Talk:Battle of Jutland

Tactically inconclusive

The info box says the battle was tactically inconclusive. Here we go again, but what exactly does this mean, and what does anyone thing it would mean to someone who happened to have heard the radio quiz today so looked up the battle but otherwise is no military expert? Sandpiper (talk) 20:58, 18 January 2010 (UTC)

Nothing really changed by the Battle, would be the way I would take it as the most truthful. The HSF came into the battle fearful of the GF and ran like hell the once Scheer was certain he was really facing the entire Grand Fleet. Germany would continue to starve and political dissolution caused by the population's unrest thereby was part of the German surrender. Tirronan (talk) 17:23, 19 January 2010 (UTC)

The Oxford English Dictionary definition of tactics: "The art or science of deploying military or naval forces in order of battle, and of performing warlike evolutions and manœuvres." Surely "tactically inconclusive" could only possibly be accurate if the opposing fleets had circled each other all day and then each side had withdrawn. We know this did not happen.

And the battle did change things. Scheer became Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet with the intention of following a far more aggressive surface action policy. Jutland changed that as shown by his recommendation to concentrate on submarine warfare. As for the British, if you believe some sources the deficiencies in shell caused the Grand Fleet to pursue a far more passive posture. --Simon Harley (talk | library | book reviews) 18:07, 19 January 2010 (UTC)

Assuming that any of the current editors couldn't give you chapter and verse of who, what, and where, the battle took the fleets, for instance it is mentioned about 10 times that this battle resulted in the turning to the submarine war that leads directly to 2 million US soldiers on the battlefield with 4 million more in various stages of training/transport, at the very least on the archives if not on this page already. As already stated in the article, the HSF sortied a couple of times with the intention of catching part of the GF in isolation only to quickly retreat both times. Intentions aside the HSF spent most of its time residing safely at port and the GF didn't do much better refusing to expose itself to the torpedo threat. Intentions aside there is nothing that allowed a tactical decision, in this case used as a delineation between tactical and strategic, in this case but I am glad that you have an Oxford dictionary. The Germans wanted to run and run they did. Tirronan (talk) 18:24, 19 January 2010 (UTC)

We occasionally get trolls and Anglophobes in here suggesting that the battle was clearly a German victory because they suffered fewer losses.

On that basis, we should rewrite the Isandlwana and Little Big Horn pages as victories for the British and for Custer, right? After all, they inflicted the most casualties and in both cases the enemy force was superior in numbers. Actually, the losses inflicted by one-ninth of the British forces at Isandlwana knocked so much fight out of the Zulus that they failed to capitalise on their win and simply waited to get crushed, so although I say that as a joke it's almost a defendable view...

More seriously: 'tactical' can mean different things according to the noun being qualified with it. A tactical decision is one taken with regard only to the immediate circumstances. A tactical victory is usually one in which the fighting goes your way, but the wider issue of overall victory is either unresolved, or perhaps gets worse for you. In Napoleon's 1812 campaign, Borodino would be an example of a tactical victory. He chucked the Russians out of all their positions, but then advanced even further into Russia. Corunna in 1809 would be a British tactical victory, in that a French attack was handily repulsed, but the British still had to evacuate their whole army. New Orleans in 1815 was a similar American victory, but was clearly not decisive because the peace had already been signed.

IMHO, whoever won Jutland gained a pyrrhic (i.e. unaffordably costly) victory. The Royal Navy couldn't have fought endless Jutlands because losing 3 dreadnoughts for each German dreadnought they sank wasn't sustainable. Germany couldn't have fought more Jutlands because they were lucky to lose only one dreadnought and the RN was unlucky to lose as many as three.

Unfortunately 'pyrrhic' is a much-misunderstood term so I don't know if it would help the article to bring it up.Tirailleur (talk) 16:53, 21 January 2010 (UTC)

Good to see that you are still around my friend. I'd argue that Germany building large numbers of Dreadnoughts was a mistake unless it could field enough to really go after the the Grand Fleet. There was way too much effort put into a service that couldn't really do it much good. In all actuality what the GF lost that day wasn't much in terms of real fighting power and it was never going to suffer flash to magazines full of cordite again. Just a bit of good luck was all that stood between Sedlitz sinking was well, it was that close. Derflinger and Nassau were wrecks. Two Konig was badly torn up, she wouldn't be out of drydock till December. It doesn't take a genius to figure out that the German's did get a bit lucky that day. It is also beyond dispute that all they wanted was to get back to dock after seeing the Grand Fleet, that isn't a victor. Tirronan (talk) 00:18, 22 January 2010 (UTC)

