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'''Digital contact tracing''' is a method of [[contact tracing]] that takes advantage of mobile devices to determine contact between an infected patient and a user. Although a substantial body of literature on the subject existed as early as 2013,<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Bell|first=James|last2=Butler|first2=David|last3=Hicks|first3=Chris|last4=Crowcroft|first4=Jon|date=2020-04-08|title=TraceSecure: Towards Privacy Preserving Contact Tracing|url=http://arxiv.org/abs/2004.04059|journal=arXiv:2004.04059 [cs]}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Altuwaiyan|first=Thamer|last2=Hadian|first2=Mohammad|last3=Liang|first3=Xiaohui|date=May 2018|title=EPIC: Efficient Privacy-Preserving Contact Tracing for Infection Detection|url=https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8422886/|journal=2018 IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC)|location=Kansas City, MO|publisher=IEEE|pages=1–6|doi=10.1109/ICC.2018.8422886|isbn=978-1-5386-3180-5}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Rui Zhang|last2=Jinxue Zhang|last3=Yanchao Zhang|last4=Jinyuan Sun|last5=Guanhua Yan|date=September 2013|title=Privacy-Preserving Profile Matching for Proximity-Based Mobile Social Networking|url=http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6544548/|journal=IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications|volume=31|issue=9|pages=656–668|doi=10.1109/JSAC.2013.SUP.0513057|issn=0733-8716}}</ref> it came to public prominence during the [[2019–20 coronavirus pandemic]].<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.abc.net.au/news/science/2020-04-17/5-questions-the-governments-coronavirus-contact-tracing-app/12151264|title=Five questions we need answered about the government's coronavirus contact tracing app|last=Bogle|first=Ariel|date=2020-04-17|website=ABC News|language=en-AU|access-date=2020-04-18}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/seouls-radical-experiment-in-digital-contact-tracing|title=Seoul’s Radical Experiment in Digital Contact Tracing|last=Kim|first=Max S.|website=The New Yorker|language=en|access-date=2020-04-18}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://qz.com/1838625/how-bluetooth-could-power-a-global-experiment-in-contact-tracing/|title=How Bluetooth could bring digital contact tracing for Covid-19 to billions|last=Shendruk|first=Amrita Khalid, Amanda|website=Quartz|language=en|access-date=2020-04-18}}</ref> Since the initial outbreak, many groups have developed nonstandard protocols designed to allow for wide scale digital contact tracing, most notably [[BlueTrace]] and the [[Google / Apple contact tracing project|Google / Apple contact tracing project.]]<ref name=":0">{{Cite web|url=https://bluetrace.io/static/bluetrace_whitepaper-938063656596c104632def383eb33b3c.pdf|title=BlueTrace: A privacy-preserving protocol for community-driven contact tracing across borders|last=Jason Bay, Joel Kek, Alvin Tan, Chai Sheng Hau, Lai Yongquan, Janice Tan, Tang Anh Quy|first=|date=|website=Government Technology Agency|url-status=live|archive-url=|archive-date=|access-date=12 April 2020}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.apple.com/covid19/contacttracing|title=Privacy-Preserving Contact Tracing|last=|first=|date=|website=Apple|url-status=live|archive-url=|archive-date=|access-date=2020-04-19}}</ref> When considering the limitations of mobile devices, there are two competing ways to trace contact: [[Global Positioning System|GPS]] and [[Bluetooth]]; each with their own drawbacks. Additionally the protocols can either be [[Centralized system|centralized]] or [[Decentralised system|decentralized]], meaning contact history can either be processed by a central health authority, or by individual clients in the network.
