Talk:Ontological argument

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Mistake in criticism of Plantinga

This portion is incorrect: Consider premise 3': Maximal greatness is possibly NOT exemplified. It is possible that there be NO being that has maximal greatness. (Premise) Following the same logic, NO omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being exists.

Here's the problem: Following the same logic, it does obviously not follow that no omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being exists. This has to be deleted.

In case it's not that obvious for you guys:

Plantinga's argument can be summarized as this: (1) It's possible (in a modal sense) that there exists something that has the property of being an F (2) Something is an F if and only if it necessarily exemplifies F* (3) Therefore, there exists something that is an F* (from 1 and 2 + Axiom S5)

In this case, F would be maximal greatness and F* would be maximal excellence.

But even if there's a possible world where F is not instantiated, it does not follow that F* is not instantiated.

Just insert something trivial:

(1) It's possible (in a modal sense) that there exists something that has the property of being a maximal horse (2) Something is a maximal horse if and only if it necessarily exemplifies horse-likeness (3) Therefore, a horse-like being exists (from 1 and 2 + Axiom S5)

Is there anyone here who thinks that horses exists if and only if a maximal horse exists? I hope not. That's why I'll delete that portion.

If anyone can offer a formal proof that, given Plantinga's premises, maximal excellence is possibly exemplified if and only if maximal greatness is necessarily exemplified and can show me that this does not disprove the existence of horses, restore it. But this won't happen. 84.59.133.76 (talk) 21:13, 22 June 2009 (UTC)

General vs. Specific

This page is supposed to deal with Ontological argument, when really it deals with Ontological argument about the existence of God, or ontotheology. I think that "Ontological argument" should just redirect to "ontology" and people can get to Anselm's argument through one of the "Arguments for God" or theological channels, or just see the section of "ontology" on Anselm's argument. The page as it is is a misnomer, even if redirecting to "Anselm's argument." Funetikahl 20:11 25 June 2007 (PST)

you know a lot more about this than i (i am really only familiar with the descartes and godel ontological stuff), but i would tend to agree all the same. let's hammer it out here before making any more drastic amendments though. also i messed up the page restore, so i'll be readding the comments from the original ontological argument article now.--Kaini 03:15, 26 June 2007 (UTC)

Okay, I won't do anything else. It's just two other people had commented (under "Page Title") and no one had done anything about it. I suppose I'm a little impatient. Funetikahl 03:20, 26 June 2007 (UTC)

I think this was a bad idea, perhaps we could ask for community feedback on this issue. Every encyclopaedia I know use the term "Ontological argument" explicitly about ontological arguments for God's existence. More importantly, whatever you guys do, please complete it, the current situation is very confusing because Anselm's argument is really a duplicate of this one. This article itself is really low-traffic, so how are we to maintain two articles on this topic? --Merzul 08:33, 26 June 2007 (UTC)

perhaps you're right; maybe renaming the article to Onotological argument for the existence of God would be a better idea? --Kaini 16:46, 26 June 2007 (UTC)

I think that's better, but note that cosmological argument is also not about arguments in cosmology, but specifically about the cosmological argument for the existence of God, even when there are many different formulations. I really don't understand what the problem was with the title. --Merzul 17:34, 27 June 2007 (UTC)

I'm not a philosophy expert but I really don't think anyone's getting confused about what "ontological argument" refers to. Sure there are other arguments in the study of ontology and those may be called "ontological arguments" within context, but this is the known name for this argument. Onotological argument for the existence of God seems like unnecessary disambiguation. No good reason for splitting off Anselm's version; "Anselm's argument" is less used than "[Anselm's] ontological argument" according to Google and Google Scholar. –Pomte 02:06, 28 June 2007 (UTC)

fair enough, i was essentially just waiting for some bit of consensus at this point! no drastic changes have been made to this article, so i'm going to change Anselm's argument to a redirect to the relevant section of this article. --Kaini 02:33, 28 June 2007 (UTC)

For the record, I got very confused when I first saw this page. The fact is, it's just incorrect for the page on Ontological argument to deal only with the ontological argument for the existence of God, since that's only a small subcategory of ontological argument. You don't need to be a philosophy major; you just need to know the definition of "onthology." I renew my motion to somehow recognize the distinction, preferably by having a page about ontological argument from which ontological argument for the existence of God can be reached with one of those "Main article" links under a subsection. Funetikahl 21:44, 10 July 2007 (UTC)

"Ontological Argument" is the technical name for a particular species of theistic argument and its relatives. Yes, there are arguments that are ontological in other cases, but they are not Ontological Arguments(tm). :-) 129.62.170.152 (talk) 18:23, 6 December 2007 (UTC)

Thank you for adding the "see also Ontology." Since I don't think anyone's going to asictually fix this page any time soon, for now I'm content with that. Funetikahl 21:18, 13 July 2007 (UTC)

Tautology?