Er, SMS Nassau wasn't in that bad of shape at the end of the battle; she was back with the fleet by 10 July. She'd only been hit twice by heavy-caliber shells, and the collision with Spitfire only tore a 3.5m gash in the side of the ship, above the waterline. For comparison, SMS Derfflinger, which was a wreck (having been hit by 17 large caliber and 9 secondary shells) at the end of the battle, was in dock until mid October. Parsecboy (talk) 00:29, 22 January 2010 (UTC)

Yup sorry about that brain fart on my part there. Derfflinger had both of her after turrets torn up and was pretty useless as a war fighting asset. Only Moltke was really able to fight after the battle. Tirronan (talk) 07:21, 22 January 2010 (UTC)

With hindsight Germany building a fleet was a terrible mistake. If they hadn't, and with careful diplomacy, they might have had England on their side, or at least standing neutral. The problem with such a judgement is that the fleet was a gamble and they did know it. They wanted to beat England too and following that course a fight became inevitable. There was a long term building program and who can say what might have happened if war had come earlier or later. It seems to be correct that what most critically went wrong for the RN on the day was the self igniting battlecruisers. Personally, I still havn't seen a good analysis of this which demonstrates whether the navy got on top of the issues so that in a re-run it would not have happened again. Beatty's ship handling didn't help, but still it was the German ships which were reduced to swiss cheese rather than the british ones. Sandpiper (talk) 19:48, 22 January 2010 (UTC)

There's an interesting analysis, I think by John Keegan, in which he argued that increasing the size of the German army of 1914 would not have increased the forces deployable in either the east or the west. This was because the railway system used to mobilise the army had finite capacity, it was all in use, and the German staff knew this. Had the HDF never been built, its 50,000 men couldn't have been used in the initial phase, and thereafter would have been neither here nor there. 50,000 men was one day's losses in a trench offensive.

This being so, it seems that the best use of these men may indeed have been at sea. They couldn't have been used on land in the initial fighting, and they'd have been of no account in the later fighting. At sea, they tied down more resources than they consumed.

This contrarian view doesn't undermine the fact that the HSF was a huge diplomatic mistake, because as you say, it ensured that a powerful combatant joined the alliance against Germany.

On the exploding battlecruisers - yes, three went up, but Lion took ten heavy hits and survived, which is respectable. Tirailleur (talk) 01:47, 26 January 2010 (UTC)

Remember, Lion nearly did explode. If it weren't for Francis Harvey's quick action, she very well could have joined Indefatigable, Queen Mary, and Invincible (and taken Beatty down with her too, in all likelihood). Parsecboy (talk) 03:50, 26 January 2010 (UTC)

To be scrupulously fair, the tendency to describe Jutland as a German tactical victory on the basis of heavier British losses is not restricted to "trolls and Anglophobes." Take one example:

Tactically the Germans secured a victory, sinking three British battle-cruisers at a cost of only one battle-cruiser and one old battleship.

– Archer Jones, The Art of War in the Western World p. 446

(This is very much a cherry-picked quote but we've all seen similar, and to pretend it doesn't exist in the scholarship is a little disingenuous.) The "British victory after all" school strikes me as the overzealous revisionism typical of First World War scholarship: swinging the pendulum too far the other way. To invoke Donald Rumsfeld's words of wisdom, "You go to war with the army you have, not the army you might want or wish to have at a later time." In other words, this interpretation does not make sufficient allowance for whether each navy's operational goals were at all realistic. Given the respective capacities of the HSF and GF, it's almost impossible to conceive an engagement which would not result in "British dominance of the North Sea [being] maintained." To associate this outcome with the actions at Jutland sui generis, and not simply as a structural and nigh-insuperable function of German naval weakness, is suspect in the extreme. While I do not explicitly call for a change to the article, I suppose I subscribe to the notion of a German tactical victory in the context of the possible. Albrecht (talk) 03:43, 26 January 2010 (UTC)

In fact (I'm not familiar with the article's edit history), a stable result such as the present one is to be infinitely preferred over a chronic edit-quasi-war over victories and half-victories. Albrecht (talk) 03:51, 26 January 2010 (UTC)

You'd never get it, one side or the other constantly picks at it, even if you were to say that the Germans won it, you'd be dealing with the "as they ran like hell" argument that is just as valid. One could make an argument that it was a tactical victory and a strategic loss, if not an outright disaster but its honest none the less. --Tirronan (talk) 04:44, 26 January 2010 (UTC)

Speaking as a physicist, one of the difficulties of assessing the outcome follows from the quantum nature of naval warfare. Either you lose a ship or you don't. If it makes it back home with no functional guns and water washing over the decks it tends to get counted as if the enemy never did it any harm. Your ship barely makes it back and the enemy doesnt, then you had a great victory. Thus German tactical victory. Clearly if you are a commander of a numerically inferior force then the whole business is about picking your best moment, but the result here didnt simply show the advantage of doing things right against an enemy who does things wrong, it also demonstrated the limits of that strategy (or tactic?).

