Operation Brevity

Operation Brevity
Part of World War II, North African Campaign
This map charts Rommel's first offensive and the British counterattacks, March 24 – June 17, 1941
Date May 15, 1941 – May 16, 1941 Location Egyptian and Libyan border area Result Inconclusive
Belligerents
Australia United Kingdom	Germany Italy
Commanders and leaders
Archibald Wavell William Gott	Erwin Rommel Maximilian von Herff
Strength
Elements of : British XIII Corps 3 Infantry Battalions 53 tanks	Elements of: Afrika Korps Various small Italian infantry formations 30-50 tanks
Casualties and losses
1British and Commonwealth: 205+ casualties 5 tanks destroyed 6 planes destroyed	1German and Italian: 605+ casualties 3 tanks destroyed
1More detailed information is available in the 'Aftermath' section

Operation Brevity was a limited attack in the World War II Western Desert Campaign. It was conducted by elements of the British XIII Corps between 15 May and 16 May, 1941, led by Brigadier William Gott, to dislodge the Axis forces from the Sollum–Capuzzo–Bardia areas and secure more ground from which a major attack could later be launched. The main objective of the attack was to destroy as much Axis equipment as possible without risking the force committed. A secondary objective was to exploit a breakthrough towards Tobruk as far as supply would allow, again without risking the force committed.

The operation started with mixed results, encountering pockets of stiff resistance from German and Italian forces which were not overcome until the afternoon. Following the arrival of German armoured reinforcements Gott, concerned that his troops could be seriously mauled, ordered all forces to retire, calling off the operation the next day.

The operation failed to meet any of its objectives other than the capture of the Halfaya Pass, which in turn was lost to a German counterattack on 27 May during Operation Skorpion.

Background

Operation Compass, conducted between late December 1940 and February 1941, had resulted in the ejection of the Italian armed forces from Egypt by the Western Desert Force (renamed as XIII Corps in January 1941). The British and Commonwealth forces had advanced as far westwards as El Agheila, conquering the Italian province of Cyrenaica and part of the Italian colony of Libya, and destroying the Italian Tenth Army in the process. Having eliminated the Italian threat to Egypt, difficulties with supply and maintenance and the commitment to provide military assistance to Greece precluded further offensive operations. The Australian 6th Infantry Division and the 2nd New Zealand Division were redeployed to Greece as part of the Commonwealth expeditionary force, while the British 7th Armoured Division was withdrawn to the Nile Delta for rest and refit. In their place the British 2nd Armoured Division and the Australian 9th Infantry Division were deployed to Cyrenaica. Both divisions lacked experience, and both were required to give up much of their equipment and transport, including one of the 2nd Division's armoured brigades, to support the effort in Greece.

Following the loss of the Italian Tenth Army, the German Afrika Korps; comprising of two divisions under the command of General Erwin Rommel, along with supporting Luftwaffe units, were deployed to Libya as part of Operation Sonnenblume. The objective of this Corps was to act as a blocking force to keep the British and other allied forces from driving the Italians out of North Africa. However, realising the weakness of the allied forces on the frontline and their unwillingness to hold easily outflanked territory, Rommel disregarded orders and launched an attack. Ordering the 5th Light Division onto the offensive, during March and April he pushed the British XIII Corps eastwards, destroying the understrength 2nd Armoured Division in the process. With Axis forces streaming eastwards the Australian 9th Infantry Division and other allied forces fell back to the fortress of Tobruk, while the main British and Commonwealth force withdrew a further 100 miles (160 km) east to Sollum to defend the Libyan-Egyptian border there, a total retreat of some 400 miles (640 km).

The German-Italian forces invested Tobruk and launched several unsuccessful assaults against the city and port. As the main body of the German-Italian forces prepared for the second assault, Kampfgruppe von Herff advanced westwards, capturing Fort Capuzzo and Bardia before advancing into Egypt, taking the town of Sollum and the strategically important Halfaya Pass by the end of April. During the first half of May, Rommel ordered additional German and Italian battalions forward, some to reinforce Kampfgruppe von Herff and others to garrison the captured positions. The orders given to Kampfgruppe von Herff were to offensively defend the captured ground and to conduct aggressive reconnaissance missions.

