King George V-class battleship (1939)

For the King George V class of World War I, see King George V class battleship (1911).

HMS King George V in 1941
Class overview
Name	King George V
Operators	Royal Navy
Preceded by	Nelson-class
Succeeded by	Lion-class (planned)
Completed	Five
Lost	One
General characteristics
Class and type	battleship
Displacement	38,031 tons (1940) Standard; 42,237 (1940) to 44,460 tons (1944) at Full Load (figures for King George V)
Length	745 ft (227 m)
Beam	103 ft (31 m)
Draught	32.6 ft (9.9 m)
Propulsion	Eight Admiralty three-drum small-tube boilers with superheaters Four Parsons single-reduction geared turbines Four three-bladed propellers, 14 ft 6 in diameter (4.42 m) 128,000-134,000 SHP achieved in service
Speed	28.0 knots at 111,700 SHP (1941 trials)
Range	5,400+ nm at 18 knots (11.9 tons/hour fuel burn)
Complement	1,314 to 1,631
Armament	10 × BL 14-inch (360 mm) Mk VII guns 16 × QF 5.25-inch (133 mm) Mk I guns 32 × QF 2 pounder 40 mm "pom-pom" guns (4×8) (as built; light AA was substantially reinforced during the war)
Armour	Main belt: 14.7 in (374 mm) lower belt: 5.4 in (137 mm) deck: up to 5.38 in (136 mm) main turrets: 12.75 in (324 mm) barbettes: 12.75 in (324 mm)
Aircraft carried	Four Supermarine Walrus seaplanes
Aviation facilities	one double-ended catapult

The King George V-class battleships (KGV) were the penultimate battleship design completed for the Royal Navy (RN). Five ships of the class were commissioned: King George V (1940), Prince of Wales (1941), Duke of York (1941), Howe (1942), and Anson (1942).

The Washington Naval Treaty limiting both the quantity, size (in tonnage), and armament of post World War I battleship construction had been extended by the First London Naval Treaty, but the treaty was due to expire in 1936. With increased tension between the various major naval nations, it was expected by planners that the treaty might not be renewed and the King George V-class was designed with this loss of restriction in mind.

All five ships served in the Second World War. Prince of Wales was the only one lost when she, along with the battlecruiser Repulse were sunk by Japanese air attack near Singapore. The survivors were broken in the late 1950s.

Development

The King George V-class were the outcome of a design process dating from 1928. Under the terms of the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922, a 'holiday' from building capital ships was in force until 1931. The battleship element of the British Navy consisted of only those battleships retained after the end of the First World War and the two new but slow Nelson class battleships. In 1928 the Royal Navy commenced discussion of the staff requirements for the ships it expected to begin in 1931.

In the event, the First London Naval Treaty of 1930 extended the 'building holiday' to 1937. Planning recommenced in 1935, drawing on previous design work. The new class would be built up to the Treaty maximum displacement of 35,000 tons. Alternatives with 16-inch, 15-inch and 14-inch main guns were considered, and it was considered that the 15-inch armament would give the best balance. Most designs were intended to make about 27 knots, and it was considered that the likely decisive range in a battle would be 12,000 to 16,000 yards. Armour and torpedo protection would form a much greater proportion of the design than previous British battleships.

In October 1935, the decision was made to use the 14-inch guns. At the time, Britain was negotiating a continuation of the Naval Treaties. The British favoured a reduction in the maximum calibre of battleship gun to 14-inch calibre, and in early October learnt that the USA would support this position if the Japanese could also be persuaded to do so. Therefore, the Admiralty decided to use a 14-inch gun on the King George V-class. The Second London Naval Treaty, a result of the Second London Naval Conference began in December 1935, was signed in March 1936 by the US France and the UK confirming 14 inch guns as the treaty limit; however Japan left the conference in January and Italy refused to sign.

Armour

One of the King George V battleships, Prince of Wales

The armour protection scheme was based on the Royal Navy's fighting experience in WW1 and full scale testing between the wars. Magazine protection was given priority through the provision of very thick belt and deck armour and by placing the magazines onto the lowest levels of the ship.