Albrecht, in the context of the possible I think the Germans did very well at Jutland. But I also think they themselves privately (as opposed to propaganda claims of victory) acknowledged that there was little or nothing of victory about the state of their fleet after the battle as compared to before. How far can you go in dclaring parts of a process as victories when repeating those victories over and over could only bring you to defeat? As regards ability to fight the German battlecruisers were in a worse state than the british after the engagement, including the sinkings. But then as you say, they were outnumbered 2:1 so how can you fairly assess their performance?

Tirailleur (by the way, nice to see some unfamiliar names here), it seems to me Keegan is taking an unrealisticallly narrow view of what scrappping the navy might have meant. At its peak naval expenditure reached about half the amount being spent on the army, certainly exceeding 1/3 the amount being spent on the army for the 5 years before WWI. If the army was 1 million strong, that would equate to an extra 3-500,000 trained and fully equipped men, not just the 50,000 employed as sailors. Many more were employed building those ships than operating them and then there was the huge expenditure on the materials and equipment. This was occupying a significant proportion of German industrial output. Might have spent some of that on building some extra trains.

I'm very unhappy about Harvey's role in saving Lion, see discussion on that pages chat, but various accounts make me believe Harvey became the official hero because he was certainly dead doing his duty, heroes were needed and because the full story might very well have reflected badly on a number of people. It seems to be quite likey Grant was the guy who saved Lion and Beatty was the guy who put her in jeopardy (with the help of others in encouraging bad ammunition handling). Alternatively, it might be they were just lucky the shell took the turret roof off, which allowed the blast to escape upwards. For whatever reasons the ship did not explode because the initial fire did not spread down into the magazine. Flooding the magazine only saved them from the secondary fire 20 minutes after the initial fire which killed Harvey. Obviously people were busy because they were in the middle of a battle, but the fact that a secondary fire broke out after everything had been declared safe only illustrates further failings in their damage control procedures. Sandpiper (talk) 11:57, 26 January 2010 (UTC)

Interesting comments all. Albrecht: you're right and I was being a bit flippant. There is a certain tendency - here, on Usenet, and elsewhere - for a certain type of poster to argue that any British military victory was either a defeat, didn't matter, or was won by someone else. It is a bit of a "God of the gaps" theory, inasmuch as if one accepted it, one would then be short of an alternative explanation for how Britain came to rule a quarter of the world despite not winning any of the battles.

What I would observe is that the claim for a German victory is usually based on the balance of losses, while the argument that it was a British victory is usually based on who was pushing whom around and dictating the actual course of the battle. Nobody seriously maintains the battle went well for Scheer, who spent it trying to disengage; and nobody seriously maintains that Beatty failed comprehensively. Perhaps the most elegant compromise is the Andrew Gordon (or was it Massie's?) view that Hipper defeated Beatty and Jellicoe defeated Scheer.

I take your point about whether any conceivable result could have been judged a British defeat. I'd suggest however that there were occasions, before and after Jutland, when an unqualified British defeat very nearly happened. On at least one occasion beforehand, one British battle squadron nearly ran into the whole German fleet. Had Germany wiped out 4 or 5 British BBs for no or little reciprocal loss, that would unquestionably have been a tactical and strategic victory - but still an indecisive one. That is, they won the fighting and achieved exactly what they were playing for, but they still needed to win a few more like it to gain the upper hand. Napoleon taking out Mack at Ulm in 1805 is an instance: a tactical and strategic French victory, but it wasn't decisive because the Allies could afford the loss and were still stronger.

Sandpiper: Keegan (or whoever it was...!), was actually debunking the conjecture that, had the HSF not existed and those resources channelled to the Army, Germany would then have been strong enough to have won on land in the summer of 1914. His objection was that the German staff were up against hard limits of railway capacity, including that of the countries they attacked. Therefore, the army they mobilised was the largest feasible. More men could not have been physically deployed, and nor could more railways have been built - because they were needed in the invaded territory. In effect, Germany had surplus military capacity, and building a navy offered a way to apply it to the enemy. So it wasn't per se stupid. It was stupid because its very existence ensured more enemies. Your point about use of resources post-1914 is well made.Tirailleur (talk) 11:58, 28 January 2010 (UTC)

I don't know that the very existence of the HSF ensured more enemies. It had more to do with the fact that Tirpitz intended it to be the "dagger at Great Britain's throat" in the North Sea that pushed the British into the French/Russian camp. Had the Germans divided the fleet into smaller portions for its overseas possessions (as was the norm in the late 19th-early 20th centuries) instead of aiming it directly at the UK, then who's to say what Britain might have done. Parsecboy (talk) 15:05, 28 January 2010 (UTC)