Does the ontological argument qualify as a tautology? Does it qualify as circular reasoning? Why or why not? These questions are never addressed in the article (and maybe for good reason, I'm not sure), but they seem relevant. Obviously I have very little experience in philosophy or logic; I'm just curious. Thank you. Xastic (talk) 05:52, 11 March 2008 (UTC)

You are right. It's pure tautology. But there is no need to involve logic or philisophy in any discussion about God because God is just a fantasy and fantasies can not be analyzed philisophically or logically. Fantasies have their own rules. For example, if I conceive of a little green people with antennaes sticking out of their heads, what can philosophy or logic say about that? 66.65.129.159 (talk) 02:21, 14 June 2008 (UTC)

Since you asked your question, the Kant section has been filled in, which should help answer your question. For those who criticize the ontological argument, especially Kant, it is a tautology. To me, Kant's argument seems convincing. But for those who advocate the ontological argument, either it isn't a tautology, or, if it is, it's a meaningful one. I have to disagree strenuously with the previous responder to your question. If fantasies can't be analyzed criticized philosophically or logically, how could we dispute their truth value or identify them as fantasies? Jjshapiro (talk) 01:52, 17 June 2008 (UTC)

I'm curious as to how you use the word tautology here. For the record though I'm a believer I've never been quite convinced of any of the philosophical proofs for God's existence; It's more intuitive for me. That said as I was taught the Ontological proof in college: it ends some thing like, ... therefore 'God exists' is a tautology and tautologies are by definition true, and cannot be rationally denied. You speak here as if a tautology is something absurd. I'd always understood them to be unquestionably true, because the predicate is contained by definition with in the nominative. Of course, tautologies are also considered bad writting for the same reason. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 72.16.146.33 (talk) 16:32, 6 October 2009 (UTC)

I ask does it not seem he has created an oxymoron one cannot believe in god because one is god and you prove it by saying that if you can think of it it therefore must exist, therefore you become the god creator.Mysha1959 (talk) 22:21, 29 May 2010 (UTC)

Dysontological argument?

Has anyone ever made an opposite (dysontological) argument against the existence of God such as this:

1. God is, by definition, a being greater than anything that can be imagined.
2. However, He would be an even greater being if He could do all that He has done without even existing.
3. Therefore, ...

It would be a parody, of course. Richard001 (talk) 03:12, 22 June 2008 (UTC)

I don't know if anyone has ever made this argument in this form, but it is very cool. It reminds me that I have been meaning to add to the refutations of the ontological argument, Nietzche's, which is a kind of existential/psychological refutation: "If God exists, I could not be God. Therefore, God does not exist." Jjshapiro (talk) 03:28, 22 June 2008 (UTC)

I thought of it myself, though I suspect I am not the first to do so. I say it's a parody, though given that theologians believe things like 'God can see exactly what He will do in the future, although he could have done otherwise', it might warrant serious consideration :)

I do remember something similar in God Delusion, though I think it was someone arguing how God was left with less and less (eventually nothing) to do and needn't even bother existing. Richard001 (talk) 03:39, 22 June 2008 (UTC)

Although humorous, I fail to see how this contributes to the discussion of the article. I guess if someone collected these lines of thought and made it into a section (or a new article if long enough) then it would be useful. Otherwise the speculation muddies what is already a muddled page of apologetics/anti-apologetics/how-to-improve-article. JECompton (talk) 14:11, 10 July 2008 (UTC)

I'm curious as to how you use the word tautology here. For the record though I'm a believer I've never been quite convinced of any of the philosophical proofs for God's existence; It's more intuitive for me. That said as I was taught the Ontological proof in college: it ends some thing like, ... therefore 'God exists' is a tautology and tautologies are by definition true, and cannot be rationally denied. You speak here as if a tautology is something absurd. I'd always understood them to be unquestionably true, because the predicate is contained by definition with in the nominative. Of course, tautologies are also considered bad writting for the same reason. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 72.16.146.33 (talk) 16:13, 6 October 2009 (UTC)

Gaunilo Section Unclear

The paragraph beginning "This response may be inadequate, however..." immediately follows the paragraph by Glenn, but has nothing to do with Glenn's case. It seems like a direct attempt to refute Anselm's argument by quoting Gaunilo. The way it's phrased, it looks like a case of apologetics. Even worse, it is a repetition of the first paragraph of the section. The clarification using the "numbers example" is not only pedantic, but presents a weak analogy (comparison of numbers with islands with God, all without clarifying how these can be formally related). The only merit I see in this passage comes from the organization of Gaunilo's argument in numbered points. Although I usually appreciate numbered lists for clarification, I find the current 1st paragraph of the Gaunilo section sufficiently clear and more expressive than the numbered list in this case. I would recommend deletion from "This response may be inadequate..." to the end of the section. JECompton (talk) 14:33, 10 July 2008 (UTC)

Why should God have necessary existence?