Horizontal protection was equal to that of contemporary battleships built in World War II. The horizontal armour over the magazines totalled just under 8.63 inches of armour in 3 layers; the weather deck was 1.25 inches thick, the main armoured deck was 5.88 inches thick over a .5 inch steel deck, and above the shell rooms there was another 1.5 inch splinter deck. The powder magazines were located below the shell rooms for added protection, a practise that was begun with the Nelson class battleships. The weatherdeck thickness was the same over the machinery spaces, but there the main armoured deck was reduced to 4.88 inches over a .5 inch steel deck. The main armoured deck was continued forward of the forward armoured bulkhead and gradually reduced from full thickness to 2.5 inches, while aft of the after magazines an armoured turtle deck covered the steering gear with 4.5-5 inches of armour whilst also providing protection along the waterline.

The main armour belt was 23.5 feet (7.2 m) high and covered the hull side from the main armoured deck to finish 15 feet (4.6 m) below the deep waterline. Along the ship, the belt started just forward of the forward turret and finished just aft of the aft turret. The belt was at its thickest along the magazines the belt was 15 inches thick (381 mm); over the machinery spaces, the belt was 14 inches (356 mm). The lower section of belt tapered to a thickness of between 4.5 in and 5.5 in.

The main armour belt was unusually high, stretching 23.5 feet (7.2 m) down the side of the ship from the main deck to finish 8.5 feet (2.6 m) below the designed waterline. Along the ship, the belt started just forward of the forward turret and finished just aft of the aft turret. The belt was at its thickest above, and at, the waterline. Over the magazines, the belt was 15 inches thick (381 mm); between the magazines, the belt was 14 inches (356 mm). The lower section of belt tapered to a thickness of between 4.5 in and 5.5 in. Side protection was adequate against 15- or 16-inch shellfire at normal battle ranges. The armoured belt, together with armoured bulkheads fore and aft and the armoured main deck, formed an 'armoured citadel' protecting magazines and machinery. The bulkhead, like the main belt, was 15 in (381 mm) thick.

The armoured belt, together with armoured bulkheads fore and aft and the armoured main deck, formed an "armoured citadel" protecting magazines and machinery. The armoured bulkhead was 12 in (305 mm) thick forward and 10 in (254 mm) thick at the after end of the citadel The main armoured belt extended forward and aft of the main armoured bulkheads with reduced height to protect the waterline and gradually reduced in thickness from 13 to 5.5 inches. Against the British 15 inch Mark I naval gun, firing an 1,938 lb shell, this protection scheme provided an immunity zone from 17,200 to 32,000 yards over the magazines, 19,500 to 28,000 yards over the machinery. Against the German 38cm (15 inch) C/34 naval gun mounted on the contemporary Bismarck class battleships, the immunity zone was from 21,500 to 36,600 yards yards over the magazines, 23,800 to 33,200 yards yards over the machinery.

Maximum turret and barbette armour was reduced to 12.75 inches in this class from the 16 inches of the Nelson class. The turret faces had 12.75 in (324 mm) of armour at the front; 8.84 inches (225 mm) sides (at the gun chamber); 6.86 inches (284-174 mm) on the sides and rear; the roof plate was 5.88 in (149 mm) thick. The main armament barbettes were of varying thickness: 12.75 in (324 mm) thick on the sides, 11.76 in (298 mm) forward and 10.82 in (275 mm) aft of the turret. To some extent the higher quality of the armour minimized the loss of protection and the turret's flat face improved ballistic resistance at long ranges, while the low profile of the turret minimized target area at closer ranges. However the reduction in turret and barbette armour was a design trade off in favour of the thickest possible protection for the magazines. The extensive anti-flash protection in the turrets and barbettes was designed to ensure that the magazines would remain safe even if the turrets and/or barbettes were penetrated. The secondary gun mounts, casements and handling rooms received only light plating of 0.98 in (25 mm) to protect against splinters.

Unlike contemporary foreign battleships and the Nelson class battleships, the KGV class had comparatively light conning tower protection with 2.94 inches (75 mm) inches sides, 3.94 in (100 mm) forward and aft and a 1.47 in (38 mm) roof plate. The RN's analysis of the First World War revealed that command personnel were unlikely to use an armoured conning tower, preferring the superior visibility of unarmoured bridge positions. Stability and weight considerations clearly played an important part in the British decision to limit superstructure armour.