I can't see it as anything but a rather stupid choice. If you play a game that you can't win, why are you playing at all? The only thing that Germany bought itself with the HSF was making an enemy of the British Empire when it didn't have to. Then again from a diplomatic stand-point nothing that the Germans did made a huge amount of sense to me during the early run up to the war. Personally I would have told Austria to back down or else and declared that Germany would defend it's own boarders and nothing else. She got dragged into a war she was ready for but didn't actually want.--Tirronan (talk) 16:29, 28 January 2010 (UTC)

The problem was they apparently thought Britain would have to retain its dispersed fleet structure even in the face of German naval expansion; Fisher's reorganization threw a wrench into Tirpitz's plans, but by then, the gauntlet had been thrown. You are right in your opinion of German diplomacy; Wilhelm II basically threw away the coalition of European powers that isolated France Bismarck had assembled in the wake of the Franco-Prussian War. I think plenty of Germans wanted the war though; all of Europe had been convinced that the speed and completeness of the Prussian victory in 1870-71 was the norm for modern warfare rather than the exception it truly was. Parsecboy (talk) 16:48, 28 January 2010 (UTC)

There are, unfortunately, 2 parts to a devastating victory (Franco-Prussian war, Battle of France, Desert Storm, French Empire vs Prussia, etc.), in that one side has to be very very good, however it also requires the other side to have made some very very bad choices or just be plain bad. The problem becomes when you assume that the other side will play the part assigned, and the French of 1914 just were not that bad at all and most capable of learning and adapting. To tie this back to the article though the Germans proved to be very well trained and her fleet performed about as well as could be expected. But unless Germany could float a fleet the size of the Grand Fleet and keep the army to the size that it had to be it didn't make sense to play the game at all. It doesn't show much understanding of the British who feared an invasion by a continental army most of all and who would have done anything to prevent it. To me it is telling that within a few weeks all that that GF lost to damage/sinking was more than replaced by new construction ships dreadnoughts and a new battle-cruiser coming into the line. --Tirronan (talk) 18:48, 28 January 2010 (UTC)

[Deindent] To be fair to the German surface fleet, the British felt obliged to continue building warships throughout the war which meant they were not building cargo ships which were desperately needed. The destroyers reserved for grand fleet screening could have been released for convoy work and likely convoys would have got underway much sooner (both because of ship availability and because the admiralty would not have had its mind set on the vital importance of fleet work). Then there was German coastal protection and control of the Baltic hindering the Russians, all of which had some impact on the land war. I have not looked at the details of the land war, but although the british army was pretty small at the start, it did have some troops to throw into northern France. German planning was based upon a quick war, meaning the immediate British contribution to a land war would be small and hopefully Britain would not get its act together in time to make any difference. German planning supposedly allowed for worst-case of the British managing to send what troops they had, and being able to deal with this.

I remain in two minds over the German fleet. Bismark opposed it, which was one reason Wilhelm got rid of him. More seriouly I think, Wilhelm wanted to be his own man and thus could not stand inheriting Bismark, though obviously Bismark was getting on a bit by then and probably past his best. Mostly Wilhelm wanted a fleet, and thus chose Tirpitz for high office as someone like minded who wanted to build one and could make it happen. The fleet was the most obvious challenge to BRitain pushing Britain into becoming an enemy, but it was not the only one. It is fine to be friendly to a small state which is not a threat, but once they get bigger they become rivals. Whether or not Germany had a fleet it was manoeuvering for control of the continent and working on acquiring colonies. Coming late to the game maybe made it all the more a rival because all the best spots were already taken. Even without the threat to its control of the high seas, Britain by WW1 was coming round to the idea that it could not live with a German empire occupying most of Europe. Of course, without the obvious threat to its fleet, it might have been difficult for the politicians in Britain to have justified taking part in the war.

Tirronan, I think ultimately the reason the Germans chose to have a fleet despite knowing it would make Britain an enemy was that they were going for broke. They had to beat Britain too and this could not be done without a fleet. Strategically, I think they would have been better off hanging on to Bismark for longer and confining their territorial interest to continental europe. But sooner or later Britain was going to jump ship from neutral/friend to rival to enemy, so at some point they had to start shipbuilding. Could they have smashed France and Russia and then have started from scratch to build a navy with Britain hostile from the start? It is is quite weird listening to British politicians now discussing the legality of invading Iraq, when 100 years ago they would have done as they pleased.