It seems to me that defining God as "a being who is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good in all possible worlds" as opposed to merely "a being who is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good in this world" is not at all well justified. I don't really think that this notion of necessary existence in all possible worlds is what the average person has in mind when talking about God. Unless we have a precise definition of what it means to be "perfect", there's no particular reason to think "perfection" implies "necessary existence". Is a being who exists in other (merely hypothetical) worlds really "better" in any meaningful way than a being who merely exists in this real world?

I suppose one could argue that even if we just define God as "an omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good being", that proving things about a God who is also necessary is even more significant than simply proving things about God. But I disagree. I can prove by the same logic that if a necessary unicorn is possible, then it must exist. This just follows from S5. But this is far less significant than proving that if unicorns are possible they must exist. Everyone ought to agree that the existence of unicorns is possible in principle (even though that possiblity certainly doesn't seem to be realized in the world in which we are living), so proving that their possibility implies their existence amounts to proving unicorns exist. Whereas the statement "necessary unicorns are possible" is far more dubious, so proving that things are implied from this statement is far less likely to have any bearing on the real world.

It seems obvious that "necessary X are possible" is in general far less likely to be true than "X are possible", since "X are possible" means X exists in at least one possible world whereas "necessary X are possible" means X exists in the whole infinity of possible worlds. To simply assign a probability of 1/2 to a claim that some necessary entity has possible existence based on a total lack of evidence for or against it is only reasonable if you likewise recognize that the uncertainty on this probability is maximal. That is to say, it makes sense to say the probability of X is 1/2 plus or minus 1/2 -- in other words the probability is between zero or one. This of course is no different than saying "We don't have any idea what the probability is". -- Tim314 (talk) 18:16, 7 August 2008 (UTC)

...I would like to start here and continue with this at another date with the word and terming of God. The example I will pertain to is the possibility of how God came to be, till then.David George DeLancey (talk) 01:48, 31 March 2011 (UTC)

Nietzsche

Besides his polemics, I remember that Nietzsche had a fairly direct critique of the Ontological argument as it applied to both Christianity and Platonism. Unfortunately, I can't for the life of me recall which book it was from. I'm thinking it was either Genealogy of Morals or Will to Power. Anyway, the quote went something like this: "We see that our world is imperfect, and from there we conclude that there must exist a perfect world." The upshot was that our conceptions of perfection are obtained by simply negating reality and are actually devoid of content.

I think this merits a subsection under "Criticisms and Objections" but I can't really add anything without consulting the source again. Anyone remember where the passage I'm talking about is from? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 74.72.207.114 (talk) 20:19, 19 August 2008 (UTC)

Cosmological Argument of Leibniz

This section should be deleted. Although a proof of god's existence, it is not the ontological proof, or even related in any way. Any seconds? CancelHoo72 (talk) 03:22, 26 August 2008 (UTC)

The article as it is, states Leibnitz' argument is a reformulation of Anselm's argument, which i don't see either: one philosophises about necessary causes, the other about the thought of perfection and its consequences, don't really see much of a connection there either. But i think, nonetheless, that Leibnitz' argument is an ontological one, in the sense as the first sentence of the article outlines it. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 84.182.247.76 (talk) 09:03, 27 August 2008 (UTC)

The article states that it is a cosmological argument. There is a totally separate article for this. I have checked the source and found that it is a paper on the proofs of god in general, not on the ontological proof. As far as being a reworking of Anselm, this is not in the source and it is obvious that it is a reworking of Aquinas. As far as the introductory sentence, the cosmological proof is NOT a priori. This is obvious by the bracketed term [observable]. A priori is "independent of experience." I am removing the offending section.CancelHoo72 (talk) 14:49, 27 August 2008 (UTC)

Ultimate atheist argument

I just wanted to put this UAA silliness to bed. The ontological argument is that the greatest thing you can imagine must exist outside of your mind as well as be an idea in it, otherwise it's not the greatest thing you can imagine. And then the second postulate is that God is the greatest thing you can imagine because God is by definition the greatest thing, and so therefore God exists. Now not everyone agrees God is the greatest thing you can imagine, and so that's why everyone doesn't accept the argument.

However the UAA is trying to assert, if it really is of the same form as the OA, that the greatest argument you can imagine must also be an argument that exists, that is it exists outside of your mind as well as inside it, and that the greatest argument you can imagine is the UAA. Ignoring the objection that the UAA might not be the greatest thing you can imagine(especially since what that argument might be isn't given at all), the greater problem with it is that AN ARGUMENT CAN NOT EXIST OUTSIDE OF A MIND. An argument is an idea, and ideas only exists in minds, and so the UAA must also only exist inside a mind (or minds). It therefore can not be of the same form as the OA, because you can never assert that there exists an idea which is not exclusively in a mind, no matter how great it is. Plato for instance held that only ideas really exist, but that these are the ideas in the mind of God.

