Battle of Arras (1917)

Battle of Arras
Part of the Western Front of World War I
The Town Square, Arras, France. February, 1919.
Date 9 April to 16 May, 1917 Location France Result Tactical British Empire victory, stalemate continued.
Belligerents
British Empire • United Kingdom • Canada • Australia	German Empire
Commanders and leaders
Douglas Haig Edmund Allenby Hubert Gough Henry Horne	Erich Ludendorff Ludwig von Falkenhausen Georg von der Marwitz
Strength
approx. 400,000 on 9 April	unknown
Casualties and losses
approx. 150,000	approx. 100,000

The Battle of Arras was an offensive during World War I by forces of the British Empire between 9 April and 16 May, 1917. British, Canadian and Australian troops attacked German trenches near the French city of Arras. The Allied objective was to draw German troops away from the River Aisne, where French commanders were planning a major assault. As a diversionary tactic, the battle was successful, as the Germans were forced to increase their troop commitments in the Arras sector.

Perhaps surprisingly, given the diversionary nature of the plan, the first days of the offensive resulted in important strategic gains for the Allied forces. Notable among these was the capture of Vimy Ridge by the Canadian Corps, and the advances made by British troops east of Arras. However, British and Canadian forces were unable to completely break through German defences, and the assault ground to a halt by mid-April.

Small, localised actions, to consolidate the gains of the first days and protect the flanks of the salient created, continued until mid-May. Although mostly successful, the later assaults resulted in high casualties for little territorial gain. When the battle officially ended on 16 May, British Empire troops had made significant advances, but had been unable to achieve a major breakthrough at any point. The front reverted to the stalemate that characterised most of the war.

Background

Although the French and British had intended an assault for the spring of 1917, two developments put the plan in jeopardy. Firstly, in February, Russia declined to commit to a joint offensive, meaning that the planned two-front offensive would be reduced to a French-only assault along the River Aisne. Secondly, the German Army began to retreat and consolidate positions along the Hindenburg line, thus disrupting the tactical assumptions underlying the plans for the French offensive. In fact, until French troops advanced to compensate, there were no German troops at all in the planned assault sector. Given these factors, there was initially disagreement about whether or not the offensive should go forward. Political turmoil in France meant that the existing government desperately needed a major victory to avoid major civil unrest, but the British were wary of proceding in view of the changing tactical situation. However, in a meeting with David Lloyd George, French commanding general Nivelle was able to convince the British Prime Minister that, with a diversionary assault by the British, the French offensive could succeed. It was agreed that the French assault on the Aisne would go forward in mid-April, and that the British would make a diversionary attack in the Arras sector approximately one week prior.

The British plan was well developed, and drew on the lessons of the Somme offensive of the previous summer. Rather than attacking on an extended front, the full weight of artillery would be concentrated on a relatively narrow front of 24 miles, and troops would advance in stages, with units leapfrogging each other in order to allow time to consolidate and regroup. Three major British empire formations were already concentrated in the Arras sector, and units from each would play important roles in the assault. These formations were: the First Army under Horne, Third Army under Allenby, Fifth Army under Gough, all under the supreme command of General Haig. They were opposed by two German formations, the Sixth Army under von Falkenhausen and Second Army under von der Marwitz.

Initial assault

Map of the British attack.

On 4 April, British artillery began a sustained bombardment of German positions in the region of Arras. Limited to a front of only 24 miles, the British used almost 2.7 million shells, over a million more than had been used on the Somme. For the last ten hours of bombardment, gas shells were used.

Zero Hour had originally been planned for the morning of 8 April (Easter Sunday), but it was pushed back 24 hours at the request of the French, despite relatively good weather in the assault sector. By the morning of 9 April, it was snowing heavily; troop movement was hindered by large drifts and visibility on the battlefield was incredibly poor. Nonetheless, the offensive began at 5:30 AM.

