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Once again, war by proxy and preemptive strike are entirely different and unrelated things. "...was allocated a role of a proxy (the "Icebreaker") in Stalin's plans, and, accordingly, Operation Barbarossa was a preemptive strike" does not make any sense
Reverted good faith edits by My very best wishes: Obviously, in that case, "proxy" meant that Stalin planned that Hitler would attack France, and after both side exhaused each other, Stalin would conquer both of them. Obviously, Hitler wanted to avoid that scenario and launched a preemptive attack as an act of self-defense. That is what sources say. (TW)
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'''''Icebreaker: Who Started the Second World War?''''' ([[Russian language|Russian]] title: ''Ledokol'', ''Ледокол'') is a [[history book]] by [[Viktor Suvorov]]. According to the book, [[Stalin]] planned a conquest of Europe for many years and allocated the [[Nazi Germany]] a role of his [[Proxy war|proxy]] (the "Icebreaker") to attack the West. Therefore, he concluded the [[Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact]] and [[Nazi–Soviet economic relations (1934–41)|collaborated with Nazi Germany before World War II]]. At the end of the war, Stalin was able to achieve only some of his initial objectives by occupying [[Eastern Europe]] and establishing Communist regimes in China and [[North Korea]].
'''''Icebreaker: Who Started the Second World War?''''' ([[Russian language|Russian]] title: ''Ledokol'', ''Ледокол'') is a [[history book]] by [[Viktor Suvorov]]. The book argues that [[Stalin]] planned a conquest of Europe for many years, that the [[Nazi Germany]] was allocated a role of a proxy (the "Icebreaker") in Stalin's plans, and, accordingly, [[Operation Barbarossa]] was a [[preemptive strike]]. This thesis received a relatively wide public support in some post-Soviet and Central European states, but little support among Western scholars.

According to the book, Stalin was preparing to launch a surprise attack on Nazi Germany in the end of summer of 1941, and, the [[Operation Barbarossa]] was therefore a [[preemptive strike]] by Hitler. This thesis received a relatively wide public support in some post-Soviet and Central European states, but little support among Western scholars.


==Content==
==Content==

Revision as of 19:41, 28 January 2020

Icebreaker
Original title‹See Tfd›Russian: Ледокол

Icebreaker: Who Started the Second World War? (Russian title: Ledokol, Ледокол) is a history book by Viktor Suvorov. The book argues that Stalin planned a conquest of Europe for many years, that the Nazi Germany was allocated a role of a proxy (the "Icebreaker") in Stalin's plans, and, accordingly, Operation Barbarossa was a preemptive strike. This thesis received a relatively wide public support in some post-Soviet and Central European states, but little support among Western scholars.

Content

The main argument Suvorov makes in Icebreaker, as well as in a series of other publications, starting from a short 1985 article[1] and ending with the 2008 monograph,[2] is that in 1930s, Stalin was planning a conquest of Europe, and he had been working toward this objective for many years.[3] Suvorov argues that the infamous Molotov-Ribbentrop pact was engineered by Stalin to provoke Hitler to start a conflict with Western powers,[4] which would have lead to mutual exhaustion of "capitalist powers". After that, Stalin planned to seize the opportune moment to attack Germany from the rear, overran Europe and put it under Soviet control.[4]. Therefore, according to Suvorov, the Operation Barbarossa was a preemptive strike by Hitler,[5] an act of self-defence in attempt to prevent imminent Red Army assault.[6]

He argued that Soviet ground forces were well-organized and mobilized en masse along the German–Soviet frontier for a Soviet invasion of Europe slated for Sunday, July 6, 1941 but were unprepared to defend their own territory.

One of Suvorov's pieces of evidence favoring the theory of an impending Soviet attack was his claim regarding the maps and phrasebooks issued to Soviet troops. Military topographic maps, unlike other military supplies, are strictly local and cannot be used elsewhere than in the intended operational area. Suvorov claims Soviet units were issued with maps of Germany and German-occupied territory, and phrasebooks including questions about SA offices—SA offices were found only in German territory proper. In contrast, maps of Soviet territory were scarce. Notably, after the German attack, the officer responsible for maps, Lieutenant General M.K. Kudryavtsev, was not punished by Stalin, who was known for extreme punishments after failures to obey his orders. According to Suvorov, this demonstrates that Kudryavtsev was obeying the orders of Stalin, who simply did not expect a German attack.[7]

Suvorov offers as another piece of evidence the extensive effort Stalin took to conceal general mobilization by manipulating the laws setting the conscription age. That allowed Stalin to provide the expansive build-up of the Red Army. Since there was no universal military draft in the Soviet Union until 1939, by enacting the universal military draft on 1 September 1939 (the date World War II had begun), and by changing the minimum age for joining the Red Army from 21 to 18, Stalin triggered a mechanism which achieved a dramatic increase in the military strength of the Red Army.