The OA is asserting that the greatest idea you can have must be an idea of something that also exists outside your mind, and so it can't be simply an idea (although it could have ideas if you assert the greatest thing is the greatest mind) and the UAA is asserting there exists an idea so great is exists outside your mind, or any other mind in the universe, as an idea. However an idea is by definition always part of a mind, because only minds have ideas. The OA is talking about something that isn't simply an idea, whereas the UAA is talking exclusively about ideas, and so they are not of the same form and the argument collapses. And you can't weasel out by saying the greatest idea is one so great it doesn't need a mind, because you're now asserting that there is an idea which isn't a thought, and an idea is always a thought. 24.8.102.238 (talk) 05:53, 4 October 2008

(UTC)

Well...no. I don't for a moment think the UAA is a particularly useful argument against the ontological argument (however, I think Kant puts it away nicely) but the argument is based on the fact that the UAA would be a PROOF that God does not exist. Therefore it would have to be based on some impeccable logic or irrefutable empirical evidence. In that sense, it would not exist merely in the mind, as it would be a manifest quality of the universe that there was no God, if there was a UAA and it was true. The fallacy of the criticism is in fact here: if existence was a predicate, it would be a requirement for a being described as the ultimate, most maximally perfect being. However, the 'greatness' of the UAA would lie in how provable and believable it was. Existence, then, is not a required predicate.

npov

"Mulla Sadra, the single most important and influential Islamic philosopher in the last four hundred years". I see that it has a citation, but just because someone has said it in print doesn't mean it isn't an opinion. I'm going to go ahead and delete the sentece, it's a textbook case of a Peacock term. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 129.11.196.206 (talk) 14:26, 22 October 2008 (UTC)

Cartoon deleted

Link to a cartoon example of the ontologial argument was deleted because it clearly misapprehends the actual ontological argument and replaces it with the 1st cartoon character's interpretation of it. Then (sigh) it proceeds with the 2nd character deliberately omitting Descartes' "clearly and distinctly" and then perceives God as a jelly donut (an obvious non-sequitur). Which then magically appears. It baits the audience as rational in the first panel and then irrational in the second. Hence the gag. Original link: http://machall.com/view.php?date=2003-04-21 —Preceding unsigned comment added by Obiwanjacoby (talk • contribs) 06:00, 7 January 2009 (UTC)

Necessary Nonexistence

This section shifts entirely with the criticism of Gasking's argument. In particular, the last section sounds very unprofessional, a bit like a lousy undergrad paper. The section I'm talking about is:

Defenders[who?] of the Ontological argument would of course point out that the above articulation of Gasking's ontological spoof contains 3 rather obvious errors[citation needed]

The first error is premise 3. It would be rather dangerous to objectify something which is completely subjective, in this case being impressed with a 4 year-old composing a symphony.

The second error contained in Gasking's Ontological spoof is premise 4. Of course, non-existence is not an actual property. Only existing things or entities or truths have properties, something cannot have the property of nonexistence.

Going further, the third problem with Gasking's Ontological spoof is that another conclusion must be drawn which is absolutely necessary, and that is the conclusion that God created the world while at the same time not existing. Of course it does not take much reflection to realize that something cannot both create the world and at the same time not exist, for in order to create the world, the very thing which created the world would have to exist.

I think this section should be eliminated and/or integrated in the preceding text. If there's someone that knows much about Gasking's argument, I'd rather they do the rewrite than me. This text could just be deleted, too, which would also be satisfactory, but I don't want to slight critics of Gasking. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Alistaire47 (talk • contribs) 06:59, 26 February 2009 (UTC)

"errors" in Gasking argument

I've cut out this section, since it looks like original research. The text is below.

Defenders of the Ontological argument would of course point out that the above articulation of Gasking's ontological spoof contains 3 rather obvious errors

The first error is premise 3. It would be rather dangerous to objectify something which is completely subjective, in this case being impressed with a 4 year-old composing a symphony.

The second error contained in Gasking's Ontological spoof is premise 4. Of course, non-existence is not an actual property. Only existing things or entities or truths have properties, something cannot have the property of nonexistence.

Going further, the third problem with Gasking's Ontological spoof is that another conclusion must be drawn which is absolutely necessary, and that is the conclusion that God created the world while at the same time not existing. Of course it does not take much reflection to realize that something cannot both create the world and at the same time not exist, for in order to create the world, the very thing which created the world would have to exist.

 Я Madler  גם זה יעבור R  14:15, 26 February 2009 (UTC)

Misunderstanding Anselm

This article contains a common mistake. Anselm's argument is cited as:

   1. God is something than which nothing greater can be thought.
   2. God exists in the understanding.
   3. It is greater to exist in reality and in the understanding than just in understanding.
   4. Therefore, God exists in reality

But 4 is incorrect when given Anselm's position:

"Hence, even the fool is convinced that something exists in the understanding, at least, than which nothing greater can be conceived. For, when he hears of this, he understands it. And whatever is understood, exists in the understanding. And assuredly that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, cannot exist in the understanding alone: then it can be conceived to exist in reality; which is greater." - Proslogium, 8

Remember: He's bouncing off of the Psalm, "the fool says in his heart, 'there is no God.'"

