Talk:Noumenon

Old comments

I completely rewrote the article. No disrespect for anything other than your philosophical presumptions, guys--but you really shouldn't write articles about stuff that you don't know about. --Larry Sanger

Yeah, but do you have to gloat about it? --Ed Poor

I'm not gloating, I'm disgusted! I'm not trying to lord it over anybody. I really honestly think that people should not write about stuff that they don't know about. I don't do it (or, I'm not aware of doing it) in other fields; why do other people who don't know about philosophy think they can write about it? --Larry Sanger

I am no Kant scholar, but I think he would have taken issue with the description of the noumenal realm as "a basic reality underlying observable phenomena". In the Critique of Pure Reason, he states, "[t]hat ... which we entitle 'noumenon' must be understood as being such only in a negative sense" (B309)--that which is "not an object of our sensible intuition" (B307). The definition given here is positive and uses the words "basic" and "underlying"--language used to describe phenomena, and which cannot rightly be applied to noumena. I would like to replace this definition to make it consistent with the Kantian sense in which the term is generally used unless anyone would disagree...

I think I agree with the above proposition. A statement that the noumenon "underlies" anything or forms its "basis" would seem to me to establish a causal link between the noumenon and other things, which, to my knowledge, is a link Kant would not have made between it and anything else. However, I'm not entirely sure of this; I'm rereading Kant lately, and if anyone else finds a definite refutation of this then he or she should let us know. Otherwise, I vote that we use a definition more reflective of the above statements. (A final request, though-- let's not change anything because of what we think Kant would have taken issue with, especially when textual evidence of his position is readily available.)

Because everybody thinks they know about philosophy. It's only because I've actually studied it for a few years that I've learned enough to really understand the scope of my own ignorance. For everybody else, they don't know enough about to realize that they don't know anything. --LDC

Please leave the link to [[Phenomenon (Kant). I don't know if Larry will actually write an article, but it is an appropriate link from the article as written which addresses mainly the use of noumenon as used by Kant. Fredbauder 16:07 Oct 25, 2002 (UTC) and gay dudes

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Regarding the article on Noumenon: I've barely read Kant, so maybe its my fault, but can someone please explain to me what the text in the article means when it says Max Born solves the enigma of Kant's Ding an Sich with the statement One person cannot convey the concept of the color red, but two people can agree (on the color). Is this really what Kant meant by Noumenon? It doesn't seem right to me. Its also strange to say that he "solved" the enigma--I did read Hegel, and I know that both Hegel and Gottlieb Fichte, as well as other German Idealists, made arguments refuting the notion of the thing-in-itself. Hegel says there is no thing-in-itself that is beyond understanding. Does this article need to be changed and corrected? Brianshapiro

I'm removing that paragraph...169.207.87.118 is writing about something he doesn't understand. Obviously, philosophers generally recognize some kind of distinction along the lines made by Kant and Locke but disagree about whether noumenon or "unobservables" are "unknowable" as Kant says they are. B 16:28, May 5, 2004 (UTC)

Noumena

Philosophy is hard to restrict to people who have 'studied' it. Philosophy, along with all arts, fine arts, and social sciences, pertain to everyone. And the proletariat can hardly be expected to go deeply into all fields of enquiry. People like Larry (who rewrote the article, I think) should keep up the good work, without delusions of intellectual grandeur. Humans shouldn't be relegated to the world of noumena!

I agree. My studies of Physics involved a great deal of discussion of philosophy, and so have my wife's studies of art history. Not everyone qualified to discuss the topic needs to be an actual philosopher. MichaelCrawford 00:21, 31 March 2006 (UTC)

Well, insofar as there can be a philosophy of pretty much anything, the boundaries between philosophy and any subject are somewhat blurred. But if you're trained in art history or physics then it's not a given that you'll produce good philosophy just because there are some philosophical issues that naturally arise from your subject matter. (I mean, just empirically, there are many examples of bad philosophy done by famous scientists, and that's in issues on their own turf.) For despite the overlap, philosophy is nonetheless its own subject and has its own modes of inquiry. These have to be studied and practiced with as much effort as any other subject. It doesn't do just to say that it pertains to everyone - physics also pertains to everyone (quite literally) but that doesn't mean I'm going to go comment on the mechanics of heat diffusion in a plasma unless I know an awful lot about it. And knowing a lot about it will probably take a few years of study. Until then, I'll obviously defer to a physicist. I don't see why the same is not true of philosophy, particularly with respect to articles on similarly technical vocabulary, such as 'noumenon'. zenpea 10:21, 31 March 2006 (UTC)

Noumenon and Buddhism

Wondering if there is space or reason to put a subnote about the very common error of attributing this term and to a degree, Transcendental Idealism as being what the Buddhist notion of the two truths and emptiness is about. (20040302)

Noumenon / Transcendental Object / Thing in Itself

First, one might wonder how Kant could say noumenon and phenomenon stand in any kind of relationship insofar as the categories of relation cannot be applied to noumenon. But of course, if the form of logical judgments are distinguished from the categories of understanding, it's easy to show that whilst we can *judge* that they stand in a logical relation, we can only make *negative* claims about the metaphysics underlyling it (e.g. that the relationship is not one of inherence/subsistence, cause/effect or community/reciprocity). Perhaps this element of the connection between noumenon and phenomenon could be made clearer in the article?