British Marmon-Herrington Mk II armoured car, as operated by the 11th Hussars

While there was no British attempt to retake the pass, or Axis attempt to carry on the advance into Egypt, there was continual skirmishing between both sides. These resulted in daily clashes between armoured cars, air attacks against ground units, small unit actions and handfuls of prisoners being taken. It was from these clashes that a reasonable picture of the strength and disposition of the German-Italian forces was built. It was known, for instance, that there were 30-50 tanks in the frontier region, and that Fort Capuzzo, Halfaya Pass and Sollum were all occupied, although there was no certainty where else the Axis forces might be encountered. This information came at a price however, and in late April the 11th Hussars lost 7 armoured cars and 16 men killed, wounded or captured as they attempted to punch through the outer defences of Fort Capuzzo to conduct reconnaissance closer to the fort.

Rommel’s failure to capture Tobruk and its port facilities meant that he not only had an extended line of supply to his front-line positions, but also that these forces were threatened from the rear by the Tobruk garrison. This, along with insufficient forces at Sollum because of the substantial commitment required at Tobruk, made any immediate offensive into Egypt impractical, forcing the Axis army to halt. The stubborn defence of Tobruk by the Australian and British garrison meant that the initiative had now passed back to the Allies.

Plans

Further information: Operation Brevity order of battle

A map of the contested frontier, over which Operation Brevity was fought

General Archibald Wavell, Commander-in-Chief of British Middle East Command, appreciated the weakened position the Axis forces were now in; fought to a standstill outside of Tobruk, with extended supply lines, and the 15th Panzer Division not yet ready to be deployed. His response was Operation Brevity, designed to be a rapid blow in the Sollum area as a precursor to Operation Battleaxe, his planned main offensive. The objective of Brevity was to capture the tactically vital Halfaya Pass, drive the enemy from the Sollum and Capuzzo areas, and inflict as much loss on the opposing forces as possible. If successful, he then intended to exploit towards Tobruk as far as supply would allow without endangering his committed troops.

The operation was entrusted to Brigadier William Gott, who had been commanding all allied forces on the frontier since the retreat. He was given all the available armour; 53 tanks, comprising 29 cruiser tanks of the 2nd Royal Tank Regiment (2RTR) and 24 infantry tanks of the 4th Royal Tank Regiment (4RTR), elements of the 7th Armoured Brigade, the 7th Support Group, and the 22nd Guards Brigade (comprising in part the 1st Durham Light Infantry (1DLI) and 2nd Scots Guards). He would also have support from the Royal Air Force (RAF), with all available fighters assigned to standing patrols over his force, and a small force of bombers interdicting enemy supply columns beyond the battlefield. Gott’s plan for Brevity was to advance in three parallel columns.

British A13 cruiser (foreground) and Matilda infantry tanks

On the southern, desert flank the Allied column consisted of the 7th Armoured Brigade group, with the 2RTR cruisers divided into two squadrons, along with three Jock columns from the Support Group. Their mission was to advance thirty miles from Bir el Khireigat to Sidi Azeiz, destroying all opposition encountered en route. The 11th Hussars would operate on their left flank, patrolling the open desert and sending one squadron to monitor the Sidi Azeiz-Bardia road. The centre column, consisting of the 22nd Guards Brigade Group, using transport borrowed from the 4th Indian Infantry Division, and with the infantry tanks of 4RTR, was to clear the top of the Halfaya Pass, secure Bir Wair, Musaid, Fort Capuzzo and exploit northwards towards Sollum. The coastal column was allocated to the "Coast Group" which consisted mainly of the 2nd Rifle Brigade and the Royal Artillery's 8th Field Regiment. Their mission was to attack down the Coast Road, capture the lower Halfaya Pass, Sollum barracks and the town of Sollum itself.