By this, the 4 should be:

   1. God is something than which nothing greater can be thought.
   2. God exists in the understanding of the Fool.
   3. It is greater to exist in reality and in the understanding than just in understanding.
   4. Therefore, the Fool conceives of God in reality.

His point is not that God exists because existence is greater than non-existence. Instead, he says:

"There is, then, so truly a being than which nothing greater can be conceived to exist, that it cannot even be conceived not to exist; and this being thou art, O Lord, our God." - Proslogium, 9

His point is that the unique position of God in the mind is evidence that God exists.

The misinterpretation of Anselm is exactly why Gaunilon tried to reply with an insufficient argument. Obviously the concept of a "lost island" does not hold the same uniqueness as the concept of God.

That's also why Kant's "existence is not a predicate" reply is insufficient, Anselm's argument isn't completely ontological; it's epistemic!

But, it has historically been called the Ontological Argument, so here it will remain.

Comments and Concerns will be enjoyed. :)

...

For those of you who need it:

http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/anselm-proslogium.html#CHAPTER%20III —Preceding unsigned comment added by 74.203.158.34 (talk) 03:39, 27 April 2009 (UTC)

Thanks for this and the ref - very useful. But, from Anselm, should not your 4 read: "Therefore, EVEN the Fool conceives of God in reality"? This seems to be attempting to persuade us that God exists because even an idiot (or a simple person) can see it's true. Myrvin (talk) 07:11, 13 August 2009 (UTC)

After more thought, I've gone off my characterisation. I now think this all means that, if the fool can say ‘there is no God’, then he is actually conceiving of God – who he believes, ‘in his heart’, does not exist. But this means that even the fool understands the concept of God, and God – that which nothing greater can be conceived – cannot only exist in the understanding. Therefore, God exists in reality. There should still be an "even" in your number 2 though. Myrvin (talk) 09:10, 13 August 2009 (UTC)

Unrelated to your main point here, but still under the topic of misunderstanding Anselm: under the revisions portion of the article it states "Obviously St. Anselm thought this argument was valid and persuasive, and it still has occasional defenders, but many contemporary philosophers believe that the ontological argument, as St. Anselm articulated it, does not stand up to strict logical scrutiny.[1]" but this is not true, it unfairly attacks Anselm and what he was trying to do in the Proslogium, on the wiki page http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proslogion, it states that "Anselm wrote this discourse, not from the perspective of an attempt to convince non-Christians of the truth of Christianity, but rather from the perspective of a Christian believer seeking a rationale for his/her faith. His original title for the discourse, in fact, was Faith Seeking Understanding." another note: "As originally formulated by the Christian theologian Anselm (1033-1109), it was not meant to be an argument to prove God's existence; rather, for him it formed a way of understanding the God in whom he already believed." (Peterson, 92, ISBN 987-0-19-533599-6) anyway i think it should not state the Anselm thought it was obviously valid and persuasive, but i was not sure how that sentence and the change of section should be handled so i leave it up to you to decide. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 71.237.193.44 (talk) 01:36, 20 April 2010 (UTC)

Anselm's argument was that the only greater thing that a person can conceive of is something in their conceptions plus the reality of that concept? This makes no sense, since in order to possess a full concept of god a person would have to be as perfect as god; how else could they form an accurate concept? Their concepts would not encompass the full perfection of god, and thus that flawed concept would only lead to an imperfect being which as suggested by Anselm would also lack the necessary perfection of reality.124.168.144.254 (talk) 15:46, 26 February 2011 (UTC)

Gasking argument

"The third premise might seem odd; the intuition is that we are generally more impressed by, for example, a four-year-old child composing a marvelous symphony than the same composition of a professional."

This example doesn't constitute a valid objection to the third premise. A small child would indeed be severely handicapped in its ability to compose a symphony, as a seasoned professional would have the advantage of a much greater experience in this field. On the other hand, one could argue that a child who could accomplish such a feat must be vastly more talented than the average composer, who could only do so after years of training, and that under these circumstances, it is actually the adult composer who's handicapped. But if we, for example, understood "handicapped" in its medical sense, wouldn't it be much more impressive if a symphony were created by somebody who was born deaf, instead of a person with normal hearing? That's why I'd suggest to remove the lines about criticisms concerning the third premise (unless someone can bring up additional objections), and to start the paragraph with Oppy's critique of the first premise. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 77.56.178.140 (talk) 14:41, 17 June 2009 (UTC)

Personally I'd have to disagree. If hearing a beautiful symphony and asking what genius wrote it I was told, actually it was written by someone born deaf. I'd be disappointed to realize that someone who didn't truly understand the beauty of what he had created, had accidentally tripped on this beautiful melody. The symphony would be just as beautiful, but the handicap lessens the accomplishment not increases it. It reminds me of when I was in architecture school; a professor said that when he saw a design of what he considered to be great poetry, he was always afraid to ask the student how he arrived at it, because often he'd find the student didn't grasp the true quality of his own design.

