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==Spinoza/Einstein Vandalism==

Theists are constantly trying to call Albert Einstein a "believer", as the article says in the Spinoza section. For Spinoza, God was a word he used to call 'Nature' or 'substance'. All of the natural world is made of one substance, God, or Nature. God is not anything personal, not a being, and not outside of the universe. Just as Spinoza did not believe in a personal god or any being inside or outside of the natural world, neither did Einstein. --[[Special:Contributions/96.253.50.139|96.253.50.139]] ([[User talk:96.253.50.139|talk]]) 20:41, 25 October 2010 (UTC)

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Criticisms

I notice the page has quotes from Gandhi and the Pope that challenge rationalism. However it seems to me that they are actually criticisms of a different position. They don't seem to be criticizing the idea that knowledge can be innate, but rather the idea that the world can be understood by scientific means. Or perhaps they are criticizing something more related to the rationalism in political philosophy that is described below. At any rate, it doesn't seem to be this particular epistemological position that they are criticizing. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 76.171.57.234 (talk) 04:22, 16 February 2010 (UTC)[reply]

I agree. The word "rationalism" is used with different meanings here. There are many serious critiques of epistemological rationalism that should be inlcuded in that section, but Gandhi's is certainly not one of them.201.21.68.17 (talk) 12:25, 11 May 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Kant

"Immanuel Kant started as a traditional rationalist, having studied the rationalists Leibniz and Wolff, but after studying David Hume's works, which "awoke [him] from [his] dogmatic slumbers", he developed a distinctive and very influential rationalism of his own which attempted to synthesise the traditional rationalist and empiricist traditions."

That first part is simply false. The young (or "pre-Critical") Kant's attitude toward Leibniz and Wolff was derisive and mocking -- see Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Illustrated by Dreams of Metaphysics which was published fifteen years before the first Critique and attempted to show that the hallucinations of Swedenborg were no more ridiculous and fanciful than the metaphysical claims of Leibniz and Wolff. He regularly refers to Leibniz by name and calls his ideas "laughable" at least once. His feelings toward Leibniz and Wolff softened as he got older, and he used Leibniz as a reference point on many occasions. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 128.197.78.78 (talk) 19:48, 11 December 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Spinoza as one of the rationalist

According to Stuart Hampshire, in his book Spinoza (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England 1951), argues that Spinoza should be among the most influential rationalist since he was an "heroic" methapisist in the days when modern physics was getting a lot of popularity, in order to answer the question of human existence only using decuctive methods.

I think that Spinoza's main book's name says it all. Ethica, ordine geometrico demostrata or Ethics demostred according the geometrical order. (if my translation from Spanish is not mistaken)

--Dribero (talk) 23:32, 9 February 2008 (UTC)dribero[reply]

Uh, it's Latin, not Spanish. The title "Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata" translates to "Ethics demonstrated in geometrical order". 64.134.252.10 (talk) 07:04, 20 March 2009 (UTC)[reply]


Why is Spinoza not listed? He is there as a primary source but is not discussed like the others are...??? 10:55, 15 August 2009

Ockham's Eraser

JA: Under the rubric, "Do not ramify subtext beyond necessity", I am moving one editorical comment to the talk page, so that it can be archived for all posteriority. Jon Awbrey 12:27, 13 April 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Leibniz developed his theory of monads in response to both Descartes and Spinoza <!-- this is speculation (and not convincing, to be honest), because he found that Spinoza's response to the [[mind-body problem]] did not allow for [[individuation]]-->.

On speculation

JA: The way I read them, Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza are not just rational thinkers but speculative thinkers, and we need to exercise caution to avoid a type of misunderstanding that often arises in presenting the work of speculative thinkers. A speculative reasoner can present one sort of speculative system on a Monday morning, a very different system on a Tuesday afternoon, and an utterly fantastic system on a Sunday evening. But they can be, and in the case of these three, certainly were, just as acquainted with ordinary reality as anybody has to be in order to get through life, and they do not of necessity contradict themsleves anymore than Walt Whitman did. In the case of Leibniz especially, his speculations about what God knows and when he knows it have to be keep in a separate hamper from his knowledge of what we "fallible and mortal finite information critters" (FAMFIC's) know and how we come to know it. Jon Awbrey 12:48, 13 April 2006 (UTC)[reply]

They are historically classed as rationalists as opposed to empiricists. They may be speculative but then so were the idealists (even more so perhaps). Pretty much every philosopher, amateur and professional is in consensus about this. Hence on my course when I was taught about the rationalists, Spinoza, Leibniz et. al were mentioned. What are you on about when you talk about FAMFIC's? --Knucmo2 18:04, 10 May 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Malebranche et al.