Tirailler, My own concern about switching resouces from the German navy to the army was not that they could not have figured how to use them, but that France would have felt obliged to try to match any further increases in the German army with increases of its own. I don't know whether this would have been possible? Lloyd George noted that the French did not believe the German army could move by road through Belgium, which it did. Perhaps they might have surprised Keegan if they had been given more resources. They had time as well as money if they had chosen to take it. Although the British contribution might have been small, it seems to have been well placed to arrive at the most critical area of the battlefront. The Germans failed to take the British army seriously in their planning, and despite their claimed intent before the war to fight the british with whatever fleet they had and thereby inflict whatever damage they could, in practice they drew back from doing this once the war had started. Does anyone have views on what the military position might have been if the Germans had done well, and managed to whittle down most of the British dreadnoughts at the cost of their own? I guess the answer is that in such a a case, the British would have brought up their reserve pre-dreadnoughts which would then have been the most powerful ships remaining. So being saddled with a useless fleet, perhaps the best use of it was to leave it to rust quietly and therefore keep the british wrong footed in fear of it. I think at the point of decision the Germans knew they had made a mistake in underestimating Britain, but by then it was too late to draw back and too late to change plans. Again, it sounds rather like the recent American invasion of Iraq. Sandpiper (talk) 21:21, 29 January 2010 (UTC)

Is there any historian claiming this was tactical inconclusive? why inconclusive in the box? how is it possbile that such see fight becomes "inconclusive" at wiki. in every language u get tactical victory. this battle is an example for a tactical victory. nobody achieved his objectives, status quo maintained. German won tactical victory. I read the notice in the box now 6 months later i see no reason why it should be not called german tactical victory. Blablaaa (talk) 05:43, 10 July 2010 (UTC)

i was reverted but i see no response here. i ask please for a exact answer why inconclusive? i could understand disputed or something like zhis but inconclusive is the same direct assertion than german victory or allied. We have no sources claiming inconclusive. So we should take the commons sense, and outside the uk german tactical victory is the common sense. So please give a reason for inconclusive. I already mentioned that every wiki has german tactical victory. Why does the english wiki give inconclusive which is nowhere said. If u have no outcome than write disputed but not inconclusive. inconclusive is dubios compared to german tactical victory. I want to remind that english wiki is the only wiki giving tactical inconclusive for the outcome. An GB participated in this battle this looks pretty unfavorable for me. Blablaaa (talk) 20:11, 10 July 2010 (UTC)

If one reads the "conclusion" sections of the German and French wikipedia articles, for example, there is nothing which supports the "deutscher taktischer Sieg" or "Victoire tactique allemande" in their respective infoboxes. The German article has one whole footnote. The French fifteen. Are you honestly trying to claim those are well-referenced articles?

And please, do enlighten us with your reading list regarding the battle, upon which you base your understanding of the tactical implications. --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 21:12, 10 July 2010 (UTC)

A straight comparison of numbers of ships sunk does give Germany an edge over the UK, but that's a very superficial assessment. If you'd like a quote from a historian, how about this: "The Grand Fleet had failed to achieve a victory over the High Seas Fleet—but it was itself far from defeated" (V.E. Tarrant, Jutland: The German Perspective, p. 273). Tarrant goes on to say "From the tactical point of view, since neither fleet was able to inflict a crippling blow on the other, Jutland belongs to the series of inclusive battles...which are the rule in naval warfare" (p. 278). Parsecboy (talk) 21:19, 10 July 2010 (UTC)

And that verdict was so popular Tarrant copied it word for word from Marder (1978). From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow. III. p. 252. --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 21:30, 10 July 2010 (UTC)

One question to both. What makes the battle tactical inconclusive? Beside the fact somebody found a book out there which claims this. Also we forget the fact that the entire world sees this battle as german tactical victory. Can someone of u please explain to me why this battle should be considered inconclusive with allied losing twice the BRT ? Blablaaa (talk) 21:37, 10 July 2010 (UTC)

parcey: : " A straight comparison of numbers of ships sunk does give Germany an edge over the UK, but that's a very superficial assessment ", no thats exactly what tactical means, strategic factors are unimportant at the tactical scale -.- Blablaaa (talk) 21:41, 10 July 2010 (UTC)

simon : "The German article has one whole footnote. The French fifteen. Are you honestly trying to claim those are well-referenced articles? , no i claim that it is the common sense everywhere only at the english wiki its different. I see a link , u not? Blablaaa (talk) 21:44, 10 July 2010 (UTC)

simon : "And please, do enlighten us with your reading list regarding the battle, upon which you base your understanding of the tactical implications. " my english is not perfect i dont fully understant the intention of this sentence but i guess its kinda provocating, isnt it? So thanks to you that you start the discussion this way. I think its better if i leave the discussionBlablaaa (talk) 21:54, 10 July 2010 (UTC)

maybe i will come back if i have some sources to provide. Blablaaa (talk) 22:09, 10 July 2010 (UTC)

What can I say, the English language Wikipedia leads by example. As to a link, Blablaaa, all I see is that various editors on other language Wikipedias have, ignoring the somewhat dubious content or their respective articles, incorrectly summarised the battle in the infoboxes.