Second, Perhaps you might also mention the scope of overlap between the following distinctions: noumenon / thing-in-itself / transcendental object. Are they the same thing? Is there any merit to claims we should treat them differently? I reckon that, in general, flagging these kinds of debates in philosophy articles might be useful, given the amount of students who rely on wikipedia. 05:51, 29 March 2006 (UTC) zenpea

I've tried to provide a reasonably simple explanation of your first point in paragraph 4. 06:35, 13 April 2006 128.233.146.88

The article, in the "Kant's usage" section, claims that Kant asserted that we are sensibly cognizant of representations of unknown somethings. Then the article has the words "what Kant refers to as the transcendental object." Kant used the phrase transcendental object only once in his book. This was in the first edition (A109). There, it designated only an unknown X that is always the same and has no individual characteristics. The transcendental object is actually the unity of the observing subject's consciousness in its knowledge of an experienced world. Kant, therefore, used the erroneous triple distinction of representation, object, and thing-in-itself. This was criticized in Schopenhauer's criticism of the Kantian philosophy. Schopenhauer claimed that there is no represented (transcendental) object. There is only a distinction between representation and thing-in-itself.Lestrade 14:00, 20 June 2006 (UTC)Lestrade

Etymology

The etymology of "noumena" is perfectly fine, but the explanation of "noesis" seems abysmally bad. "Noesis" is indeed from the same root as "noumena"; it is an abstract noun made with the regular formative suffix "sis." It just means "thought." I'm going to delete this sentence in the article, unless anyone can support the "tendency towards the new" interpretation. Andrew Ollett 20:15, 8 May 2006 (UTC)

Good catch. — goethean ॐ 20:28, 8 May 2006 (UTC)

Indeterminacy (Philosophy)

I am re-adding my article on indeterminacy in philosophy since critics of Kant's noumenon consider it to be indeterminate for reasons expressed in that article. If someone wishes to remove it, then he or she should discuss the reasons for doing so here. Thanks, Tastyummy 06:23, 16 August 2006 (UTC)

First off, it isn't your article. It is Wikipedia's. Second, I removed it because that is a redirect that will be deleted. I've moved the original's name to Indeterminacy (Philosophy). Third, the body of the article already links to it. So it doesn't need to be placed in the See also section. I strongly suggest you familiarize yourself with Wikipedia's policies.Aey 06:29, 16 August 2006 (UTC)

It is my article in that I wrote it in its entirety a few days ago. I have given Wikipedia all rights to it, but I assert my right to take pride in my own work. I apologize for the mixup over the redirection thing, though. The body of the article only links to indeterminacy's disambig, which itself links to several articles. I thought it would be useful to the reader not to have to go through an extra step, no? (If not, no problem here.) Thanks for your advice; I do try generally to follow Wikipedia policies. Please let me know if there is any further problem. Tastyummy 06:34, 16 August 2006 (UTC)

The link is broken. I'm too new to know how to fix this quickly, although I'll try to figure it out. If you know how, please do so, since I'll have to look up how that kind of link works. Tastyummy 06:37, 16 August 2006 (UTC)

Nevermind. Fixed already. Thanks. Tastyummy 06:38, 16 August 2006 (UTC)

Removed because it's "erroneous and personal"? Defend your assertion, please!

I find it interesting that my statement that Nietzscheanistic criticism of the Noumenon arguably precursed the scientific method was recently removed due to its being an "erroneous personal argument". I'd love to see the evidence that I am in error in asserting that Nietzsche's critique of the noumenon did, in fact, precurse the scientific method:

The following quotation is from Beyond Good and Evil, the "Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy" edition, in the chapter entitled "On the prejudices of philosophers":

"'[...]Things of the highest value must have another, separate origin of their own, -- they cannot be derived from this [...] world[...] Look instead into the lap of being, the everlasting, the hidden God, the 'thing-in-itself' -- this is where their ground must be, and nowhere else!'

-- This way of judging typifies the prejudices by which metaphysicians of all ages can be recognized: this type of valuation lies behind all their logical procedures. From these "beliefs" they try to acquire their "knowledge," to acquire something that will end up being solemnly christened as 'the truth'[...]"

Nietzsche's argument against the thing-in-itself focuses, throughout his work, on its intangibility, its indeterminacy, that it is unobservable, et cetera. And science can only deal with observable phenomena, or processes which can be logically deduced from observable phenomena, and which thus are, in their own way, observable. How is Nietzschean thought, then, in its opposition to the possibility of faith-based "knowledge", not precursive of a scientific worldview in those regards?

It seems to me that the user who deleted the section I had written was, in fact, himself making an argument that was both erroneous and personal: without giving any further reason than that he thought it was incorrect, he deleted my statement. I, for my part, can provide evidence that the statement I have made here is correct. The reason I suggest that the other user's removal of the section was on personal grounds was, quite simply, that no other grounds are immediately evident: I certainly am not making the argument "for personal reasons"-- whatever that even means-- any more than does a physicist argue that the atom is composed of protons, neutrons, and electrons "for personal reasons": I am presenting an evidentially-based argument as such: you will note that I say that Nietzsche arguably precursed the scientific method, and not that he definitely did, and that to support my argument I refer to Nietzsche's treatment of the inobservable in general, which is supported in all of Nietzsche's works. The above citation is further evidence that I'm not just making this up: read Nietzsche yourself if you doubt this. I have read almost all of his works available in English translation several times; if there is evidence that I have been wrong about Nietzsche in all the years that I have studied his works, I would like to see it immediately.

I am reverting this article to the previous edit, and if there are evidential grounds that the section I am re-adding is "erroneous" or "personal", then I implore the offended readers to discuss this evidence before re-deleting them.

Thank you,

Tastyummy 08:13, 28 August 2006 (UTC)

One further note: this argument isn't original, by any means, and I am not the only person of the above opinion. In Darwin's Dangerous Idea, by Daniel Dennett, the author quotes Hollingdale:

"[...]Nietzsche considered that evolution presented a correct picture of the world, but that it was a disastrous picture. His philosophy was an attempt to produce a new world-picture which took Darwinism into account and was not nullified by it."

You now have user:tastyummy quoting Dennett, quoting Hollingdale, quoting Nietzsche. Dennett, as a bright, is a proponent of a naturalistic worldview, and his extensive quotation of Nietzsche throughout the aforementioned work indicates that he, too, finds Nietzscheanistic thought precursive of scientific analysis. This is clearly not "personal", whether or not it's "erroneous".