As already mentioned, the less prominent rationalists have no mention in the article as of yet. How are we to go about mentioning their rationalist "credentials" without turning it into a full summary of their works. Somehow, the distinctly "rationalist" parts have to be emphasised. Is Gassendi a rationalist by the way? --Knucmo2 18:03, 10 May 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Well, as the category "Rationalists" is artificial and a bit vague in the first place, it's not easy to say definitively who ought to be placed in it. On the whole, I'd say that Gassendi shares enough with the Rationalists to be included (though his views on, for example, the possibility of deriving scientific knowledge through the senses changed through his life, and his scepticism and Epicureanism might be taken to set him apart from the Rationalists). --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 20:53, 11 May 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Hmm, I agree that the distinction is a little artificial. How about Malebranche? I'm not overly familiar with his works as I am with Gassendi's. Two good books that collaborators on this article might want to read are Cottingham, J. (Major Descartes scholar) Rationalism and Aune, B. Rationalism, Empiricism and Pragmatism: An Introduction, as they are valuable secondary resources we'll be able to use for the article and they're notable for their clarity in drawing out similarities and differences between the philosophers. --Knucmo2 21:35, 12 May 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Requested Move: Should Continental Rationalism be merged with the Rationalism article?

I vote no. As a user with a PhD in Philosophy, I think that (a) the current Continental Rationalism article provides a sober, satisfactory description of some of the modern rationalist philosophers, but (b) the current Rationalism article veers into what many academic philosophers think of as fringe material involving free thinking and anti-religious humanism. (a) Philosophical rationalism is generally seen as following a distinctly separate path from empiricism, but (b) humanistic "rationalism" is often seen as closely allied with contemporary scientific empiricism. Bottom Line: I don't think that the prospects are good for merging these 2 articles. I'd suggest instead that the current Rationalism article be left as is and that Continental Rationalism be expanded into something like Rationalism in Academic Philosophy, so that the thought of classical and medieval philosophical rationalists like Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas can be included, as well as 20th century philosophical rationalists like Brand Blanshard or Henry Veatch. --WikiPedant 03:18, 12 July 2006 (UTC)[reply]

You are saying precisely what I have been trying to say. I propose not that they be merged, but that rationalism should either redirect here or continental rationalism should be moved there. The content currently found at rationalism could be moved to something like rationalist movement. As is, it gives many people the wrong impression of what rationalism means in philosophy. Srnec 04:27, 12 July 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Yes, Srnec, now I see what you have in mind. Your suggestion works for me. It keeps the articles separate and rightly gives the name Rationalism to the academic philosophical stream. Sorry for misunderstanding your intent. --WikiPedant 18:08, 12 July 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Because nobody else but you has responded to dispute tags and move requests, I have unilaterally moved rationalism to rationalist movement and made the former a redirect here. There is a disambiguation page at rationalism (disambiguation). I still think this page ought to be moved to rationalism and continental rationalism ought to redirect there. Srnec 20:16, 12 July 2006 (UTC)[reply]
I agree that the correct next step is to move this page to Rationalism and redirect Continental Rationalism there. --WikiPedant 21:07, 12 July 2006 (UTC)[reply]

JA: People are not following the proper protocols for page moves. When they do, I will vote that the best name for the philosophical position commonly associated with Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza, et al. in Enlightenment Days and let us say Chomsky in recent times is just plain vanilla Rationalism. And please, I don't want to return here in the Fall and find an article entitled Just Plain Vanilla Rationalism. Jon Awbrey 21:18, 12 July 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Requested move

Survey

Add *Support or *Oppose followed by an optional one-sentence explanation, then sign your opinion with ~~~~

Discussion

Add any additional comments

I'm not ready to vote on this (in part because it seems that someone didn't quite follow etiquette here -- the rationalism page has already been turned into a redirect; that should have waited, moi), but it seems to me we need to consider whether we really need this change. Note: I'm a philosopher, and, myself, say "rationalism" to refer to the thought of Descartes, Leibniz, and (generally) Spinoza. But now that Wikipedia is becoming international, we need to keep in mind the broader perspectives of people from Asia, South America, etc. It might be seen -- somewhat goofily or not -- that three European dudes shouldn't be able to "own" as important a word as rationalism.

Basically, what do we lose by keeping this article at Continental rationalism, and opening the article like so:

"Continental rationalism (generally referred to simply as "rationalism" by scholars of European philosophy) is an approach to philosophy ..."