As to your other question, "Can someone of u please explain to me why this battle should be considered inconclusive with allied losing twice the BRT ?" The Royal Navy could afford the losses in ships and men far more than the Germans could. The day after Jutland the Royal Navy could easily put twenty-four dreadnoughts to sea for the Germans' ten. Scheer's Chief of Staff had to admit that "the battle-cruisers were no longer operational." For the three British battle cruisers lost, two more powerful ones were a few months away from completion, and another one had been refitting anyway. The Germans had to wait alot longer for the replacement for their lost battle cruiser.

As to tactics, Holger Herwig writes in his well-regarded history of the Imperial German Navy, "It is generally accepted that Hipper outskirmished Beatty during the initial phase of the battle, and that Jellicoe outmaneouvred Scheer badly on two occasions. During the latter, the German received seventy hits while scoring twenty against the Grand Fleet." --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 22:22, 10 July 2010 (UTC)

simon: "The Royal Navy could afford the losses in ships and men far more than the Germans could" , this clearly indicates you didnt fully understood the difference between tactical and operational/strategic scale. Blablaaa (talk) 22:41, 10 July 2010 (UTC)

simon: "German received seventy hits while scoring twenty against the Grand Fleet" overall german scored 227 hits, british "only" 142. german had 3.3% hit ratio, british "only" 2,1% . Your point seems selective u picked a partial figure instead of the overall figure which says exactly the opposite and contratics your argumentation. Like i said i cant provide sources so iam out of the discussion Blablaaa (talk) 22:45, 10 July 2010 (UTC)

so i found at least 15 books sying german tactical victory and no book glaiming british tactical victory. So i will change it soon. Blablaaa (talk) 10:10, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

And you will find us ready to revert it.Tirronan (talk) 10:27, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

, :-) , you are member of MILHIST ? Blablaaa (talk) 10:53, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

i added tactical german victory now. Feel free to reduce the amount of refs to a degree which you consider appropriate.Blablaaa (talk) 11:12, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

No one is claiming it was a British tactical victory; we're saying that it was tactically inconclusive, which it was. Explain to me how being forced to retreat is a tactical victory? Parsecboy (talk) 11:48, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

After i brought 30 books claiming german tactical victory, and said i can bring plenty more, you ask for my opinion why this can be called a tactical victory? are you serious? Consider striking your comments. I will not use them then. Blablaaa (talk) 12:01, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

Nothing is going to change the fact that the German fleet ran for its very life and NOTHING changed.Tirronan (talk) 12:07, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

Ok so it was no tactical victory? Blablaaa (talk) 12:09, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

First it was 15 books, now it's 30? We gave you several sources as well, and certainly more reliable than "The complete idiot's guide to World War I." And yes, there was no tactical victory for anyone at Jutland. Parsecboy (talk) 12:11, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

Actually it were 22. I can bring more. Can you give the books which claim tactical inconclusive? Blablaaa (talk) 12:13, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

Did you guys ever consider the possibility that you not fully understand what tactical means?Blablaaa (talk) 12:18, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

I sure understand trolling, consider this your 1st warning.Tirronan (talk) 12:39, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

The sources

Here's some more sources:

"The inconclusive result was a great disappointment [to the British]...the Germans came within sight of victory after Jutland, not because they won the battle, but because they recognized that there was nothing to gain by repeating it." - A.J.P. Taylor, English History, 1914-1945 p. 63

"A clearer picture of Jutland as emerged over the years. Both sides could claim tactical advantages at differing stages in the battle but overall it was a strategic in inconclusive victory for the Grand Fleet. Fawcett & Hooper, The Fighting at Jutland p. 9

"The only major fleet action of the war, Jutland had been disappointingly inconclusive" Jones, US Battleship Operations in World War I" p. 23

Parsecboy (talk) 12:43, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

your quotes simply say it was strategical inconclusive, which is also not common but far more reasonable then tactical inconclusive.Blablaaa (talk) 21:09, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

please give sources which claim tactical inconclusive and not overall inconclusive. Please unterstand what tactical scale means. look here "tactical victory" that are correct quotes:

