Operation Badr (1973)

"The Crossing" redirects here. For other uses, see The Crossing (disambiguation).

Operation Badr (1973)
Date October 6-8, 1973 Location Suez canal, Sinai peninsula Result Decisive Egyptian Victory
Belligerents
Israel	Egypt
Commanders and leaders
David Elazar Shmuel Gonen Albert Mandler Abraham Adan Ariel Sharon	Saad El Shazly Saad Mamoun Abdel Muneim Wassel
Strength
October 6: 300-360 tanks (3 brigades) 8,000 infantry (450-600 in the Bar Lev Line) October 8: 3 Divisions 640 tanks	October 6: 32,000 infantry 1:00am, October 7: 200 tanks October 8: 5 divisions 90,000 infantry, 980 tanks
Casualties and losses
280-300 tanks destroyed (nearly all) ~3,500 killed/wounded 200+ captured	October 6-7: 280 killed 20 tanks destroyed

Operation Badr was the code name for the Egyptian military operation (October 6, 1973) to cross the Suez Canal and seize the Bar-Lev Line at the start of the Yom Kippur War. It is also known in Egypt as The Crossing (العبور). That term is translated from the word which means "The Crossovering" in Arabic, that was particularly used to indicate the highlight of the Yom Kippur war surprise attack that was initiated by the frontline infantry in contrast to the expected routine airborne start.

Prologue

At the end of the Six Day War, Israel occupied the entire Sinai peninsula upto the Suez Canal. The Egyptian military was severely mauled by the war, losing most of its airforces and much equipment. Reconstruction of the Egyptian Armed Forces following the disastrous Six Day War began only weeks later with much needed Soviet assistance.

By September 1968, the ground forces had sufficiently recovered to challenge Israeli presence east of the canal. The War of Attrition had started that year. It began in the form of artillery barrages along with commando operations that carried out ambushes and raids against military installations and targets in Sinai. The Israelis countered these initial successes by means of deep heli-borne raids deep into Egypt. Egypt was forced to call off its attacks on October 30 after the damage that had been done to the country's infrastructure.

The war resumed five months later. Egyptian artillery caused severe casualties along the entire canal line, and the Israeli Air Force retialated with airstrikes in the canal zone and deep into Egypt. In January 1970, Nasser went to the Soviet Union requesting help. In reply, eighty Mig-21 fighters and SAM battallions with their pilots and ground crews began arriving through February and March, with the mission to protect Egypt's interior only. They became operational in April, and soon their presence was announced. The Israelis finally ceased their deep penetration raids. This gave the Egyptians the oportunity to rebuild their air defences, and Israeli aircraft losses mounted from June 30 to the end of July, when a ceasefire was finally imposed. Nasser died in September that year. He was succeeded by Anwar Sadat.

The new Egyptian President's regime was quite unstable and threatened by student demonstrations and political opponents. Sadat's administration were unable to carry out economic reforms that were necessary to Egypt's survival, and there was widespread public dissapointment at Egypt's inablilty to regain Sinai three years after the Six Day War. Sadat repeadetly threatened Israel with war throughout 1972 and 1973, but his threats were ignored. President Sadat hoped to achieve even a limited victory to jump-start diplomatic efforts and regain the Sinai. His Soviet advisors thought otherwise and argued that it would take many days of fighting and a 50% casualty rate for Egypt to capture the canal, but he decided to proceed anyway.

Preparations for War

Background

The Egyptian Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Saad El Shazly, was responsible for constructing a plan for the Egyptian attack. Annual exercises were held in Egypt starting in 1968 simulating an assault across the canal. At the time these exercises were considered by Egyptian commanders to be entirely unrealistic simulations in light of Egypt's weakened military capabilities after the Six Day War. With each each passing year, as the reconstruction of the Egyptian military continued, the exercises became more realistic and their planning more in accordance with the army's capabilities. These exercises represented the first step in preparations for an assault across the canal.

When Shazly assumed the position of Chief of Staff on May 16, 1971, there was as yet no offensive plan into Sinai. All that existed was a defensive plan code-named Operation 200, as well as a more aggressive plan code-named Operation Granite. Although Granite incorporated raids and assaults into Sinai, it remained essentially a defensive plan. Shazly began assessing the capabilities of the Egyptian military prior to formulating an offensive plan.

He concluded that the air force was the military's weakest arm. It had been destroyed almost completely on the ground in 1967, and although very few pilots had been killed, their morale was all but destroyed. Egyptian pilots were less experienced than their Israeli counterparts, and their fighter aircraft had a smaller payload and shorter range. To cover up for this weakness, the military's air defenses were improved. After the War of Attrition, an increased number of SA-2, SA-3 and SA-6 surface-to-air missile systems were obtained. This air defense system would provide air cover to ground units crossing the canal. The army had a total of 800,000 men, but nearly 500,000 of this figure was used to provide protection for the country's vast infrastructure in anticipation of Israeli commando raids as in the War of Attrition; possible targets included hundreds of bridges spanning the Nile, installations in the Nile Delta and throughout the Red Sea and Mediterranean coasts, irrigation systems and canals, power plants and industrial areas, etc... This left 300,000 men available for deployment as field troops.

