Mozambican War of Independence: Difference between revisions
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This particular project became deeply linked with Portugal's concerns over security in her overseas colonies. The Portuguese government viewed the construction of the dam as testimony to Portugal’s “civilizing mission”<ref>http://209.85.129.104/search?q=cache:myPFvKgNAHYJ:www.kyle.aem.cornell.edu/lusopaps/isaac_sned_M.Cornell.doc+Cabora+Bassa+Dam&hl=en&gl=uk&ct=clnk&cd=4</ref> and intended for the dam to reaffirm Mozambican belief in the strength and security of the Portuguese colonial government. |
This particular project became deeply linked with Portugal's concerns over security in her overseas colonies. The Portuguese government viewed the construction of the dam as testimony to Portugal’s “civilizing mission”<ref>http://209.85.129.104/search?q=cache:myPFvKgNAHYJ:www.kyle.aem.cornell.edu/lusopaps/isaac_sned_M.Cornell.doc+Cabora+Bassa+Dam&hl=en&gl=uk&ct=clnk&cd=4</ref> and intended for the dam to reaffirm Mozambican belief in the strength and security of the Portuguese colonial government. |
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Realising this, Frelimo attempted for seven years to |
Realising this, Frelimo attempted for seven years to halt the construction of the dam, which was finally completed in [[December]] [[1974]]. The ideas that the Portuguese indented the dam to represent were marred somewhat due to adverse public reaction in Mozambique due to the large numbers of indigenous populace forced to relocate from their homes due to the construction project. The dam also deprived farmers of the much needed annual floods, which would otherwise re-fertilise the plantations. |
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====Assassination of Eduardo Mondlane==== |
====Assassination of Eduardo Mondlane==== |
Revision as of 13:53, 23 October 2006
Mozambican War of Independence | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
File:MozambiqueIndep.jpg Guerrillas of the Mozambique Liberation Front | |||||||
| |||||||
Belligerents | |||||||
Portugal | Mozambique Liberation Front | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Eduardo Mondlane (1962-1969) and Filipe Samuel Magaia (1964-1966), Samora Moïses Machel (1969-1975) | General Augusto dos Santos (1964-1969), General Kaúlza de Arriaga (1969-1974) | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
73'000 | 15'000 at largest point | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
10'000 | 25'000 |
- This article is currently under construction, please see the discussion page before making any major changes, incase your edits interfere with ongoing efforts by other users, thankyou
The Mozambican War of Independence was a conflict from 1964 until 1975 between the Mozambique Liberation Front or Frelimo (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique), and Portugal. While from a military standpoint the Portuguese held the upper hand during the conflict with guerilla forces, due to a coup d'état in Portugal, Mozambique succeeded in achieving independence on 25 June 1975.
Background to the conflict
The Portuguese Colony
Bantu-speaking peoples were the native inhabitants of Mozambique since first and fourth centuries AD, however in 1498 Portuguese explorers landed on the Mozambiquan coastline, and Portuguese influence grew through the 1500’s. Slavery and gold became profitable for the Portuguese. However, influence was largely exercised through individual settlers and there was no centralised administration, furthermore Portugal soon turned her attention to India and Brazil.
During the 19th Century, in an attempt to avoid a naval conflict with the superior Royal Navy, Portugal adjusted the borders of her colony and the modern nation of Mozambique was created. Control of Mozambique was left to various organisations such as the Mozambique Company, the Zambezi Company and the Niassa Company, who were provided money and slaves by the British Empire to work in mines and construct railways. These companies penetrated inland from the coastline, setting up plantations and taxing the local populace who had until then resisted encroachment by the European Power.
The final tribes who still survived away from the coastline were defeated by 1902 and in the same year Portugal established Lourenço Marques as the capital. In 1926, political changes in Portugal increased their interest in the African colony, and in 1951 Mozambique became an official overseas province. However, calls for independence arose shortly after World War II in light of the independence granted to many other colonies worldwide after the conflict was over.
Rise of Frelimo
Despite the designation in 1951 of Mozambique as an overseas territory, in order to show to the world that the colony had a greater autonomy, Portugal still maintained strong control over the country. The growing number of newly independent African nations post-World War II, and specifically the disproportionate number of white Portuguese with well paid careers compared to the poverty of the majority of the African population encouraged feelings of nationalism to grow in Mozambique, and several nationalist groups were created.
