Viktor Suvorov

Vladimir Bogdanovich Rezun (Russian: Владимир Богда́нович Резу́н) (born April 20, 1947), better known by the pen name Viktor Suvorov (Russian: Ви́ктор Суво́ров) is a Russian writer and historian. He served in the Soviet Army and worked in Soviet military intelligence (GRU). He deserted and escaped to the United Kingdom in 1978 where he worked as an intelligence analyst and lecturer. He made his name writing books about Russian History, the Soviet Army, GRU, and Spetsnaz.

Suvorov's most provocative idea was that Stalin had planned to use Nazi Germany as a proxy (the “Icebreaker”) against the West. For this reason Stalin had provided significant material and political support to Hitler, and at the same time was preparing the Red Army to “liberate” the whole of Europe from Nazi occupation. Suvorov argued that Hitler had lost World War II from the very moment he attacked Poland, because not only was he going to war with the Allies, it was only a matter of time before the Soviet Union would attack him from his rear at the most appropriate moment. This left Hitler with no other choice but to launch a pre-emptive strike on the Soviet Union while Stalin's forces had redeployed from a defensive to an offensive posture, providing him with an important initial tactical advantage. But this was strategically hopeless since the Germans now had to fight on two fronts, a mistake Hitler himself had identified as Germany's undoing in the previous war. In the end therefore, Stalin was able to achieve some of his objectives by establishing Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, China, and North Korea, which according to Suvorov, made him the primary winner of World War II. Suvorov's ideas remain controversial.

Publications and ideas

Suvorov has written several books about his Soviet Army experiences and also joined the team led by the British General Sir John Hackett in writing the book The Third World War: The Untold Story . Published in 1982, this book was the sequel to the 1978 original The Third World War, in which Hackett and his team had speculated about the possible course of a Soviet/NATO war in Germany.

However Suvorov is best known for books about Stalin's times in a polemic, popular-science style, an approach considered unacceptable by some professional historians. The first such work was Icebreaker. Suvorov used hundreds of Soviet-era memoir books and other publicly accessible sources, claiming that the actual reason behind initial Soviet defeats in 1941 was Stalin's intention to strike Germany himself. Thus, according to Suvorov, Stalin had used Hitler as an Icebreaker. Other books followed about World War II, and were based on fragments of officially written memoirs and Soviet documents. Suvorov's most significant thesis is that Stalin wished to extend his Socialism in One Country thesis by igniting a war among "imperialist" countries and later "liberating" Europe.

Suvorov provides analysis of Stalin's gradual preparation for war. Stalin, the leader of the Communist party of the USSR announced three phases that should have led to the final preparation for the war: three Five Year Plan phases with the first one focused on collectivisation, the second focused on industrialisation and the third phase emphasized militarization of the country.

Suvorov reminded the reader that all of the USSR's pre-war doctrine was based on Marxism-Leninism, which dictated that capitalism will be overthrown through communist revolution. Suvorov documented that USSR's leader Joseph Stalin understood that capitalist societies wouldn't normally accept a vision of Leninism. Therefore, Suvorov argued, the USSR was using a patient approach to escalating tensions in Europe by providing a combination of economical and military support to Hitler. According to Stalin's plan and vision, Hitler's unpredictability and his revisionist ideas, described in his book Mein Kampf, made him a potential candidate to the role of "icebreaker" of communist revolution by starting wars with the European countries that would warrant the USSR to join World War II by assaulting Nazi Germany and "liberating", and sovietizing European countries.

If the USSR's goal was to ignite war, it was successful: Ribbentrop and Molotov signed the infamous Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. The essence of this pact was in secret protocols that divided Europe into zones of influence and removed a buffer between Germany and the USSR. Some countries that fell into the Soviet zone of influence, such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and others, were occupied. The difference between smaller nations, occupied and annexed by USSR, and Poland, occupied by Germany, was that Poland had military assistance guarantees from Great Britain and France. It should be noted that the previous writer has forgotten to mention that Poland was split in half and occupied by Hitler and Stalin. This means that Great Britain declared war on only one of Poland's invaders.

