Talk:Viktor Suvorov

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Lack of indepth critics[edit]

Too bad that nobody actually cared to post some of the most serious critics of Suvorov: the critics which proves that he is a biased and dishonest author providing false quotes, false numbers, false technical characteristics and using propagandistic methods of work which renders his work hard to evaluate as a historical one. <by User:Theocide>

I'd appreciate if you could prove some of his alleged lies, proving that he is a biased and dishonest author.--Constanz - Talk 09:00, 20 April 2006 (UTC)

Sure. The most evident example is his constant playing with numbers - like giving the amount of German tanks of 3300 on the Soviet border vs. the overall amount of 23000 of Soviet tanks, even those in the Far East, Middle-Asia, including those under repair and those that are being modified, etc.

Answer : No. Suvorov isn't playing with numbers at all. There is a very simple and logical explanation for this. Suvorov gives the total number of german tanks prepared for the Barbarossa Operation vs the total number of tanks in the soviet inventory and that is how it should be. This difference is caused by the different circumstances in which both armies found themselves on 22 June 1941. An army which is about to attack is massing all its available armor at the borders of the enemy. On the other hand, an army which is not expecting the attack will not have all its armor in the threatened region, but spread across the country. But, when the war starts, the defending side has the possibility to get their remaining tanks ready for battle quickly and send them at the front. The attacking one (in our case, the Wehrmacht) can't do that. Yes, Red Army had only 12,000 tanks in their western regions, but, once the war started, they sent all the others against the germans. The Barbarossa did not end in 1-2 weeks, so the soviets had plenty of time to get the rest of their tanks at the front. The germans, on the other hand, had to do with what they started.

While I'm undecided on the issue, there is one reason why I find the anti-Suvorov arguments unconvincing and looking more like they are trying to push an agenda. To say that I'm an amateur in this field would be a complement. Still, as you can seem, I'm perfectly capable to bust a lot of the arguments expressed against Suvorov, because they have such logical holes that you can drive a whole carrier through them. 141.70.82.221 (talk) 00:02, 19 October 2009 (UTC) Sentinel

Yeah, but probably Soviets still outnumbered the Germans, as contemporary research shows (some users here have reported that the ratio is similar to that given by mr Glantz):
June 21, 1941. Soviet-German front
Red Army German Army (inc allies) Ratio
Divisions 190 166 1.1 : 1
Personnel 3,289,851 4,306,800 1 : 1.3
Guns and mortars 59,787 42,601 1.4 : 1
Tanks (incl assault guns) 15,687 4,171 3.8 : 1
Aircraft 10,743 4,846 2.2 : 1

Source: Mikhail MeltyukhovStalin's Missed Chance” --Constanz - Talk 15:33, 20 April 2006 (UTC)

Yep, so? Are you discussing Suvorov or everything at once? Whether the USSR was or was not planning an offensive is a completely different thing. Right now, I'm talking about Suvorov's fakes. Deliberate fakes, I dare say. And the question that arises: why play with numbers, false quotes and fakes unless you have an agenda?--Theocide 11:09, 5 May 2006 (UTC)

He deliberately provides only parts of Mein Kampf so as to proof that Hitler didn't consider the slavic people to be inferior and to make the readers (especially those who never read Mein Kampf) believe that the book shows Hitler's only main intention - to defeat France.

Hilter's hatred towards the slavs (and just every nation except the germans) was of course true. With regards to defeating France, Suvorov seems to have a point though:But the Russians knew Germany and the Nazis. They had read Mein Kampf. They learned from this book not only that Hitler coveted the Ukraine, but also that Hitler's fundamental strategical idea was to embark upon the conquest of Russia only after having definitely and forever annihilated France. The Russians were fully convinced that Hitler's expectation, as expressed in Mein Kampf, that Great Britain and the United States would keep out of this war and would quietly let France be destroyed, was vain. They were certain that such a new world war, in which they themselves planned to stay neutral, would result in a new German defeat. And this defeat, they argued, would make Germany—if not the whole of Europe— safe for Bolshevism (Ludwig_von_Mises, [1])--Constanz - Talk 15:33, 20 April 2006 (UTC)
Where exactly in Mein Kampf it is stated that Germany would attack bosheviks only after defeating France? --Theocide 11:09, 5 May 2006 (UTC)

He claims tanks with letter "A" in their names to be special "Autobahn tanks" which were supposedly designed especially to drop their caterpillars and drive on wheels on good german roads during the Soviet offensive, while in reality the letter "A" meant that the tank was on the design stage (for example, T-34 before being launched into production was named A-34) and the country with a big amount of tanks possesing both wheels and caterpillars was Sweden. I wonder, how Sweden was planning to attack Germany?