Planning and preparations

To improve the air force, pilot training was intesified after the War of Attrition, and each airbase was defended with a ring of SAM batteries. The fighter aircraft, especially the older MiG-17, were upgraded with more modern electronic equipment. Furthermore, around 500 concrete shelters were built to prevent the air force from being destroyed on the ground again. Air defence of the canal was improved, and gradually Egyptian personnel replaced Soviet ones manning the SAM batteries, radar installations and electronic jamming equipment. This air defense would provide cover for the assaulting Egyptian troops. Replacing their losses in the Six Day War, the Egyptian army received T-55 and T-62 tanks to replace their obsolete T-34s from 1970 to the beginning of the war. However, in open ground, only the T-62 could effectively counter the Israeli M60 Patton and Centurion tanks in terms of armor and armament.

Shazly began in July 1971, in conjunction with the then Minister of War, General Mohammed Ahmad Sadek, to develop two offensive plans. The first was Operation 41, and it involved an offensive along the entire Suez Canal, with the objective of siezing the key passes of the Sinai, 55-70 km from the Suez Canal. The plan would be developed in full cooperation with the Soviet advisors. As it was, the objectives of the operation was outside the capabilites of the Egyptian military. It's only virtue was that it would force the Soviets to supply more arms and equipments. The plan would be presented to the Syrians to encourage their cooperation in an attack against Israel. Operation 41 was completed by September 1971, and the following month, Sadat flew with Sadek to Moscow to conclude Egypt's largest arm's deal yet, receiving 100 MiG-21 fighters, 10 Tu-16 bombers, SA-6 AA missilies and heavy artillery. Operation 41 was later renamed Granite Two.

The second plan was codenamed the High Minarets, and it called for an assault across the canal along five crossing points at a depth of 10-15 km, after which troops would dig in and assume defensive positions. By making only a limited advance meant, Egyptian troops would remain within range of their own SAM defences, negating the Israeli advantage in the air. In this way the High Minarets was planned in accordnace with the capabilities of the Egyptian Army. The plan's outline was completed by Semptember 1971 in absolute secrecy.

In October 1972, Sadek was replaced as War Minister by General Ahmed Ismail. The High Minarets continued to be developed as the only viable offensive plan available, and the spring of 1973 was chosen as a possible date for an assault. Based on intelligence estimates, the main Israeli counterattacks by three armored brigades would come 6-8 hours after the assault began, while the assault infantry would not expect armor support of their own for 12 or more hours. To deal with this, the assault force would be supplied with large numbers of ATGM and RPG weapons. They would advance a limited distance of 6 km and establish bridgeheads 5 km wide to defeat enemy counterattacks. Initially, the attack would receive supporting fire from several sand ramparts built west of the canal, but this would decrease as troops advanced deeper into Sinai. Once friendly armor arrived and the Israeli artillery in the Bar Lev line neutralised, Egyptian SAM units west of the canal would be moved to positions closer to the canal and Egyptian forces would expand their bridgeheads 15 km. Additionally airborne and seaborne forces would conduct attacks and ambushes to delay Israeli reserves heading for the Bar Lev line, creating confusion and inflicting as many casualties as possible.

Egyptian engineers had several daunting tasks, crucial to the success of the entire operation. They had to open 70 passages along the entire canal in the sand rampart on the east bank. They must also build 35 ferries, 10 heavy bridges, 5 light bridges, and 10 pontoon bridges. The passages must be opened in 5 to 7 hours, immediately followed by the ferries, then the bridges 2 hours later. All this would take place under enemy fire, artillery bombardments and airstrikes.

As it happened, no offensive was ever carried out in early 1973. By September 1973 however, war became a certainty. At the request of Ahmed Ismail, Sadat produced a presidential directive for war. Therefore it was only in September, less than a month before the attack, that the date October 6 was finally selected as D-Day. That day would coincide with the tenth of Ramadan. It was in this month that the Muslims won their first victory at the Battle of Badr in the year 634. Opting for something more inspirational the High Minarets as a name, Operation Badr was chosen as the assault's codename.