?

Not trying to be difficult; I've just been starting to appreciate how much many users around the world are frustrated by the Western focus of the English Wikipedia (which has become the de facto international Wikipedia). And, again: what do we lose by saying "Continental rationalism"? Note, also, the use of the term 'Continental rationalism' is not at all "rare" in the U.S. and Canada. --Cultural Freedom talk 2006-07-13 07:07 (UTC)

JA: The term "Continental" is inaccurate and misleading as rationalism is a logical element of many philosophies that are found on many other continents both before and after the fluorescing of the Big Three Enlighteners of undergraduate philosophy courses. The basic tenet is the pertinence of rational concepts, or concepts of the reason, and it is thus a minimal form of opposition to nominalism. This is the reason for its being taken up in the late great cognitive revolution by Chomsky and others as a counterpoint to the nominal replacement for psychology proper that was represented by behaviorism. Making sense of its influence through history is nearly impossible under the onus of the label "Continental". Jon Awbrey 14:02, 13 July 2006 (UTC)[reply]

The adjective "Continental" should be dropped from the name of this article. Rationalism is one of the most established currents in philosophy, ranging from the Ancient Greeks (not usually considered "continentals" in philosophy) to contemporary North American philosophers. I believe there was a rationalist school in classical Hindu philosophy, but have no expertise in this. There were certainly rationalists among the major medieval Islamic philosophers (largely under the influence of Aristotle). The modern continental rationalists (Descartes through Kant) as well as all of the other schools and time periods can be suitably covered in subsections of a single article on rationalism. It is simply unacceptable for an encyclopedia of any consequence to fail to have a primary article on philosophical rationalism. WikiPedant 17:13, 13 July 2006 (UTC)[reply]

I admit to not following protocols, but that was because the situation was already confusing and I think there was misinformation. The primary purpose of moving rationalism to rationalist movement and redirecting it to continental rationalism was to draw attention to the problem and to fix the major problem of misinformation: rationalism in philosophical discussion describes continental rationalism. The word has connotations outside of philosophy that have led it to be applied to many different schools and modes of thought which are not in any way rationalist (note I did not say rational). Rationalism, in philosophy, is shorthand for continental rationalism. Rationalism may have more than one dictionary definition, but only this sense is an encyclopaedia topic. The fact that people like Richard Dawkins have inappropriately misappropriated the term for themselves does not change its actual meaning even if many people (non-philosophers to be sure) have accepted this "new" definition: similar to using "materialism" as a synonym for "greed." Srnec 17:23, 13 July 2006 (UTC)[reply]
No prob about not following protocols! I also believe in the WP "Be Bold" dicate. I have no problem dropping "Continental" from the name, as long as the article is (or becomes) about rationalism in general. Right now, it's almost entirely about Continental Rationalism :). --Cultural Freedom "talk" 2006-07-13 17:52 (UTC)

JA: Similar problems affect the philosophical use of the term Pragmatism, which has come to have many meanings among both literate and illiterate philosophers in addition to the ordinary variety of popular and non-technical uses. Rather than lend diplomatic recognition to every new "movement" that comes down the pike, it was thought preferable there to create a catch-all article Pragmatism (non-technical). You might find this a better idea in this situation, too. Jon Awbrey 17:40, 13 July 2006 (UTC)[reply]

After examining the Pragmatism (non-technical) page, I'm inclined to think that it should be redone as a standard Widipedia disambiguation page. This seems to be exactly the kind of situation that disambiguation pages are intended to deal with. Srnec has already created a Rationalism (disambiguation) page, and I think this will serve well as the "catch-all" for Rationalism. WikiPedant 21:13, 13 July 2006 (UTC)[reply]

JA: Probably best to discuss all that at Talk:Pragmatism (non-technical usage). But I can fill you in on the features of its peculiar history — not all of which I know about — that are pertinent to the situation here. The page was once a lot larger but had a lot of content deleted by one editor back in April that nobody else has gotten around to giving a second look, and it just got rewritten by the addition of some new material that is still in flux, and so it does look a little "dabby". But it was not intended as a dab page so much as place to treat the everyday meanings of the word pragmatism. Most likely the name would eventually be shortened to something less awkward sounding. Jon Awbrey 21:30, 13 July 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Let's stay on-topic here, folks. Banno 21:50, 13 July 2006 (UTC)[reply]