His division of weapons into "offensive" and "defensive" ones is way out of this world and is either a demonstration of one's idiocy or a well-prepared provocation.

He quotes Liddel Hart as saying that "Hitler told his generals that Stalin was preparing for an offensive..." and the three dots hide the rest of the sentence which goes like "... but when the generals crossed the border they saw that Stalin fooled them". In other words, Suvorov provided only part of the quote so as to imply that his opinion is somehow shared by Liddel Hart.

True, I've heard of numerous other examples like this. This of course doesn't refute the Stalin's offensive thesis, though.

Once again, there is "Stalin's offensive thesis" and there are "Suvorov's books". Right now I'm mostly discussing the second. HIS proof of Stalin's offensive doesn't hold since it consists of many fakes. --Theocide 11:09, 5 May 2006 (UTC)

but when the generals crossed the border they saw that Stalin fooled them", well many Germans regarded the situation as this:Hitler stated that the Soviets had placed a huge number of divisions along the German-Soviet border. What I saw when traveling through that forest were huge masses of well-camouflaged tanks, artillery, trucks, and other war materiel. Slonim was then only some 30 km. from the German-Soviet border and I must believe Hitler when he speculated that he had taken the jump against the Soviets because a few days later, they would have attacked. To judge from that much war materiel, I am inclined to believe Hitler. Remember: the Nazis were not the only ones who lied through their teeth. [2]--Constanz - Talk 15:33, 20 April 2006 (UTC)

What was that? The link is broken. --Theocide 11:09, 5 May 2006 (UTC)
You broke the link yourself. Constanz

One could go one forever showing his false quotes and false information.--Theocide 09:42, 20 April 2006 (UTC)

Typical Suvorov trick is his comparison of Wehrmacht and Red Army. In that, he takes German forces at the Eastern Front (minus other Axis) and compared them to total size of Red Army, Navy, Air Force and NKVD combined. If I wanted to reverse the trick, I'd point out that there were 2.6 million Red Army soldiers facing total of 7.1 million Germans (total size of the German armed forces) plus 1 million+ (Finnish Army alone almost half a million) Axis troops...--Mikoyan21 10:50, 1 May 2006 (UTC)

I'd point out that there were 2.6 million Red Army soldiers facing total of 7.1 million Germans hard to believe, unless you give your sources. My source paints different picture (glance the table, if you have not yet done so)--Constanz - Talk 15:54, 1 May 2006 (UTC)
Constanz, relax. Mikouyan simply says that it is possible to manipulate with numbers in this way as well, by taking them from different contexts. `'mikka (t) 17:01, 1 May 2006 (UTC)

If we do exactly what Suvorov did, only reversing the sides, then we indeed get 7.1 million Germans (combined size of Heer, LW, KM and SS) vs 2.6 million Soviets (total strength of three Western Military Disricts). Of course, this is only one example of Suvorov's number game. His other trick is to compare Soviet division counts to Cold War era division counts to make it appear like Red Army was humongously large. By same logic, Finns must also have been planning invasion somewhere as Finnish Army had more divisions than US Army has today...--Mikoyan21 17:11, 1 May 2006 (UTC)

They were. The Soviet attack - 25. june. Finnish counterattack - 28. june. The reversing sides is the best critics against Suvorov (though not Soviet attack theory in general). As Japan and SU had not made neutrality pact yet and as USA was neutral this reversing can be done. - Melilac (talk) 13:06, 11 January 2015 (UTC)

A lot of the basic criticisms of Suvorov are summarized here:

http://www.battlefield.ru/content/view/208/108/lang,en/

The author Potapov only deals with Suvorov and does not address the more general issue of whether or not archival documents might support an alternate version of Suvorov's general thesis that Stalin was allegedly planning to move first.