Tastyummy 09:06, 28 August 2006 (UTC)

Dennett is brilliant, and has made a career of stirring the pot with controversial philosophical assertions. I suggest if he's going to be used in "Nietzsche's critique of noumenon", it be accurately quoted or paraphrased, and cited to the appropriate work by Dennett. ... Kenosis 23:59, 30 August 2006 (UTC)

The idea that Nietzsche was a "precursor" to the scientific method is simply preposterous. He was writing in the late 19th century when science was well established -- indeed it was something of a golden age. Disucssion of the scientific method goes back at least as far as Bacon (1620). The stuff about Dennett and evolution is irrelevant.

1Z1Z

Removed sentence

I've removed this sentence due to the fact that it does not accurately represent Nietzsche's place in 19th Century philosophy with respect to scientific method. ... Kenosis 23:52, 30 August 2006 (UTC)

• Nietzscheanistic criticism of the noumenon found, for example, in his Beyond Good and Evil, was arguably a precursor of the scientific method in that both rely heavily on quantifiability and definition for proof of a statement of fact, and in that both find fault with the Noumenon's lack of quantifiability, observability, etc.... 23:52, 30 August 2006 (UTC)

Kant's use of noumenon sets up modern scientific method to stick with phenomena (the empirically "observable"). Nietzsche's approach had absolutely nothing to do with it. ... Kenosis 23:56, 30 August 2006 (UTC)

Kant's noumenon only "sets up the modern scientific method to stick with phenomena" to the extent that it is a wonderfully-lucid way of "describing" the indescriptible. Kant himself was no scientist, and his assertion that the noumenon lies behind all phenomena is utterly unscientific since there is absolutely no evidential support for its existence. And even if we do consider Kant as having "set up the scientific method" by writing works in support of the kind of reasoning science attempts to avoid, it was Nietzschean and other criticism of Kant that allowed the scientific method to emerge from Kant's epistemological "primordial soup". And Nietzsche had much to do with the scientific method besides: he questioned the truth of various "scientific facts" of his day which lacked evidential support, such as his age's formulations of atomism, which have subsequently been shown time and time again to have been incomplete and fundamentally flawed physical models; and Nietzsche managed to work this out without particle accelerators, or cloud chambers, or any other machinery more complicated than his own pen: he simply saw the logical flaws in many unscientific arguments by identifying components of models like his day's atomism with the thing-in-itself. Just because he didn't call it "science" doesn't mean he wasn't a scientific thinker, or at least, as I actually said to begin with, a precursor to scientific thought: Consider that in science a hypothesis must be testable. Long before the scientific method was formulated, Nietzsche noted passingly that "that a theory is refutable is, frankly, not the least of its charms". (-from Beyond Good and Evil, ch. 1, sec. 18)

He was also one of the first people of any real philosophical influence to consider the motivations of human behaviours in terms of instinctual drives; this line of thinking heavily influenced Freud, who in turn continues to influence much of modern psychology. Nietzsche's critique of the Cartesian Cogito was one of the earliest psychologies to consider the human mind as a sum of other discrete phenomena, and not as the single "subject", "I", et cetera: and psychology is a true emperical science to the extent to which it can predict quantifiable human behaviours, such as drug addiction. Few people before Nietzsche had the courage to say, in a Christian West, that humans were no more and no less than animals and that their motivations only appeared to be special because their observers themselves were "human, all-too-human". Where Nietzsche saw the Thing in Itself in a philosophy, he saw the object of a philosopher's faith:

"From these beliefs [in phenomena's origination in the thing-in-itself], they ["the metaphysicians"] try to acquire their "knowledge", to acquire something that will end up being solemnly christened as "the truth".

"I have gradually come to realise what every great philosophy so far has been: a confession of faith on the part of its author[...]" -both from Beyond Good and Evil, first chapter.

This sort of questioning of non-evidentially based arguments and explanations is an integral part of the scientific process. If we as a civilisation had continued, as Kant did, to argue for the existence of phenomena without evidence for their existence, we wouldn't have anything you or I would call science; we'd only have theology and its ilk! Nietzscheanistic criticism of the Noumenon is a mirror of the scientific method: if the scientific method must, as you say, (and I'll agree here,) "stick with phenomena", then it was Nietzsche, and not Kant, who deserves credit for "setting up" science! How can you say that Nietzsche had "nothing to do with it"? For better or for worse, Nietzsche profoundly impacted Western philosophy, and his criticism of Kant is reiterated throughout his work: this is historical fact! Whether or not you agree with Nietzsche, how can you say he had "nothing to do with" the process via which science moved away from "studying" the Noumenon, if you've already said that science deals only with phenomena? Nietzsche, unlike Kant and all of the Idealists who came before him, (--and, for that matter, the immense number that came after him--), questioned the "existence" of something for which there was no tangible evidence but which was nonetheless taken to be "self-evident" by virtually all philosophers in his day. Arguments about the origin of complex ideological structures found in Nietzsche's book, On the Genealogy of Morals, are comparable in many respects to modern work in memetics-- and Dennett agrees here, as well, so, again, this isn't only my personal opinion.

Unfortunately, all you have provided so far in this discussion has, in fact, been your personal opinion. You have not given a single shred of evidence for your assertion that Nietzsche "had nothing to do with" the scientific method. Furthermore, even if Kant had been remotely scientific in his thinking-- which, in my personal opinion, certainly wasn't the case, although I'm at least willing to admit that that statement is one of personal opinion and not of fact-- this is no argument against the validity of my comparison between specific elements common to Nietzschean and scientific thought: observability, for example: Nietzsche tried only to deal with what was observable, as does science. Any statement about something that is utterly inobservable is necessarily untestable, and, thus, not a valid scientific hypothesis. And Nietzsche made many errors, as did every philosopher I've ever read, and as do I: but this does not invalidate his work's influence any more than scientific criticism invalidates Kant's historical influence.