[[File:A schematic of app-based COVID-19 contact tracing (Fig. 4 from Ferretti et al. 2020).jpg|thumb|350px|Example proposal for a location-based COVID-19 contact tracing app: Contacts of individual A (and all individuals using the app) are traced using GPS co-localisations with other app users, supplemented by scanning [[QR codes]] displayed on high-traffic public amenities where GPS is too coarse. Individual A requests a SARS-COV-2 test (using the app) and their positive test result triggers an instant notification to individuals who have been in close contact. The app advises isolation for the case (individual A) and quarantine of their contacts.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Ferretti|first=Luca|last2=Wymant|first2=Chris|last3=Kendall|first3=Michelle|last4=Zhao|first4=Lele|last5=Nurtay|first5=Anel|last6=Abeler-Dörner|first6=Lucie|last7=Parker|first7=Michael|last8=Bonsall|first8=David|last9=Fraser|first9=Christophe|date=2020-03-31|title=Quantifying SARS-CoV-2 transmission suggests epidemic control with digital contact tracing|url=https://science.sciencemag.org/content/early/2020/04/09/science.abb6936|journal=Science|language=en|doi=10.1126/science.abb6936|issn=0036-8075|pmid=32234805}}</ref>]]'''Digital contact tracing''' is a method of [[contact tracing]] that takes advantage of mobile devices to determine contact between an infected patient and a user. Although a substantial body of literature on the subject existed as early as 2013,<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Bell|first=James|last2=Butler|first2=David|last3=Hicks|first3=Chris|last4=Crowcroft|first4=Jon|date=2020-04-08|title=TraceSecure: Towards Privacy Preserving Contact Tracing|url=http://arxiv.org/abs/2004.04059|journal=arXiv:2004.04059 [cs]}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Altuwaiyan|first=Thamer|last2=Hadian|first2=Mohammad|last3=Liang|first3=Xiaohui|date=May 2018|title=EPIC: Efficient Privacy-Preserving Contact Tracing for Infection Detection|url=https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8422886/|journal=2018 IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC)|location=Kansas City, MO|publisher=IEEE|pages=1–6|doi=10.1109/ICC.2018.8422886|isbn=978-1-5386-3180-5}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Rui Zhang|last2=Jinxue Zhang|last3=Yanchao Zhang|last4=Jinyuan Sun|last5=Guanhua Yan|date=September 2013|title=Privacy-Preserving Profile Matching for Proximity-Based Mobile Social Networking|url=http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6544548/|journal=IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications|volume=31|issue=9|pages=656–668|doi=10.1109/JSAC.2013.SUP.0513057|issn=0733-8716}}</ref> it came to public prominence during the [[2019–20 coronavirus pandemic]].<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.abc.net.au/news/science/2020-04-17/5-questions-the-governments-coronavirus-contact-tracing-app/12151264|title=Five questions we need answered about the government's coronavirus contact tracing app|last=Bogle|first=Ariel|date=2020-04-17|website=ABC News|language=en-AU|access-date=2020-04-18}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/seouls-radical-experiment-in-digital-contact-tracing|title=Seoul’s Radical Experiment in Digital Contact Tracing|last=Kim|first=Max S.|website=The New Yorker|language=en|access-date=2020-04-18}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://qz.com/1838625/how-bluetooth-could-power-a-global-experiment-in-contact-tracing/|title=How Bluetooth could bring digital contact tracing for Covid-19 to billions|last=Shendruk|first=Amrita Khalid, Amanda|website=Quartz|language=en|access-date=2020-04-18}}</ref> Since the initial outbreak, many groups have developed nonstandard protocols designed to allow for wide scale digital contact tracing, most notably [[BlueTrace]] and the [[Google / Apple contact tracing project|Google / Apple contact tracing project.]]<ref name=":0">{{Cite web|url=https://bluetrace.io/static/bluetrace_whitepaper-938063656596c104632def383eb33b3c.pdf|title=BlueTrace: A privacy-preserving protocol for community-driven contact tracing across borders|last=Jason Bay, Joel Kek, Alvin Tan, Chai Sheng Hau, Lai Yongquan, Janice Tan, Tang Anh Quy|first=|date=|website=Government Technology Agency|url-status=live|archive-url=|archive-date=|access-date=12 April 2020}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.apple.com/covid19/contacttracing|title=Privacy-Preserving Contact Tracing|last=|first=|date=|website=Apple|url-status=live|archive-url=|archive-date=|access-date=2020-04-19}}</ref> When considering the limitations of mobile devices, there are two competing ways to trace contact: [[Global Positioning System|GPS]] and [[Bluetooth]]; each with their own drawbacks. Additionally the protocols can either be [[Centralized system|centralized]] or [[Decentralised system|decentralized]], meaning contact history can either be processed by a central health authority, or by individual clients in the network.


