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==Historical Background==
==Historical Background==
One of the most controversial aspects of the international politics of food has been the question of “food power”—the hypothetical international power advantage enjoyed by food-exporting nations over food-importing nations. Food crises are created by affluent countries, not by demands of the poor in poor countries. For many poor nations there is hardly any possibility to turn to the world market for food. There are only four exporters that are globally significant: US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. This means that the rest of the world has to turn to any of these four to satisfy demand in situations of shortage. Political leaders in some food-importing countries have at times argued for the importance of “food self-sufficiency” so as to reduce the vulnerability associated with import dependence.{{Citation needed|date=November 2009}}
One of the most controversial aspects of the international politics of food has been the question of “food power”—the hypothetical international power advantage enjoyed by food-exporting nations over food-importing nations. Food crises are created by affluent countries, not by demands of the poor in poor countries.<ref>http://jpr.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/13/4/277.pdf</ref> For many poor nations there is hardly any possibility to turn to the world market for food. There are only four exporters that are globally significant: US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.<ref>http://jpr.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/13/4/277.pdf</ref> This means that the rest of the world has to turn to any of these four to satisfy demand in situations of shortage.<ref>http://jpr.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/13/4/277.pdf</ref> Political leaders in some food-importing countries have at times argued for the importance of “food self-sufficiency” so as to reduce the vulnerability associated with import dependence.{{Citation needed|date=November 2009}}


This hypothetical vulnerability to food power has seldom been tested, mostly because food-exporting nations are constrained by domestic producers from withholding commercial exports.<ref>http://www.mywire.com/a/Oxford-Companion-Politics-World/Food-Politics/9577797/?&pbl=105</ref> On those occasions when “food power” has been attempted, the exporter's advantage has not been confirmed.<ref>http://www.mywire.com/a/Oxford-Companion-Politics-World/Food-Politics/9577797/?&pbl=105</ref> In 1980 -- 1981, when the United States imposed a partial grain embargo on the Soviet Union following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Soviet Union had little trouble finding alternative grain suppliers in [[Argentina|Argentina]], [[Australia|Australia]], [[Canada|Canada]], and the European Community. <ref>http://www.mywire.com/a/Oxford-Companion-Politics-World/Food-Politics/9577797/?&pbl=105</ref>Total Soviet grain imports actually increased during the period that the U.S. embargo was in place.<ref>http://www.mywire.com/a/Oxford-Companion-Politics-World/Food-Politics/9577797/?&pbl=105</ref>However, although the embargo was technically a failure, the inefficiencies in which the [[Soviet Union|Soviet Union]] encountered while receiving grain from other sources besides the United States did cause the Soviets to pay somewhat more than they would have if the [[United States|United States]] had not imposed the grain embargo. <ref>http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/80/08/Russian_Aug_Sep1980.pdf</ref>
This hypothetical vulnerability to food power has seldom been tested, mostly because food-exporting nations are constrained by domestic producers from withholding commercial exports.<ref>http://www.mywire.com/a/Oxford-Companion-Politics-World/Food-Politics/9577797/?&pbl=105</ref> On those occasions when “food power” has been attempted, the exporter's advantage has not been confirmed.<ref>http://www.mywire.com/a/Oxford-Companion-Politics-World/Food-Politics/9577797/?&pbl=105</ref> In 1980 -- 1981, when the United States imposed a partial grain embargo on the Soviet Union following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Soviet Union had little trouble finding alternative grain suppliers in [[Argentina|Argentina]], [[Australia|Australia]], [[Canada|Canada]], and the European Community. <ref>http://www.mywire.com/a/Oxford-Companion-Politics-World/Food-Politics/9577797/?&pbl=105</ref>Total Soviet grain imports actually increased during the period that the U.S. embargo was in place.<ref>http://www.mywire.com/a/Oxford-Companion-Politics-World/Food-Politics/9577797/?&pbl=105</ref>However, although the embargo was technically a failure, the inefficiencies in which the [[Soviet Union|Soviet Union]] encountered while receiving grain from other sources besides the United States did cause the Soviets to pay somewhat more than they would have if the [[United States|United States]] had not imposed the grain embargo. <ref>http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/80/08/Russian_Aug_Sep1980.pdf</ref>

Revision as of 19:26, 13 November 2009

In international relations, food power is the act of withholding or making available agricultural commodities for export or aid by an exporting nation or group of nations for the purpose of influencing the actions of another country or group of countries. Food power implies a foreign policy motivation rather than a financial or humanitarian motivation to export activities. Since economic commodities are necessary to maintain life and give life a material form, by denying access to food, life is threatened. [1] If the lives a particular nation are threatened, the government being denied food will most likely do anything in its power to get food for its people, i.e taking political action; making alliances, signing contracts, ect. A government can use economic commodities in the same way a military weapon can be used; either to punish enemies, or reward friends. The political use of this commodity potentially has the most inhumane effects [starvation], and thus is a weapon strongly parallel to military instruments.