Israeli defences

The Israelis had constructed a massive line of fortifications along the canal called the Bar Lev Line, which was considered impregnable. The main obstacle of these defences were massive artificial sand banks erected by Israeli engineers, 18 meters high with a 45-60 degree incline, along the entire Suez Canal. The ramparts were reinforced by concrete rising just above the water line, which prevented any attempt by amphibious vehicles to climb the sand wall. To blast through the sand barrier the Israelis estimated would take at least twenty-four, probably forty-eight hours. Behind this rampart were a series of 22 fortifications comprising 35 strongpoints. On average, the fortifications was 5.4 kilometers apart, but at likely crossing points they were distanced only 900 meters from each other. The strongpoints were several stories high into the sand and constructed to provide protection from 1,000 pound bombs. Major strongpoints had around twenty six bunkers housing medium and heavy machine guns, four anti aircraft bunkers, six mortar positions and three ramparts providing firing positions for tanks. The strongpoints were surrounded by fifteen circles of barbed wire and minefields to a depth of 200 meters. Each strongpoint had an underground reservoir filled with crude oil. The oil could be pumped into the Suez Canal via a pipe system, and ignited to create an inferno on the surface of the canal, with temperatures reaching 700 degrees. Behind the main line on the canal were concentration areas for armor and infantry, supply depots, artillery positions and so forth.

The Israeli command developed a basic defensive plan codenamed Dovecoat (Shovach Yonim), whose details were known to the Egyptian commanders. The plan divided the Bar Lev Line into three sectors: the northern sector defended Arish on the coast to Qantara, the central sector defended Ismailia to Abu-Ageila, and the southern sector defended the area from the Great Bitter Lake to the end of the Suez Canal, and prevented a thrust to the Mitla and Gedy Passes. The 252nd Armored Division, led by Major General Albert Mandler, was charged with the defense of the Bar Lev Line, and it was divided into three brigades. Positioned 5-9 kilometers behind the series of fortifications was a brigade of 110-120 tanks, led by Colonel Reshef, split into three battalions of 36-40 tanks each, with one battalion to a sector. In case of an Egyptian attack, the brigade was to move forward to occupy tank platforms and firing positions along the Bar Lev Line. A further 20-35 kilometers behind the canal were two additional armored brigades led by Colonel Gabi Amir and Colonel Dan Shomron, each with around 120 tanks. One brigade was to reinforce the forward armored brigade, while the other brigade counterattacked against the main Egyptian assault.

The Sinai garrison numbered 18,000 men. The overall commander was Shmuel Gonen, who served as head of the Israeli Southern Command. Of the garrison stationed in the Sinai, one infantry brigade occupied the strongpoints on the canal on October 6, while a further 8,000 could be deployed to the line within 30 minutes to two hours along with the armor.

Egyptian attack

The 1973 War in the Sinai, October 6-15.

Egypt, in cooperation with Syria, launched the attack on October 6, 1973. The attack began with a major air strike at 1400 hours by 220 Egyptian aircraft against three airbases, ten Hawk SAM batteries, three command centers, artillery positions and several radar stations. The air strike was coupled with a barrage at 1405 hours from nearly 2,000 artillery pieces (including smaller caliber weapons such as mortars), against the Bar-Lev line fortifications, armor concentration areas and artillery positions.

Under cover of the artillery barrage which landed smoke canisters at the crossing sites, the first wave of Egyptian assault infantry, 4,000 men, started to move across the canal in 720 dinghies, crying "Allahu Akbar...Allahu Akbar..." (God is Great). The wave landed on the opposite bank at five separate crossing locations along the canal at 1430, and immediately began to scale the embankment using rope ladders. The first wave of assault infantry was armed with a large number of anti tank weapons: RPG-7 rockets and RPG-43 grenades, as well as the less numerous but deadly AT-3 Sagger missiles. Once over the sand embankment, Egyptian soldiers raised their flag and bypassed Israeli defences, proceeding instead to tank ramparts and firing positions as well as reinforcement routes, deploying initially at a depth of around one kilometer to lay mines and prepare ambushes. The purpose of the first wave was to prevent Israeli reinforcements from interfering with follow-up waves of Egyptian infantry. At this time Egyptian aircraft involved in the airstrike return, having hit the majority of their targets while losing only 5 aircraft. Engineer platoons begin to ferry their pumps to the opposite bank to clear 70 passages within the sand wall. They are allotted only five to seven hours to accomplish this.

At the Great Bitter Lake, the 130th Egyptian Amphibious Brigade performed its own crossing. The brigade composed of 1,000 men, including a Sagger anti-tank battalion, and anti-air battalion, 20 PT-76 tanks and 100 amphibious armored personnel carriers. It reached the opposite bank around 1440 without losing a single casualty. The sand rampart that lined the entire Suez Canal did not exist in the Bitter Lakes, and consequently there were no Israeli defences or units to be encountered.