The real problem here is that continental rationalism and the modern rationalist movement are so different as to be almost antonymous: most people describing themselves falsely as "rationalists" because (it seems) they oppose "religion" are in fact empiricists, which would be the opposing philosophy of rationalism. This is why there can be no overarching rationalism page. We need a rationalist movement page and a continental rationalism page with a dab page. The question, then, is: should rationalism be the dab page or the site of continental rationalism? I vote to keep it the latter in accordance with most encyclopaedias and philsophical usage (it is a philosophical term). Srnec 03:07, 14 July 2006 (UTC)[reply]

JA: Rationalism is not a school, it's an aspect of almost any, er, rational philosophy. Some philosophers emphasize this aspect more than others, and depending on arbitrary thresholds in the eye of the observer they get classified as "rationalists". As I have already pointed out, the fact that things like grammatical categories — say, NP, VP, etc. — are rational concepts, that is to say, concepts that extend beyond the finite empirical data given, is an important feature of "modern" cognitive science since the mid 1950's. For another example, even though Peirce is known for roundly criticizing significant features of Cartesian philosophy, he concurs with Descartes on the importance of rational concepts in this sense, and this is in fact one of the things that separates Peirce's original version of pragmatism from the radically naive empiricisms that James and the early but not the late Dewey sometimes drifted off into. Jon Awbrey 03:22, 14 July 2006 (UTC)[reply]

JA: As for the term "modern rationalism", this is a non-notable neologism that is not recognized in philosophy. The fact that anybody with a radio talk show these days can declare a new "movement" in pop philosophy, and most of them already have, witness truthiness, does not make that movement notable in reputable philosophical circles. Jon Awbrey 03:30, 14 July 2006 (UTC)[reply]

What are you trying to say? I, too, would not call rationalism a school, but is not an aspect of almost any philosophy. Empiricists may be rational, but not rationalistic. Some schools of rationalism and empiricism may share concepts, but they differ foundationally. Srnec 03:46, 14 July 2006 (UTC)[reply]

JA: Let's see if we can find some common definitions. How about the informal definition of rational concept that I gave above? Do we share an understanding of the difference between rational concepts and empirical concepts? For example, the rational concept of a Sentence is something that covers an infinite number of instances, whereas my empirical concept of a Sentence covers exactly the finite number of sentences that I have seen in my finite experience up to this point in time. Jon Awbrey 03:58, 14 July 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Agreed. Srnec 04:03, 14 July 2006 (UTC)[reply]

JA: Okay. Then let's see if we agree about the uses and abuses of ideal types, analytic ideals, what are more humbly known as textbook caricatures. For example, I am mostly concerned with scientific inquiry, and I find that all scientific inquirers, in actu, are mixed cases of empiricists and rationalists, no matter how the textbooks classify them, and no matter even how they might have depicted themselves, in armchairum. Do you observe this too? Jon Awbrey 04:16, 14 July 2006 (UTC)[reply]

As a rationalist, I do find that it is impossible to think without a priori knowledge and scientific inquireres are no exception. Certainly any scientist who wishes to maintain his sanity (or the sanity of his science) would be forced to abandon a Humean scepticism, which they could only do, while accepting Humean empiricism, if they accepted certain rationalist presuppositions. I hope that made sense. Srnec 04:32, 14 July 2006 (UTC)[reply]

JA: I'll take that as a yes, if only because it's late here, and I want to rush on by the nuances of a priori that might still force us to backtrack later.

JA: Now, scientific inquiry is really just a disciplined form of common sense, in a reflective and self-critical sense of common sense. And so common sense, which nobody gets through their day without, is a mixture of empirical and rational ingredients. That is, to come toward the middle from the rationalist side, even people who easily fess up to using rational concepts will also admit to using classes of rational concepts that they find themselves, willy nilly, testing against experience for the sake of judging their utility. Maybe some concepts are excluded from that testing, but hardly all of them are. Are we still on the same page about all this? Jon Awbrey 05:00, 14 July 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Science is not "commonsense". It is anything but the obvious. See quantum mechanics. Be clear with your terms in discussion. --Knucmo2 15:48, 29 July 2006 (UTC)[reply]
What types of "rational concepts" can be "test[ed] against experience for the sake of judging their utility"? And what does this mean epistemologically? It only means that we accept some rational concept as being good for attaining some end if we already accept the likelihood of the future resembling the past, which is a rational concept, for it certainly cannot be determined empirically. In the end, we haven't verified anything empirically even if we test some rational concept against experience. I don't think were still on the same page, but perhaps I should say that "common sense" may just refer to those assumptions which we accept as grounded without being commonly aware of their ground. Whether they are grounded or not, or whether that ground is empirical or rational is the real question. Srnec 18:32, 14 July 2006 (UTC)[reply]

JA: In the realm of lingusitics we have the rational concepts of a Language, a Sentence, a Noun Phrase, a Verb Phrase, and so on.