Underwater protection

The hull below the waterline, along the main armour belt, formed the Side Protection System (SPS). It was subdivided into series of longitudinal compartments in a void-liquid-void layout; the outer and inner were filled with air, and the middle compartment with liquid (fuel or water). The outer hull plating in the region of the SPS was made as thin as possible to minimize splinter damage in the event of a torpedo hit. The outer compartment of the SPS was normally an empty or void space (containing only air) and this allowed the initial explosion from a torpedo to expand while minimizing damage to the ship. The centre compartment was filled with oil or seawater and this spread the pressure pulse over a larger area while the liquid contained any metal splinters that were created from the torpedo explosion. The inboard compartment was another void space and served to contain any liquid leaking from the liquid layer and any remaining pressure pulse from the torpedo explosion. Inboard of the final void space was an armoured bulkhead which varied in thickness from 1.5 in (37 mm) over the machinery spaces to 1.75 inch (44 mm) abreast of the magazines. This bulkhead formed the "holding bulkhead" and it was designed to resist the residual blast effects from the torpedo hit. If this final inner bulkhead was penetrated a further set of subdivided compartments would contain any leaks; inboard of the holding bulkhead the ship was highly subdivided into small compartments containing auxiliary machinery spaces. The SPS void-liquid-void layer was generally about 13 feet wide, and the auxiliary machinery spaces added approximately another 8 feet of space from the outer hull plating to the major machinery spaces. The only exception to this was abreast A and B Engine Rooms, where the auxiliary machinery spaces were omitted, but another void space, about 3 feet wide was substituted in its place. Above the SPS, and directly behind the armour belt, was a series of compartments, typically used for washrooms or storage spaces, which were designed to allow for upward venting of overpressure from a torpedo hit. This scheme was designed to protect against a 1000 lb warhead, and had been tested and found effective in full-scale trials. The SPS was also a key component of the ship's damage control system, as lists resulting from flooding could be corrected by counterflooding empty void spaces, and/or draining normally liquid filled compartments. In the case of the loss of the Prince of Wales these spaces were used for counterflooding to reduce list.

On 10 December 1941, HMS Prince of Wales was sunk after being hit by 4 torpedoes and a 500 kg bomb. The extent and magnitude of flooding on HMS Prince of Wales raised a serious question in naval experts about the effectiveness of the torpedo defence system in practice, since the Japanese aerial torpedo warhead at 330 pounds of TNT/Hexyl were less than half as powerful as the design resistance of 1,000 pounds. The loss of the Prince of Wales revealed that propeller shaft glands were susceptible to leakage because of shaft strut damage. After the shaft was bent, it kept turning and ultimately wrecked the shaft glands on all bulkheads of the shaft alley, greatly increasing the flooded area.A survey of the wreck of Prince of Wales showed that three of the four torpedoes that had struck the hull had hit outside the area protected by the SPS, and for the fourth the SPS holding bulkhead appeared intact abreast the area where it was hit. The conclusion of the survey and analysis was that the primary cause of the sinking was uncontained flooding along "B" propeller shaft. The propellor shaft external shaft bracket failed, and the movement of the unsupported shaft then tore up the bulkheads all the way from the external propellor shaft gland through to B Engine Room itself. This allowed flooding into the primary machinery spaces. The damage and flooding was exacerbated by poor damage control and the premature abandonment of the after magazines and a telephone communications switchboard. "B" propeller shaft had been stopped, and then restarted several minutes after being struck by a torpedo. Subsequent inquiries on her loss at the time identified the need for a number of design improvements, which were implemented to a lessor or greater degree on surviving ships of the this class. Ventilation and watertightness of the ventilation system was improved, while internal passageways within the machinery spaces were redesigned and the communications system made more robust. Improved propeller shaft glands and shaft locking gear was introduced. Many of the supposed failures of the ship were predicated on the assumption that a torpedo may have hit and defeated the SPS at frame 206 on the port side due to a column of water seen in that area at the time of the initial hit that damaged B propeller shaft. A recent survey indicates that the hull is intact in this area. Inability to survey the wreck frustrated efforts to arrive at a definitive cause for PoW's loss and has led to a number of theories, regarding the reasons for the sinking.

On examination of the Prince of Wales after her encounter with the Bismarck and the Prinz Eugen, three damaging hits were discovered, one of which, fired from Bismarck, had penetrated the torpedo protection outer bulkhead in a region very close to an auxiliary machinery space, causing local flooding with 600 tons of water entering the ship. The inner, 1.5 inch ( 2x19 mm) D-steel holding bulkhead, however, remained intact, as the German shell was a dud.. The German shell would have actually exploded in the water if its fuse had worked properly, due to the depth which the shell had to dive before striking the Prince of Wales under her armoured belt.

