Cream skimming: Difference between revisions
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For example, it was believed that [[MCI]] and [[Sprint]] [[Interexchange carrier|long distance telephone]] companies would end up taking away very high value business and some residential accounts from [[AT&T]], leaving AT&T primarily with higher-cost to service residential and rural accounts, meaning all customers of AT&T would end up paying more. <ref>An example of how it is believed competitors may take advantage of cream skimming off the carrier of last resort in telecommunications, who otherwise would be making monopoly profits, is given by Peter Smith, "Subscribing to Monopoly" in ''Public Policy for the Private Sector'', [[The World Bank]], September, 1995, available at http://rru.worldbank.org/documents/publicpolicyjournal/053smith.pdf, (179K, retrieved [[March 11]] [[2008]])</ref> This could conceivably lead to a [[vicious circle]] as more customers leave the high-price carrier |
For example, it was believed that [[MCI]] and [[Sprint]] [[Interexchange carrier|long distance telephone]] companies would end up taking away very high value business and some residential accounts from [[AT&T]], leaving AT&T primarily with higher-cost to service residential and rural accounts, meaning all customers of AT&T would end up paying more. <ref>An example of how it is believed competitors may take advantage of cream skimming off the carrier of last resort in telecommunications, who otherwise would be making monopoly profits, is given by Peter Smith, "Subscribing to Monopoly" in ''Public Policy for the Private Sector'', [[The World Bank]], September, 1995, available at http://rru.worldbank.org/documents/publicpolicyjournal/053smith.pdf, (179K, retrieved [[March 11]] [[2008]])</ref> This could conceivably lead to a [[vicious circle]] as more customers leave the high-price carrier |
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for the lower priced carrier. This scenario did not occur, as various technological changes (spurred in part by the availability of competition) eventually lowered the net cost for most long-distance telephone calls.<ref>Examples of how extreme competition in telephone service drove prices down and cream skimming did not occur, is given in Martin Ostermayer,Christian Nobs and Darrell Gualco, ''Business: Local Service Market including ILEC and CLEC'', [[ |
for the lower priced carrier. This scenario did not occur, as various technological changes (spurred in part by the availability of competition) eventually lowered the net cost for most long-distance telephone calls.<ref>Examples of how extreme competition in telephone service drove prices down and cream skimming did not occur, is given in Martin Ostermayer,Christian Nobs and Darrell Gualco, ''Business: Local Service Market including ILEC and CLEC'', [[17 February]] [[1999]] at http://www.ehrlichorg.com/s99ibm/b0217-02.doc (Microsoft Word Document, 172K, retrieved [[11 March]] [[2008]])</ref> |
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⚫ | The [[United States Postal Service]] has a monopoly on the delivery of "non-urgent" first-class mail, where delivery is not time sensitive. It also has the exclusive right to use its customer-owned mail boxes for placing the customer's mail for delivery. This law is in effect because it is believed that were the Postal Service not have this monopoly, other competing mail carriers would take over the most lucrative parts of the business (e.g. local delivery of bills in dense urban areas), leaving the Postal Service with more expensive urban deliveries and rural service. |
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⚫ | The [[United States Postal Service]] has a monopoly on the delivery of "non-urgent" first-class mail, where delivery is not time sensitive. It also has the exclusive right to use its customer-owned mail boxes for placing the customer's mail for delivery. This law is in effect because it is believed that were the Postal Service not have this monopoly, other competing mail carriers would take over the most lucrative parts of the business (e.g. local delivery of bills in dense urban areas), leaving the Postal Service with more expensive urban deliveries and rural service.<ref>An analysis of this particular factor is given in Michael A. Crew, and Paul R. Kleindorfer ''Emerging Competition in Postal and Delivery Services'', in Chapter 10, "An Analysis of the Potential of Cream Skimming in the United States Residential Delivery Market" by Robert H. Cohen, William W. Ferguson, John D. Walker and Spyros X. Xenakis. A sample from this chapter is available from Google Book Search at [http://books.google.com/books?id=4nd-sU4jOE8C&pg=PA141&lpg=PA141&dq=postal+mail+%22cream+skimming%22&source=web&ots=ZzMCSiAaay&sig=_bjE4OAqVtUMcekStnVwmHmyeHU&hl=en this link] (Retrieved [[11 March]] [[2008]]) The same article also appears as a web page on the website of the [[Postal Rate Commission]] at http://www.prc.gov/tsp/26/cohen.html (Retrieved [[11 March]] [[2008]])</ref> |
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==References== |
==References== |
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Revision as of 17:47, 11 March 2008
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Cream skimming is a perjorative term used to refer to the perceived practice of a company providing a product or a service to only provide it to the high-value or low-cost customers of that product or service, and either leaving the more expensive or harder to service customers without the desired product or service at all or "dumping" them on some default provider, who is left with less of the higher value customer whom, in some cases, would have used the extra revenue from lower cost or higher value customers to subsidize or reduce the cost to service the higher-cost customers. It is considered a type of moral hazard.
Whether or not the perceived negative effects of cream skimming actually do occur - or only occur in limited circumstances - is a matter of debate.
For example, it was believed that MCI and Sprint long distance telephone companies would end up taking away very high value business and some residential accounts from AT&T, leaving AT&T primarily with higher-cost to service residential and rural accounts, meaning all customers of AT&T would end up paying more. [1] This could conceivably lead to a vicious circle as more customers leave the high-price carrier for the lower priced carrier. This scenario did not occur, as various technological changes (spurred in part by the availability of competition) eventually lowered the net cost for most long-distance telephone calls.[2]
The United States Postal Service has a monopoly on the delivery of "non-urgent" first-class mail, where delivery is not time sensitive. It also has the exclusive right to use its customer-owned mail boxes for placing the customer's mail for delivery. This law is in effect because it is believed that were the Postal Service not have this monopoly, other competing mail carriers would take over the most lucrative parts of the business (e.g. local delivery of bills in dense urban areas), leaving the Postal Service with more expensive urban deliveries and rural service.[3]
References
- ^ An example of how it is believed competitors may take advantage of cream skimming off the carrier of last resort in telecommunications, who otherwise would be making monopoly profits, is given by Peter Smith, "Subscribing to Monopoly" in Public Policy for the Private Sector, The World Bank, September, 1995, available at http://rru.worldbank.org/documents/publicpolicyjournal/053smith.pdf, (179K, retrieved March 11 2008)
- ^ Examples of how extreme competition in telephone service drove prices down and cream skimming did not occur, is given in Martin Ostermayer,Christian Nobs and Darrell Gualco, Business: Local Service Market including ILEC and CLEC, 17 February 1999 at http://www.ehrlichorg.com/s99ibm/b0217-02.doc (Microsoft Word Document, 172K, retrieved 11 March 2008)
- ^ An analysis of this particular factor is given in Michael A. Crew, and Paul R. Kleindorfer Emerging Competition in Postal and Delivery Services, in Chapter 10, "An Analysis of the Potential of Cream Skimming in the United States Residential Delivery Market" by Robert H. Cohen, William W. Ferguson, John D. Walker and Spyros X. Xenakis. A sample from this chapter is available from Google Book Search at this link (Retrieved 11 March 2008) The same article also appears as a web page on the website of the Postal Rate Commission at http://www.prc.gov/tsp/26/cohen.html (Retrieved 11 March 2008)