Fifteen minutes later, at 1445, the second wave landed. This wave reinforced the first wave in its mission, but also began to assault Israeli defences. At 1500 hours, a third wave of troops lands, and Egyptian infantry captured the first enemy fortification, which was positioned east of Ismailia. Successive waves continued to arrive at fifteen minute intervals. By now company and battalion-sized units of Israeli tanks begin to reach the Bar Lev Line, but are ambushed by Egyptian infantry. The bridgeheads are only 200 meters deep by 1515 hours, and ten minutes later a second strongpoint is captured. Combat engineers worked on clearing the minefields surrounding the strongpoints. As additional troops crossed the canal more strongpoints were captured. A few Israeli tanks that manage to break through Egyptian ambushes to reach the Bar Lev Line are fired upon by Egyptian forces on the west bank of the Suez Canal. Egyptian commanders received reports of good progress from engineers clearing the sand wall, and promptly ordered the bridging battalions to start moving to the crossing sites, and engineers prepare to begin assembling ferries.

In the meantime the Israeli Southern Command was trying to determine the main Egyptian effort to launch a counterattack with Dan Shomron's armored brigade. In reality, there was no main effort; Egyptian strategy planned for a broad assault on the entire front. As a result Southern Command lost several critical hours. When Reshef moved his tank brigade to support the Bar Lev Line, Israeli commanders did not carry out any kind of reconnaissance beforehand, and as a result Egyptian troops managed to successfully ambush Israeli units and armor. In the confusion ensuing the surprise Egyptian assault, the Israeli command failed to evacuate the garrison at the Bar Lev Line.

By 1615, ten infantry brigades had crossed at the five bridgeheads, totaling 23,500 men (around 4,700 at each bridgehead). The sixth strongpoint is captured and the bridgeheads are nine kilometers wide and nearly two kilometers deep. Egyptian artillery now ceased fire against the Bar Lev Line and began striking targets deeper into Sinai, including Israeli reinforcements, with forward infantry acting as artillery spotters. Meanwhile engineer battalions begin assembling ferries. At 1730, the twelfth and final infantry wave lands, three hours after the start of the assault. The five bridgeheads have a total of 32,000 men (around 6,400 in each bridgehead). Fourteen strongpoints have been seized, and each bridgehead is now 3.5 to 4.5 kilometers deep. The Israelis had lost around 100 tanks so far to anti tank infantry and concentrated artillery fire. The magnitude of Israeli losses stemmed from their insistence to reach their comrades in the Bar Lev defences, and they repeatedly ran into aggressive ambushes by Egyptian soldiers.

Taking advantage of dusk, at 1750 four battalions of commandos (Sa'iqa, literally: lightning) were airdropped deep into the Sinai by helicopters flying at low altitude. The commandos were assigned the objective of hampering reserves en route from Israel.

At 1800 Egyptian armor and anti tank units started to move towards the crossing sites. Fifteen minutes later engineers complete the assembly of all 35 ferries and wait for the breaches to be opened. At 1830 an exhausted engineer platoon announces it has cleared the first breach; the job was done in only four hours. By then the bridgeheads have reached a depth of four-six kilometers. With Israeli artillery on the Bar Lev Line eliminated, the immobile SA-2 and SA-3 units are moved forward. Until the units reach their new positions and reinforcements arrive, the infantry holds its positions. Six hours into the war, 60 passages had been cleared. In the far south of the canal in Third Army's sector, and especially at 19th Division's bridgehead, the sand turned into mud making it difficult to breach. Consequently four ferries and three bridges assigned to that division were not deployed. Between 2030 to 2230 all bridges - eight heavy duty bridges and four light bridges - were laid, and reinforcements started to cross. Occasionally the bridges were moved to different locations to confuse Israeli air strikes targeting the bridges - the Egyptians had opened 60 passages but were using only 12 bridges, allowing each bridge to be moved to one of five passages.

October 7

In the early hours of Sunday October 7, just after midnight, the assault infantry advanced again, at last supported by tanks. Israeli armored formations had experienced heavy losses in trying repeatedly to reach the Bar Lev Line and were disorganized and confused. Nevertheless many Israeli units stubbornly resisted the Egyptian advance. Twice during the night of October 6 to October 7, groups of tanks and infantry penetrated the bridgeheads to reach the canal line. They bombarded the bridges, inflicting significant damage, and opened fire on Egyptian forces across the canal. Surrounded on all sides however, these units received heavy fire from Egyptian units. Before sunrise the bridgeheads had reached a depth of six-nine kilometers, and the remaining Israeli units retreated. With sufficient numbers of armor finally across, reinforcements of infantry began to cross the canal in bridges and ferries. Dawn on October 7 saw a total of 50,000 men (around 10,000 to each bridgehead) and 400 Egyptian tanks occupying five bridgeheads in the Sinai across the Suez Canal. Egyptian forces reorganised and entrenched themselves in anticipation of Israeli counterattacks.