But there is a problem. Your source tells: "Our major point is to represent Soviet point of view...". Besides, your link is basically a blog that provides long discussions by anonymous users.Biophys (talk) 18:44, 22 August 2008 (UTC)

Your misquoting. Because the site is operated by Russians, the English language version does not always come through as we would phrase. What they say is that:


Our major point is to represent Soviet point of view based on materials from ex-Soviet archives for everyone who does not know Russian language. Therefore we try to make both Russian and English versions of every page. However translation takes a lot of time so it is possible some materials are not translated yet.

It is important to understand our website does support neither Bolshevik nor Nazi beliefs.


In other words, the phrase "Soviet view" here does not refer to "Bolshevik ... beliefs" but simply to the events of the war as experienced by Soviet citizens. We would normally phrase that differently, but the site owners are not attempting to argue for any party line decreed by the old CPUSSR. That is not there usage of the term "Soviet view," although in English we might ordinarily interpret the phrase it that way.

"your link is basically a blog that provides long discussions by anonymous users"

No it is not. It is an article by Potapov where the site owners have allowed readers to post comments after the article, as is common with many internet publications. The sourcing is clearly identified by Potapov both within the text of the article and in the bibliography at the close of the article. The reader commentaries are a totally separate matter which have a clearly defined beginning separate from and after Potapov's article.


Answer : No offense, but this article by Potapov isn't worth quoting. Putting aside the mistakes in it (including the one I pointed above about the interpretation in the number of tanks), the respective article is way too insulting to be taken seriously - not against Suvorov per se, which would be understandable to a certain extent, but to those who might agree with him. I've read the english version about 1 year ago, so I hope it hasn't been modified meanwhile (the link has only a russian one), but I was poorly impressed by it. And there is also using intellectual dishonesty to accuse Suvorov of...intellectual dishonesty. One example : Suvorov claims that the shortage of maps in the Red Army was evidence of preparation for attack. The soviets had no maps of soviet territory, because they were preparing to fight on the german one. Potapov takes this argument as an example of "dishonest statement" and refers to an example provided by Suvorov from november 1941. Potapov's claim : Suvorov is lying because the example is from a period too late in the war ; as such, the soviets lacked maps due to the fact that they weren't expecting the germans to advance so deep ; thus, he implies that the premisis of the argument was disingenuous. The problem is that Suvorov offers 4 examples and just one of them is from november 1941, the other 3 are from June and July. It's impossible for Mr.Potapov to have missed them, they are all on the same 2 pages. So why aren't they mentioned and Potapov focuses his attention only to fourth one, from November 1941, in order to suggest that Suvorov is misleading the reader by refering to a very late period in the war ?

Another example. Potapov is extremely sarcastic about the use of T-34's main characteristic as criterias for a modern tank in 1941. He says "if T-34 was capable of flying, Suvorov would have mentioned that as well as a requirement for a modern tank". The sarcasm is completely gratuituous. The T-34 was the best tank in the world in 1941 by such a large margin that it is absolutely normal to be used as the benchmark. If I would be asked today what are the characteristics of a modern fighter, I would say : stealth, supercruise, thrust vectoring, ability to act as a mini-awacs. By Potapov's logic, I could also be mocked that the requirements I listed are the exact characteristics of the F-22. Yes and that is how it should be, because F-22 has set the standard of the new generation of fighters. Just like the T-34 did in 1941 for the new generation of tanks. The caustic comments made about T-34 in that article are both ridiculous and pointless.

Article concentrated on wrong topic[edit]

This article seems to be purely dedicated for discussing theory that USSR was planning agressive war aganist germany then barbarossa started. Actualy most of it should have separate article like Dispute over Soviet plans before Barbarossa or something like that. Although Suvorov is most well known supporter of idea, it should not be so directly connected to his person anymore as there are also other, probably more respectable historians, supporting that thesis. This article should simply give overview of Suvorov's life and short overview of his books. Detailed desrciption about dispute over Stalin's pre-war intentions probably should have its own article.--Staberinde 07:40, 3 October 2007 (UTC)