Food Power and Food Security

Food security and Food Power are not the same thing.[2] However, they are often directly related. Food security is when all people of a region at all times have enough food for an active, healthy life.[3] Food Power is related when a government, company, leader, country etc. takes this security away in order to get something favorable. [4]Therefore, the two are often related to each other due to the fact that many countries employ the exploit of food power to threaten a certain country's food security. A country's welfare correlates directly with the welfare of its people, and therefore wants to have an appropriate supply of food for its citizens. This want, however,can easily be used as leverage in the politics of food, demonstrating food power.

Policy

Food politics are the political aspects of the production, control, regulation, inspection and distribution of food. The politics can be affected by the ethical, cultural, medical and environmental disputes concerning proper farming, agricultural and retailing methods and regulations. Food power is an integral part of the politics of food.

“Food is a weapon” Earl Butz , the American Secretary of Agriculture stated in 1974. OPEC’s use of oil as a political weapon brought on the possibility for America to use food as a tool against other states and to further the US’s goals.[5] There are alternative uses of food power as well. An importer can refuse to continue import unless political concessions are made. This would have the same affects that an exporter refusing to export would have.[6] An example of this would be American reduction of the Cuban sugar quota. In simple terms, the demand concentration (one importer being the dominant buyer) and supply dispersion (several exporters competing to sell the same product) an importer can try to use this exchange politically to their favor; this is especially effective if the exporter has little else so export (low action independence).[7]

Food Power and Embargoes

An embargo is not the same as Food Power, however, Food Power can be used in an embargo.[8] In fact, most embargoes that do not involve food in their list of restricted items often fail.[9] For example, on August 20th 1914 the Allied Powers began an embargo on important items that were normally shipped to Germany.[10] However, the embargo was not complete nor effective until food was added to the list of restricted materials.[11] Food has the real power. [12]After food was introduced the blockade began to strangle Germany's economy because they were dependent on imports for food.[13] Because the Allied Powers used the power of food in their embargo, Germany was forced to resort to desperate measures and eventually failed despite them. [14]

Another example of an embargo is the United States embargo against the nation of Cuba. With witholding as leverage, the United States wanted Cuba to adhere to the laws of democratization and human rights. Unfortunately,this is still an ongoing embargo. And, due to the declining situation and health of Cuba's people,[15] the embargo has been subject to much protest.[16]

Withholding

Conditions

Food power can only be used effectively if certain structural conditions apply:[17] 1. Scarcity: If demand is high and supply is limited the value of a given commodity increases. The price often reflects the potential of the goods as a weapon;[18] as it indicates the importance attached to it. a. Example: If a consumer is prepared to pay a high price for monetary terms he may also be willing to pay a high price in political concessions. 2. Supply Concentration: Supply should only be in the hands of few producers/ sellers, as this makes possible for limited competition, price fixes, or potentially a monopoly.[19] 3. Demand Dispersion: Allows sellers to play the consumers against each other as well as increase prices or make terms conditional.[20] This favors the use of economic goods [food]as a weapon.[21] 4. Action Independence: In order to ensure affectivity the seller/producer most control his own assets. Either the seller/producer must be able to control the production process, perhaps through governmental control over companies carrying out the production), or he must have access to means on the other dimensions to ensure that he can maintain or extend control over his assets.[22]

The four conditions listed above MUST be simultaneously present in order to turn an economic asset [food] into a political instrument.[23] This does not necessarily mean that the asset will be used whenever the four conditions above are present. Such a decision would be considered only if there were further conditions, for example, the nature of a given conflict and judgment, goals, alternative means, and judgment of utility.[24]

Employment

There are several uses for employing economic weapons against one country or another. One use for using economic weapons would concern the seller/buyer bargaining on the conditions of a business contract. This would include price, transportation, timetable for consignment and payment, etc.[25] Although this is an example of the successful application of “food power”, it is not a “political” objective. Another use concerns the economic objectives other than these relating to the transaction of goods; to the general economic policy of the buyer.[26] This would be balance of payments, general problems, such as, inflation or taxation, and land holding. What distinguishes this from the first is the fact that there is no link between the conditions laid down and the transfer of product.[27] The conditions refer to the economic realm of life. A political use would be one concerning the buyer’s foreign and defense policies. Many believe there is a “moral threshold” between economy and politics, making the use of economic means for political gains questionable.[28] Examples of the use of economic weapons for political aims are boycotts against certain countries as well as the buying of votes in the UN.[29] A forth purpose pertains to the basic assumption of the third category: the governments no longer accept each other as legitimate. The economic goals are no longer seen as a means of influencing an opposite government but rather to stimulate opposition and achieve the overthrow or capitulation of the government.[30]

Historical Background

One of the most controversial aspects of the international politics of food has been the question of “food power”—the hypothetical international power advantage enjoyed by food-exporting nations over food-importing nations. Food crises are created by affluent countries, not by demands of the poor in poor countries.[31] For many poor nations there is hardly any possibility to turn to the world market for food. There are only four exporters that are globally significant: US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.[32] This means that the rest of the world has to turn to any of these four to satisfy demand in situations of shortage.[33] Political leaders in some food-importing countries have at times argued for the importance of “food self-sufficiency” so as to reduce the vulnerability associated with import dependence.[citation needed]