If my statement that Nietzsche arguably precursed the modern scientific method in certain very specific ways is, in fact, demonstrably wrong, then, by all means, prove it! Elaborate on your theory that Kant was more influential on scientific thought than was Nietzsche by providing some historical evidence, and perhaps-- heaven forbid-- by actually quoting Kant! "That a theory is refutable is not the least of its charms", quoth Nietzsche, but quoth Kant:

"It is a call to reason to undertake anew the most difficult of all its tasks, namely, that of self-knowledge, and to institute a tribunal which will assure to reason its lawful claims, and dismiss all groundless pretensions, not by despotic decrees, but in accordance with its own eternal and unalterable laws. This tribunal is no other than the critique of pure reason. I do not mean by this a critique of books and systems, but of the faculty of reason in general, in respect of all knowledge after which it may strive independently of all experience."

Nietzsche praises disprovability in a theory, while Kant states outright in his Critique of Pure Reason that he intends to "institute a tribunal which will assure to reason its lawful claims[...]"-- how is this in any way scientific? Certainly, both Kant and the scientist seek knowledge, but science is a process of constructive doubt, and not of the "construction" of "knowledge" out of a grandiose sense of self-excellence. And Nietzsche had an overly-high opinion of himself, as well-- but he spoke of his ideas on provability, et cetera, as though they were obvious, and not as though he had made some incredible discovery as Kant thought he had done.

Furthermore, how is Kant's assertion that knowledge can derive from anything other than experience in any way scientific? The scientific process is one in which conclusions are drawn from empirical data. There's no need whatsoever to mention the Noumenon in any scientific hypothesis: as is mentioned already in the article on the Noumenon, Occam's Razor neatly slices it out.

Some of what I've said about Kant on this discussion page, and not in the article, such as my implication that his assumption that he could actually create an immutable system of knowledge was arrogant and silly, has simply been my personal opinion. But all of my statements about Nietzsche's precursion of scientific thought are supported by historical evidence and eminent modern philosophers. If you have any real evidence for Kant's being more influential in science than Nietzsche, why not make a section elsewhere in the article on the argument that the Noumenon is part of scientific thought, instead of simply removing an argument that disagrees with it? You'll notice that I haven't messed with anything Kant actually said, even though I passionately disagree with him; I have appropriately placed criticisms of his ideas in properly-labeled sections so that people can think about these ideas for themselves. If you think Kant's argument isn't detailed well enough in the article, by all means, fix it! But don't remove an argument unless you can give more reason for doing so than "because it was wrong" (or, equally vacuously, "because it had nothing to do with it the scientific method, because I said so..."). Let's be constructive: I'm writing about a philosophical argument that I happen to agree with, but what I've written could just as easily have been written by someone who disagrees with it: again, note that I state at the beggining that the connection for which I provide evidence is arguable, and not that it is certain: why not make a section for counter-criticisms? This would provide the reader with more information overall, instead of taking it away. And what, exactly, do you mean by saying that Dennett needs to be cited here, anyway? I only quoted Dennett to show that my statement wasn't original research, but every last sentence on Wikipedia needn't cite a source, and certainly not if the subject isn't even really controversial. But just to make you happy, I'll include Nietzsche's own words in my next edit.

I am, of course, reverting this article once again. If my well-supported statement of an arguable connection between Nietzsche and science is again removed without stated evidential grounds for its being incorrect, I will contact an administrator about this.

Have a nice day, everyone.

Tastyummy 04:00, 1 September 2006 (UTC)

Update: I just reverted the article (except for the recent spelling fix) and then added a citation about Karl Popper from the wikipedia article on him as well as a quote from Nietzsche cited at Project Gutenberg. This should show quite clearly where I'm getting my evidence that Nietzsche was, to some extent, a scientific thinker.

Again, if someone else thinks he wasn't, I request that he or she kindly provide some evidence for this before removing what I've written.

Tastyummy 04:31, 1 September 2006 (UTC)

Discordianism?

I removed the link in the "see also" section to Discordianism. I can sort of see a connection between this statement

"[Discordianism] can be viewed as a simple rejection of reductionism and dualism, even falsifiability — not in concept different from postmodernism or certain trends in the philosophy of mathematics."

and the article on the noumenon as it currently stands either via the dualism of noumenon and phenomenon or via Nietzsche's and Popper's statements on falsifiability.

However, there are certainly many more ideologies which reject falsifiability and/or dualism than Discordianism (since, as its own article asserts, such rejection is "not in concept different from postmodernism or certain trends in the philosophy of mathematics"). Postmodernism, as a much more influential movement than Discordianism, would deserve a place here too if Discordianism does (and if, indeed, postmodernism in general actually and necessarily includes this position), as would such diverse "isms" as Dadaism and nihilism. But linking to every concept that is related to the Kantian noumenon only in rejecting an aspect of one of its criticisms would be a pretty monumental task.

It would be preferable-- but nevertheless not, in my opinion, terribly necessary-- to link to "dualism", for example, since the separation of the noumenon and phenomenon can be seen as a type of dualism; however, even this isn't specifically relevant to this article since, to be fair in using this connection as justification for adding this link, we'd then have to attempt to provide a link to dualism in all other articles on philosophical positions that either imply or are criticised by some given dualistic view of things. And as far as falsifiability goes, I've now linked to it in the body of the article; if this was the connection you saw between Discordianism and the Kantian noumenon, I'd suggest adding Discordianism to some kind of category for falsifiability in general, since Discordianism doesn't seem to relate specifically to the concept of the noumenon in its treatment of falsifiability in general (and if I'm wrong on this point, then the article on Discordianism ought to be changed to reflect this connection, since it currently describes Discordianism as a philosophical position in rather vague terms).

I think the person who linked to it here should create (or use) some category for ideologies (or, for that matter, religions) that are critical of dualism and/or falsifiability. I actually think that this is probably too general a category to be useful-- anything that purports to be "monistic" and to access "absolute" (unfalsifiable) truth would have to go in there, for example-- but that's a problem that should be addressed in the article on Discordianism. The "citation needed" tags on its statements about postmodernism and the philosophy of mathematics are there because that the statement wasn't clearly demonstrated to whoever placed them, and they're not being clearly demonstrated to me either. While the concept of the noumenon can indeed be connected to Discordianism, it can also be connected to Hinduism, or to Platonism, or even to sponges via the following sequence of already-existing links: Noumenon -> Natural world -> Animal -> Porifera (which redirects to "sea sponge", which includes a disambiguation page that links to other types of sponge). For a page to be put in the "see also" section of an article, it should be specifically relevant to the subject matter of that article and not just connected with via very general concepts, unless the article is a category, list, etc.