David Elazar continued to instruct Gonen to evacuate soldiers from strongpoints which were not yet surrounded, even though by October 7 most of the Israeli defences were encircled. Egyptian losses up to the morning of October 7 were only 280 killed and 20 tanks destroyed. Israeli losses were far more heavy; the brigade in the Bar Lev Line was completely surrounded and most of its men were casualties while 200 were captured. Around 280-300 Israeli tanks had been destroyed. In subsequent days some of the defenders in the Bar Lev Line managed to break though Egyptian forces and return to their lines, or were extracted by Israeli forces in counterattacks that came later on.

As the magnitude of Israeli losses became more apparent, Gonen made the decision at noon to form a defensive line on the Lateral Road, 30 kilometers east of the canal, and ordered his divisional commanders to pull back and deploy accordingly. This brought a pause to the fighting along the front, and Egyptian forces used this opportunity to consolidate their gains and establish their own defences. At noon, elements of Abraham Adan's 162nd Division and Ariel Sharon's 143rd Division began to reach the fronts. Consequently Gonen divided the front into three divisional commands: Adan deployed himself in the northern sector, Sharon in the central sector, and Mandler in the Southern sector.

During the afternoon, Israeli Command received optimistic reports from the Israeli Air Force. Air strikes continued throughout the day, already knocking out seven bridges, and the IAF expected to destroy the remaining ones by evening. In fact, several of the bridges that had been destroyed were dummies. The real bridges, in the meantime, were quickly repaired and returned to service. In the crossing, the Egyptians had laid ten heavy bridges (two bridges in the south were laid but not operational), and kept two in reserve. Now, on October 7, five of these bridges were removed and kept in reserve, leaving each division across the canal with one heavy bridge and one light bridge.

Egyptian forces widened their bridgeheads that day to narrow the 30 kilometer gap that existed between the bridgeheads. Meanwhile, the General Command worked on organizing its forces on the east bank of the canal. Egyptian troops had crossed with supplies that sufficed them for 24 hours. By Sunday it became necessary to resupply these forces, but the administrative and supply units charged with this responsibility were disorganized, and to the south problems with laying the bridges further handicapped supply efforts there. October 7 offered a relative lull from the intense fighting that had taken place, and this gave an opportunity to organize battlefield administration. At 19th Division's bridgehead to the south, all efforts to lay three bridges there were abandoned due to difficulties with the terrain. Instead, supplies and reinforcement destined for the division were transferred over 7th Division's bridges to the north, where engineers were more successful in laying the bridges.

Fighting throughout the front did not cease entirely. Egyptian forces besieged Israeli defences and strongpoints that had not yet been captured. Meanwhile, the commando (Sa'iqa) units airdropped into Sinai the previous day now engaged Israeli reserves heading for the front. One commando unit capture the Ras Sidr Pass south of Port Tawfiq, along the Gulf of Suez. This unit held its position for the remainder of the war, preventing Israeli reserves from pushing through its location to reach the front. In another case, a company established defensive positions along the northern route between Romani and Baluza. The following day, it ambushed an Israeli reserve armored brigade belonging to Adan's division. The advance of the brigade, commanded by Colonel Natke Nir, was halted, and in in the ensuing battle, 12 tanks and 6 half-tracks were destroyed and 30 soldiers of the brigade were killed, but the commando company lost 75 dead. In addition to delaying Israeli reserves, the commandos carried out sabotage missions. The commando operations inflicted significant losses to Israeli units and created confusion and anxiety in the Israeli Command, which was forced to allocate front-line units to protect installations and perform guard duties, while reserve units en route to the front adopted a cautious approach, which delayed their arrival.

At the northern end of the canal, troops from the 18th Division, under the command of Brigadier General Fuad 'Aziz Ghali, entered the town of Qantara and became engaged with Israeli units inside the town. Close quarter combat, even hand-to-hand fighting took place as Egyptian forces cleared the town building by building. Fighting was heavy, and by the end of October 7, most of the town and its outskirts was under Egyptian control.

Meanwhile, one battalion of the 130th Amphibious Brigade attacked the Israeli Southern HQ at the entrance of the Mitla Pass, while other units of the battalion were raiding communications, radar and electronics installations. At 0810 the battalion came under heavy fire, and the light PT-76s were outmatched by the heavier Israeli M60 tanks. The battalion suffered heavy losses and retreated to the Third Army units. The other battalion of the brigade proceeded through the Gedy Pass.

Israeli planning for a counterattack

David Elazar, encouraged by the Israeli Air Force's reports of the destruction of Egyptian bridges, decided to visit Israeli Southern Command. He was accompanied by his aide, Colonel Avner Shalev and the former Israeli Chief of Staff, Yitzhak Rabin. Elazar intended to meet with Israeli commanders and organize a plan for the following day. He arrived at Gonen's advance command post at Gebel Umm Hashiba at 1845. He met with Gonen, Adan and Mandler. Sharon only arrived after the meeting had been concluded.