I think one might create article that you suggested. Please also take a look at Causes of World War II. However, such new article would not affect this article about Suvorov. As you can see, it is focused on Suvorov's work and criticism and support of his work. The topic of this aricle is correct as long as it discusses Suvorov's ideas.Biophys 17:26, 3 October 2007 (UTC)
The concern is one of emphasis. His early writings dealt with his time in the Soviet Union: during the invasion of Czechoslovakia (The Liberators) and his work in Spetsnaz and as an intelligence officer for the GRU (The Aquarium). Then his three non-fiction books: Inside the Soviet Army, Inside Soviet Military Intelligence, and Spetsnaz: The Inside Story of the Soviet Special Forces. These were all important books that were highly notable. :: And yet, what we see in the lede to this article is "Suvorov made his name writing Icebreaker and several follow-up books on history of World War II." Which even the article itself contradicts.
Now, obviously what's happened is that the current debate over Suvorov's historical work regarding Stalin and Hitler is being litigated on Suvorov's bio page, and the topic of the article (Suvorov himself) is being pushed out to make room. This is not unusual, but it needs some trimming, and more on his other notable works needs to be added to avoid giving the WW2 stuff undue weight.
Finally, does anyone have any information on "Devil's Mother"? It's the only book I can't find information for-- I'm not even certain it exists. Has anyone read this book, or a review of it? Are there cites we can link that verify its existence and contents? 131.96.211.115 (talk) 19:07, 8 October 2015 (UTC)
Exactly, there's many things missing. Rezun has also been senteced to death (acording to claims to his books) in soviet union, which is stil valid. His history in GRU and Specnatz are very shocking and controversial among military specialist. I'm sure this would deserve some more attention. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 83.240.11.115 (talk) 21:28, 22 November 2007 (UTC)
Yes, it needs a lot of work. I will make a few changes. First of all, this article does not really explain the ideas of Suvorov. Second, some defamatory statements with regard to a living person remain completely unsourced and therefore should be deleted per WP:BLP rules.Biophys (talk) 02:27, 14 June 2008 (UTC)
I made new and more clear version of "publications and ideas". Still needs a lot of work. Please discuss if there are any serious objections rather than revert.Biophys (talk) 04:15, 14 June 2008 (UTC)
This article is crap. It goes on and on about a dubious Soviet history thesis, and it brings in all kinds of sources that have nothing to do with Suvorov. Suvorov is an isolated crank rarely taken seriously by anyone. This article presents him as key player in some grand historical debate - debate simply not happening. 74.14.70.54 (talk) 18:20, 3 August 2009 (UTC)
I agree with you !
It might be good to cite some additional sources to contextualise any discussion in such an article with other examples. For instance, many countries (or companies from many countries) aided the rearmament of Germany. It should also be noted that offensive war plans are relatively common (for instance the United States has developed several offensive war plans against Canada and Canada has developed at least one defence strategy that would rely on rapid incursions into American territory near the border). Without considering such facts it is very hard for the reader to gain a nuanced understanding (eg. the fact that some policies assisting Germany had to have been high level state police in the USSR, whereas it just required opportunists or sympathiser, along with government tolerance in Western societies)... --Hrimpurstala (talk) 14:36, 25 April 2010 (UTC)
Re: "It should also be noted that offensive war plans are relatively common" Some sources (cited in the "Criticism" section) directly tell about that in a context of the Suvotov's "theory" (See also Soviet offensive plans controversy.) In general, the only thing that is needed to be done is to remove the major part of the text from the "Support" section. because it is artificially inflated to create an absolutely wrong impression that Suvorov is being supported and criticised in about the same extent. He is a fringe theorist, not supported by the western scholars, and the article must tell about that clearly.--Paul Siebert (talk) 14:45, 25 April 2010 (UTC)
I think a cursory glance at the names mentioned in the "Support" and "Criticism" sections should be a clear indicator that he is "not supported by the western scholars". His scholarly support comes mainly from the East. Perhaps you could add some of the multitudinous Western criticisms to give the article the balance/slant that you want... Lothar von Richthofen (talk) 18:44, 25 April 2010 (UTC)
I think, instead of expanding criticism it would be better to shrink the "Support" section, because most these details belong to (and described in) the Soviet offensive plans controversy article. In addition, I doubt Meltukhov to belong to Suvorov's supporters (his position is middle).--Paul Siebert (talk) 20:16, 25 April 2010 (UTC)
Mel'tjukhov's positions concur with Rezun's on most points, with a few exceptions, most notable the notion that Barbarossa was preemptive. For all intents and purposes, this is 'support', for the main debate is about whether or not the USSR planned to attack Nazi Germany. Both Rezun and Mel'tjukhov agree that such plans did exist.Lothar von Richthofen (talk) 21:28, 25 April 2010 (UTC)

Unsourced statements[edit]