First Battle of the Scarpe

The major British assault of the first day was directly east of Arras, with the 12th Division attacking Observation Ridge, north of the Arras—Cambrai road. After reaching this objective, they were to push on towards Feuchy, as well as the second and third lines of German trenches. At the same time, elements of 3rd Division began an assault south of the road, with primary objectives of Devil's Wood, Tilloy lés Mofflains, and the Bois des Boeufs. The ultimate objective of these assaults was the Monchyriegel, a trench running between Wancourt and Feuchy, and an important component of the German defences. Most of the objectives, including Feuchy village, had been gained by the evening of 10 April. However, the Germans were still in control of large sections of trench in between Wancourt and Feuchy, particularly in the area of the heavily fortified village of Neuville-Vitasse. The following day, troops from the 56th Division were able to force the Germans out of the village, although the Monchyriegel was not fully in British hands until a few days later. The British were able to consolidate these gains and push forward towards Monchy le Preux, although they suffered heavy casualties in fighting near the village.

One reason for the success of the offensive in this sector was the failure of German commander von Falkenhausen to employ Ludendorff's new innovation, the "elastic defence." In theory, the enemy was allowed to make initial gains, thus stretching their lines of communication. Reserves held close to the battlefield would be committed once the initial advance had bogged down, before enemy reinforcements could be brought up. The defenders would thus be able to counterattack and regain any lost territory. In this sector, however, von Falkenhausen kept his reserve troops too far from the front, and they were unable to arrive in time for a useful counterattack on either 10 or 11 April. On discovering the reason for the British success lay at least partially with command failures in his own army, Ludendorff removed a number of commanders, including von Falkenhausen.

Battle of Vimy Ridge

Further information: Battle of Vimy Ridge

Canadian machine gun squad at Vimy Ridge

At roughly the same time, in perhaps the most carefully crafted portion of the entire offensive, the Canadian Corps launched an assault on Vimy Ridge. Advancing behind a creeping barrage, and making heavy use of machine guns – eighty to each brigade, including one Lewis gun in each platoon – the corps was able to advance through about 4,000 yards of German defences, and captured the crest of the ridge at about 1 PM. Many military historians have attributed the success of this attack to careful planning by Canadian Corps commander Arthur Currie and constant training, as well as the assignment of specific objectives to each platoon. Rather than a general attempt to capture the ridge, each unit had individual objectives to achieve, and had rehearsed them extensively. This allowed small units to continue to advance even if officers were killed or communication broke down, thus bypassing two major problems of combat on the Western Front.

First Battle of Bullecourt

South of Arras, the plan called for two divisions, the British 62nd Division and Australian 4th Division to attack either side of the village of Bullecourt and push the Germans out of their fortified positions and into the reserve trenches. The attack was initially scheduled for the morning of 10 May, but the tanks intended for the assault did not arrive due to the weather, and it was delayed by 24 hours. Unfortunately, the order to delay did not reach all units in time, and two battalions of the West Yorkshire Regiment attacked, and were driven back with significant losses. Despite protests from the Australian commanders, the attack was resumed on the morning of 11 April; mechanical failures meant that only 11 tanks were able to advance in support, and the limited artilery barrage left much of the barbed wire in front of the German trenches uncut. Additionally, the abortive attack of the previous day alerted German troops in the area to the impending assault, and they were better prepared than they had been in the Candian sector. Misleading reports about the extent of the gains made by the Australians deprived them of necessary artillery support and, although elements of the 4th Division briefly occupied sections of German trenches, they were ultimately forced to retreat with heavy losses. In this sector, the German commanders correctly employed the elastic defense strategy, and were able to counterattack effectively.

The battle continues

Although the initial assault had made significant gains, it failed to bring about a major breakthrough at any point, and by the middle of April, the offensive had ground to a halt. A large number of German troops had been transferred to the Arras sector, and the defences had stiffened as a result of the reinforcements. However, Haig and other commanders determined to continue the battle east of Arras, partly to consolidate the gains made in the first days of the offensive, and partly because the still held out hope of achieving a breakthrough.

Second Battle of the Scarpe

On 23 April, the British launched an assault east from Wancourt towards Vis en Artois. Elements of the 30th and 50th Divisions made initial gains, and were in fact able to secure the village of Guémappe, but could advance no farther east and suffered heavy losses. Farther north, German forces counterattacked in an attempt to recapture Monchy le Preux, but troops from the Royal Newfoundland Regiment were able to hold the village until reinforcements from 29th Division arrived. British commanders determined not to push forward in the face of stiff resistance, and the attack was called off the following day, 24 April.