If I'm missing something here, and there really is a relevant and specific connection between Discordianism and the thing-in-itself that isn't shared by hundreds of other philosophical worldviews, please fix the article on Discordianism to include this connection before linking to it here.

Thanks,

Tastyummy 02:00, 8 September 2006 (UTC)

Some removed material

I've removed the following material in keeping with the request for citations in the article represented by the template at the head of the article. I inserted this material some months ago, but I wouldn't know where to source it because it's my explanation. Here's what I removed: ... Kenosis 19:51, 12 October 2006 (UTC)

• "Kant, here, is using a metaphor that is the opposite of "understand" ("to stand under"), saying instead that to "transcend" a direct observation or experience is to use reason and classifications (the forms of thought we engage in, including organizing and manipulating words and/or other symbolic representations) which strive to correlate with the phenomena we observe. By Kant's view, we can make sense out of phenomena in these various ways, but can never directly know the noumena, the "things-in-themselves," the actual objects and dynamics of the natural world. In other words, by Kant's Critique, our minds may attempt to correlate in useful ways, perhaps even closely accurate ways, with the structure and order of the universe, but cannot know these "things" directly. Rather, we must infer the extent to which thoughts correspond with things by our further observations of the manifestations of those things that can be seen, heard, touched, smelled, tasted, and/or measured in some way by instrumentation, that is, of phenomena." ... 19:51, 12 October 2006 (UTC)

The rest of the second paragraph I left intact, such as the references to the specific classes of transcendental aesthetic. They can be sourced quite easily (cite to the Critique of Pure (Speculative) Reason or some appropriate secondary source). ... Kenosis 19:51, 12 October 2006 (UTC)

Nietzsche's critique and science

I've realised that I may have spent more space in trying to make a point about Nietzsche than in writing an article on the noumenon. Looking back at it, I feel like I've all but written "Nietzsche was a scientist". This was not my intention. Nietzsche was a "proto-scientist", and he was definitely a psychologist, etc., but so, too, in his way, was Kant. While, in my opinion, Nietzsche's critique of Kant was a direct step toward modern scientific thought, it was necessitated by Kant's own work, as Kenosis said earlier. Despite the fact that I do think Kantianism has had a negative influence on philosophy, I'm trying not to put my personal opinions on WP without evidence supporting them. If I've failed to do this, please bring it to my and other editors' attention.

I'm going to modify the section on his critique anyway, since elements of Nietzsche's own philosophy (i.e., his Will to Power) are arguably noumenal themselves ("This, too, is will to power and nothing more[...]"-- Nietzsche's attempted monism can sometimes be reformulated as noumenon/phenomenon, so it's not fair to make it sound like Nietzsche figured the whole thing out. (You can make a Nietzscheanistic criticism of Nietzsche on the grounds that he contradicted his own critique of the noumenon: "The causa sui is a type of logical rape and abomination" (from Beyond Good and Evil) versus the "self-propelled wheel" of the total affirmation of life (from Zarathustra) is an example of this. And while he did influence science, he was not a scientist; I'll make it clear that Nietzscheanism and Popper's falsificationism are not interchangeable and that the two critiques are really quite separate, even though Nietzsche's quote on falsifiability does, I think, deserve to remain in his criticism, as he did make it before Popper formulated his epistemology.

I'm trying to revamp the "criticisms" sections to make them as NPOV as possible; if anyone thinks other work needs to be done to achieve this, please discuss it here. The Kantian noumenon and noumenality in philosophy in general are a touchy subject among philosophers, but I think that if we work together we can turn this into an article of outstanding quality.

I also might add a Wittgenstein quote, "of that of which we cannot speak, we must remain silent," if I can track down the source.

This article also needs to be updated to reflect Hegel's use of the term. I haven't read much Hegel, but I'll try to track down a lecture of his I once read in which he "criticised" Kant's Critique of Pure Reason at length but fails to eliminate noumenal elements from his phenomenology. I'm also going to discuss Kant's influence on Derrida and Hegel in the "Influences on Modern Philosophy" section, since it's really quite important to much of their work, for better or for worse.

Good night/morning/afternoon/evening, wherever you are, Tastyummy 08:54, 13 October 2006 (UTC)

Occam's Razor

I see that someone's re-inserted the assertion that Occam's Razor is noumenal into the section on criticism of the noumenon via Occam's Razor. I will continue to argue against this for the simple reason that Occam's Razor, being, as it is, a descriptible principle, is phenomenon rather than noumenon. If, as this article currently says, "for Kant, the noumenal realm is radically unknowable", (and with this I agree), then unless Occam's razor is unknowable it is not the noumenon or "part of" the noumenon, whatever that would mean. If Occam's Razor is a principle necessarily expressed in words, which are observable, then it is phenomenon. If it demonstrably relates to observable things-- i.e., if there is a causal relationship between it and anything empirical, such as a theory X derived in part from the elimination of redundant elements from a more complex, but no more informative, theory Y, etc.-- then it is phenomenon.

Even the word "noumenon" is phenomenal; it is a word, which is observable. Unless Occam's Razor is not descriptible, it is not noumenal.

Unless I am mistaken, this is consistent with the rest of the article as it stands as well as with Kantianism; if there is an opposing claim, please discuss it here.

Thanks,

Tastyummy 16:37, 30 October 2006 (UTC)

Positive and negative noumena

The relationship between the thing-in-itself and noumena needs to be clarified. A TII is only a negative noumemenon. Positive noumena are another issue. I should be able to add a section clarifying this with citations.