A lot of the statements in the article are unsourced. I marked but a few. --παγκρἃτωρ/pankrator 04:37, 7 August 2010 (UTC) —Preceding unsigned comment added by Pankrator (talkcontribs)

The problem with the unsourced statements is not their factuality, but attribution to Suvorov. Were does Suvorov say X, and who says Y about Suvorov's works. --Alm8y 11:33, 3 September 2010 (UTC) There is a serious mistake in this article. V.Suvorov (or V.Rezun) never had writing that Stalin is the main winner of WWII. Moreover, in his book "The last republic" Suvorov decisevely argue that Stalin did not achieve the main goals of his strategy, i.e. to develop the communists rule over the world. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 78.60.167.143 (talk) 19:23, 13 September 2010 (UTC)

True. That is indeed just a ludicrous statement, the one who made it didn't really have any clue whatsoever what they were writing about. FYI, the subtext on the cover of an original russian edition of "The Last Republic" (I read it at the end of the 90s I reckon) was "Why the Soviet Union lost the WW2". In fact, this idea is explored and expanded quite thoroughly in his latest books (i.e. ones printed in the late 90s and the 00s.) Egh0st (talk) 23:27, 8 May 2011 (UTC)
False. For someone, who was born in USSR, like Suvorov, is gross "misunderstanding" that "world revolution" in Marxist or Leninist terms was or is about to collect the greatest army and capture the whole world. Socialist or Communist mode of production should have been much superior to capitalist one and after WWI it looked for the revolutionaries that preceding world order was definitely failing and will be superseded by more advanced one. Not in military terms, definitely. And Soviets were afraid invasions from every side, maybe from Britain and France even more. And by taking into account backwardness of the country, rightly so! There were even suspicions that Britain, France and Germany might unite against USSR in case of war, despite their own differences. The whole point of discussion is out of touch with existing realities of the time. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 208.120.18.38 (talk) 21:13, 25 May 2011 (UTC)
You're arguing the rightness of what he said, not whether or not he said them. Please substantiate your summary of his argument with citations. If you're going to critique his argument, do it somewhere other than wikipedia, but if you'd like to quote critiques from notable scholarship, please provide citations for that. Our job is to summarize his points and notable reactions among historians to them, not litigate whether or not he was right. 131.96.211.115 (talk) 18:53, 8 October 2015 (UTC)

By the way - who verified Suworow claims?[edit]

Ok, probably most works about GRU are based on his words. Okay we can believe him(why not), but does anyone at least checked him? Even in Stasi archives, which are open to writers, and historians? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 89.68.103.25 (talk) 03:21, 7 June 2012 (UTC)