JA: One of the things that we expect of rational concepts is that they will have definitions that can be reasoned from in a purely a priori deductive manner, without any necessary reference to any realm of experience outside the experience of reasoning with the elements that are admitted into a suitably well-defined domain. And there is no doubt that we have something approaching a pure rational system in the example of formal language theory. Historically speaking, of couse, we never would've thought of such things if it had not been for our natural interest in natural languages, but once the realm of formal abstractions is formed it tends to rule itself by its own rules, as if it were autonomous and independent of experience.

JA: But I think that even Cartesian linguists like Chomsky consider themselves to be engaged in an empirical science of linguistics, and so they must bring the purely rational concepts and rubbery definitions of Language, Sentence, Part of Speech and so on to meet the road of actual parts of speech, real live sentences, and natural languages. And they will judge rational concepts of all of these things as being more or less useful for explaining the properties of their putative empirical instances.

JA: Something like that is what I think I had in mind when I wrote that hazy stuff late last night. Jon Awbrey 19:25, 14 July 2006 (UTC)[reply]

But would not a rationalist regard actual language as an expression of conceptual language? That is to say, language exists in the mind without being accessible to the senses. We can express it in writing (visual), speech (audial), braille (tactile), and many other ways which utilise the senses, but ultimately the sensible language derives its value from "fundamental properties of the mind" which are not empirical. Language can be contrasted with jibberish: I can construct a language of my own, but I can also construct jibberish and they are distinguishable. Whether or not either language actually exists, I can differentiate them based on these "fundamental properties of the mind". That is to say, I need not have actual languages to know what is fundamental to language. That actual languages possess these features is not empirically derived, but known aforehand. I can't see that language is dependent on sense experience. Can you explain why language must be accessible to the senses to be known? Or am I misunderstanding you? Srnec 20:25, 14 July 2006 (UTC)[reply]

JA: I don't know what a person whom you call a rationalist would say say about language, since I don't know whether we are using that word the same way. So maybe it's time to go back and see if we've made any headway with the initial question.

JA: I started out with the following statement:

JA: Rationalism is not a school, it's an aspect of almost any rational philosophy. Some philosophers emphasize this aspect more than others, and depending on arbitrary thresholds in the eye of the observer they get classified as "rationalists".

JA: And you expressed puzzlement with this in the following words:

What are you trying to say? I, too, would not call rationalism a school, but is not an aspect of almost any philosophy. Empiricists may be rational, but not rationalistic. Some schools of rationalism and empiricism may share concepts, but they differ foundationally. Srnec 03:46, 14 July 2006 (UTC)

JA: So we agree that rationalism is not a school, but just what sort of thing it is we have yet to decide. Just off the top of my head I called it an aspect of any philosophy that employs reason. This is probably because I consider the bare use of rational concepts to be the birth of rationalism. But we are many things at birth that we are not yet conscious of being, so maybe I should wait until a thinker is conscious of using rational concepts before I call him or her a rationalist. What do you think?

JA: Or maybe we should reserve the term rationalist for the thinker who is not merely a user of rational concepts but who asserts and truly believes that he or she has no need of anything else but rational concepts — well, they usually say in principle here. How about that? Jon Awbrey 21:04, 14 July 2006 (UTC)[reply]

To call it an "aspect of any philosophy that employs reason" is too broad. I think we may both have equivocated on the meaning of the term "rational concepts", but I'm not going to re-read this whole discussion. I think consciousness of rational concepts is still too broad. Your subsequent definition seems too narrow. I think most rationalists would assert that we have need of more than rational concepts to discover certain things. I cannot rationally deduce the colour of an apple, but I cannot know anything empirically without rational concepts first. They are precedent and foundational. To be able to know everything knowable in principle without recourse to empiricism is, I believe, a minority viewpoint even among those who are clearly not empiricist but tend towards rationalism. Unless of course one argues that all is reasoned by God and not known to him empirically, but to finite beings, such knowledge is inaccessible. This may be knowable if we recourse to empiricism founded on some divine characteristic (as Descartes did and as C.S. Lewis did). It seems to me now that the best definition of rationalism defines it as that philosophy which considers all knowledge to be ultimately grounded in reason and places empirical knowledge in a secondary position. Or, "reason is necessary for all knowledge and nothing is known solely empirically." Perhaps this is what you've been saying. How do you find this defintion? Srnec 21:28, 14 July 2006 (UTC)[reply]