Suvorov's theory postulates that after Germany occupied Poland, defeated Poland's ally France and started preparations to occupy the British Isles (Operation Seelöwe), Hitler's intelligence identified USSR's preparations of gigantic proportions to assault Germany.

In 1940 the Wehrmacht drafted a preemptive war plan and on June 22, 1941 launched an assault on USSR, preventing the USSR's strike against Eastern and Central Europe in July 1941. Had this planned invasion taken place, it would have fallen only two weeks after the date on which the actual Axis invasion of the Soviet Union took place. Suvorov claimed that Stalin had made no major defensive preparations. On the contrary, the so-called Stalin line (fortifications through Belarus-Ukraine) was dismantled, and the new Molotov line was all but finished till the time of Nazi invasion. As Suvorov tries to prove with his sources, the latter fortifications were actually built in unimportant places, which might show the lack of Soviet defensive intentions.

The idea about Stalin's preparations to strike prior to the Axis invasion was proposed earlier by dissident Pyotr Grigorenko. Suvorov evolved it in further detail and worked to substantiate it in his own books.

Suvorov's books have been hotly debated as they contradict the traditional theories about Soviet planning concerning the Second World War.

Suvorov's books may appear under slightly different titles depending upon the publisher; for example, Aquarium, published in the UK by Hamish Hamilton, subsequently appeared in the United States as Inside the Aquarium.

Suvorov's books and comments about the Russian Armed forces have been dismissed by most professional Western historians as a combination of hyperbole and made up facts. Many military historians are skeptical of Suvorov's works. One writer supportive of Suvorov’s thesis is Mikhail Meltyukhov in his book Stalin's Missed Chance . Most of Meltyukhov's material comes from various Russian state archives. (For a review of the book see [3]).

Criticism and support

Criticism

Among the noted critics of Suvorov's work are Israeli historian Gabriel Gorodetsky, American military historian David Glantz and Russian military historians Makhmut Gareyev and Dmitri Volkogonov.

One criticism of Suvorov's work is that Red Army was not actually ready for the war. While it may be possible that Suvorov is correct in discerning Stalin's true plans and exposing the huge hardware potential of the Soviet military machine, he does not address some of the traditional arguments about problems plaguing the Red Army, among these: poor leadership after the purges of 1938 and low morale. While Suvorov addressed these points in his later books, the dispute remains unsettled.

File:Mark BT.jpg

Antonov A-40 "flying tank"

Much of Suvorov's focus is on circumstancial evidence: a typical Suvorov argument is that certain types of weapons were only suited for offensive warfare—or were believed to be only suited for offensive warfare by Soviet military doctrine of the time (Suvorov takes care to emphasize this)—and if the Red Army had large amounts of such weapons, then it proves that Red Army was prepared for the offensive.

An example of Suvorov's arguments is when he points out that the Soviet Union was outfitting large numbers of paratroopers—entire parachute armies, in fact—and that paratroopers are only suitable for offensive action, which Soviet military doctrine of the time recognized. In like fashion, he cites the development of the KT/A-40 Antonov "flying tank" as evidence of Stalin's aggressive plans.

Similarly, he suggests in Icebreaker that indirect fire artillery is only suited for offense, whilst direct fire artillery is suited for defence. Critics suggest that much of this type of evidence is not convincing or downright erroneous, and can be explained in terms other than those of Suvorov.

Suvorov has also been criticized being prone to exaggaration about number and capabilities of Soviet forces and weapons. For example, he claims that USSR planned to build 100 000 or more Su-2 attack aircraft in case of mobilization (actual number built: around 800), or that in 1941, Red Army had a million trained paratroopers. These kinds of figures have been dismissed by most historians, especially when contrasted to reality of available fuel or transportation.