== Bluetooth contact tracing ==
== Bluetooth contact tracing ==

Revision as of 18:11, 18 April 2020

Example proposal for a location-based COVID-19 contact tracing app: Contacts of individual A (and all individuals using the app) are traced using GPS co-localisations with other app users, supplemented by scanning QR codes displayed on high-traffic public amenities where GPS is too coarse. Individual A requests a SARS-COV-2 test (using the app) and their positive test result triggers an instant notification to individuals who have been in close contact. The app advises isolation for the case (individual A) and quarantine of their contacts.[1]

Digital contact tracing is a method of contact tracing that takes advantage of mobile devices to determine contact between an infected patient and a user. Although a substantial body of literature on the subject existed as early as 2013,[2][3][4] it came to public prominence during the 2019–20 coronavirus pandemic.[5][6][7] Since the initial outbreak, many groups have developed nonstandard protocols designed to allow for wide scale digital contact tracing, most notably BlueTrace and the Google / Apple contact tracing project.[8][9] When considering the limitations of mobile devices, there are two competing ways to trace contact: GPS and Bluetooth; each with their own drawbacks. Additionally the protocols can either be centralized or decentralized, meaning contact history can either be processed by a central health authority, or by individual clients in the network.

Bluetooth contact tracing

Currently all major digital contact tracing apps use Bluetooth, more specifically Bluetooth Low Energy, to track encounters.[10][11][12] Typically, Bluetooth is used to transmit anonymous, time-shifting identifiers to nearby devices. Receiving devices then commit these identifiers to a locally stored contact history log. When a patient tests positive for infection, a centralized system such as BlueTrace would require them to upload their contact history log to a central server, where the health authority would match the identifiers with user records and contact people who came in close contact with the patient.[13] Decentralized systems such as the TCN Protocol on the other hand, have the user upload to the central server a token that has no intrinsic information, but can then be used by client devices to derive and match contact history identifiers.[14]

Bluetooth protocols are predominately favored over their location based counterparts because of their much stronger privacy protections and lower battery usage.[8]: table. 1  Because a user's location is not logged as part of the protocols, their location cannot be tracked. The biggest drawback of using a Bluetooth system is the inability to track patients who may have become infected by touching a surface an ill patient has also touched.

Location contact tracing

No digital contact tracing apps currently make use of GPS, however some implementations do make use of network-based location tracking. This approach has the advantage of eliminating the need to download an app. The first contact tracing protocol of this type was deployed in Israel,[15] however all location based solutions that have access to raw location data have significant privacy problems.[16]

List of protocols

Name Functionality Platform Author/promoter Licence Homepage Ref
Pan-European Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (PEPP-PT) project privacy-preserving contact tracing undisclosed Fraunhofer Institute for Telecommunications, Robert Koch Institute, Technical University of Berlin, TU Dresden, University of Erfurt, Vodafone Germany multiple protocols, closed source, private specifications https://www.pepp-pt.org/ [17]
Google / Apple privacy-preserving tracing project privacy-preserving contact tracing platform-independent Google, Apple Inc. public specification https://www.apple.com/covid19/contacttracing [18]
Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (DP-3T) privacy-preserving contact tracing platform-independent EPFL, ETHZ, KU Leuven, TU Delft, University College London, CISPA, University of Oxford, University of Torino / ISI Foundation publicly-developed Apache 2.0 reference implementation, MPL 2.0 iOS/Android code.
 https://github.com/DP-3T [19]
BlueTrace / OpenTrace privacy-preserving contact tracing platform-independent Singapore Government Digital Services public specification, GPL 3 code bluetrace.io [20]
TCN Coalition / TCN Protocol privacy-preserving contact tracing platform-independent CovidWatch, CoEpi, ITO, Commons Project, Zcash Foundation, Openmined public developed specification, MIT License code tcn-coalition.org https://github.com/TCNCoalition/TCN [18]