On May 9, the Germans intercepted a British radio transmission detailing weather reports. The Afrika Korps war diary notes that "In the past, such reports had always been issued prior to the important enemy offensives to capture Sidi Barrani, Bardi, Tobruk, and the Gebel". Rommel responded by strengthening the eastern side of his cordon around Tobruk to prevent any sorties from the garrison. He also ordered Kampfgruppe Herff to act more aggressively. On the 13th Herff reported that he expected the British to attack soon, while reconnaissance aircraft bombed tank concentrations. The following day aircraft were unable to confirm the British locations and it was reported that the "enemy intentions to attack were not known".

The battle

British Advance

On May 13 the British infantry battalions, based around Sidi Barrani, set off for their start lines. The tank battalions spent this time preparing their machines, moving up to the start line during a night march in the early hours of May 15. The operation began at 0600 hours when the three columns set off under the cover of a standing patrol of Hawker Hurricanes from No. 274 Group.

Centre column

In the centre, C Squadron, 4RTR and G Company of the 2nd Scots Guards advanced on the first objective; the top of Halfaya Pass, where they were met by heavy opposition from an Italian Bersaglieri Company and an anti tank battery. The position was neutralised after a brief fight, at the cost of seven tanks. The remainder of the Scots Guards battalion and C Squadron 4RTR then pushed on towards the next objective; the road network between Bir Wair and Musaid. At around 0800 hours they encountered a large German-Italian camp which quickly surrendered, and by 1015 hours both Bir Wair and Musaid were taken in the face of limited opposition.

Fort Capuzzo, the focal point of most of the days fighting

Following the successful action at Halfaya Pass, A Squadron, 4RTR, which had up until then provided flank protection, advanced with 1DLI towards Fort Capuzzo. As the tanks moved towards the fort they were engaged by anti tank guns and between 20 and 30 German tanks in hull down positions behind a ridge. The British continued their advance, losing five tanks but forcing the German tankers to retire. As the Matilda tanks closed in on the fort they lost contact with C Company, 1DLI, the Company tasked with capturing the fort. Facing vigorous opposition, the men of C Company had dismounted from their trucks and gone straight into the assault, resulting in intense fighting. They eventually captured the fort just before midday after repeated attacks, supported by 4RTR, which lost another tank in the process, and A and B Companies of 1DLI. D Company, 1DLI, which had been in reserve during the attack, subsequently made a wide left hook from the fort to capture a small landing ground to the north.

In the afternoon a company of the 2nd Scots Guards advanced towards the Sollum Barracks. As they closed in on their objective they came under heavy machine gun fire from three positions. The machine guns were quickly charged and neutralised by universal carriers under the command of Sergeant F. Riley. The carriers then came under fire from anti tank guns, causing the temporary loss of one. Sergeant Riley, executing a second charge during which his carrier was hit three times, succeeded in silencing the guns and taking their crews prisoner, following which the advance continued. In his book on the 2nd Scots Guards, David Erskine states "The Company was in an exposed position at the time, and there is no doubt that Sergeant Riley’s speed and dash saved it from suffering heavy casualties." For his actions Sergeant Riley was awarded the Military Medal, the first decoration to be awarded to the battalion in the war.

Desert column

On the desert flank, the 7th Armoured Brigade group was making fair progress. During the morning the 2RTR received reports of up to thirty tanks or armoured cars operating near them. ‘A’ Squadron was ordered to engage them and while most of the German force retreated, three remained and were brought under fire. One Panzer IV was disabled and the other two tanks retreated, for the loss of one British tank due to mechanical failure. As the two German tanks withdrew a force of 15 more Axis tanks was sighted. They were engaged by two tanks of No. 2 Troop, resulting in one Panzer III being completely destroyed and the remainder withdrawing. By midday the British forces had reached a position west of Fort Capuzzo. In the afternoon, A Squadron, 2RTR was ordered to conduct a reconnaissance patrol to Sidi Azeiz with its nine remaining cruisers.