Post-Soviet verification of Soviet-era history remains controversial among historians. You need only scroll up to see why. When the current generation of partisans retires, I think at that point you'll see people taking a more objective look at the era.
You'd be surprised to find how few people commented in the open literature about Suvorov's Inside... series at all. Especially among his critics in the academic Left, the reaction to his books was mostly to ignore them. I can say that at the time most rolled their eyes at the whole series, but very few were willing to put their objections into print. When the Soviet Union fell, the Army and Spetsnaz GRU maintained its discipline, so very little leaked out into the open press the way that KGB and party information did.
Reviews overall were quite mixed. Kirkus Reviews slammed Inside the Soviet Army hard in an uncredited review (link). Library Journal's review (vol 108, issue 3, p213) admitted that most of the factual content was accurate but that it was "a hodgepodge of personal recollections, political theory, and crude "Red Peril" writings." The review criticized Suvorov's views on weapons development, but offered no substantiation or examples of things he'd gotten wrong. Both were single-paragraph reviews. The conservative National Review didn't so much review the book as gush about one of its passages (S.T. Cohen, Vol. 35 Issue 25, p1621). Political Science Quarterly featured a detailed review from left-wing academic and Brookings Institution fellow Raymond Garthoff (Vol. 99, Issue 1, p93). In it, Garthoff described Suvorov as a "tank officer" with no way of having known the information he'd written about, and the book as a mixture of propaganda, ghostwriting, and lies... both verifiably false and unverifiable but implausible. He gives no specific examples of what he felt were lies, nor any reason why he believes Suvorov had a ghostwriter. He omits any mention of Suvorov's work in the GRU or Spetsnaz. Garthoff makes a point of criticizing Suvorov for not providing insider information on the invasion of Afghanistan... likely because Suvorov defected prior to this invasion and really wouldn't have had any specific knowledge of it. It's worth mentioning that Garthoff was lobbying hard at the time for a view of Soviet nuclear doctrine as very docile, and Suvorov's book directly contradicts him, so Garthoff's harsh review and insistence that the book never be cited has to be taken with that in mind.
So we have one negative review that accepts his facts but condemns his style, and two others that condemn the book in toto. There are only two cites I found which appear to provide detailed and sincere reviews. Ingmar Oldberg, now of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs and writing at the time in the Journal of Peace Research (Vol. 22, Issue 3, p. 273) provides a very detailed review. He points out that Suvorov doesn't cite sources other than his personal experience. He argues that Suvorov contradicts himself on several points and accepts Soviet doctrine on points that are incorrect-- citing specific examples in some detail. He also criticizes Suvorov's tone as inflammatory. But he praises Suvorov's perspective as a likely accurate picture of Soviet military views and doctrine. Eliot Cohen (now Professor of Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins, writing at the time in Commentary Vol 76 Issue 1, p78-80) gave the book very high marks for accuracy, readability, and a window into the strategic worldview of the Soviet army officer. Both contrast Suvorov with Andrew Cockburn's contemporaneous and more academic work The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine. I also found a few declassified military articles that cite him, so to me that's a strong vote in his favor.
So now let's look at these critiques in terms of what we know now, three decades and the fall of the Soviet Union later. First, Suvorov's claim that the Soviet Union's high command worried about mass defections is unfalsifiable; however, less than ten years after publication, the Soviet Army essentially mutinied and the country collapsed. In light of that, Suvorov's claim is more plausible. This also support Suvorov's very grim picture of the morale of Soviet society-- something his critics sharply rebuked. Second. My understanding is that Garthoff continues to litigate his views about Soviet peaceful intent in its nuclear doctrine. So that remains an open question. Third, Suvorov's picture of the internal problems and social dynamics of the Soviet Army appear to have been accurate (many of Putin's mid-2000's reforms centered on trying to remedy this). Fourth, Suvorov contended that there was a campaign of mass Soviet espionage, far worse than even the most paranoid Westerners believed. In light of the revelations of the Mitrokhin Archive, it's difficult to dispute this, especially since Mitrokhin's document dump does not include the Soviet's parallel GRU efforts. Fifth, Suvorov provides data on Soviet tactics, doctrine, mobilization, and TO&E that have nearly all been independently verified either at the time or subsequently.
Sixth, Oldberg's review comments on the contrast between Suvorov and Cockburn's views on the MIG-25, the Mi-24, and Soviet surface to air missiles. These are very minor points, but can be verified independently. Suvorov views each of these weapons positively and Cockburn considers each to be inferior. We might never know about the MIG-25 because it was never used in its intended role, but the other two can be definitively tested. The Hind helicopter has been widely acclaimed since the fall of the Soviet Union; indeed, the next-generation American design, the Sikorsky S-97 Raider, borrows several Russian ideas. Russian SAMs, on the other hand, have performed poorly in every conflict where they've been deployed. Suvorov's claim that the Soviets created inferior export versions of their weapons systems ("monkey models") has been independently verified, but it appears even native Russian SAMs fit Cockburn's picture better than Suvorov's.
In the final analysis, it appears that nearly all of Suvorov's most controversial claims have been independently verified in the years since his publication. Garthoff's criticisms in retrospect seem inflammatory themselves, and more than a little self-serving. Where Suvorov has been proven wrong (air defense, for example) it appears to be a case of knowing and revealing what the Soviets believed about their own weapons, rather than fabrication. Criticisms of Suvorov's tone, style, and political axe-grinding remain perfectly valid. As at the time, the book provides a valuable window into the Brezhnev-era army officer's world view. As a primary source, Suvorov can be excused in my opinion for not having citations.
I hope this detailed survey of reviews of his books helps. 131.96.211.115 (talk) 18:49, 8 October 2015 (UTC)

Reason for not visiting Russia[edit]

I doubt that he fears "a pending search warrant and Soviet court conviction in absentia". If he was convicted by a Soviet court, this is not "pending". A search warrant is nothing to worry about, unless he takes papers to the ex-USSR republics. If there was a conviction, details ought to be given.Royalcourtier (talk) 09:01, 8 June 2017 (UTC)