This specific law on mobilization allowed the Red Army to increase its army of 1,871,600 men in 1939 to 5,081,000 in the spring of 1941 under secrecy to avoid alarming the rest of the world.[8] Eighteen million reservists were also drafted.[citation needed] The duration of service was 2 years. Thus, according to supporters of this theory, the Red Army had to enter a war by 1 September 1941 or the drafted soldiers would have to be released from service.

Points

Suvorov's main points include the following:

  • The Soviet Union was intrinsically unstable. It had to expand to survive. According to Suvorov's interpretation of the permanent revolution theory, the communist system had to expand and occupy the entire world to survive. Otherwise, the system would fail in a peaceful and/or military struggle with surrounding "capitalist" countries. Stalin and other Soviet leaders opposed this and high-ranking officials who supported "permanent revolution" were purged from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Stalin publicly declared that "the ultimate victory of socialism... can only be achieved on an international scale".[9] Under this theory, Soviet leaders therefore started preparations for a large-scale war of aggression. They officially declared an adherence to the theory of "Socialism in One Country", according to which Socialism can win in a single country, without being immediately overthrown by hostile capitalist neighbors. This leading country would then help revolutionary movements in other countries. Either way, the Soviet pre-war doctrine was based on the Marxism-Leninism theory that capitalism will be overthrown through Communist revolution.
  • The Soviet Union made extensive preparations for a future war of aggression during the 1920s and 1930s. Suvorov provides an extensive analysis of Stalin's preparations for war. According to Suvorov, there were supposed to be three Five-Year Plan phases that would prepare the Soviet Union for war. The first one was to be focused on collectivisation, the second focused on industrialisation, and the third phase would emphasize the militarisation of the country.
  • Stalin escalated tensions in Europe by providing a combination of economic and military support to Weimar Germany, and later to Nazi Germany (see Germany–Soviet Union relations before 1941). After World War I, the Entente attempted to impose severe restrictions on Weimar Germany to prevent it from rearming and again becoming a significant military threat. During "the early 1920s until 1933, the Soviet Union was engaged in secret collaboration with the German military to enable it to circumvent the provisions of the Versailles Treaty", which limited Germany's military production.[10] Moscow allowed the Germans to produce and test their weapons on Soviet territory, while some Red Army officers attended general-staff courses in Germany.[10] The basis for this collaboration was the Treaty of Rapallo, signed between the two nations in 1922, and subsequent diplomatic interactions. This collaboration ended when the anti-communist Nazis took power in 1933. But, according to Suvorov, in the years 1932–1933, "Stalin helped Hitler come to power by forbidding German Communists to make common cause with the Social Democrats against the Nazis in parliamentary elections".[10] Suvorov claims that Stalin's plan and vision was that Hitler's predictability and his violent reactionary ideas made him a candidate for the role of "icebreaker" for the Communist revolution. By starting wars with European countries, Hitler would validate the USSR's entry into World War II by attacking Nazi Germany and "liberating" and Sovietising all of Europe. When concluding the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact in 1939, Stalin "clearly counted on the repetition of the 1914–1918 war of attrition, which would leave the "capitalist" countries so exhausted that the USSR could sweep into Europe virtually unopposed"[10] (see also Stalin's speech on August 19, 1939).
  • According to Suvorov and others, Stalin always planned to exploit military conflict between the capitalist countries to his advantage. He said as early as 1925 that "Struggles, conflicts and wars among our enemies are...our great ally...and the greatest supporter of our government and our revolution" and "If a war does break out, we will not sit with folded arms – we will have to take the field, but we will be last to do so. And we shall do so in order to throw the decisive load on the scale".[10]
  • World War II was initiated by the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, which became co-belligerents after signing the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. The essence of this pact was in the secret protocols which divided Europe into spheres of influence, and removed the Polish buffer between Germany and the USSR. Some countries that fell into the Soviet sphere of influence – Estonia and Latvia – were occupied. The difference between these smaller nations, occupied and annexed by the USSR, and Poland (which was initially attacked by Germany) was that Poland had military assistance guarantees from Great Britain and France.
  • Stalin planned to attack Nazi Germany from the rear in July 1941, only a few weeks after the date on which the Axis invasion of the Soviet Union took place. According to Suvorov, the Red Army had already redeployed from a defensive to an offensive stance. Suvorov also states that Stalin had made no major defensive preparations.
  • Hitler's intelligence identified the USSR's preparations to attack Germany. Therefore, the Wehrmacht had drafted a preemptive war plan based on Hitler's orders as early as mid-1940, soon after the Soviet annexations of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. On June 22, 1941, the Axis began an assault on the USSR.