1. Winston S. Churchill, 1874-1965 : "In fact, the battle was a strategic victory for the British, but a tactical victory for the Germans"
2. The Royal Navy and the capital ship in the interwar period:"utland proved a tactical victory for the Germans"
3. World War I: encyclopedia. M - R, Volume 3:"Over the German claim to tactical victory there can be little disagreement"
4. Command at sea: naval command and control since the sixteenth century: "The Germans declared, and achieved, a tactical victory"
5. The Marshall Cavendish illustrated encyclopedia of World War I:"The Germans could claim a tactical victory in terms of ships sunk,"
6. Strategy in the contemporary world: an introduction to strategic studies:"Jutland was a tactical victory for the German fleet,"
7. War, peace and international relations: an introduction to strategic history:"The German High Seas Fleet won a tactical victory at Jutland"
8. Dubious battles: aggression, defeat, and the international system:"as the Germans won a tactical victory over the Royal Navy"
9. The complete idiot's guide to World War I:"Battle of Jutland, a tactical victory for the Germans"
10. Cruisers and battle cruisers: an illustrated history of their impact:"Although the Germans could claim a tactical victory, since they inflicted more damage than they received"
11. Churchill and Hitler: essays on the political-military direction of total war:"In fact, the German High Seas Fleet won a minor tactical victory at Jutland"
12. Illustrated Encyclopaedia of World History - Page 4764:may not unfairly describes as tactical victory for germany
13. The Nordic way: a path to Baltic equilibrium:"When the German High Seas Fleet finally tried to force its way out of the Baltic Sea on May 3 1 , 1 9 1 6, its tactical victory"
14. Fighting the Great War: a global history:"On the tactical level, Jutland could be counted a German victory"
15. Europe and naval arms control in the Gorbachev era:"The battle was seen as a tactical victory for the German naval force"
16. The good Nazi: the life and lies of Albert Speer:"virtually confined to port since its tactical victory but strategic defeat at the Battle of Jutland"
17. Power at Sea: The age of navalism, 1890-1918:"As for Jutland itself, the outcome is clear enough. Scheer achieved a tactical victory; "
18. The Second World War: The war at sea:"On paper, it was a tactical victory for the Germans"
19. Count not the dead: the popular image of the German submarine:"Germany had in fact won a tactical victory"
20. The First World War: a very short introduction:"and so were able plausibly to claim a tactical victory"
21. American sea power since 1775:"he Germans won a tactical victory at Jutland"
22. A Companion to World War I:"a German claim for victory. The claim could be justified only on tactical grounds."
23. Researching World War One:"hat the Battle of Jutland was a German victory "
24. USS Yorktown at Midway:"again like Jutland — was a strategic victory even while it was a tactical defeat"
25. Transformation under fire: revolutionizing how America fights:"ater at Jutland, it turned out to be armor and striking power that tipped the tactical outcome in favor of the Germans"
26. The strategy of the Lloyd George coalition, 1916-1918:"a tactical triumph for the Germans"
27. Magill's Guide to Military History:"A tactical victory for the Germans"
28. The Saturday review of politics, literature, science and art:"force the Germans to leave their ports, and did make tactical victory possible both at Jutland"
29. Erich Raeder: Admiral of the Third Reich:"German naval force to date and the Imperial Navy had won an indisputable "quantitative" victory"
30. The American historical review:"It is plain that our author awards the tactical victory at Jutland to the Germans"
31. The nation and the navy: a history of naval life and policy:"Scheer could claim a tactical victory
32. President Wilson fights his war::"The Battle of Jutland may be regarded as a strategical draw for the British and a tactical victory for the Germans"
33. Hitler's northern war::"the Battle of Jutland, Germany won a tactical victory"
34. Sea battles in close-up:"was a strategic victory even while it was a tactical defeat"
35. The Living age:"Germans may have won a tactical victory"
36. A history of civilization:"Although Jutland was a tactical victory for the Germans"
37. The naval strategy of the World War:"It is generally agreed today that Jutland was a German tactical victory"
38. Worst enemy:"he High Seas Fleet fought only one major action with its dreadnoughts, winning a tactical victory at Jutland. "
39. Deutsche seegeschichte:"durchaus als ein taktischer Sieg zu werten"
40. Scapa Flow: die Selbstversenkung der wilhelminischen Flotte:"Taktisch, so das inzwischen einmütige Urteil, war die Schlacht ein Sieg für die Deutschen"
41. Frankfurter Hefte:"Ihr taktischer Sieg über die britische »Grand Fleet« "
42. Handbuch der deutschen Geschichte: Deutsche Geschichte der ...:"Flotten endete mit einem deutschen taktischen Sieg"