This hypothetical vulnerability to food power has seldom been tested, mostly because food-exporting nations are constrained by domestic producers from withholding commercial exports.[34] On those occasions when “food power” has been attempted, the exporter's advantage has not been confirmed.[35] In 1980 -- 1981, when the United States imposed a partial grain embargo on the Soviet Union following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Soviet Union had little trouble finding alternative grain suppliers in Argentina, Australia, Canada, and the European Community. [36]Total Soviet grain imports actually increased during the period that the U.S. embargo was in place.[37]However, although the embargo was technically a failure, the inefficiencies in which the Soviet Union encountered while receiving grain from other sources besides the United States did cause the Soviets to pay somewhat more than they would have if the United States had not imposed the grain embargo. [38]

In 1990, following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, a comprehensive economic embargo was imposed on Iraq by the UN Security Council, but it excluded food and medicine exports on humanitarian grounds.[39] So long as rich countries continue to subsidize food production, international markets are likely to remain—in most years—a setting in which buyers rather than sellers enjoy a political and commercial advantage.[40]

North America

United States

Barley is a major animal feed crop.

During the time the United States was the most dominant in all areas like military, energy, exports etc. "Food Power" was not really thought about.[41] However, since some of those powers have since diminished, the power of food has come to the surface.[42] In the realm of food, The United States remains at the top, unchallenged.[43] The US has fertile lands, advanced agricultural technology, and an effective farm policy for maximum output. The United States has the position of being the largest producer and exporter of food. [44] While others nations, predominantly developing nations but even some of the richest oil-exporting nations, [45] are beginning to have food shortages and becoming more and more dependent on imported food from the United States, giving it more and more power.[46] This allows the United States to expect friendly behavior from the countries that import American food.[47] It is also likely that the United States would have some form of influence over these countries. [48]Even some of the poorest OPEC countries have become dependent of U.S. wheat.[49] Therefore, there is a possibility that the United States could restrict its food exports for political purposes.[50] With the existence of borders and with the possibility to control the international trade system so that benefits are geared only toward some, supply concentration is a means of influence. The US is among the most significant nations, thus the basis for independent action exists. The US formulates its goals and has the capacity to pursue them. The United States could use this Food power as a means of exerting pressure on OPEC countries. [51]Food power will be most effective in times of food shortage or famine because this is when those countries that have some dependence on the United States are most desperate. [52]

Europe

Public pressure can be highly effective. If food power is concentrating, even large corporations are vulnerable and exposed to sudden changes in public sympathy.[53] When European food safety procedures were found wanting in the 1990s, arguments from consumer campaigners for more ecological systems of food production found popular resonance and moved from the fringe to centre-stage in public policy. [54]Politicians intervened in the supply chain because consumers realized that they had little control at the point of sale. [55]The consumerist bargain (cornucopia without consequences) looked momentarily shaky.[56] In the EU, this culminated in the crisis over BSE (mad cow disease) which forced the President and Council onto the defensive. [57]Other crises, for example, over contaminated feed in Belgium and a wave of food safety scandals in the UK, for instance, highlighted the vulnerability of the industrial food system. [58]The policy question was raised that prices might be cheap, but at what social, health and environmental cost? [59]The implications of this question are still being struggled over within the supply chain, with companies investing hugely in traceability systems while consumer and health analysts argue that the externalized costs are not just microbiological. [60] Indeed, these represent a small fraction of the total burden.[61]

Genetically Modified Food

References

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Public Domain This article incorporates public domain material from Jasper Womach. Report for Congress: Agriculture: A Glossary of Terms, Programs, and Laws, 2005 Edition (PDF). Congressional Research Service. Paarlberg, Robert. "Food Politics." Oxford Companion to Politics (2008). Mywire. University of Oxford, 1 Jan. 2008. Web. 2 Nov. 2009. <http://www.mywire.com/a/Oxford-Companion-Politics-World/Food-Politics/9577797/?&pbl=105>

External links

  • Robert Paarlberg , Food Politics, Oxford Companion to the Politics of the World, Jan 1, 2008

Further reading

  • P Wallensteen, Scarce Goods as Political Weapons: The Case of Food, Journal of Peace Research, 1976; 13: 277-298
  • Paarlberg, R.L., Failure of food power, Policy Studies Journal, 2008; (United States); Journal Volume: 6:4
  • Joseph D. Coffey, THE ROLE OF FOOD IN THE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS OF THE UNITED STATES, SOUTHERN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS JULY, 1981, [1]
  • Thorald K. Warley, Agriculture in International Economic Relations, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 58, No. 5, Proceedings Issue (Dec., 1976), pp. 820-830 , JSTOR
  • Robert L. Paarlberg, Food, Oil and Coercive Power, in Mark W. Zacher (ed.), The International political economy of natural resources., Edward Elgar Publishing, 1993, ISBN 1852786027, Google Print, p.76-92