I disagree with the disagreement above. Its the professor who saw the magnificence in the creation and no the creator. Similarly, we humans are seeing the magnificence of the creation. It doesn't matter if the creator grasps the beauty in His/Her work. The handicap does not lessen the accomplishment. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 99.228.61.208 (talk) 02:51, 14 May 2010 (UTC)

Image in bibliography

Pardon me if this is a completely newbie question, but why is there an uncaptioned image in the bibliography? Is it related to the subject of the article, or just illustrating the concept "bibliography"? (If the latter, can it be deleted?) Cancilla (talk) 06:05, 21 June 2009 (UTC)

Anselm of Canterbury or Avicenna?

The Anselm of Canterbury article claims that "he is famous as the originator of the ontological argument for the existence of God," while this article claims that "Avicenna was the first person to come up with the ontological argument." So which is it?--98.232.98.144 (talk) 03:15, 13 August 2009 (UTC)

Well, Amselm apparently has the fame for inventing it. 88.68.105.219 (talk) 19:49, 3 September 2009 (UTC)

Avicenna's argument, while it may contain ontological elements, is primarily a cosmological argument. Anselm's argument is strictly ontological. In philosophy, as an academic discipline, "the ontological argument" refers specifically to Anselm's a priori argument for the existence of God. The Wiki article would be much improved by removing all information not pertinent to the argument in question (this would include the whole section on Avicenna).

Anselm's argument, as found in Proslogion, is actually a reductio ad absurdum: It assumes the opposite of the proposition it aims at proving and then attempts to show that such an assumption leads to a logical contradiction.

1. Nothing greater than God can be conceived (accepted as a premise) 2. People, even the fool, have a conception of God (again premised) 3. If the conception of God does not include existence, then something greater can be conceived--A god which does exist. 4. To conceive God without existence thereby contradicts our first premise.

The simplest counterargument is, without contesting the premises, that of Aquinas: Anselm proves, at best, that an idea of God must include the idea of existence, but this in no way proves that God actually exists.

False dichotomy - Anselm or Avicenna? Actually, neither... Ontological arguments for Divinity's existence are reported in Antiquity: Sextus Empiricus reports that Diogenes of Babylon made such an argument for the gods' existence. There are scholarly articles on this matter if you look for them. e.g. Michael Papazian's "The ontological argument of Diogenes of Babylon" http://cat.inist.fr/?aModele=afficheN&cpsidt=18874067Emyth (talk) 17:25, 19 February 2011 (UTC)

Extraneous Content

I have deleted the following sections of the article as they are extraneous to the topic:

Avicenna's Argument--This is actually a cosmological argument derived from Aristotle's Metaphysics.

Shahab al-Din Suhrawardi's Argument--Again, this is a cosmological argument.

Mulla Sadra's Arguments--This is simply a lengthy quote from a work of dubious relevance to the ontological argument.

Problem of Evil--This is, at best, tangentially related to the topic.

Criticism by "essence precedes existence"--These are rebuttals to Avicenna's cosmological argument.

Alexander R. Pruss and Samkara's dictum--This section has only marginal relevance to the main topic and has the appearance of original research.

Apparently Wikipedia won't allow such an extensive edit without somehow verifying that it is not vandalism.

I strongly suggest the content I have mentioned be deleted. The large amount of extraneous or marginally relevant information in the article makes it a poor resource for either the student of philosophy/theology or the interested layperson.

I agree that the Sadra paragraph beginning: "Therefore, if existence is not created through the creation of a creator ..." appears to be the cosmological argument. And the whole section is much too big. I'll have a go at reducing it. Myrvin (talk) 10:24, 16 December 2010 (UTC)

Other suggestions for improvement

Besides the deletion of extraneous content I also suggest the following changes:

1) "The ontological argument has been a controversial topic in philosophy. Many philosophers...have openly criticized it."

This gives the silly impression that at least some philosophers disagree with the argument but have refrained from openly criticizing it because of its controversial nature.

The article should simply describe the most pertinent criticisms of the argument made by philosophers.

2) In the context of the Abrahamic religions, ontological arguments were first proposed by...

This gives an erroneous impression of the argument's philosophical context and pedigree. Avicenna, Anselm, and company were not only all members of "Abrahamic religions", they were also all heavily influenced by neoplatonism. A proper understanding of the argument requires it be examined in the context of neoplatonic realism. The form of neoplatonism found in medieval Catholic philosophy is largely due to Asian, and especially Islamic (starting with Al-Kindi), philosophers.

These philosophers, in turn, first encountered neoplatonism via the Christian philosopher Boethius (the definition of God used by Anselm in his argument [id quo maius cogitari nequit] is from Boethius) and the pagan philosophers Porphyry and Plotinus.

