. Stefka maintained his position that he quoted sources correctly. Then Vanamonde93 saidtwice that Stefka hadn't quoted sources properly, before Stefka changed the text.

I can give several more examples. Normally, users are supposed to keep each other in check. That doesn't work here because some users support Stefka no matter what. They don't bother to check his proposals. One has even admitted to not reading the RfC before he supports Stefka. This is why we need an admin who can critically examine if a proposal violates a policy or just plain common sense.VR talk 16:14, 15 January 2021 (UTC)

Haha, good luck in finding one! Yes, I share your concerns there. I suppose I can just use WP:GS/IRANPOL to mandate Stefka to moderate their approach. I may well end up doing just that. El_C 16:20, 15 January 2021 (UTC)
Stefka being picked on unilaterally is very perplexing and a let down. Has anybody bothered to check VR's accusations for accuracy?
1. "falsified information traceable to the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence": Many souces for this statement were provided, even though Mhhossein reverted a lot of it from the article [3][4][5]. Also Stefka did respond[6] to the source VR is talking about. The opposing side could have been content with the many sources that were provided to support this statement, but instead they removed them!
2. This point just shows that the RFCs in this talk page were being monitored by Vanamonde, who made suggestions that were followed. This shows that Stefka follows advice when making these RfCs, and far as I can tell, nobody told Stefka or anybody else here that they couldn't make these RFCs, on the contrary, they were encouraged to open them. Mhhossein was accused of adding things to the article that were a violation of WP:V, and nobody commented on that, least of all VR. This looks like "trying to railroad the opposing side", which Mhhossein has been trying to do to Stefka since I became involved in this page. Alex-h (talk) 13:44, 16 January 2021 (UTC)
Well, not to boast (but to boast), but I think my reputation for being even-handed and detached in the topic area is... well, pretty stellar. Same with Vanamonde93. Has he, as you claim, seen the super-trim RfCs and gave them his seal of approval? I suppose it's possible, but I tend to doubt it. El_C 23:15, 16 January 2021 (UTC)
If I’m allowed to express my opinion, I think Vanamonde has been a much more impartial and overall better admin here. Even though he blocked me when I reported Saff V., at least Vanamonde checked the sources carefully and took action against deceitful editing.
There have been many instances when Mhhossein had been reported for similar things, like here. That looks like a problem that continues to this day (I can provide more diffs to back this up).
Stefka has always been willing to work together and listen to admin’s advice in this page, not the case with Mhhossein. Ypatch (talk) 10:39, 17 January 2021 (UTC)

Thanks, Ypatch. Generally speaking, if creating large RfCs is frowned upon, I won't open/initiate those anymore. In fact I won't initiate RfCs for a while here; I'll pass on the pleasures of cleaning up the POV here to the other editors involved. Bless. Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 18:47, 17 January 2021 (UTC)

  • I agree that Vanamonde has been the admin who has been the most neutral and has spent the most time trying to look at problems. I think we have advanced a lot here since Vanamonde has been involved. @El C: you have been very responsive and sympathetic to Mhhossein's complaints, but are nowhere to be found when there are complains against Mhhossein's edits. I can think of at least one other instance where Mhhossein violated the warning you gave them. Would you like to see it? Idealigic (talk) 08:41, 18 January 2021 (UTC)
  • Not really. But this is familiar enough for me. Sometime, the pro-MEK side didn't like me, sometime it was the anti-MEK side. I guess it's pronouncedly the pro-MEK side's turn now. Which makes sense: the pro-MEK side seems to have taken advantage of some sort of a vacuum lately, and since I pointed that out, some of them are trying a bit extra-harder than usual, even to the point of trying to discredit me now. What's that old saying? No good deed? Goes to show that ideology comes first on this page, though this isn't unique to the pro-MEK side — again, they're just on a bit of a roll lately, it seems, and me wishing to moderate that is most unwelcome by them. As always, I am undaunted. El_C 08:55, 18 January 2021 (UTC)
El_C: Pro-MEK users are clearly trying to keep you away from this page (understanding the motivation behind it is not rocket science). I guess your proposal of Consensus Required have effectively benefited the stability of the page. It has largely stopped them. From the other hand, they tried to railroad me by taking me to ANI or SPI (both led to their failure). The developments of this page are getting weird. Say something which is not desirable for them and all will turn against you. Mandating Stefka Bulgaria to moderate their approach via WP:GS/IRANPOL would be another great improvement to this page. --Mhhossein talk 13:25, 18 January 2021 (UTC)
I have already said that I would not be opening these RfCs anymore (even though no administrator ever told me not to open them, and even though most non-involved editors/admins endorsed the close of the last RfC). @Mhhossein please don't drag me into this conversation anymore. Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 14:48, 18 January 2021 (UTC)