Coastal column

Progress near the coast was slower. The "Coast Group", without any tank support, was held up all morning by determined Italian resistance, preventing the British from capturing the positions below the Halfaya Pass. This first objective was finally achieved towards evening when S Company, 2nd Rifle Brigade, supported by Australian anti-tank gunners who had abandoned their guns to fight as infantry, captured the positions below the pass, taking up to 130 prisoners.

German reactions

Although the Axis forces knew that a British attack was imminent they were taken by surprise when it was launched, with Rommel recording in his diary that the initial attacks had caused him considerable losses. By midday the Axis forces had considerably over-reacted to the British operation, believing that more than 100 tanks were involved, and repeated requests were made to the Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica for a maximum effort to defeat the attack. Around Tobruk Axis formations were being ordered to the east of the besieged city, both to block any attempt to relieve the city and to prevent any attempt by the garrison to break out in the direction of the attacking forces. Additionally, Lieutenant-Colonel Krammer was ordered to move east to the frontier with a battalion from Panzer Regiment 8 and a battery of Anti-Aircraft guns to reinforce Kampfgruppe von Herff. German counter-attacks concentrated on the British advances of the centre and desert columns.

A Panzer II (right) and a Panzer III (left), the main tanks in use by the Afrika Korps during 1941, advance across the open desert

In the centre, Von Herff, who had been prepared to fall back, first ordered a local counterattack by the 2nd Battalion, Panzer Regiment 5 to retake Fort Capuzzo. At around 1330 hours, the counterattack overran D Company, 1DLI at the landing ground and pressed on south towards Fort Capuzzo. With no anti-tank support more capable than Boys Anti Tank Rifles, 1DLI was forced to fall back. They did so under the cover of a dust cloud towards Musaid and by 1445 hours Panzer Regiment 5 reported Capuzzo retaken, 70 prisoners captured, and heavy casualties inflicted on the British.

In the desert, the patrol of A Squadron, 2RTR towards Sidi Azeiz was monitored by Panzer Regiment 5, who misidentified the tanks as Matilda’s and reported that an attack against this force was not currently possible. Colonel von Herff, believing the British had two divisions operating in the area, had grown uneasy. A Squadron's patrol was interpreted as an attempt to concentrate south of Sidi Azeiz in preparation for an attempt to sweep aside von Herff's force the next day and then thrust northwards, a move which would have threatened to completely unhinge the German front in the Sollum-Bardia area. Consequently von Herff broke contact with the British and attempted to join up with Panzer Regiment 8, his plan being to mount a concentrated attack the following morning.

British withdrawal

Realising that the 22nd Guards Brigade group would be unable to defend themselves in the open ground around Bir Wair and Mussaid if they were attacked by German armour during the day, at 0200 hours on the 16th Brigadier Gott ordered them to withdraw to Halfaya Pass. The 7th Armoured Brigade group and the 11th Hussars were ordered to remain in their current positions for the time being. The first German reinforcements; Krammer's 1st Battalion, Panzer Regiment 8, arrived in the Sidi Azeiz area at 0300 hours, and at 0630 hours a small force of tanks from this battalion occupied the now abandoned Fort Capuzzo. Around the same time Rommel ordered further reinforcements under the command of General von Esebeck towards the border to help restore the situation there. Meanwhile, Krammer's force made contact with Kampfgruppe von Herff at around 0800 hours, although by midmorning both had ran out of fuel. Around 1000 hours the 22nd Guards Brigade Group, along with the 4RTR, had completed their retreat to the pass, and at 1650 hours, Axis forces retook Sollum without a fight.