JA: That nothing is known solely via experience I take to be a no-brainer, but that's just me. But are you saying that your definition of an empiricist is someone who thinks that some things are known solely empirically? Is there really any such critter? I mean someone who actually thinks that, not just someone who says they think that. Jon Awbrey 21:38, 14 July 2006 (UTC)[reply]

I agree. The definition now sounds too broad. But did not those British empiricists (like John Locke) allege that man was born a tabula rasa on which was engrained the content of experience alone? I checked Encarta (because it was easy) and it defines empiricism that way:
a doctrine that affirms that all knowledge is based on experience, and denies the possibility of spontaneous ideas or a priori thought.
Its definition of rationalism is far broader and vaguer:
a system of thought that emphasizes the role of reason in obtaining knowledge
So there definitely exist people who would (I think) accept the definitions I gave above. Whether those are the best definitions still seems up in the air. I think perhaps rationalism begins at "all knowledge is a priori" and migrates to a middle ground which still emphasises reason, while empiricism begins at "all knowledge is a posteriori" and migrates to a middle ground which emphasises experience. Srnec 23:18, 14 July 2006 (UTC)[reply]

JA: It's common to observe that there's quite a bit of wiggle room in that concept of "based on experience", and there are at least three different ways of reading a priori, somewhat analogous to the three nuances of the Greek archein, which can mean (1) to begin (2) to lead (3) to rule. But a couple of Golden Buddha Margaritas at our Chinese restaurant have left me in an East-West krater too deep to see the rim, so I'll have to leave this until the dawn. Jon Awbrey 03:18, 15 July 2006 (UTC)[reply]

GF: In the description of René Descartes' rationalism, isn't the sentence "Descartes thought that only knowledge of eternal truths [...] could be attained by reason alone; other knowledge required experience of the world, aided by the scientific method." contradicted by the first sentence in the second paragraph: "Descartes therefore argued, as a result of his method, that reason alone determined knowledge, and that this could be done independently of the senses."

Compromise, continental rationalism and the rationalist movement

There are two distinct forms of rationalism; the first is a philosophical school deriving from Descartes, opposed to empiricism, and dealt with in the present article. The other relates to humanist ideas of the 19th century, and is closely allied with secularism and scepticism, and is dealt with at Rationalist movement. (Incidentally, that page needs work).

My preference is to have the present article moved to rationalism, and disambiguation links to the other pages; this reflects the more common usage.

Septentrionalis, would this be an acceptable compromise? Kenosis, I'm afraid I disagree with your reason given above. i think that the two forms of rationalism are sufficiently distinct that it would be misleading to include mention of Descartes and co. in the Rationalist movement article. I hope you will agree to not including it.

Failing that, perhaps Jon, Wikipedant, and Srnec would accept moving the disambiguation page to rationalism and leaving this material here. Although not my preferred option, I would be willing to accept this.

Let's work towards a compromise, before the talk page becomes a quagmire. Banno 23:28, 14 July 2006 (UTC)[reply]

It should be pointed out that, should this page be moved, there would be a considerable workload involved in disambiguation and re-directing links to this article. Banno 23:38, 14 July 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Nothing quagmirish yet, just friendly discussion on a philosophical definition. Your proposal is my proposal. Srnec 23:44, 14 July 2006 (UTC)[reply]

JA: In the sources that I have found so far continental rationalism is a subtopic under rationalism. It usually noted that (1) that the label continental rationalism was concocted much later and (2) few of the writers so labelled would have considered thenselves members of a single "school", especially one that amounted to an "ism" of such extreme beliefs. Jon Awbrey 15:42, 15 July 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Both points are true. But the title of the present article is continental rationalism, not just rationalism; that is, the subject of the present article should be the philosophy of Descartes, Leibniz and Spinoza. Some might think recent edits preempt the results of the discussion by unilaterally merging rationalism with continental rationalism. Might I suggest that the article not be further edited until a consensus is reached? Banno 19:54, 16 July 2006 (UTC)[reply]

JA: There is compromise and then there is compromising the integrity of articles. I have documented what rationalism normally means in philosophy. All of the standard reference works that I have looked at so far say roughly the same things. Continental rationalism is a label that some use for a period in the history of rationalism, and others object to as a misleading concoction of textbook writers from a later age, so there's not much use having a separate article for it, as main articles on the main lights already exist. I just don't find reputable sources referring to anything called the Rationalist Movement, so that is at present a non-notable concoction. We can always do what we had to do with Pragmatism, and document the non-technical uses in a separate article, or maybe just a paragraph about "general use" somewhere. Jon Awbrey 20:10, 16 July 2006 (UTC)[reply]