3) The article would also benefit by a more accurate synopsis of the argument and a direct quote of the argument as found in the Proslogion:

Assuredly, this [being] exists so truly [i.e., really] that it cannot even be thought not to exist. For there can be thought to exist something which cannot be thought not to exist; and this thing is greater than that which can be thought not to exist. Therefore, if that than which a greater cannot be thought could be thought not to exist, then that than which a greater cannot be thought would not be that than which a greater cannot be thought—[a consequence] which is contradictory. Hence, something than which a greater cannot be thought exists so truly that it cannot even be thought not to exist. And You are this [being], 0 Lord our God.

-Proslogion, ch. III. Hopkins

66.213.90.3 (talk) 17:54, 27 September 2009 (UTC)

Problem with Problem of Evil

"Some Christians argue that God's justice is easily reconcilable with His mercy: "Mercy in this life; justice in the next."

"The Christian doctrine of Penal substitution reconciles this, however. It argues that Jesus, being both God and man, represented all of humanity when He died on the cross. In his death, God meted out the justice, deserved by humanity, onto Christ so that God could be both completely just and completely merciful. (2 Corinthians 5:21, Romans 3:26)"

Neither of these two represents a viable solution to the problem of evil. The first one doesn't say anything and the second still leaves the fact that God created all evil in the first place when he had (and presumably still has) the power to stop it. Furthermore, how could humanity deserve justice when they were created by God himself who, being omniscient, knew prior to creating them that they were going to deserve his justice? Thus God would have had to condone the evilness that would emerge through us—his creation—and either actively chose to let it be that way or is currently powerless to change it. And those are just a few of the issues. These two replies add nothing to this article and should be removed. --logic— 02:34, 26 October 2009 (UTC) —Preceding unsigned comment added by Nathanmx (talk • contribs)

The problem of evil has no place with the ontological argument. Both are separate religious points/arguments/ discussions. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 82.32.217.177 (talk) 16:39, 7 November 2009 (UTC)

Both of the comments above are essentially on the mark. There is a weak attempt in this section to link the problem of evil to the ontological argument as follows: versions of the ontological argument require that maximal greatness be possible and (roughly) derive its necessity from its possibility. The existence of evil seems prima facie evidence against maximal greatness and therefore undermines its necessity and thereby is possibility. But this can be stated in a single sentence, and everything else in the section is just cobbled on. In short, the section should be deleted. Cerberus (talk) 00:26, 12 November 2009 (UTC)

The problem of evil is unrelated to this article. I removed it. By the way, Nathanmx's argument is not very convincing, because it assumes all kinds of things of good and evil for which there is no basis. Most importantly, what is evil or bad anyway? In order to make a muscle grow, it must be subjected to microtrauma, which effectively breaks the muscle, and would be bad as such. Likewise, it could be argued that good simply entails some portion of evil in the very core of the concept. It is possible, therefore, that the end-result of everything (including things we tend to call evil) is indeed the optimal amount good, the ultimate good, goodness in its purest form. There is nothing illogical in this explanation - that God condones what we call "evil" and is still omnipotent and all-good. Ask yourself if there is a maximum amount of good. If you think there is, then that amount (no more or no less) of good is the amount of good that and all-powerful all-good God would (logically) have to create. You cannot estimate whether the the maximum good has been established or not if you do not know how much of the things we call evil that good would entail, and can never know that, so you cannot say, that the evil we experince would be somehow a proof of the alleged fact that the maximum happiness has not been established. Then again if you do not think there is a maximum amount of good but think that "good" is limitless, then we are dealing with some relatively complex concepts of infinity that might appear counter-intuitive to some. If something is limitless, taking something away from it would still have it remain limitless. Likewise, if God was able and willing to create a good mode of existence manifesting limitless goodness, then having some non-good elements withing that existence would not render that goodness any less limitless. So the illogicalities you point are only true with certain assumptions about good and evil that are very questionable. But as I said, this has next to nothing to do with this article, I remove this part. 128.214.164.107 (talk) 15:37, 21 October 2010 (UTC)

Avicenna

Traditionally,St.Anselm has been credited as the inventor of the ontological argument.I have found no other sources that support the claim that Avicenna was the first to develop this argument.In fact,99% of the sources say St Anselm did.It shold be noticed that Avicenna argument,though it has an ontological basis,is very different from the original argument.And it´s really cosmological(The first paragraph of the section is repedted in the cosmological argument page. So,I´ll remove any information regarding Avicenna in this article.--Knight1993 (talk) 02:50, 20 April 2010 (UTC)

I've reverted your edits. The material you have removed appears to comply with WP:V. A policy=reliably source based reason for it's removal isn't clear from your statement. Sean.hoyland - talk 03:51, 20 April 2010 (UTC)

The problem is that they are practically the only sources to tell that.I can give you at least 300 sources about the ontological argument that don´t meantion Avicenna at all.And another main problem is that that particular info was written by an editor that is well known by his extreme pro-Islam bias.--Knight1993 (talk) 17:43, 23 April 2010 (UTC)

Sentence must be revised or removed

"Classical theism states that God is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent, without worrying whether these terms (even assuming they are meaningful) can be coherently jointly asserted."