1Z 15:42, 23 December 2006 (UTC)1Z

Science and Occam's razor

The sections on science and occam's razor present poor arguments one-sidedly. I am considering merging them and offering counter-arguments, but it will be harder to add citations. Not that there are any currently.

1Z 15:38, 23 December 2006 (UTC)1Z

The Thing-in-itself

The article needs a discussion of the question of whether the thing-in-itself and the thing-as-it-appears-to-us are two different things are two aspects of the same thing. Most of the criticisms in the current article assume the former.

1Z 02:38, 24 December 2006 (UTC)1Z

Not related to "numinous" ?

The article now states "Noumenon is linguistically unrelated to "numinous" ". When I read our article about nouminous, I seem to perceive a likeness. __meco 22:16, 20 January 2007 (UTC)

"Nouminous" is indeed related, but more to the idea of a positive noumenon or intelligible reality. The present article obscures the issue by focussing on the negative noumenon=thing-in-itself.1Z 22:31, 20 January 2007 (UTC)

Kenosis

Please explain which specific editorial policies you were referring to in your decision to revert.1Z 13:31, 13 February 2007 (UTC)

'Noumenon ... is "defined" as "thing-in-itself"'. 

Do you have a source for that?1Z 13:50, 13 February 2007 (UTC)

"Placing section on Noumena and the Thing-in-itself under criticisms with an OR tag)"

1. Its not criticism, it is explanation.

2 If you can source it, it isn't OR, and you know that I can source it, because there were many citations of primary source material in the version you reverted. I notice that you have still made no effort to source any of your stated opinions on the subject.

"Kant's usage is why the word is in our lexicon today". 

I know. I stated so in my revision of the lead which you reverted. That Kant was not using "noumenon" in the classical sense was criticism made by Schopenhauer, as the article states. Kant himself aludes to the fact that he is using it to mean "not sensible" rather than "inteligible":

"If we are pleased to name this object noumenon for the reason that its representation is not sensible,.."

You attitude is most unhelpful. Your changes do not have editorial justification as AFAICS.

1Z 18:08, 13 February 2007 (UTC)

What 1Z (User:Peterdjones) attempted to apply to the article is original-research-based analysis of Kant, attempting to argue, based upon Kant's Critique, that "Ding-an-sich" (thing in itself) is not what Kant meant. I don't have time to give a lesson in Kant, but the assertion shows a fundamental lack of understanding of the context and influence of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. It's original research, and that's why I placed it under "criticisms" and put up an "original research" tag. That has nothing to do with "attitude" as you say here.

Briefly, why I reverted the newly written lead earlier on was that it started with an etymology rather than a definition. Currently the lead reads fairly reasonably again (after your last edits), so this time I left it as it stands. I removed the sentence alleging that "thing-in-itself" is a controversial interpretation, and as I said, placed the subsection on the same issue under criticisms with an OR tag, pending further discussion and analysis. ... Kenosis 18:32, 13 February 2007 (UTC)

One more thing for the moment. I did not assert that noumenon is defined as "thing-in-itself". Many editors have had their hands on this, and I support changing that to a more appropriate definition. The current definition is a reasonable choice in my estimation. ... Kenosis 18:56, 13 February 2007 (UTC)

I only have a few moments right now, and will need to get back to this later on. But as any decent encyclopedia of philosophy or basic exposition of Kant will tell, what Kant was essentially saying is that the thing in itself is the object of consciousness when we inquire into how things in the world work. We can't know the thing in itself, but instead must deduce its nature based on its appearances (phenomena) and by applying certain rational processes (about which he wrote in great detail) to figure out the nature of the thing in itself, the object of our consciousness, the object of our investigation. It was Kant's response to the debate of the day that ran from Descartes through Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. It also was sufficiently groundbreaking that it led to the use of the term "phenomena" to define the limits of investigation by modern scientific method. Criticisms by Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, certainly are appropriate to include because they are easily verified by many reliable sources. A firsthand analysis of the Critique asserting that Kant may not have meant "thing in itself" as the object of consciousness, such as was just added to the article, appears to be original research. Note, however, that I did not delete it outright, but instead only placed a tag on the section and moved it into "criticisms" for now. In due time, I'm sure we'll be able to sort it through. ... Kenosis 19:37, 13 February 2007 (UTC)

"Citing sources and avoiding original research are inextricably linked" --WP:OR

1Z 19:58, 13 February 2007 (UTC)

The material just added is Peterdjones' personal interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, and as such it is OR.

Please read the discussion about primary, secondary and tertiary sources in WP:NOR. Thanks. ... Kenosis 20:10, 13 February 2007 (UTC)

You're forgetting Palmquist and Oizerman.

"research that consists of collecting and organizing information from existing primary and/or secondary sources is, of course, strongly encouraged" --WP:OR 1Z 20:17, 13 February 2007 (UTC)

I've several times needed to remove or move !Z's comments placed in the middle of my submissions. Please do not break up others' submissions. Instead, kindly reproduce what's necessary in a separate submission, in quotes or italics, as needed to make clear what's being responded to. ... Kenosis 20:26, 13 February 2007 (UTC)

If Palmquist and Oizerman are offering an alternative explanation for what Kant meant, then note it in a brief subsection, placed after the main idea is introduced. "Thing-in-itself", however, is so standard a statement of what Kant was referring to when he used "noumenon" that it's not properly referred to as a "controversial" interpretation of Kant's Critique. Gotta go; talk later. ... Kenosis 20:32, 13 February 2007 (UTC)

I have written nothing suggesting noumenon=TII is controversial.1Z 20:50, 13 February 2007 (UTC)

See the following Wp:or#Synthesis_of_published_material_serving_to_advance_a_position. What you have written falls in this category. •Jim62sch• 21:06, 13 February 2007 (UTC)

Obviously not, since I am only using one primary source.1Z 21:13, 13 February 2007 (UTC)

Are you sure you understand Kant? •Jim62sch• 21:33, 13 February 2007 (UTC)