"I have documented what rationalism normally means in philosophy." Yes, you have; but in an article entitled, specifically, continental rationalism. If your edits are kept, then there is no choice but to move the article to rationalism. Does anyone object to doing this? Banno 20:37, 16 July 2006 (UTC)[reply]

JA: What are you saying? Four people, including yourself, have already voted to rename this article to Rationalism. Jon Awbrey 20:44, 16 July 2006 (UTC)[reply]

JA: I am writing the article on Rationalism. The title Rationalism redirects to here. Jon Awbrey 20:48, 16 July 2006 (UTC)[reply]

If that does not strike you as an odd task to set yourself, prior to the movement of this article to rationalism, then I am at a loss. Consider the point moot.Banno 21:43, 16 July 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Removed redirect and placed existing content in rationalism

I've removed the redirect from rationalism to here, and placed the current content from this article in that one. Judging by the discussion above, this article may be merged anyway, and I have no judgment or strong opinion about such a move. But a redirect from "rationalism" to "continental rationalism" makes little sense. If there's any strong disagreement about that, by all means revert. ... Kenosis 23:47, 14 July 2006 (UTC) ... I also added stub sections for Plato et al and the neo-Platonists, with no judgment about how exactly that should all be sectioned in the end. ... Kenosis 23:49, 14 July 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Folks, take a look at meta:Help:Moving a page and Wikipedia:How to fix cut and paste moves. It's not just a cut-and-paste. Banno 00:40, 15 July 2006 (UTC)[reply]

JA: We are in the middle of considering a move from continental rationalsim to rationalism. The way this usually goes, Nightstallion or somebody will check out the vote after few days and do the move or not accordingly. I do however continue to stress that continental rationalism is a misnomer given the geography and history of the "position" that standardly goes by the name rationalism, as anybody can check in the literature if they believe in that sort of fact-checking nonsense. Jon Awbrey 02:56, 15 July 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Now that the page has been moved, there is a job to be done when you have some spare time. There are quite a few links to continental rationalism that should now be redirected to this article.[1] Banno 21:51, 18 July 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Some of the pages are talk pages and user pages, which probably don't need attention. I've been chipping away at the rest, and as time permits will continue to amuse myself with this task set. -WikiPedant 05:33, 19 July 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Cool. Have you thought of using Wikipedia:AutoWikiBrowser? Banno 06:13, 19 July 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Okay, mission accomplished. One by one (with appropriate minor rewrites where required) I have fixed all the articles which formerly linked to "continental rationalism" so that they now link to "rationalism". I didn't bother with user pages and talk pages. I also noticed another slight problem -- the new "rationalism" article appears to have some articles linking to it which should now link to "rationalist movement" instead. I fixed a few of the more obvious of these too, but people who have been involved in this renaming exercise should probably keep an eye peeled for pages where a link to "rationalism" should be changed to "rationalist movement". -WikiPedant 05:14, 21 July 2006 (UTC)[reply]

JA: FYI, it isn't really necessarly to change links except to fix double redirects, which is usually a lot less work. All you have to do is see what links to Rationalism, and then flatten the redirect tree to a bush, no political puns intended. Jon Awbrey 04:18, 31 July 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Thanks, Wikipedant, for fixing the links. Jon seems to have missed the point - again. Banno 20:41, 10 August 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Rationalism: a Philosophy, a "Religion" of some sort, or a Way of Thinking?

I came across the page on rationalism because another page listed it as a "non-theistic" religion or philosophy. The problem with this is that rationalism can be paired with any religion and any philosophy. Rationalism is a way of thinking and (for lack of a better word) rationalizing ones beliefs. In other words, if you adhere to no relgion at all without ever questioning why, this isn't rationalism. The same goes for any religion or philosophy.

Why does this page link to social Darwinism? I'm removing the lnik, but feel free to tell me if there is a legitamate reason. --NeoNerd 13:01, 20 January 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Excuse my pedantic intrusion, but I do not think that you will be troubled with a "legitamate" reason. However, I think we both should be concerned that the Version 1 Editorial Team has already reviewed this page.-- Infonomics November 14, 2007.
That was impolite, and in disaccord with the good faith principle of WP. Said: Rursus 10:23, 16 July 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Can we get a semiprotect or something on this page. Too much vandalism. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 146.7.196.17 (talk) 22:17, 15 November 2007 (UTC)[reply]

What is neoplatonism doing here?