References

  1. ^ Ferretti, Luca; Wymant, Chris; Kendall, Michelle; Zhao, Lele; Nurtay, Anel; Abeler-Dörner, Lucie; Parker, Michael; Bonsall, David; Fraser, Christophe (2020-03-31). "Quantifying SARS-CoV-2 transmission suggests epidemic control with digital contact tracing". Science. doi:10.1126/science.abb6936. ISSN 0036-8075. PMID 32234805.
  2. ^ Bell, James; Butler, David; Hicks, Chris; Crowcroft, Jon (2020-04-08). "TraceSecure: Towards Privacy Preserving Contact Tracing". arXiv:2004.04059 [cs].
  3. ^ Altuwaiyan, Thamer; Hadian, Mohammad; Liang, Xiaohui (May 2018). "EPIC: Efficient Privacy-Preserving Contact Tracing for Infection Detection". 2018 IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC). Kansas City, MO: IEEE: 1–6. doi:10.1109/ICC.2018.8422886. ISBN 978-1-5386-3180-5.
  4. ^ Rui Zhang; Jinxue Zhang; Yanchao Zhang; Jinyuan Sun; Guanhua Yan (September 2013). "Privacy-Preserving Profile Matching for Proximity-Based Mobile Social Networking". IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications. 31 (9): 656–668. doi:10.1109/JSAC.2013.SUP.0513057. ISSN 0733-8716.
  5. ^ Bogle, Ariel (2020-04-17). "Five questions we need answered about the government's coronavirus contact tracing app". ABC News. Retrieved 2020-04-18.
  6. ^ Kim, Max S. "Seoul's Radical Experiment in Digital Contact Tracing". The New Yorker. Retrieved 2020-04-18.
  7. ^ Shendruk, Amrita Khalid, Amanda. "How Bluetooth could bring digital contact tracing for Covid-19 to billions". Quartz. Retrieved 2020-04-18.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  8. ^ a b Jason Bay, Joel Kek, Alvin Tan, Chai Sheng Hau, Lai Yongquan, Janice Tan, Tang Anh Quy. "BlueTrace: A privacy-preserving protocol for community-driven contact tracing across borders" (PDF). Government Technology Agency. Retrieved 12 April 2020.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  9. ^ "Privacy-Preserving Contact Tracing". Apple. Retrieved 2020-04-19.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  10. ^ "Is Apple and Google's Covid-19 Contact Tracing a Privacy Risk?". Wired. ISSN 1059-1028. Retrieved 2020-04-18.
  11. ^ Wetsman, Nicole (2020-04-15). "Google and Apple's COVID-19 tracking system can't save lives all on its own". The Verge. Retrieved 2020-04-18.
  12. ^ "Explainer: How smartphone apps can help 'contact trace' the new coronavirus". Reuters. 2020-04-14. Retrieved 2020-04-18.
  13. ^ Jackson, Carl (2020-04-06). "TraceTogether, Singaporean COVID-19 contact tracing and Australian recommendations". Melbourne School of Engineering. Retrieved 2020-04-18.
  14. ^ TCNCoalition/TCN, TCN Coalition, 2020-04-18, retrieved 2020-04-18
  15. ^ Holmes, Oliver (2020-03-17). "Israel to track mobile phones of suspected coronavirus cases". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Retrieved 2020-04-01.
  16. ^ "ACLU White Paper: The Limits of Location Tracking in an Epidemic". American Civil Liberties Union. Retrieved 2020-04-10.
  17. ^ "An EU coalition of techies is backing a 'privacy-preserving' standard for COVID-19 contacts tracing". TechCrunch. Retrieved 2020-04-02.
  18. ^ a b Sam Schechner and Rolfe Winkler (2020-04-11). "Here's How Apple and Google Plan to Track the Coronavirus Through Your Phone". The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 2020-04-11.{{cite news}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  19. ^ "Call for common EU approach to apps and data to fight COVID-19 and protect citizens' rights". TechCrunch. 2020-04-08. Retrieved 2020-04-13.
  20. ^ Cite error: The named reference computerweekly.com was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
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