David Glantz disputed the argument that the Red Army was deployed in an offensive stance in 1941. Glantz work demonstrates that the Red Army was in a state of partial mobilization in July 1941 from which neither effective defensive nor offensive action could be offered without considerable delay. Regarding Hitler's alleged pre-emptive intentions, Erickson has claimed that “what really concerned Hitler was not Soviet aggression but Soviet concessions to Germany, which could frustrate his own grand design, depriving him of a pretext to attack.”

Another criticism of Suvorov's position includes the claim that there is no evidence that Stalin ever "encouraged" Hitler to start World War II. In his political works, Stalin was always firmly opposed to Trotsky's theory of Permanent Revolution, implementation of which regarded worldwide war and other countries' usurpation as necessary (because practice showed that war, the ultimate devastation, could create revolutionary conditions that usually did not occur in any natural way). Stalin instead insisted on the policy of Socialism in One Country which promoted separation and peaceful standalone development of socialism in a selected country, while waiting for two-stage revolutions that would lead other countries to socialism. Conventional theory states that Stalin prepared the Soviet Army for international war because he knew he would have to free Europe of Fascism, and the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact was nothing more than the way to suspend the war with Nazism—exactly for the purpose to have time for preparations that Suvorov's researches exposed.

Middle positions

A middle position seems to be taken by the Israeli historian Martin van Creveld. In an interview in the April 11, 2005 edition of the German news magazine FOCUS, which is the second largest weekly magazine in Germany, he said: "I doubt that Stalin wanted to attack as early as autumn 1941, as some writers argue. But I have no doubt that sooner or later, if Germany would have been entangled in a war with Great Britain and the USA, he would have taken what he wanted. Judging by the talks between Ribbentrop and Molotov in November 1940 this would have been Romania, Bulgaria, an access to the North Sea, the Dardanelles and probably those parts of Poland that were under German control at that time." Asked to what degree the leaders of the Wehrmacht needed to feel threatened by the Soviet military buildup, van Creveld replies "very much" and adds: "In 1941 the Red Army was the largest army in the world. Stalin may, as I said, not have planned to attack Germany in autumn 1941. But it would be hard to believe that he would not have taken the opportunity to stab the Reich in the back sometime."

Suvorov's critics argue that the suggestion that Stalin regarded war with Nazi Germany as inevitable sits oddly with the undisputed fact that the attack by Nazi Germany in 1941 took Stalin completely by surprise. On the other hand, the fact that Stalin was taken completely by surprise doesn't suit the established history either, as it is often claimed that Stalin was paranoical about a possible foreign invasion and had concentrated on defensive policies. The criticism was addressed in detail in Suvorov's book Suicide.

Support

While most of the Western researchers (the exception being Albert L. Weeks) reject or simply ignore Suvorov's thesis, he has gathered some support among Russian professional historians. Throughout the 1990s, a debate was carried out among the Russian historians. Support for Suvorov's claim that Stalin had been preparing a strike against Hitler in 1941 began to emerge, as some archive materials were declassified. Authors to support assault thesis are V.D.Danilov, V.A.Nevezhin, Constantine Pleshakov and B.V. Sokolov. As the latter has noted, the absence of documents with the precise date of the planned Soviet invasion can't be an argument in favor of the claim that this invasion was not planned at all. Although the USSR attacked Finland, there are no documents found, which would indicate November 26, 1939 as the previously assumed date for beginning of the provocations or November 30 as the date of the planned Soviet assault.[4]

A noteworthy result of the discussion that followed, is Mikhail Meltyukhov's study Stalin's Missed Chance. The author states that the idea to strike Germany arose long before May 1941 and was the very basis of Soviet military planning from 1940 to 1941. Contrary to popular opinion, no significant defense plans have been found (Meltyukhov 2000:375). In his argumentation, Meltyukhov covers five different versions of the assault plan (“Considerations on the Strategical Deployment of Soviet Troops in Case of War with Germany and its Allies” (Russian original)), the first version of which was developed soon after the outbreak of World War II. The last version was to be completed by May 1, 1941 (Meltyukhov 2000:370–372). Even the deployment of troops was chosen in South, which would have been more beneficial in case of Soviet assault (Meltyukhov 2000:381).