Southern Command expected to have 640 tanks on Monday October 8, of which 530 tanks would be distributed among three divisions. Adan would command 200 tanks, Sharon would have 180 tanks, and Mandler would have 150 tanks (part of Mandler's losses would be replaced). Estimates put the number of Egyptian tanks on the east bank at 400, when in fact, there were 800 tanks across the canal by Sunday evening. In light of the apparent superiority, Gonen recommended a frontal attack at night, with Adan's 162nd Division attacking at Qantara and crossing to the west bank of the Suez, and Sharon's 143rd Division crossing into Suez City. Adan however, lacking infantry, urged a more cautious approach until more reserves reached the front.

Elazar also preferred a cautious approach, and decided on a limited attack on the morning of October 8. Adan will instead attack southward against Second Army, remaining 3-5 kilometers away from the canal to avoid Egyptian anti-tank weaponry. Sharon would remain at Tasa to support Adan if needed. Should Adan succeed, Sharon would attack Third Army's bridgehead in a manner similar to Adan, and then cross to the west bank. Mandler would remain on the defensive, organizing his division which had been mauled by the fighting, and was down to a few dozen tanks. Elazar clearly emphasized that no canal crossing and no attempt to reach the strongpoints with his approval. The meeting ended at 2200.

As Elazar prepared to leave, he met Sharon, who just arrived after missing the entire conference. Elazar only exchanged a few words from him and told him to obtain his orders from Gonen. After being briefed, Sharon recommended a concentrated two division attack against one of the Egyptian bridgeheads. The suggestion appealed more to Gonen than Elazar's cautious approach, but he had his orders. The attack would proceed as planned.

October 8

The five division-size bridgeheads consolidated themselves on Monday, October 8 into two army-size bridgeheads: the Second Army with its three divisions occupied Qantara in the north to Deversoir in the south, while the Third Army with two divisions occupied the southern end of the Bitter Lakes to a point southeast of Port Tawfiq (at the far end of the canal). These two armies (both by western standards corps-sized) incorporated a total of 90,000 men and 980 tanks, dug in and entrenched. Each division deployed, in accordance with Operation Badr, two infantry brigades in its forward echelon, and one mechanized infantry brigade in the second echelon. In reserve was one armored brigade, placed behind the three infantry brigades.

At dawn a friendly fire incident occurred as 2nd Division and 16th Division were closing the gap between their bridgeheads. A platoon from 2nd Division advanced south, while another platoon from 16th Division moved north. Cresting a ridge, both platoons confronted each other at 500 yards. The tank crews on both sides were so agitated that all six tanks opened fire on each other. Each platoon lost two of its three tanks to direct hits within minutes, and several men were killed.

In the early hours of Monday morning the second battalion of the 130th Amphibious Brigade pushed through the Gedy Pass and conducted a raid on the Israeli air base of Bir Thamada, which had been hit by air strikes the previous day. The battalion succeeded in its raid and returned to Third Army lines.

The Egyptian Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Saad El Shazly, visited the front early morning before the Israeli attack to make form an assessment of the situation. He arrived at Second Army Headquarters, where he was briefed on the situation by the commanders, then went to 2nd Division's advanced headquarters, where he met with Brigadier General Hasan Abu Sa'ada. Many of the soldiers had not slept for two nights, but the successful crossing was a moral booster, a tonic as Shazly described it. Shazly, accompanied by Abu Sa'ada, visited the soldiers in the front, and entered the Purkan strongpoint, which had been captured only hours prior to Shazly's arrival.

Shazly then went southward in his staff car along the bitter lakes. As the car moved through 7th Division's bridgehead in Third Army's sector, the traffic on the roads steadily increased until, several hundred meters from the division's main bridge, traffic was at a complete standstill. Shazly and his aide got out of the vehicle, walked to the bridge and met with the division commander, Brigadier General Badawy. The cause behind the heavy traffic was due to problems with laying bridges in 19th Division's sector further south. Since the bridges there had not been laid, supplies and reinforcements destined for that division had to go over 7th Division's already bridges, creating a solid traffic jam. Despite Sunday's lull, the situation had not yet improved. This only created further problems, as soldiers and tank crews lost contact with their units and consequently had no of their location. Many infantrymen were low on supplies, and some even returned to the west bank of the canal to replenish their food and water supply.

After conferring with the chief engineers of the Second and Third field armies, Shazly became aware that Israeli Air Force, in spite of its heavy losses, had destroyed so many bridge sections that the Egyptians had lost the equivalent of three heavy bridges, leaving four bridges in reserve along with the five already laid in the canal. This gave rise to concerns about supply in the coming days and weeks. Shazly then discussed the possibility of constructing three bridges in the canal using earth and sand. This would make causeways impregnable against air strikes and artillery. The chief engineer of the Third Army, with whom he discussed the idea, was confidant that, given enough bulldozers, the causeways could be constructed in one week.