The first part is untrue because "omnibenevolent" is not a word used by theologians of note. It is mainly used by atheists who wish to disprove God's existence. There are, in fact, no Bible verses to support the idea that God is "omnibenevolent" if that word means giving only good things, and never punishment or trouble. The word "omnibenevolent" does not appear in the Bible, in any language. God is omniscient, omnipotent, holy, righteous, and just. Any thought of God's goodness must be balanced by an understanding of God's justice. http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/14569a.htm

The second part of the sentence is untrue, and completely ignores the millennia of Christian scholarship that have occurred since Jesus was resurrected. Seriously? Have we all not heard of churches splitting, battles fought, people excommunicated, monks arguing and punching each other, and so on, and all over theology? To say that theologians "don't worry" about whether their statements are logicallly consistent is just ignorant. http://philchristi.org/ http://stjrussianorthodox.com/theology.htm http://www.reformed.org/documents/wcf_with_proofs/ http://www.vatican.va/archive/catechism/ccc_toc.htm (etc. etc. ad infinitum!)

Because neither of these statements is true or sourced, I think this sentence should be deleted. The article is just fine without it.

Agreed. The sentence is essentially somebody's personal argument and is irrelevant to the article. Pruss, your recent deletion of a cosmological argument and some miscellaneous original speculation is totally on the mark, IMO. ... Kenosis (talk) 17:53, 11 November 2010 (UTC)

Bertrand Russell's criticism

-- It has also received its share of criticism from non-Christians: Bertrand Russell noted that "The argument does not, to a modern mind, seem very convincing, but it is easier to feel convinced that it must be fallacious than it is to find out precisely where the fallacy lies." --

This hardly sounds like a criticism. In fact Russell is saying that it is difficult to discover where the argument is fallacious and seems to imply that it may not be fallacious at all. While not rejecting the argument's validity, this quote also does not state that Russell did not believe the argument was sound, which by necessity he must have. I'm sure someone can find a better quote. One that is actually critical to the ontological argument -- not defending its validity. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 97.126.158.140 (talk) 01:35, 5 April 2011 (UTC)

"this quote also does not state that Russell did not believe the argument was sound, which by necessity he must have" Huh? What necessity? Have you read anything he wrote? Russell was far from any sort of believer, a direct contradiction to the claim he believed this argument sound. To me, you've just engaged in contorted original research; I really don't see how you think this single quote implies Russell thought the argument was sound and supported it. GManNickG (talk) 02:10, 5 April 2011 (UTC)

Come on GMan, there's no need to be rude. Rather than insulting people, you might find another quote, as suggested. I'll look too. Myrvin (talk) 08:40, 5 April 2011 (UTC)

How about this from "Why I am not a Christian":

I for a long time accepted the argument of the First Cause, until one day, at the age of eighteen, I read John Stuart Mill's Autobiography, and I there found this sentence: "My father taught me that the question, Who made me? cannot be answered, since it immediately suggests the further question, Who made God?" That very simple sentence showed me, as I still think, the fallacy in the argument of the First Cause. If everything must have a cause, then God must have a cause. If there can be anything without a cause, it may just as well be the world as God, so that there cannot be any validity in that argument.

Myrvin (talk) 09:18, 5 April 2011 (UTC)

I've put this in a new sub-section. Myrvin (talk) 09:35, 5 April 2011 (UTC)

I would just like to point out that the above quoted section was with regards to the cosmological argument not the ontological one. I do not believe he addresses the ontological argument in "Why I am Not a Christian". -OhMan.

I shuffled this argument about to unconfuse it. You are quite right, I've removed it. Tut! Myrvin (talk) 20:20, 12 April 2011 (UTC)

Let me try again. In this [1] Russell writes of Leibniz: "He ought, therefore, to have arrived at Kant's position that existence is not a predicate, and that God's non-existence cannot be self-contradictory." Myrvin (talk) 20:37, 12 April 2011 (UTC)

Mulla Sadra

So why did someone delete all that Mulla Sadra stuff? I do not know anything about him, and it was strange that his response was so intricately reported on when Aquinas's can be summarized in a few sentences. However, I am not aware of any reason to just delete those parts. Am I missing something before I undo all the deletes? —Preceding unsigned comment added by Qowieury (talk • contribs) 08:20, 15 May 2011 (UTC)

"Samskara's Dictum"

I have changed some of the wording of this section to reflect the Wikipedia style guide. I have also deleted a seemingly extraneous sentence that cannot be plausibly mistaken for meeting the neutral point-of-view guidelines of wikipedia, and added a citation tag to a clause that reads that original research. Furthermore, it cites to Alexander Pruss- I have read much of his work and I am very confident, based on the language of the section, that Pruss himself has written it and I advise that some inquiry be directed thusly. 76.118.32.67 (talk) 23:11, 17 July 2011 (UTC)