In Stalin's War of Extermination Joachim Hoffmann makes extensive use of interrogations of Soviet prisoners of war, ranging in rank from general to private, conducted by their German captors during the war. The book is also based on open-source, unclassified literature and recently declassified materials. Based on that evidence, Hoffmann argues that the Soviet Union was making final preparations for its own attack when the Wehrmacht struck. He also remarks that the Zhukov's plan of May 15, 1941 has long been known and analyzed. Colonel Valeri Danilov and Dr. Heinz Magenheimer examined this plan and other documents that indicate Soviet preparations for attack almost ten years ago in an Austrian military journal (Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, nos. 5 and 6, 1991; no. 1, 1993; and no. 1, 1994). Both researchers concluded that the Zhukov plan of May 15, 1941, reflected Stalin's May 5, 1941 speech heralding the birth of the new offensive Red Army.

In 2006, a collection of articles (entitled The Truth of Viktor Suvorov) by various historians, who share some views with Suvorov, was published.

Several politicians have also made claims similar to Suvorov's. On August 20, 2004, former Prime Minister of Estonia Mart Laar published an article in The Wall Street Journal titled When Will Russia Say 'Sorry'?. In this article he said: The new evidence shows that by encouraging Hitler to start World War II, Stalin hoped to simultaneously ignite a world-wide revolution and conquer all of Europe. Another former statesman to share views of Soviet aggression plan is Mauno Koivisto, who wrote: It seems to be clear the Soviet Union was not ready for defense in the summer of 1941, but it was rather preparing for an assault... The forces mobilized in the Soviet Union were not positioned for defensive but for offensive aims. Koivisto concludes: Hitler's invasion forces didn't outnumber [the Soviets], but were rather outnumbered themselves. The Soviets were unable to organize defenses. The troops were provided with maps that covered territories outside the Soviet Union.

See also

• Operation Barbarossa
• Stalin's speech on August 19, 1939

Bibliography

Books by Viktor Suvorov

• The series about the outbreak of the Nazi-Soviet War
  • Icebreaker (Ледокол) 1990, Hamish Hamilton Ltd, ISBN 0-241-12622-3
  • Day "M" (День "М")
  • Suicide (Самоубийство)
  • Last Republic (Последняя республика)
• Aquarium (Аквариум), 1985, Hamish Hamilton Ltd, ISBN 0-241-11545-0
• Inside the Soviet Army, 1982, Macmillan Publishing Co.
• The Liberators (Освободитель), 1981, Hamish Hamilton Ltd, ISBN 0-241-10675-3
• Shadow of Victory (Тень победы), questions the image of Georgy Zhukov. The first book of trilogy with the same name.
• I Take My Words Back (Беру Свои Слова Обратно), questions the image of Georgy Zhukov. The second book of "Shadow of Victory" trilogy.
• Cleansing (Очищение)
• Inside Soviet Military Intelligence, 1984, ISBN 0-02-615510-9
• Spetsnaz, 1987, Hamish Hamilton Ltd, ISBN 0-241-11961-8
• Tales of a Liberator (Рассказы освободителя), fiction
• Control ([Контроль), fiction
• Choice (Выбор] Error: {{Lang}}: text has italic markup (help)), fiction
• The Chief Culprit: Stalin's Grand Design to Start World War II. Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2007 (hardcover, ISBN 1-59797-114-6).