The book is based on an analysis of Soviet military investments, diplomatic maneuvers, Politburo speeches and other circumstantial evidences.[4]

Reception

Icebreaker and subsequent books by Suvorov had sparkled what is currently known as "Suvorov's debates".[11] Suvorov's concept had not survived scrutiny,[12] and currently, only few authors take the main Suvorov's thesis about per-war Soviet plans for Europe conquest[3] (another extreme view expressed by e.g., Carley, is that the USSR had no aggressive plans at all[13]). It is currently believed that, whereas the war against "capitalist powers" was seen as potentially inevitable by Soviet leadership, and the Soviet Union was making some preparations for war, the Soviet pursuit for collective security system in Europe (a.k.a. "Litvinov's line") was sincere in late 1930s, and the event that marked active Soviet war preparations was the rapid collapse of the Anglo-French alliance in 1940.[3]

"Suvorov's debates"

The Suvorov's thesis has been strongly criticised by many scholars.[5] The book is seen as an "anti-Soviet tract" in Western countries,[14] and is generally discredited.[15][16]

The majority of historians believe that Stalin was seeking to avoid war in 1941, as he believed that his military was not ready to fight the German forces.[17]

Many historians have written in response to Suvorov's views. Gabriel Gorodetsky and David Glantz authored books debunking his claims.[18][19][20] Suvorov received some support from Valeri Danilov, Joachim Hoffmann, Mikhail Meltyukhov, and Vladimir Nevezhin.[21][5]

Glantz argues that Soviet Union simply was not ready for the war in summer 1941[22] Robin Edmonds said that "the Red Army planning staff would not have been doing its job if it had not devoted some time between 1939 and 1941 to the possibility, at some future date, of a pre-emptive strike against Wehrmacht".[23] David Brandenberger said that recently published pre-1941 German analysis of Soviet military readiness came to conclusion that Soviet preparations were assessed to be "defensive" by German intelligence."[24]

Public reception

The book was enthusiastically accepted by a fraction of a German society that hope to re-introduce Hitler as a legitimate part of the patriotic historical discourse[25]. In post-Soviet Russia, where a collapse of communist ideology coincided with the wave of criticism of Stalin's rule, Icebreaker thesis about Stalin's responsibility for WWII outbreak and about Soviet plans for world conquest find a considerable support among a part of society that wanted to disassociate themselves with the uncomfortable past.[25]