The Marxist-Leninist Mozambique Liberation Front or Frelimo (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique) was formed in Dar es Salaam, the largest city in neighbouring Tanzania, on the 25 June 1962. It was created during a conference, by the merging of a number of exiled political figures, and various existing nationalist groups, including the Mozambican African National Union, National African Union of Independent Mozambique and the National Democratic Union of Mozambique which had been formed two years earlier. A year later in 1963, Frelimo set up headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam under the leadership of sociologist Eduardo Mondlane, and began to call for independence from Portugal.
After two years of organization and failing political manoeuvres in an attempt to seek a peaceful independence, Mondlane began a campaign of guerrilla warfare in an attempt to achieve independence for Mozambique in 1964. Originally, the United States offered support to the nationalist groups in Africa, particularly in Portuguese colonies, however upon a threat by Portugal to withdrawn from NATO, this support was cut off, and the nationalist groups in Mozambique were forced to turn to help from the east.
Support from the Soviet Union
During the cold war, the destabilising of Western powers by disruption of their hold on African colonies was a strategy of the Soviet Union and Communist China in the late 1950's[1], and it was Nikita Khrushchev in particular who viewed the 'underdeveloped third of mankind' as an opportunity to weaken the West. For the Soviets, Africa represented a chance to create a rift between western powers and their colonial assets, and create pro-communist states in Africa with which to foster future relations.
Prior to the formation of Frelimo, the Soviet position regarding the nationalist movements in Mozambique was one of confusion, as they were facing the idea of supporting multiple independence movements without sure knowledge that any would succeed. The nationalist groups in Mozambique, like those across Africa during the period, received training an equipment from the Soviet Union[2].
Eduardo Mondlane's successor, President Samora Machel commented that “the only ones who will really help us. . . . They have fought armed struggles, and whatever they have learned that is relevant to Mozambique we will use.”[3] Guerrillas received tuition in subversion and political warfare as well as military aide, specifically shipments of 122-mm artillery rockets in 1972[4], with 1600 advisors from Russia, Cuba and East Germany [5]. The Soviet Union continued to support the new Frelimo government against counter revolution in the years after 1975, by 1981, there were 230 Soviet and 800 Cuban military advisers still in the country[6].
The conflict
The guerrilla war (1964-69)
section under construction
In 1964, attempts at peaceful negotiation by the Mozambique Liberation Front were abandoned and on 25 September 1964 Eduardo Mondlane began to launch guerrilla attacks on targets in northern Mozambique from his base in Tanzania, and a large military force was sent by the Portuguese government to quell the unrest, with troop numbers rising from 8'000 to 24'000 from 1964-[7], and numbers of local soldiers recruited for the Portuguese cause rose to 23'000 in the same period. 860 special forces operatives were also being trained in Centres for Commando Instruction by 1969.
The paramilitary forces of the Frelimo were commanded by Filipe Samuel Magaia, who sought assistance in training them from neighbouring Algeria, who complied. Magaia outlined the strategy of the guerrilla forces as one of the "gradual wearing down, morally, psychologically and materially, of the enemy forces, and of the entire machinery that sustained the colonisation of Mozambique"[8].
The Portuguese forces, in contrast, were under the command of General Augusto dos Santos, a man with strong faith in new counter-insurgency theories, and a supporter of collaboration with Rodehesia to create African Scout units and other special forces units.
The initial Frelimo attacks took place in Chai Chai, a province of Cabo Delgado. The fighting later spread to Niassa, Tete at the centre of the country by August 21, according to a report from the Portuguese army. The Portuguese troops began to suffer losses in November , fighting in the northern region of Xilama. With increasing support for Frelimo, and the low number of Portuguese troops, Frelimo was quickly able to advance south towards Meponda and Mandimba, linking to Tete with the aid of forces from the Republic of Malawi, a neighbouring country who had obtained her own independence in 1963.
During the early stages of the conflict, Frelimo activity was reduced to small, platoon sized engagements, harassments and raids on Portuguese installations. While the Portuguese maintained control over the urban areas, they enjoyed little success in hunting the Frelimo guerrillas in the Mozambican countryside, where the insurgents were free to travel through the indigenous population.
On the 10 October 1966, Filipe Samuel Magaia was shot dead by Lourenco Matola, a fellow Frelimo guerrilla who was said to be in the employ of the Portuguese, on returning to Tanzania after inspecting the front lines.
The Portuguese development program
To counter the increasing insurgency of Mozambique Liberation Front forces, the Portuguese government began a major program to develop the infrastructure of Mozambique by creating new roads, railways, schools and hospitals to stimulate economic growth and support from the populace. As part of this program, construction of the Cahora Bassa Dam began in 1969.