Armament

British 14-inch naval gun as used on King George V-class battleships. This example, never installed, is now on display at the Royal Armoury Fort Nelson, Hampshire, UK

The King George V and the four other ships of the class as built carried ten BL 14 inch Mk VII naval guns, in two quadruple turrets fore and aft and a single twin turret behind and above the fore turret. There was debate within the Admiralty over the choice of gun calibre; though there was little or no debate within Parliament; other European powers preferred 15 inch, and the USN, 16 inch main guns. Initially the Admiralty studied vessels armed with a variety of differing main armament layouts including nine 15-inch (381 mm) guns in three turrets, 2 forward and 1 aft. While this was well within the capabilities of the British shipyards, the design was quickly rejected as they felt compelled to adhere to the Second London Naval Treaty signed in 1936, and there was a serious shortage of skilled technicians and ordnance designers, along with compelling pressures to reduce weight. As a result, the class was designed to carry twelve 14-inch guns in three quadruple turrets and this configuration had a heavier broadside than the nine 15-inch guns. Unfortunately it proved impossible to include this amount of firepower and the desired level of protection into a 35,000 ton displacement, and the weight of the superimposed quadruple turret brought the stability of the vessel into question. In the end, the second forward turret was changed to a smaller two gun turret in exchange for better armour protection, reducing the broadside weight to below that of the nine gun arrangement. The 14 inch AP shell also carried a very large bursting charge of 48.5 lb. The last naval treaty had a clause that permitted a change to 16 inch guns if another signatory did not conform to it by 1 January 1937. Although they could have invoked this clause, the effect would have been to delay construction and it was considered prudent to build with 14 inch rather than find themselves without the new battleships. The US opted to absorb a delay and built its ships with larger guns.

In service, the quad turrets proved to be less reliable than was hoped for. Wartime haste in building, insufficient clearance between the rotating and fixed structure of the turret, insufficient full calibre firing exercises and extensive arrangements to prevent flash from reaching the magazines made it mechanically complex , leading to problems during prolonged actions. Improved clearances, improved mechanical linkages, and better training led to greater reliability in the quadruple turrets but they remained controversial.

During the combat against the German battleship Bismarck, the main battery of the newly commissioned Prince of Wales had mechanical problems: it started to fire three-round salvos instead of five-round salvos, and there were problems in all except for the twin "B" turret. The main battery output was reduced to 74 percent during the engagement, as out of seventy-four rounds ordered fired, only fifty-five were possible.. 'A' turret was taking in water leading to discomfort for its crew and "Y" turret jammed at salvo 20. The number of known defects in the main armament that was hampering 14 inch fire, the damage sustained and the worsening tactical situation forced Captain Leach to disengage from combat. With the range down to 14500 yds and with five of his 14 inch guns out of action, Leach decided to break off his engagement with a superior enemy. Roskill in the War at Sea, volume 1, describes the decision to turn away: " In addition to the defective gun in her forward turret another 4 gun turret was temporarily incapacitated by mechanical breakdowns. In these circumstances Leach decided to break off the action and, at 0613, turned away under cover of smoke." During the later action with Bismarck, King George V was also having trouble with her main battery, and by 0927 every gun missed at least one salvo due to failures in the safety interlocks for antiflash protection. John Roberts wrote of main gunnery problems encountered by HMS King George V:

"Initially she did well achieving 1.7 salvoes per minute while employing radar control but she began to suffer severe problems from 0920 onward [Note: KGV had opened fire at 0850]. 'A' turret was completely out of action for 30 minutes, after firing about 23 rounds per gun, due to a jam between the fixed and revolving structure in the shell room and Y turret was out of action for 7 minutes due to drill errors. . . Both guns in B turret, guns 2 and 4 in A turret and gun 2 in Y turret were put out of action by jams and remained so until after the action - 5 guns out of 10! There were a multitude of other problems with mechanical failures and drill errors that caused delays and missed salvoes. There were also some misfires - one gun (3 of A turret) misfired twice and was out of action for 30 minutes before it was considered safe to open the breech."

— John Roberts, The Final Action

During the early part of her action against the Scharnhorst at the Battle of the North Cape on 26 December 1943, HMS Duke of York scored 31 straddles out of 52 broadsides fired and during the latter part she scored 21 straddles out of 25 broadsides, a very creditable gunnery performance. In total, Duke of York fired 450 shells in 77 broadsides. "However, HMS Duke of York still fired less than 70% of her possible output during this battle because of mechanical and "errors in drill" problems."