Battle of Arleux

Although the Canadian Corps had been able to capture Vimy Ridge, the difficulty encountered in making advances to the south left the position vulnerable. On 28 April, British and Canadian troops launched an attack towards Arleux in order to secure the south-eastern flank of the Canadian position. Arleux was captured by Canadian troops with relative ease, but the British troops advancing on Gavrelle met stiffer resistance. The village was secured by early evening, when a German counterattack forced a brief retreat. Elements of 63rd Division were brought up as reinforcements and the village was held, although subsequent attacks on 29 April failed to net any more advances. Despite achieving the limited objective of securing the Canadian position on Vimy Ridge, casualties were high, and the ultimate result was disappointing.

Second Battle of Bullecourt

The Hindenburg Line near Bullecourt, seen from the air.

After the initial assault failed to penetrate the German lines around Bullecourt, British commanders made preparations for another attempt. British artillery began an intense bombardment of the village, which was virtually destroyed by 20 April. Although this attack was initially planned for 20 April, it was pushed back a number of times, and finally set for the early morning of 3 May. At 3:45 AM, elements of the 2nd Division attacked east of Bullecourt village, intending to pierce the Hindenburg Line and capture Hendecourt, while British troops from 62nd Division attempted to capture Bullecourt itself. German resistance was fierce, and when the offensive was called off on 17 May, very few of the initial objectives had been met. The Australians were in possession of much of the German trench between Bullecourt and Riencourt, but had been unable to capture Hendecourt. To the west, British troops were ultimately able to push the Germans out of Bullecourt, but, in doing so, incurred considerable losses, and also failed to advance north-east to Hendecourt.

Third Battle of the Scarpe

After securing the area around Arleux at the end of April, the British determined to launch another attack east from Monchy to try and breakthrough the Boiry Riegel and reach the Wotanstellung, a major German defensive fortification. This was scheduled to coincide with the Australian attack at Bullecourt, in order to present the Germans with a two pronged assault. British commanders hoped that success in this venture would force the Germans to retreat further to the east. With this objective in mind, the British launched another attack near the Scarpe on 3 May. However, neither prong was able to make any significant advances, and the attack was called off the following day after incurring heavy casualties. Although this attack was a failure, the British learned important lessons about the relationship between tanks, infantry, and artillery, which they would later apply in the Battle of Cambrai.

Aftermath

File:Battle of Arras 1917.jpg

An article commemorating the battle; from a South African newspaper.

By the standards of the Western front the gains of the first two days were nothing short of spectacular. A great deal of ground was gained for relatively few casualties, and a number of strategically significant points were captured, notably Vimy Ridge. Additionally, the offensive succeeded in drawing German troops away from the French offensive in the Aisne sector. In many respects, the battle might be deemed a victory for the British and their allies, but one or two counterpoints should be noted. Firstly, after the initial gains and light casualties of the initial assault, the offensive ground to a halt and casualty rates soared. By the end of the offensive, the British had suffered more than 150,000 casualties and gained little ground since the first day. Additionally, despite the number of German troops transferred to the Arras sector, the French offensive to the southeast was a complete failure. And finally, despite significant early gains, the British were unable to effect a breakthrough, and the situation reverted to stalemate. Although historians generally consider the battle a British victory, in the wider context of the front, it had very little impact on the strategic or tactical situation.

References

• Keegan, John. The First World War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999
  
• Liddel Hart, B.H. The Real War, 1914-1918 Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1930
  
• Oldham, Peter. The Hindenburg Line. London: Leo Cooper, 1997
  
• Stokesbury, James L. A short history of World War I. New York: Perennial, 1981
  
• Strachan, Hew. The First World War. New York: Viking, 2003

External links

• Online history of the Worcestershire Regiment. General history of a regiment involved in the battle, accessed 4-24-2007.
  
• The Battle of Arras at 1914-1918.net. Online history of the battle, accessed 4-4-2007.
  
• The Battle of Arras at the War Chronicle. Another online history of the battle, accessed 4-16-2007.