Books and articles by other authors

Pro or partially pro

• The Attack on the Soviet Union (Germany and the Second World War, Volume IV) by Horst Boog, Jürgen Förster, Joachim Hoffmann, Ewald Osers, Louise Wilmott, Dean S. McMurray (Editors), Ernst Klink (Translator), Rolf-Dieter Müller (Translator), Gerd R. Ueberschär (Translator). New York: Oxford University Press (USA), 1999 (ISBN 0-19-822886-4).
• Dębski, Sławomir. Między Berlinem a Moskwą: Stosunki niemiecko-sowieckie 1939–1941. Warsaw: Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, 2003 (ISBN 83-918046-2-3).
  • Reviewed by R.C. Raack in The Russian Review, 2004, Vol. 63, Issue 4, pp. 718–719.
• Hoffmann, Joachim. Stalin's War of Extermination. Capshaw, AL: Theses & Dissertations Press, 2001 (ISBN 0-9679856-8-4).
• Maser, Werner Der Wortbruch. Hitler, Stalin und der Zweite Weltkrieg. Olzog, München 1994. ISBN 3-7892-8260-X
• Maser, Werner Fälschung, Dichtung und Wahrheit über Hitler und Stalin, Olzog, München 2004. ISBN 3-7892-8134-4
• Pleshakov, Constantine. Stalin's Folly: The Tragic First Ten Days of World War Two on the Eastern Front. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2005 (ISBN 0-618-36701-2).
  • Reviewed by Ron Laurenzo in The Washington Times, May 22, 2005.
  • Reviewed by Robert Citino in World War II, Vol. 21, Issue 1. (2006), pp. 76–77.
• Raack, R.C. "Did Stalin Plan a Drang Nach Westen?", World Affairs. Vol. 155, Issue 4. (Summer 1992), pp. 13–21.
• Raack, R.C. "Preventive Wars?" [Review Essay of Pietrow-Ennker, Bianka, ed. Präventivkrieg? Der deutsche Angriff auf die Sowjetunion. 3d ed. Frankfurt-am-Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2000. ISBN 3-596-14497-3; Mel'tiukhov, Mikhail. Upushchennyi shans Stalina: Sovetskii Soiuz i bor'ba za Evropu 1939–1941. Moscow: Veche, 2000. ISBN 5-7838-1196-3; Magenheimer, Heinz. Entscheidungskampf 1941: Sowjetische Kriegsvorbereitungen. Aufmarsch. Zusammenstoss. Bielefeld: Osning Verlag, 2000. ISBN 3-9806268-1-4] The Russian Review, 2004, Vol. 63, Issue 1, pp. 134–137.
• Raack, R.C. [Review of] Stalins Vernichtungskrieg 1941–1945 by Joachim Hoffmann, Slavic Review, Vol. 55, No. 2. (Summer, 1996), pp. 493–494.
• Raack, R.C. "Stalin's Role in the Coming of World War II: Opening the Closet Door on a Key Chapter of Recent History", World Affairs. Vol. 158, Issue 4, 1996, pp. 198–211.
• Raack, R.C. "Stalin's Role in the Coming of World War II: The International Debate Goes On", World Affairs. Vol. 159, Issue 2, 1996, pp. 47–54.
• Raack, R.C. Stalin's Drive to the West, 1938–1945: The Origins of the Cold War. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995. (ISBN 0-8047-2415-6).
• Raack, R.C. "Stalin's Plans for World War Two Told by a High Comintern Source", The Historical Journal, Vol. 38, No. 4. (Dec., 1995), pp. 1031–1036.
• Raack, R.C. "[Review:] Stalins Vernichtungskrieg 1941–1945", Slavic Review, Vol. 55, No. 2. (Summer, 1996), pp. 493–494.
• Raack, R.C. "[Review:] Unternehmen Barbarossa: Deutsche und Sowjetische Angriffspläne 1940/41 by Walter Post; Die sowjetische Besatzungsmacht und das politishe System der SBZ by Stefan Creuzberger", Slavic Review, Vol. 57, No. 1. (Sring, 1998), pp. 212–214.
• Raack, R.C. "Breakers on the Stalin Wave: Review Essay [of Murphy, David E. What Stalin Knew: The Enigma of Barbarossa. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005 (ISBN 0-300-10780-3); Pleshakov, Constantine. Stalin’s Folly: The Tragic First Ten Days of World War II on the Eastern Front. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 2005 (ISBN 0-618-36701-2)]", The Russian Review, Vol. 65, No. 3. (2006), pp. 512–515.
• Topitsch, Ernst. Stalin's War: A Radical New Theory of the Origins of the Second World War. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1987 (ISBN 0-312-00989-5).
  • Reviewed critically by Alexander Dallin in The New York Times, November 15, 1987.
• Weeks, Albert L. Stalin's Other War: Soviet Grand Strategy, 1939–1941. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002 (hardcover; ISBN 0-7425-2191-5); 2003 (paperback, ISBN 0-7425-2192-3).
• Ziemke, Earl F. The Red Army, 1918–1941: From Vanguard of World Revolution to America's Ally. London; New York: Frank Cass, 2004 (ISBN 0-7146-5551-1).