See also

References

  1. ^ Suvorov , V. [pseud.] ( 1985 ) Who was planning to attack whom in June 1941, Hitler or Stalin? Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies, 130 ( 2 ): 50 – 55.
  2. ^ Suvorov , V. [pseud.] ( 2008 ) The Chief Culprit: Stalin’s Grand Design to Start World War II. Annapolis, MD : Naval Institute Press.
  3. ^ a b c Alexander Hill. Soviet Planning for War, 1928–June 1941, in Zeiler, Thomas W., DuBois, Daniel M., eds. Companion to World War Two. 1. World War, 1939–1945. ISBN 978-1-4051-9681-9, 2013, Blackwell Publishing Ltd. p. 93
  4. ^ a b c Bellamy, Chris (2007). Absolute War. Soviet Russia in the Second World War. Vintage Books. p. 100-104. ISBN 978-0-375-72471-8.
  5. ^ a b c Uldricks, Teddy (Autumn 1999). "The Icebreaker Controversy: Did Stalin Plan to Attack Hitler?". Slavic Review. 58 (3): 628–634. doi:10.2307/2697571. JSTOR 2697571.
  6. ^ Teddy J. Uldricks Icebreaker Redux: The Debate on Stalin's Role in World War II Continues. Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History, Volume 11, Number 3, Summer 2010 (New Series), pp. 649-660 (Review). DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/kri.0.0177
  7. ^ Suvorov, Viktor. The Chief Culprit: Stalin's Grand Design to Start World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008.
  8. ^ V. Suvorov, The Chief Culprit: Stalin's Grand Design to Start World War 2 Naval Institute Press (2008)
  9. ^ Pravda, February 14, 1938, cited from V. Suvorov Last Republic (Последняя республика), ACT, 1997, ISBN 5-12-000367-2, pages 75–76
  10. ^ a b c d e Richard Pipes Communism: A History (2001) ISBN 0-8129-6864-6, pages 74–75.
  11. ^ Alexander Hill, The Icebreaker Controversy and Soviet Intentions in 1941: The Plan for the Strategic Deployment of Soviet Forces of 15 May and Other Key Documents. The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 21(1), 113-128, (2008), Routledge, doi = 10.1080/13518040801894258, stable URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/13518040801894258.
  12. ^ Imlay, T.C., Strategies, Commands, and Tactics, 1939–1941. in Zeiler, Thomas W., DuBois, Daniel M., eds. Companion to World War Two. 1. World War, 1939–1945. ISBN 978-1-4051-9681-9, 2013, Blackwell Publishing Ltd. p. 429.
  13. ^ Michael Jabara Carley, End of the 'Low, Dishonest Decade': Failure of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet Alliance in 1939. Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 45, No. 2 (1993), pp. 303-341. Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/152863
  14. ^ Roberts, Cynthia (1995). "Planning for War: The Red Army and the Catastrophe of 1941". Europe-Asia Studies. 47 (8): 1326. doi:10.1080/09668139508412322.
  15. ^ Hugh Ragsdale. The Munich Crisis and the Issue of Red Army Transit across Romania. The Russian Review, Vol. 57, No. 4 (Oct., 1998), pp. 614-617: Viktor Suvorov, Icebreaker.- Who Started the Second World War?"
  16. ^ Jonathan Haslam. Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia 1941: A Failure of Reasons of State? International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 76, No.1 (Jan., 2000), pp. 133-139:", Jonathan Haslam. Soviet‐German Relations and the Origins of the Second World War: The Jury Is Still Out. The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 69, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 785-797
  17. ^ Bar-Joseph, Uri; Levy, Jack S. (Fall 2009). "Conscious Action and Intelligence Failure". Political Science Quarterly. 124 (3): 476–477. doi:10.1002/j.1538-165X.2009.tb00656.x.
  18. ^ Evan Mawdsley. Crossing the Rubicon: Soviet Plans for Offensive War in 1940-1941. The International History Review, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Dec., 2003), pp. 818-865. Stable URL: [1]
  19. ^ A. L. Weeks, Stalin's Other War: Soviet Grand Strategy, 1939-41 (Lanham, 2002), pp. 2-3.
  20. ^ Glantz, David M., Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of War, Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1998, ISBN 0-7006-0879-6 p. 4.
  21. ^ Bar-Joseph, Uri; Levy, Jack S. (Fall 2009). "Conscious Action and Intelligence Failure". Political Science Quarterly. 124 (3): 476. doi:10.1002/j.1538-165X.2009.tb00656.x.
  22. ^ Author(s): David M. Glantz. Reviewed work(s): "Icebreaker: Who Started the Second World War?" by Viktor Suvorov. The Journal of Military History, Vol. 55, No. 2 (Apr., 1991), pp. 263-264 Published by: Society for Military History
  23. ^ Robin Edmonds. Reviewed work(s): Icebreaker: Who Started the Second World War? by Viktor Suvorov. Source: International Affairs, Vol. 66, No. 4, Seventieth Anniversary Issue (Oct., 1990), p. 812
  24. ^ David Brandenberger. Reviewed work(s):Sekrety Gitlera na Stole u Stalina: Razvedka i Kontrrazvedka o Podgotovke Germanskoi Agressii Protiv SSSR, Mart-Iyun' 1941 g. Dokumenty iz Tsentral'nogo Arkhiva FSB. Source: Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 49, No. 4 (Jun., 1997), pp. 748-749
  25. ^ a b Jonathan Haslam. Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia 1941: A Failure of Reasons of State? International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 76, No.1 (Jan., 2000), pp. 133-139. Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2626201

Further reading

  • Ernst Topitsch. Stalin's War A Radical New Theory of The Origins Of The Second World War (Gunter Olzog Verlag GmbH, 1985; English language translation by Arthur Taylor, 1987) ISBN 0-312-00989-5
  • Suvorov, Viktor. Icebreaker: Who Started the Second World War? (Viking Press/Hamish Hamilton; 1990) ISBN 0-241-12622-3
  • Glantz, David. Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War. University Press of Kansas (May 1998), ISBN 0-7006-0879-6
  • Gorodetsky, Gabriel. Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia. Yale University Press (2001) ISBN 0300084595
  • Suvorov, Viktor. The Chief Culprit: Stalin's Grand Design to Start World War II. Potomac Books (July 20, 2007) ISBN 1-59797-114-6
  • Short, Neil The Stalin and Molotov Lines: Soviet Western Defences 1928-41. Osprey Publishing; (September 23, 2008) ISBN 1846031923
  • (in Russian) "Posledniy Mif" (The Last Myth). Vladimir Sinelnikov and Igor Shevtsov. "KLOTO". 1999. Film.
  • Uldricks, Teddy (Autumn 1999). "The Icebreaker Controversy: Did Stalin Plan to Attack Hitler?". Slavic Review. 58 (3): 630. doi:10.2307/2697571. JSTOR 2697571. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
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