The QF 5.25 inch Mark I dual purpose gun has been dogged with controversy as well. The RN Gunnery Pocket Book published in 1945 states that: "The maximum rate of fire should be 10-12 rounds per minute.". Wartime experience revealed that the maximum weight which the loading numbers could handle comfortably was much lower than 80-90 lb and the weight of the 5.25 in ammunition have caused serious difficulties; to manage only 7-8 rpm instead of the designed 10-12. The mount had a maximum elevation of only +70 degrees.; the slow elevating and training speeds of the mounts were inadequate for engaging modern high-speed aircraft. Despite these failings, HMS Prince of Wales was credited with several 5.25 inch kills during Operation Halberd, and damaged 10 of 16 high level bombers in two formations during her last engagement, two of which subsequently crash landed. HMS Anson had her 5.25 inch turrets upgraded to RP10 control which increased training and elevating speeds to 20 degrees per second. These ships were equipped with the HACS AA fire control system and the Admiralty Fire Control Table Mk IX for surface fire control of the main armament.

For anti-aircraft defence, the KGV were built with 4- and 8-barrelled QF 2 pounder "pom-pom" mounts and UP rockets. To this were added 20mm Oerlikon and 40mm Bofors guns. By the end of the war, the AA defences were more than 50 20mm, 8 40mm, and 88 2pdr guns in various single and multiple mounts.

Ships

Ships of the King George V class

Name	Pennant	Namesake	Builder	Ordered	Laid down	Launched	Completed	Fate
King George V	41	King George V the King's father	Vickers-Armstrong		1 January 1937	21 February 1939	11 December 1940 (commissioned)	Sold for scrap 1957
Prince of Wales	53	Prince of Wales former title of the King's brother	Cammell Laird, Birkenhead	29 July 1936	1 January 1937	3 May 1939	31 March 1941	sunk 10 December 1941 South China Sea
Duke of York	17	Duke of York former title of the King	John Brown and Company, Clydebank,	16 November 1936	5 May 1937	28 February 1940	4 November 1941 (commissioned)	Scrapped 1957
Anson	79	George Anson	Swan Hunter		20 July 1937	24 February 1940	22 June 1942	Scrapped 1957
Howe	32	Richard Howe	Fairfields	28 April 1937	1 June 1937	9 April 1940	29 August 1942 (commissioned)	scrapped 1958

Service

The King George V-class was built in an era where the aircraft carrier was supplanting the battleship as focal point of maritime operations, but nonetheless King George V, Prince of Wales, and Duke of York all saw the battleship-to-battleship action for which they were designed. The King George V and the Prince of Wales both fought the Bismarck in late May 1941, while the Duke of York duelled with the German battlecruiser Scharnhorst in the battle of North Cape, contributing to the latter's sinking in December 1943.

Poor endurance was another characteristic of these ships, and embarrassed them in Pacific operations. Contributing to this low endurance were the Parson turbines - standard British equipment for some time before the class was designed - and the large number of steam-driven auxiliaries.

Four of the five King George V-class ships survived World War II; Prince of Wales was sunk near Singapore by air attack in December 1941, a poignant foretelling of the rise of airpower over the conventional battleship. The remaining ships never suffered any serious wartime damage, except for King George V, which accidentally collided with and sank HMS Punjabi in May 1942. All of them, including the King George V, were scrapped in 1957 and 1958.

The planned successors to the KGV class were to be the Lion-class battleships of some 40,000 tonnes with nine 16-inch (406 mm) guns. These were first postponed because of other priorities then cancelled, and the KGV were followed by only Vanguard.

Refits

The ships of the KGV were refitted during the war to make improvements to AA defences and radar equipment and to make modifications for service in the Far East. In 1944 the aircraft capabilities (the Supermarine Walruses and the double-ended catapult) of King George V, Duke of York Anson and Howe were removed.

References

• Tarrant, V.E. (1991). King George V-class battleships. London: Arms and Armour Press. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |isbnb= ignored (help)
• William H. Garzke, Robert O. Dulin, Thomas G. Webb (1990). Battleships: Allied Battleships in World War II. Naval Institute Press.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
• Brown, D K (2006). Nelson to Vanguard: Warship Design and Development 1923-1945. Chatham Publishing.
• Breyer, Siegfried. Battleships of the World 1905-1970. Conway Maritime Press.
• Raven and Roberts. British Battleships of World War 2: The Development and Technical History of the Royal Navy's Battleships and Battlecruisers from 1911 to 1946. Weidenfeld & Nicholson. ISBN 978-0853681410.

External links

• Newsreel video of HMS Anson and Howe in 1942
• RN 14" gun loading and firing procedure