Israeli Counterattack

Shortly after midnight on October 8, Gonen changed plans for the attack. Adan would now attack in the direction of the strongpoints at Firdan and Ismailia. The change in plans was not formulated on precise tactical intelligence, but on the basis of optimistic field reports which expected an imminent Egyptian collapse. This change caused some confusion among Israeli commanders for the res of the day.

Adan's division was deployed along the Baluza-Tasa road to the north. His division was comprised of Colonel Natke Nir's armored brigade with 71 tanks, Gabi Amir's brigade with 50 M60 tanks, and Aryeh Keren's brigade with 62 tanks (still en route to the area) for a total of 183 tanks (the division had suffered some losses from Egyptian commandos). In spite of Gonen's new order, Adan still planned to avoid Egyptian anti tank weaponry. He planned to have Amir's brigade move southward between Lexicon and Artillery roads (the former road ran immediately alongside the canal, and the latter was 10-15 kilometers east of it), to reach a position that would link the brigade to the Hizayon strongpoint opposite Firdan and the Purkan strongpoint opposite Ismailia. Nir would also move in a similar manner to link up with Purkan. Keren would move east of Artillery Road and position his brigade opposite the Matzmed strongpoint at the northern end of the Bitter Lakes. A mechanized infantry brigade with 44 Super Shermans was expected to join in the attack by late morning. Little or no air support would come for the attack; the Israeli Air Force was concentrated on the Golan Heights.

At 0753, minutes before the Israeli attack was to commence, Israeli forces near Qantara became heavily engaged with the right flank of the Egyptian 18th Division, composed of a brigade, as Egyptian troops sought to clear the town completely and its vicinity. Fuad, the division commander, supported the brigade in its mission with two companies of T-62 tanks, numbering around 24 in all. To prevent Israeli forces in the area from being outflanked, Gonen ordered Nir to remain near Qantara to help contain the Egyptian attack. This left Adan with only 50 tanks under Amir's command to carry out the attack between Lexicon and Artillery Roads.

At 0806 Amir began the drive south, and received the order to prepare to reach the strongpoints on Adan's order. Keren was still en route to the area. Once his brigade arrived he would conduct an offensive against 16th Division's bridgehead in the direction of Matzmed. However, Amir made an error in navigation, and instead of moving three kilometers from the canal, he moved along Artillery road, fifteen kilometers away. Consequently, Amir would be forced to conduct a frontal assault in an east-west direction instead of the north-south flanking maneuver which Adan planned for.

At 0900 Amir's brigade began to reach the plain between Artillery Road and the Firdan bridge. So far no Egyptian resistance of any significance had been encountered. The brigade had the objective of attacking 2nd Division's bridgehead, commanded by Brigadier General Hassan Abu Sa'ada. Abu Sa'ada had the 24th Armored Brigade as the divisional reserve, but he could only commit it in case of an Israeli penetration of the bridgehead. Gonen wanted Adan to reach the Hizayon strongpoint, and contacted Elazar in Tel Aviv at 0955 to request a crossing of the canal. Gonen downplayed or ignored negative reports and only told Elazar of positive developments on the battlefield. Elazar, who was at a meeting, communicated with Gonen through his assistant, and approved of a crossing of the canal and gave permission for Sharon's division to move south.

At 1040, Gonen ordered Adan to cross to the west bank and Sharon to move towards Suez City. Short of forces, Adan requested Gonen that Sharon send a battalion to protect his southern flank. Gonen consented, but Sharon would not comply, and consequently several critical positions were lost to the Egyptians later on.

Just before the assault commenced, one of Amir's battalions disengaged to resupply. The other battalion proceeded with the assault at 1100. Some 25 tanks carried out an assault that was supposed to be performed by 121 tanks. The battalion broke through the first Egyptian troops and advanced to within 800 meters of the canal. The battalion then came under heavy fire from Egyptian anti-tank weaponry as well as artillery and tanks. The battalion lost 18 tanks within minutes, and most of its commanders were either killed or wounded.

By now Nir had disengaged at Qantara, leaving a battalion behind, and arrived opposite the Firdan bridge at 1230 with two tank battalions. While Amir and Nir discussed plans for an attack, Keren arrived and Adan ordered him to support Nir and Amir by attacking towards Purkan. Meanwhile Sharon left Tasa and headed for Suez City. Sharon left a single reconnaissance company hold vital ridges such as Hamadia and Kishuf, but the hills to the north, such as Hamutal fifteen kilometers southeast of Purkan, were left unoccupied. This further endangered Adan's position.

Amir's brigade was now down to one battalion. The battalion was to attack with Nir's brigade of 50 tanks. To Amir's surprise, a reserve armored battalion of 25 tanks commanded commanded by Colonel Eliashiv Shemshi arrived in the area, en route to Keren's brigade. Short of forces, Amir, with Adan's approval, commandeered Shemshi's battalion, and instructed him to provide covering fire for Nir's assault on the Firdan bridge.