The German tanks, having been refuelled, resumed their own advance at 1600 hours. The 11th Hussars, who had spent the day monitoring and harassing the German forces, made contact with 2RTR and reported that a column of up to one hundred vehicles was heading their way. 2RTR was ordered to take up positions to stop this advance, and sometime in the late evening these opposing forces met. While 2RTR, at a strength of around seventeen tanks, reported that they had halted an advance of up to fifty tanks; setting one alight and disabling another, Kampfgruppe von Herff reported that a strong British tank attack was repulsed. As nightfall approached the Kampfgruppe broke off from the attack and, with Rommel’s approval, went onto the defensive to repair their damaged machines and to reorganise themselves in preparation for a resumption of offensive operations planned for the 18th. Having held up the German tank forces until dark, 2RTR was ordered to withdraw to Bir el Khireigat, initially followed by two German tanks, one of which withdrew after the other was destroyed. They arrived at their destination, from which they had started their advance two days previously, at around 0230 hours on May 17.

Aftermath

Operation Brevity failed to achieve its objectives; to drive the Italian-German forces from the Sollum-Capuzzo areas and to inflict heavy loss upon them, and its only success was the recapture of Halfaya Pass. British casualties amounted to at least 205 men killed, wounded or captured. The 1st Durham Light Infantry suffered the most; losing a total of 196 men. The 2nd Scots Guards took five casualties; one dead and four wounded. The 11th Hussars lost two armoured cars, with four crewmen wounded. The Royal Tank Regiments lost five tanks, with a further 13 damaged, but no personnel losses. Losses amongst the 2nd Rifle Brigade are unknown. German casualties amounted to 258 men; 12 dead, 61 wounded and 185 missing. The Panzer Regiments lost three tanks; a Panzer II and two Panzer III's, with several more lightly damaged. Losses amongst the Italian forces are unknown, but allied accounts record the capture of 347 men. On August 5, 1941 Colonel von Herff, impressed by the actions and bravery of the Bersaglieri defending Halfaya Pass, issued an order of the day stating:

"The detachment which defended the plains of Halfaya Pass resisted with lionlike courage until the last man against stronger enemy forces. The greatest part of them died faithful to the flag."

Historian Thomas Jentz claims that a British victory was very much a possibility. While their tank forces were still fighting very ineffectively, the "gutsy" actions by the 2RTR and their patrol towards Sidi Azeiz had caused the German command to over-react, and convinced them that they had lost the battle by the evening of the 15th. He notes that even a faint by the 1st and 7th RTR in Tobruk may have caused the Axis command to further realign their forces, weakening their overall position, and possibly even give up the frontier area. After the battle several German commanders from Panzer Regiment 5 were removed from their positions for refusing to attack the 2RTR late on the 15th, most notably the commanding officer.

The British Prime Minister; Winston Churchill, praised the British forces, sending a telegram to Wavell that betrayed his ignorance of the events stating:

"Without using the Tiger cubs you have taken the offensive, advanced 30 miles, captured Halfaya and Sollum, taken 500 German prisoners and inflicted heavy losses in men and tanks. For this twenty I tanks and 1000 or 1500 casualties do not seem to heavy a cost."

He ended his message by querying Wavell "What are your dates for bringing Tiger cubs into action?", referring to the reinforcements that had recently arrived with the Tiger Convoy. The 11th Hussar's regimental history notes "It was clear that no further offensive action would be possible before 7[th] Arm[oured Division] was fully prepared". The arrival of the Tiger Convoy at Alexandria on the 12 May reinforced the British XIII Corps with 238 tanks, comprising 21 Mark VI light tanks, 82 Cruiser tanks (including 50 of the new Crusader tanks) and 135 Infantry tanks. Although too late for Operation Brevity, it was now possible to begin to refit and retrain the 7th Armoured Division, out of action since February after its losses, primarily to wear and tear, during the fighting and advance of Operation Compass, and start to make preparations for Operation Battleaxe and the relief of Tobruk.