Contra

• Acton, Edward. "Understanding Stalin’s Catastrophe: [Review Article]", Journal of Contemporary History, 2001, Vol. 36(3), pp. 531–540.
• Carley, Michael Jabara. "Soviet Foreign Policy in the West, 1936–1941: A Review Article", Europe–Asia Studies, Vol. 56, No. 7. (2004), pp. 1081–1100. [Review of Silvio Pons, Stalin and the Inevitable War, 1936–1941. London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2002 and Albert L. Weeks, Stalin's Other War: Soviet Grand Strategy, 1939-1941. Oxford and Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002.]
• Erickson, John. "Barbarossa June 1941: Who Attacked Whom?" History Today, July 2001, Vol. 51, Issue 7, pp. 11–17. online text
• Edmonds, Robin. "[Review: Icebreaker: Who Started the Second World War?", International Affairs, Vol. 66, No. 4. (Oct., 1990), p. 812.
• Glantz, David M. Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998 (ISBN 0-7006-0879-6).
  • Reviewed by David R. Costello in The Journal of Military History, Vol. 63, No. 1. (Jan., 1999), pp. 207–208.
  • Reviewed by Roger Reese in Slavic Review, Vol. 59, No. 1. (Spring, 2000), p. 227.
• Glantz, David M. "[Review: Icebreaker: Who Started the Second World War?", The Journal of Military History, Vol. 55, No. 2. (Apr., 1991), pp. 263–264.
• Gorodetsky, Gabriel. Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia. New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 1999 (ISBN 0-300-07792-0).
  • Reviewed by David R. Costello in The Journal of Military History, Vol. 64, No. 2. (Apr., 1999), pp. 580–582.
  • Reviewed by Stephen Blank in The Russian Review, 2000, Vol. 59, Issue 2, pp. 310–311.
  • Reviewed by Hugh Ragsdale in Slavic Review, Vol. 59, No. 2. (Summer, 2000), pp. 466–467.
  • Reviewed by Evan Mawdsley in Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 52, No. 3. (May, 2000), pp. 579–580.
• Harms, Karl. "The Military Doctrine of the Red Army on the Eve of the Great Patriotic War: Myths and Facts", Military Thought, Vol. 13, No. 03. (2004), pp. 227–237.
• Humpert, David M. "Viktor Suvorov and Operation Barbarossa: Tukhachevskii Revisited." The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 18, Issue 1. (2005), pp. 59–74.
• Lukacs, John. June 1941: Hitler and Stalin. New Haven, CT; London: Yale University Press, 2006 (ISBN 0-300-11437-0).
• McDermott, Kevin. Stalin: Revolutionary in an Era of War (European History in Perspective). New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006 (hardcover, ISBN 0-333-71121-1; paperback, ISBN 0-333-71122-X).
• Murphy, David E. What Stalin Knew: The Enigma of Barbarossa. New Haven, CT; London: Yale University Press, 2005 (ISBN 0-300-10780-3).
  • Reviewed by Robert Conquest at The American Historical Review, Vol. 111, No. 2. (2006), p. 591.
  • Reviewed by Raymond W. Leonard in the Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 37, No. 1. (2006), pp. 128–129.
• Neilson, Keith. "Stalin's Moustache: The Soviet Union and the Coming of War: [Review Article]", Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 12, No. 2. (2001), pp. 197–208.
• Roberts, Cynthia A. "Planning for War: The Red Army and the Catastrophe of 1941", Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 47, No. 8. (Dec., 1995), pp. 1293–1326.
• Rotundo, Louis. "Stalin and the Outbreak of War in 1941", Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 24, No. 2, Studies on War. (Apr., 1989), pp. 277–299.
• Gerd R. Ueberschär, Lev A. Bezymenskij (Hrsg.): Der deutsche Angriff auf die Sowjetunion 1941. Die Kontroverse um die Präventivkriegsthese Wissenschaftliche Buchgemeinschaft, Darmstadt 1998
• Uldricks, Teddy J. "The Icebreaker Controversy: Did Stalin Plan to Attack Hitler?" The Slavic Review, 1999, Vol. 53, No. 3, pp. 626–643.