At 1330, the attack was carried out by all three brigades, with a total of 162 tanks. A lack of coordination and communication difficulties between Amir and Nir's brigade hampered the Israeli attack. Abu Sa'ada had received intelligence warnings of an Israeli attack, and had prepared his forces. Nir's two battalions attacked at the same time in a line. Egyptian defences stopped the advance of one of Nir's battalions, while the other the attack. The other battalion entered a killing zone prepared by the Egyptian forces. Heavy fire destroyed 18 of the battalion's 25 tanks and killed 32 soldiers within minutes. Three other soldiers were captured. The battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Assaf Yagouri, was captured after his tank was disabled by Sergeant Mohamed El Masry, commander of an anti-tank unit. Keren's brigade had also failed in its attack towards Purkan and suffered heavy losses.

Egyptian Advance

Operation Badr called for an enlargement of the bridges on October 8. For this to take place, each of the five infantry divisions had to reorganize its forces. The mechanized infantry brigade which formed the second echelon of the division's lines was to advance and push through the two forward infantry brigades. Thus the mechanized brigade would form the first line, the two infantry brigades would from the second line, and the reserve armored brigade would constitute a third echelon.

During the afternoon of the 8th, Egyptian artillery barrages and air strikes took place along the entire front against opposing Israeli forces, followed by attacking Egyptian forces. Not all advancing Egyptian forces managed to reach the 12 kilometer mark necessary to control Artillery Road, but each division held positions at least 11 kilometers deep. In Second Army's sector, the 16th Infantry Division was the most successful by occupying the strategic positions of Mashchir, Televiza, Missouri and Hamutal, the latter was nearly 15 kilometers from the canal, and overlooked the juncture of Ismailia and Artillery Roads. The commander of the brigade which captured the positions, Brigadier General 'Adil Yusri, lost his leg while manning the forward command post. The deepest penetration was in Third Army's sector, where the bridgehead reached a depth of nearly 18 kilometers.

The Israelis now made an attempt to regain the lost ground. Keren organized his brigade for an assault on Hamutal Hill. While one battalion provided covering fire, two battalions under Lieutenant Colonels Dan Spair and Amir (not to be confused with the brigade commander Gaib Amir) attacked with 27 tanks. Nearly 1000 meters from the Egyptian positions, Dan Sapir's was killed when his tank took a direct hit, disrupting his battalion's attack. Amir's battalion continued fighting till dusk after losing 7 tanks.

Gonen, starting to realise the gravity of Adan's position, ordered Sharon at 1445 to pull back and return to his initial positions. Erez Armored Brigade arrived to offer assistance to offer assistance to Keren, but poor coordination between the commanders led to the failure of further attempts to capture Hamutal Hill. By the end of the day Adan's division alone had lost around 100 tanks. Egyptian losses were far fewer in terms of men and armor.

Aftermath

Operation Badr was the opening battle of the Yom Kippur War in the Sinai, and the first major Arab victory against the Israelis in years.

Subsequently Israeli forces managed to perform their own countercrossing, striking a seam between two Egyptian armies and cuting off the supply lines of the Egyptian Third Army.
A UNSC cease-fire was eventually negotiated between the United States and the Soviet Union and implemented to end the Yom Kippur War.

Some of President Sadat's aims were achieved, although in some unexpected ways. Egypt's initial surprise attack and perceived victory domestically, reinforced President Sadat's leadership position in Egypt. For the rest of his life he was referred to as "The Hero of the Crossing," and this status helped his regime stay in power until his assassination in 1981, on the eighth anniversary of the attack.

Eventually Anwar El Sadat went on to be the first Arab leader to visit Israel officially in 1977. Egypt and Israel signed the Camp David Accords in 1978, and a comprehensive peace treaty in 1979, which among other things saw the Sinai peninsula's return to Egypt, Egypt's official recognition of the State of Israel, its commitment to live in peace with the Jewish state, and establishment of normal diplomatic relations between Israel and Egypt.

Bibliography

• Herzog, Chaim (2005-07-12). The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East. Vintage. p. 560. ISBN 1400079632. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
• Shazly, Lieutenant General Saad el (2003). The Crossing of the Suez, Revised Edition (Revised ed.). American Mideast Research. p. 368. ISBN 0960456228.

Online Publication

• Gawrych, Dr. Goerge W. (1996). The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory. Combat Studies Insitute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. p. 97. In parts:
  • Intro
  • Part I p. 1-20
  • Part II p.21-30
  • Part III p.31-40
  • Part IV p.41-52
  • Part V p.53-61
  • Part VI p.62-72
  • Part VII p.73-82
  • Notes p.83-97