Operation Brevity revealed to Rommel the strategic importance of Halfaya Pass. Whoever held it would be assured a "comparatively safe route for his supplies" during any offensive. On May 27 Operation Skorpion was launched, in which von Herff successfully recaptured the pass, thus returning to Axis control the last British territorial gain arising from Brevity.

See also

• North African Campaign timeline
• List of World War II Battles

References

• Carver, Baron Michael (1964). Tobruk. British battles series. Batsford. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameters: |coauthors= and |origdate= (help)
• Chant, Christopher (1986). The Encyclodpedia of Code Names of World War II. Routledge & Kegan Paul. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameters: |coauthors= and |origdate= (help)
• Clarke, Dudley (1952). The Eleventh At War: Being The Story Of The XIth Hussars (Prince Albert's Own) Through The Years 1934-1945. Michael Joseph. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameters: |coauthors= and |origdate= (help)
• Erskine, David (2001). The Scots Guards 1919-1955. DNaval & Military Press Ltd. ISBN 1-84342-061-9. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |origdate= ignored (|orig-date= suggested) (help)
• Hastings, Major R.H.W.S. (1950). The Rifle Brigade In The Second World War 1939-1945. Gale & Polden. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameters: |1=, |coauthors=, and |origdate= (help)
• Jentz, Thomas L. (1998). Tank Combat In North Africa: The Opening Rounds, Opertions Sonnenblume, Brevity, Skorpion and Battleaxe, February 1941 - June 1941. Schiffer Publishing Ltd. ISBN 0-76430-226-4. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameters: |coauthors= and |origdate= (help)
• Latimer, Jon (2001). Tobruk 1941: Rommel's Opening Move. Osprey. ISBN 0-27598-287-4.
• Rissik, David (2004). The D.L.I. at war: History of the Durham Light Infantry 1939-1945. Naval & Military Press Ltd. ISBN 1-84574-144-7. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |origdate= ignored (|orig-date= suggested) (help)
• Neillands, Robin (2004). Eighth Army: From the Western Desert to the Alps, 1939-1945. John Murray Publishers Ltd. ISBN 0-71955-647-3.
• Pitt, Barrie (2001). The Crucible of War: Wavell's Command Volume I. Weidenfeld Military; New Ed edition. ISBN 0-30435-950-5. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |origdate= ignored (|orig-date= suggested) (help)
• Playfair, Major General I.S.O. (2006). The Mediterranean and Middle East, Volume II The Germans come to the help of their Ally (1941). History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series, Official Campaign History. Naval & Military Press. ISBN 1-84734-427-5. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help); Unknown parameter |origdate= ignored (|orig-date= suggested) (help)
• Rommel, Erwin (1982). The Rommel Papers. Da Capo Press. ISBN 0-30680-157-4. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help); Unknown parameter |origdate= ignored (|orig-date= suggested) (help)
• Wake, Major-General Sir Hereward (1949). Swift and bold: The story of the King's Royal Rifle Corps in the Second World War 1939-1945. Gale & Polden. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameters: |1= and |origdate= (help); Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
• Ward, S.G.P. (2005). Faithful: The story of the Durham Light Infantry. Naval & Military Press Ltd. ISBN 1-84574-147-1. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help); Unknown parameter |origdate= ignored (|orig-date= suggested) (help)
• War Diaries of the 11 Hussars (Prince Albert's Own)

External links

• Italians' Bravery Praised By Nazi Chief in Africa
• Bradford, George R. ""BREVITY" and its Impact on the DAK". {{cite web}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |1= (help)
• Chant, Christopher. "The Encyclodpedia of Code Names of World War II, entry on Operation Brevity". {{cite web}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |1= (help)
• Maughan, Barton (1966). Official History of Australia in the Second World War Volume III – Tobruk and El Alamein. Chapters 4 - 9. Series 1 - Army. Canberra: Australian War Memorial. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |origdate= (help)
• Paterson, Ian A. "History of the British 7th Armoured Division: Operation Brevity". {{cite web}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |1= (help)