If you beg to differ, please do so using appropriate citations and not appeals to your own authority.1Z 21:40, 13 February 2007 (UTC)

"Removal of non-introductory material". what are you trying to achieve here? If you state in the introduction that noumena are "intelligible" and then give an unqualified airing to the "noumena are unknowable" claim , as per most potted versions of Kant, you are just going to leave the article in a state of contradiction.1Z 21:38, 13 February 2007 (UTC) What's "alternative" about the negative/positive distinction?1Z 21:47, 13 February 2007 (UTC)

For my money, nothing. It's mentioned by Kant himself, and the distinction is explicable. --Knucmo2 19:57, 20 September 2007 (UTC)

Oh, good grief. •Jim62sch• 21:49, 13 February 2007 (UTC)

The most recent draft of the subsection on "noumena and the thing-in-itself" reads much better now. First noumenon gets introduced, then a note is given about the typical presumption of synonymity, then Palmquist's interpretation of Kant gets introduced. Makes a great deal more sense now than it did before. Thank you. ... Kenosis 22:27, 13 February 2007 (UTC)

That is what I was aiming at all along.1Z 22:43, 13 February 2007 (UTC)

I made some changes last night to the [as yet uncited] first subsection of Kant's usage. These changes included some reintroduction of previous material that had been deleted by one or more editors who evidently viewed "phonomenal" and "noumenal" as different "realms" of existence, along with a number of other changes to the approach. I hope this helps move the article forward. All of this, of course, will need to be cited at some point, in keeping with the current move of Wikipedia from the expectation of being verifiable to being actually cited to reliable sources. Thanks, Peterdjones (1Z) and also to Jim62sch, for the incentive and action to improve. ... Kenosis 07:38, 14 February 2007 (UTC) ... I also proceeded to add s few preliminary citations for the "Overview". ... Kenosis 09:46, 14 February 2007 (UTC)

noumenon = "thing in itself".

"The philosopher Immanuel Kant used the term noumenon more-or-less synonymously with the phrase thing in itself (German: Ding an sich)"

This statement needs a more precise citation than "the CPR".

There is a searchable edition here

As it stands, the article is somewhat contradictory. It is stated in general terms that Kant holds the two to be synonymous, but quotations from the primary source included in the article indicate otherwise.

Alternatively, the claim could be rephrased along the lines of "it is often stated that..", which is of course supportable by secondary sources.1Z 18:21, 4 March 2007 (UTC)

Seb Gardner and others reckon the transcendental object and the thing-in-itself are distinguishable, but I'm not so sure about the noumenon. --Knucmo2 (talk) 15:36, 12 December 2007 (UTC)

You're nto so sure, or he's not so sure? 1Z (talk) 10:10, 13 December 2007 (UTC)

Unlike noumenon which is mental entity, and subject to thoughts or judgments, the thing-in-itself is more of a necessary condition for world's material existence or it's "reality". The thing-in-itself can be thought, and talked about (as I just did), but merely as noumenon. Discussing the "real existence", "material reality", "external being" etc. of thing-in-itself is out of scope of Kantian philosophy, or if you like: it's simply a metaphysical postulate, a part of Kant's general rejection of idealism (see Prolegomena - Part one of the main transcendental problem. How is pure mathematics possible? - Remark II). Note that questions like: "is there a thing-in-itself?" or "does the Thing exist?" make no sense from this point of view. I call it "the ontological anchor" - you cannot see the seabed, you cannot tell if the ship is moving. Now that it's been dropped you cannot see the anchor either. And yet you assume being tied to something firm all along. Pragmatic choice. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 90.156.11.152 (talk) 15:57, 19 May 2009 (UTC)

Misleading Wikipedia redirection

It is a mistake that leads to misunderstanding for the concept of Thing in itself to redirect, in Wikipedia, to Noumenon. As can be understood in the section on Schopenhauer's criticism, Noumenon's original meaning of "that which is thought" is totally different from the "thing–in–itself." The latter signifies things and/or objects as they exist apart from being images in the mind of an observing subject. This is the significance of the phrase "in itself," meaning "not for something else," such as an observer.Lestrade 19:35, 19 July 2007 (UTC)Lestrade

I don't think the redirect is necessarily misleading; the article could do more to explain the pre-Kant meaning of "noumenon" and less to emphasise the equation with the T-I-I; however other editors disagree. 1Z 19:59, 19 July 2007 (UTC)

If the concept of noumenon was created by the ancient Greeks, and given a clearly specific meaning by them, why does the Wikipedia article assume that that concept is defined as Kant's technical term "thing–in–itself?"Lestrade 20:48, 19 July 2007 (UTC)Lestrade

Much of the interest of the concept to contemporay philosophers stems from Kant. 1Z 21:57, 19 July 2007 (UTC)

Is that your personal opinion or is it an objective fact? I, for one, have interest in the concept as it was used by the Greeks. If there was a separate article on Thing in itself, then the difference between it and noumena could be clearly shown. Instead, a reader who searches for the Thing in itself is redirected to Noumena. There they are told that Kant's thing in itself is the same as noumena, which is definitely not the case.Lestrade 22:43, 19 July 2007 (UTC)Lestrade

We need some sort of clear poll on the subject. I suspect that if the articles were separated, they would only end up being merged. 1Z (talk) 10:12, 13 December 2007 (UTC)

Lestrad, the noumenon for the ancient Greeks is an esoteric philosophical concept barely discussed in any classrooms; Kant is iconic figure in every philosophy department where the noumenon is a central concept in his philosophy. Ancient Greek philosophy studies will observe Plato and maybe some sophists and presocratics. Kant's noumenon would be familiar to any major in philosophy. The greek's noumenon? Not so much. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 71.80.171.38 (talk) 23:37, 4 September 2014 (UTC)

So it's just an abstract concept then?