Neutral, cautious approach

• Keep, John L.H.; Litvin, Alter L. Stalinism: Russian and Western Views at the Turn of the Millennium (Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions). New York: Routledge, 2004 (hardcover, ISBN 0-415-35108-1); 2005 (paperback, ISBN 0-415-35109-X). See chapter 5, "Foreign policy".

Other

• Carley, Michael Jabara. "Soviet Foreign Policy in the West, 1936–1941: A Review Article", Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 56, No. 7. (2004), pp. 1081–1100.
• Drabkin, Ia.S. "'Hitler’s War' or 'Stalin’s War'?", Journal of Russian and East European Psychology, Vol. 40, No. 5. (2002), pp. 5–30.
• Ericson, Edward E., III. "Karl Schnurre and the Evolution of Nazi–Soviet Relations, 1936–1941", German Studies Review, Vol. 21, No. 2. (May, 1998), pp. 263–283.
• Förster, Jürgen; Mawdsley, Evan. "Hitler and Stalin in Perspective: Secret Speeches on the Eve of Barbarossa", War in History, Vol. 11, Issue 1. (2004), pp. 61–103.
• Haslam, Jonathan. "Soviet–German Relations and the Origins of the Second World War: The Jury Is Still Out [Reivew Article]", The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 69, No. 4. (Dec., 1997), pp. 785–797.
• Haslam, Jonathan. "Stalin and the German Invasion of Russian 1941: A Failure of Reasons of State?", International Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 1. (Jan., 2000), pp. 133–139.
• Koch, H.W. "Operation Barbarossa—The Current State of the Debate", The Historical Journal, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Jun., 1988), pp. 377–390.
• Litvin, Alter L. Writing History in Twentieth-Century Russia: A View from Within, translated and edited by John L.H. Keep. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001 (hardcover, ISBN 0-333-76487-0).
• Roberts, Geoffrey. "On Soviet–German Relations: The Debate Continues [A Review Article]", Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 50, No. 8. (Dec., 1998), pp. 1471–1475.
• Vasquez, John A. "The Causes of the Second World War in Europe: A New Scientific Explanation", International Political Science Review, Vol. 17, No. 2. (Apr., 1996), pp. 161–178.

External links

• Some online books of Viktor Suvorov and links to related online publications at the Maxim Moshkov's Library
• Complete up-to-date collection of Suvorov's online books (some in English), at Militera Project
  • Viktor Suvorov, Ledokol, audio book (in Russian)
• Viktor Suvorov's homepage (in Russian)
• Template:En icon*Did Stalin deliver his alleged speech of 19 August 1939? by Carl O. Nordling
• Raack, R.C. "Stalin's Role in the Coming of World War II" at Vincent Ferraro's web site (published in World Affairs (1996) vol. 158, no. 4
• Criticism of Last Republic (in English)
• Criticism of Rezun's Ledokol in Russian Journal Military Thought
• Criticism of the Preventive War Theory by Wigbert Benz (in German)
• Виктор Грызун - Как Виктор Суворов сочинял историю.
• Template:Ro icon Andreea Tudorica, Ovidiu Ciutescu, Corina Andriuta, "Giurgiuleşti, piedică în calea lui Stalin", Jurnalul Naţional, June 26, 2007