Stefka Bulgaria, that is a distortion, at best. There were no "admins" (plural) involved in that still-open Admin board discussion you link to — there was one, singular admin who participated, and that was me. And don't even get me started about your recent bizarre SPI report... Anyway, you think any admin wants to touch this page? Do I need to spell out the obvious about why this page is unlike any other IRANPOL page, whatsoever? Let's see: the article about the country of Iran (80 million people, long history) — less than 20 TP archives, which start at 2003. This MEK organization article (a few thousand people, late modern history) — almost 40 archives, which start at 2007. And, sure, let's revise history and pretend I'm not the one who brought stability to this page as of Archive 10. But it's okay, I don't need to be popular. My dedication is to the project. Whether participants dis/like me, ultimately, isn't really a key factor for me. Never was, never will be. El_C 15:21, 18 January 2021 (UTC)

@El C: I always thought you were a good admin; I've never said otherwise. I understand your points raised about the complexity of this page and about opening large RfCs (I won't be opening them again). I love Wikipedia too, and want to help build it; not cause problems. Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 15:30, 18 January 2021 (UTC)
Thanks, Stefka Bulgaria. I appreciate that, I truly do. I also realize that you, yourself, never said anything to the contrary about me, ever. And as I also suggested multiple times, a better way may be to open a preliminary pre-RfC discussion about what this or that RfC question should look like, a venture which I encourage you to engage in. But the point I've been trying to make is that super-trim RfCs that, for example, reduce 800 words into 40 words — that is not okay. It serves to undermine a lot of the progress that was made here throughout the years and, really, comes across as one side railroading the other. Who knows, maybe next year I'll be arguing the same against the anti-MEK side trying a similar thing. Wouldn't surprise me. El_C 15:42, 18 January 2021 (UTC)
I like you El_C! :) some users here are just politely proposing to look at other issues in this talk page, that's all! You're the best, mate! Alex-h (talk) 15:54, 18 January 2021 (UTC)
/bows El_C 16:01, 18 January 2021 (UTC)

Thank you, @El C: for your kind response. I also appreciate the patience and the good will you've had with the lot of us here (on both sides), which speaks volumes about the kind of person/editor you are. I'm taking a trip so need to step away from Wikipedia for a couple of weeks; hopefully the collaboration process in this talk page becomes more unified during my absence. For those editors who may not be aware, El_C was the first admin who truly got involved in this page, placing guidelines that we could all follow and stopping a whole bunch of crazy edit wars, so a lot is owed to him here. Look after him! Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 16:41, 18 January 2021 (UTC)