Because that's what it seems like.--Loodog (talk) 03:49, 15 December 2007 (UTC)

You haven't understood a word of this. Read the article again. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 85.233.234.254 (talk) 03:55, 23 September 2013 (UTC)

Improvement Needed

A reader comes here to get a general idea of what the thing is, and they don't find out really in the first screenful. Instead we get an entire page a drivel about how "Ding an sich" which means "noumenon" which comes from the present passive participle of "νοείν" also known as (noein) which of course originates from "nous" (roughly, "mind"). And it takes a whole screenful to say that much. What I wanted to know is, what generally does "ding in sich" mean, and I got a whole lot of nothing. The answer is in here if you read far enough, but a general idea of what we're dealing with up front would make the rest of the article easier to digest. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 66.26.71.112 (talk) 21:30, 13 March 2008 (UTC)

Pre-Kantian Criticism

I added this section under the general criticism section; basically its all on George Berkeley. I understand that since Berkeley pre-dates Kant, he cannot technically be considered a critic of Kant. I acknowledge this fact in the paragraph so that a reasonable reader will not be led astray. A reasonable reader will infer that he may need to investigate Berkeley to determine if his philosophy illuminates criticism of noumenon. Berkeley's ideas on immaterialism seem to drive to the heart of the matter. I'm fairly well versed on Berkeley. If anyone can point out substantively why immaterialism is not a valid critique (and in essence a summary of critiques), notwithstanding its temporal precedence, please attest to those substantive issues within the section. If you can't substantively argue it please "talk" to me and tell me why you think its innappropriate.

I should also point out that this ongoing debate about the "thing in itself" is very important. We need to resolve it. I'm no scholar of Kant, but when I read of the "thing in itself" my first inclination is that it means that which exists independent of an observant mind (the Greek definition), not a human mind. It may be that Kant meant only a human mind, and thus the example of the "sun" and "babies" is entirely appropriate. However, my gut tells me he must have meant more than this. Yet maybe I'm suffering from indigestion!

The definition under debate seems so limited and provincial as to be entirely useless. You might as well argue that any substance is noumena since there is no means of creating somthing out of nothing. If that is the case then all you are saying is that something is because it was, (not very helpful). Even we are noumena, as we are but the product of chemicals and nutrients that we have consumed and reformulated. In essence noumena is anything except for the geist. I cannot accept this. Instead I'm forced to incline that somewhere, deep in his work in a place we have not acknowledged, he (Kant) talks about a higher mind, and its relation to or causation of noumena. A man so learned could not have ignored such a distinction. Yet like I said I'm no scholar of Kant. Butlmat (talk) 05:00, 23 August 2008 (UTC)butlmat

Kant suggests that God or some other being perhaps, if they had an intellectual intuition, could experience the noumenon; just not humans. This is because our categories of the understanding only apply to sensible intuitions of time and space (which he is at a loss to explain why these and only these are forever our limits, but does believe so. Also they are merely ideal and have no ontological status outside of their function) Even if we had other intuitions, he believes our categories would only apply to the sensible intuitions, not to any intellectual intuition that can accurately think of things in themselves without employing them strictly to a sensuous (sensible- meaning of sensation- meaning an empirically informed intuitions (time/space again).

Remember the noumenon is not just a thing-in-self, by reason of that it is also unconditioned, and so cannot 'survive' the conditions our minds impose on all thoughts. He says this like every page.

Also, Kant doesn't believe we can know anything about substances, all the 'different' substances you might think of, if they are imaginable (or consistent with being in time and space) then they are not anything but phenomena.

This is Kant fundamentals. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 71.80.171.38 (talk) 23:45, 4 September 2014 (UTC)

Pronunciation

Could we get a pronunciation guide in this article? —Preceding unsigned comment added by Salvar (talk • contribs) 23:09, 27 January 2009 (UTC)

The current pronunciation guide is wrong. 'Noumenon' is four syllables - 'no-umenon' - not three as indicated. 82.21.56.93 (talk) 22:22, 22 November 2013 (UTC)

It's three. It's pronounced Noo-ma-non — Preceding unsigned comment added by 71.80.171.38 (talk) 23:47, 4 September 2014 (UTC)

very unreliable article?

"A noumenon cannot be the actual object that results in the phenomenon in question" but routledge quotes kant "The noumenal element in some way affects us, giving rise to the representations through which phenomena are presented and constituted". —Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.136.198.118 (talk) 19:07, 28 June 2010 (UTC)

Someone has removed the offending sentence. 1Z (talk) 02:52, 31 December 2010 (UTC)

Trivial but necessary correction

In the article, one reads "Dinge an sich selbest betrachten." It should be "Dinge an sich selbst betrachten."

IMO your Definition of Phenomena/Noumena is completely wrong!

"Noumenon is distinguished from phenomenon (Erscheinung), the latter being an observable event or physical manifestation capable of being observed by one or more of the human senses."

This is completely wrong, because you haven't understood phenomena at all! Phenomena are *not* observable events, they *are* the result of observation! The event would be the Noumenon and the appearance of it is the Phenomenon! It is a common mistake of the non-philosopher to think that Phenomena happen outside and are then perceived - this is complete bullshit and rightly has to be criticized, because then the whole distinction of Phenomena/Noumena wouldn't work any more. Please, get a better understanding of this complex but very interesting matter! Simple example concerning the visual sense, an experiment you can do yourself: touch your eye carefully with a finger so that you see sparks of light (typically one sees a ring of light) - now, is this light you see caused by photons? No, it is not even of the nature of photons. The light you see is the Phenomenon and your finger, in this set up, would represent the Noumenon. This shows very clearly the relation of Phenomena to Noumena. --146.60.184.54 (talk) 11:53, 8 June 2012 (UTC)

Events and fingers happen in time and space. If the noumenon exists, neither item you used would count. The whole point is we can say ABSOLUTELY NOTHING about the noumenon, except that we know exists and we can't say anything further. But those analogies 'help' only if you realize that they fall short of the concept which can only be explained in a definition and not with examples. This is because of the unique nature of the thing, that it cannot have any knowledge about it other than what I pointed out. So, do we know about fingers? Yes, they're not noumenon then. If there is a self that exists noumenally, it doesn't have fingers.