This particular project became deeply linked with Portugal's concerns over security in her overseas colonies. The Portuguese government viewed the construction of the dam as testimony to Portugal’s “civilizing mission”[9] and intended for the dam to reaffirm Mozambican belief in the strength and security of the Portuguese colonial government.
Realising this, Frelimo attempted for seven years to halt the construction of the dam, which was finally completed in December 1974. The ideas that the Portuguese indented the dam to represent were marred somewhat due to adverse public reaction in Mozambique due to the large numbers of indigenous populace forced to relocate from their homes due to the construction project. The dam also deprived farmers of the much needed annual floods, which would otherwise re-fertilise the plantations.
Assassination of Eduardo Mondlane
On 3 February 1969, Eduardo Mondlane was killed by explosives smuggled into his locale. Many sources state that, in an attempt to rectify the situation in Mozambique, the Portuguese secret police assassinated Eduardo Mondlane by sending a parcel to his office in Dar Es Salaam, inside the parcel was a book containing an explosive device which detonated upon opening. Other sources state that Eduardo was killed when an explosive device detonated underneath his chair at the Frelimo headquarters, and that the faction responsibile was never identified [10].
However, the involvement of the Portuguese government in his assassination is generally accepted by most historians and biographers, and in 1990 it was revealed that the Portuguese stay behind Gladio-esque army, known as Aginter Press, were responsible for the assassination[11].
This resulting in a temporary power struggle for control and instability within the nationalist group.
The continuing war (1969-75)
under construction
In 1969, General Augusto dos Santos was replaced by General Kaúlza de Arriaga. Kaúlza de Arriaga favoured a more direct method of fighting the insurgents, and the previously common use of African counter-insurgency forces dropped away in favour of the deployment of regular Portuguese forces with only a small number of African members. Indegenous personnel were still recruited for special operations, such as the Special Groups of Parachutists in 1973, though their role was of a lesser significance under the new commander.
By 1972, however, there was growing pressures from other commanders, particularly Augusto dos Santos' second in command: General Costa Gomes, for the use of African soldiers in Flechas unit, under the arguments that African soldiers were cheaper, as well as other politcal and psycho-social reasons. These units saw action in the country at the very end stages of the conflict, after the dismissal of Kaúlza de Arriaga on the eve of the Portuguese coup in 1974. After victory for Frelimo, these Flechas units caused problems for the new regime in the years after 1975.
In 1974, insurgency in the north of Mozambique in areas now called 'liberated zones' was to such an extent, that a major counter-offensive was launched by the Portuguese army.
Consequences of the conflict
under construction
References and links of interest
- ^ Robert Legvold, Soviet Policy in West Africa (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 1.
- ^ Kenneth W. Grundy, Guerrilla Struggle in Africa: An Analysis and Preview (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1971), p. 51
- ^ Brig. Michael Calvert, “Counter-Insurgency in Mozambique,” Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, no. 118, March 1973
- ^ http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/
- ^ U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to the Congress
- ^ http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1983/jul-aug/belfiglio.html
- ^ 1967http://www.trentu.ca/admin/publications/psr/sample/1013.pdf
- ^ http://allafrica.com/stories/200610100722.html
- ^ http://209.85.129.104/search?q=cache:myPFvKgNAHYJ:www.kyle.aem.cornell.edu/lusopaps/isaac_sned_M.Cornell.doc+Cabora+Bassa+Dam&hl=en&gl=uk&ct=clnk&cd=4
- ^ http://www.oberlin.edu/archive/holdings/finding/RG30/SG307/biography2.html
- ^ http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php/documents/collection_gladio/chronology.htm
- http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9035330/Frelimo
- http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761571212_8/Mozambique.html
- http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1974/jul-aug/thom.html
- Janet Mondlane of the Mozambique Institute: American "Godmother" to an African Revolution
- http://www.amazon.com/Eduardo-Mondlane-Somerset-Record-Society/dp/0901787248
- http://www.oberlin.edu/archive/holdings/finding/RG30/SG307/biography2.html
- Brig. Michael Calvert, “Counter-Insurgency in Mozambique,” Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, no. 118, March 1973
- Robert Legvold, Soviet Policy in West Africa (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970)
- Kenneth W. Grundy, Guerrilla Struggle in Africa: An Analysis and Preview (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1971)
- http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1983/jul-aug/belfiglio.html
- U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to the Congress 1983