Cool beans, Stefka. I appreciate you presenting that in the way that you did for readers of this talk page who may otherwise be unfamiliar with where we are now and how we got here. Also, I'm not really committing to returning here full time. I told all of you a long time ago that having a page-dedicated admin is not a really a thing on Wikipedia. Yet it became that with me for a very long time. I also note that, as much as I speak about being "undaunted," I was actually driven out from here, after an anti-MEK editor accused me of being a pro-MEK partisan (how times have changed!). To the credit of both sides, that editor was pretty universally chastised. But during my break, I realized how much this page was taking out of me, so I pretty much stayed away. Luckily, not long after, Vanamonde appeared on the scene to fill the void (and together with him, I briefly came out of my MEK retirement to create WP:GS/IRANPOL). Now, he may return to actively monitor this page, or not. And if not, participants may end up not having choice but to collaborate without an in-house, MEK-dedicated admin to watch over things.¯\_(ツ)_/¯ Good speed on your travels! (Not at all a risk-free proposition during pandemic times, by any stretch.) Kind regards, El_C 17:08, 18 January 2021 (UTC)
I'm sorry @El C: I was not aware about your past participation here, and if my comment came across as undermining your work, I take it back. Sometimes I get caught up in the debating, and I need to learn not to do that. The year is only starting so that's one resolution I will pursue in 2021! Sorry again. Idealigic (talk) 18:20, 18 January 2021 (UTC)
Thanks, Idealigic. I appreciate the apology —which I am happy to accept— as well as the reflection and introspection. Good on you! El_C 18:37, 18 January 2021 (UTC)
For those who are not aware, the consensus required restriction came into effect after I complained about the edit war waves ignited by the pro-MEK users (see "New wave of edit war"). @El C:: Does this discussion require a closure? Stefka Bulgaria should not open super large RFCs from now on. That should be written somewhere (in a closure statement here or in WP:GS/IRANPOL) for future. Be it Stefka Bulgaria, or other users, same thing may happen as you said, and the conclusion reached here can be beneficial by then. --Mhhossein talk 12:27, 19 January 2021 (UTC)
Mhhossein: have you seen this post by Idealigic?
Here are two points that may be helpful:
1)"Discussions here are meant to build consensus, not to devolve into continuous accusation." diff
2) "A very specific proposal with a very wide scope is less likely to gain consensus than a series of proposal addressing the various parts of the issues you bring up. There is nothing stopping you from continuing this RfC, but please bear this in mind." diff
In the second point, Vanamonde is telling Stefka that there is nothing stopping him from opening RFCs with a wide scope. You are continuously accusing Stefka. El_C's concerns have been taken seriously, and Stefka said he wouldn't open these RfCs anymore, and you're still trying to get Stefka's name down at the IRANPOL GS page. IMO, I think the collaboration in this talk page would be much more improved if Mhhossein were also to take a break from this page for a short while. I think all the pinging and accusations would stop, and we could focus on fixing the article. Just with that it's worth the try. Alex-h (talk) 14:18, 19 January 2021 (UTC)
Are you still talking about Stefka Bulgaria's overzealous trimming? Those RFCs were used as "shortcut" and "railroading the opposite side". Stefka Bulgaria is free to open super-trim RFCs and I don't guarantee the rest. Given the recent discussions and El_C's serious I'm not expecting a pleasant outcome. Regarding collaboration, you have proved it is not what you are seeking. Even here in this discussion, YOU tried to attack @El C: but suddenly used kind words against him (who know why???¯\_(ツ)_/¯) when he clearly said he would not allow this pattern of super large RFCs.
Collaboration??? Right now you are talking about the possibility of acting against things we discussed yesterday. What kind of collaboration is it? Drop the stick please. That's why I ask @El C: to at least write a closure summary. After El_C quitted watching the page last time, YOU started violating WP:Consensus Required, despite the fact that it was the result of a strong consensus. We (me and Saff. V) asked El_C multpiple times to watch the page again but NONE OF YOU were concerned regarding this (because YOU could freely keep on everting without an admin watching the page). --Mhhossein talk 07:01, 20 January 2021 (UTC)
Mhhossein: I wish you'd change your demeanour in these discussions. Despite all of my attempts at getting along with you, you keep on writing these angry and distorting posts. I'll drop whatever stick you want, now why don't you do the same so that we can plan a way of working together. You can comment on Idealigic's suggestion of following Vanamonde's long list of advice that he has given in this talk page. That would be a good start. Alex-h (talk) 09:58, 20 January 2021 (UTC)
You are making personal attacks. Stop that immediately please. These so-called "angry and distorting" comments are 'facts' regarding the history of the page which should not be forgotten. YOUR collaborative attempts should be demonstrated via your deeds. Saying good things is very easy. --Mhhossein talk 11:40, 20 January 2021 (UTC)
Mhhossein: I did not make any personal attacks against you, and I have also not "attacked" El_C, as you distortedly say. I think El_C is a great admin, and also I'm trying to work with you here, but you just keep making the collaboration process so difficult. Anyways, like I told you in my talk page, please stop throwing accusations around. If you think I have done something wrong, ANI is the place to go. Alex-h (talk) 13:20, 20 January 2021 (UTC)