Have I got anything wrong, but Neoplatonism is kind of a philosophy dealing mostly with gods and heavenly hierarchies. Does that have anything to do with Rationalism, which affirms the existense of unobservable truths and uses it to create reasoning models of the science kind? Said: Rursus 10:23, 16 July 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Socrates? Or Plato?

The section on Socrates makes all kinds of assertions of dubious credibility, considering that we have no primary sources. Indeed, it sounds like most of what is attributed to "Socrates" here was taken from Plato's dialogues, which have never been considered an accurate account of what Socrates actually said or thought. This is like quoting Hamlet in an article on Danish history. --96.32.176.174 (talk) 14:01, 14 August 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Minor change made to Descartes' Cogito ergo sum reference

There's a rather popular falsehood floating around out there that claims the "Cogito" is an a priori argument, when in fact the entire DOM is based on both an empirical form and rational skepticism (The Consequences of Ideas p.85-87).

If a true a priori does exist, then it must be cited as well. If it doesn't, then the whole subsection here should be overhauled. EDIT: Sources point to Kant as the culprit, but then we're using a critic of Descartes to define his own rationalism.

--Obiwanjacoby 04:16 22 October 2008

Article introduction overly pedantic

It is nice when an article's introduction (i.e. - the text before the contents) provides a quick and simple introduction to the topic for the uninitiated. Topics can be more deeply developed in the body of the article. This article's introduction includes two references and the words "zetetic" and "maieutic". It seems written more to exhibit the author's profundity then to inform the inquiring reader.

Anyone else have the same impression?

--Tcolgan 14:33 27 October 2009 (UTC)

neoplatonism?

what is this section on neoplatonism about? there is nothing on rationalism. if not changed i am going to remove it. --Dert45 (talk) 20:12, 5 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Challenge to classical "rationalism"

There is a difference between recognizing and using reason and the historical movement of rationalism. If we are going call anyone who appeals to reason a rationalist then there is no other kind of philosopher; they all are rationaists. Rationalism means and always has meant a continuous run of philosophers starting in the 17th century who emphasized the role and function of reason as opposed to fixed views of the Bible or leaving the little matter of what to believe up to your spiritual superiors. I object totally to calling any ancient Greeks rationalists. Rationalism starts at earliest in the 17th century. I've never heard or read of rationalism being applied to the classical world or the medieval world either, and not even to the renaissance world. It seems to me such an application is the over-zealous views of one or more WP editors carried away by explaining everything to everyone without much experience of or checking the history of ideas. You just can't know everything, boys. Please take all reference to the classical world OUT of there. I would do it myself but I am involved with other articles of need just as great. Alternatively, prove what you say comes from anyone but you!Dave (talk) 18:05, 6 January 2010 (UTC)[reply]


Actually it classically started in the 12th Century under Averrois. This is what we currently classify as rational thought...JCW.

Senses (five external plus internal)

"Taken to extremes the empiricist view holds that all ideas come to us through experience, either through the five external senses or through such inner sensations as pain and pleasure"


This seems to me an infelicitous, and old-fashioned way of talking about the senses. Firstly, it's not really clear how one can divide the senses up between internal and external in this way: it makes little sense to me that pain be considered as an inner sensation and touch (one of the traditional Aristotelian five) be considered as external. Secondly, it's is not very accurate anyway to think of there being five 'external' senses, there are not, touch and temperature are separate, etc. From the article on Sense


"There is no firm agreement among neurologists as to the number of senses because of differing definitions of what constitutes a sense. One definition states that an exteroceptive sense is a faculty by which outside stimuli are perceived.[1] The traditional five senses are sight, hearing, touch, smell and taste, a classification attributed to Aristotle.[2] Humans are considered to have at least five additional senses that include: nociception (pain); equilibrioception (balance); proprioception and kinaesthesia (joint motion and acceleration); sense of time; thermoception (temperature differences); and possibly an additional weak magnetoception (direction)[3], and six more if interoceptive senses (see other internal senses below) are also considered."


Grcaldwell (talk) —Preceding undated comment added 20:13, 28 August 2010 (UTC).[reply]


Spinoza/Einstein Vandalism

Theists are constantly trying to call Albert Einstein a "believer", as the article says in the Spinoza section. For Spinoza, God was a word he used to call 'Nature' or 'substance'. All of the natural world is made of one substance, God, or Nature. God is not anything personal, not a being, and not outside of the universe. Just as Spinoza did not believe in a personal god or any being inside or outside of the natural world, neither did Einstein. --96.253.50.139 (talk) 20:41, 25 October 2010 (UTC)[reply]