43. BILD-Wissensbibliothek 7. Altertum und Neuzeit. Das große ... - Page 190:"bei dem die Deutschen einen taktischen Erfolg, aber keinen entscheidenden Sieg errangen"
44. die Entwicklung der Typenfrage im Ersten Weltkrieg: "Der taktische Erfolg der Hochseeflotte"
45. Die Technik im Weltkriege:"Der Sieg vordem Skagerrak ist nach dem Vorhergehenden in erster Linie ein Sieg der deutschen Taktik"
46. Seegeltung in der deutschen Geschichte:"großer taktischer Erfolg der Hochseeflotte"
47. Der weltkrieg, 1914-1918: dem deutschen volke dargestellt:"So groß der taktische Erfolg in der Schlacht vor dem Skagerrak "
48. Brockhaus, die Bibliothek: Aufbruch der Massen, Schrecken der ...:"taktisch erfolgreichen deutschen Hochseeflotte am Skagerrak"
49. Geschichte des europäischen Kriegswesens:"endete die Schlacht mit einem taktischen Sieg der Deutschen"
50. Die Verteidigung des Westens:"Taktisch war es zwar ein deutscher Sieg"
51. Schlachtschiffe und Schlachtkreuzer 1921-1997:"Mai 1 9 1 6 in der Skagerrak- schlacht, der mit einem taktischen Sieg über die britische Grand Fleet endete"
52. Kaiserliche Marine: "So ist die Skagerrak-Schlacht deswegen als ein deutscher Sieg anzusehen, weil die taktische Überlegenheit eindeutig bei den Verbänden von Hipper und Scheer lag."
53. Der Seekrieg, 1939-1945":Trotzdem wurde er taktisch ein deutscher Sieg,"
54. Gebhardts Handbuch der deutschen Geschichte:"Marine einen „taktischen, technischen und moralischen Sieg"
55. Enzyklopädie Erster Weltkrier:"einen taktischen Sieg über die zahlenmäßig überlegene Grand Fleet der Briten in der Schlacht vor dem Skagerrak "
56. Velhagen & Klasings Monatshefte:"Diese Schlacht ist taktisch nicht ganz durchgeschlagen, aber als unbestrittener Sieger ist die deutsche Marine daraus hervorgegangen"
57. Das buch von der kriegsmarine:"Ein großer taktischer Erfolg der beträchtlich schwächeren deutschen Flotte über die Engländer"
58. Allgemeine schweizerische militärzeitschrift:"welche die Hochseeflotte nach ihrem taktischen und materiellen Erfolg in der Schlacht vor dem Skagerrak"
59. Irrfahrt: ein Tatsachenroman:"Die deutschen Autoren, bezeichneten diese Schlacht als einen überragenden Sieg der kaiserlichen Flotte"
60. Brockhaus, die Bibliothek: Aufbruch der Massen, Schrecken der ...:"Nach der Seeschlacht zwischen der britischen und der taktisch erfolgreichen deutschen Hochseeflotte am Skagerrak"
61. Dictionnaire des batailles navales franco-anglaises:"à la Bataille du Jutland qui fut une victoire tactique pour les Allemands
62. Les erreurs stratégiques pendant la Première Guerre mondiale:"L'amiral Scheer a donc remporté une victoire tactique"
63. Polybiblion: Revue bibliographique universelle:"La rencontre du Jutland fut la victoire de l'artillerie allemande"
64. La paix armée et la grande guerre (1871-1919):"Mais s'il est certain que la flotte allemande a eu un succès tactique,"
65. Histoire de la marine française:"La bataille du Jutland, victoire stratégique anglaise mais succès tactique allemand"
66. Building the Kaiser's navy:"tactical success at Jutland"
67. The New Century Cyclopedia of Names:"hough it can be considered a German tactical success"
68. The indecisiveness of modern war: and other essays."Further, a tactical success gained by the weaker side may avail little. At Jutland the Germans gained suoh a success"
69. From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow:"skilful tactics, and extraordinary gunnery had won a tremendous tactical success for the Germans"
70. Collier's encyclopedia:"as a German tactical success. "

Blablaaa (talk) 13:08, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

I didnt research the credentials of the historians who wrote the books, i dont claim all sources are suitable for wiki. I only give a short overview. I also add more books after editors already did reply below.Blablaaa (talk) 20:45, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

It would be nice to see page numbers, etc., for all of your citations, Blablaaa, but it looks as though you've done an impressive job of supporting your position in the face of some unjustifiably violent and at times scornful opposition (a nice welcome to the English Wikipedia, no?). I completely agree with you that the outcome at Jutland is best described as a German tactical victory and a British strategic victory - to me, that has always seemed to sum-up the battle just about perfectly. Unfortunately, as you may have noticed by now, it seems that that viewpoint (which, I believe you have demonstrated, is far from uncommon) will never be allowed to see the light of day on this page. Nonetheless, I do think you have made some valid points.

I also agree with you that some of the editors on this page at times do seem to misunderstand the meaning of a tactical victory. Whenever someone suggests that the Germans won a tactical victory at Jutland, counter-arguments usually seem to be that the Germans couldn't possibly have won any kind of a victory at Jutland because they spent the remainder of the war bottled-up in port, or that the British could better afford the losses they sustained at Jutland than could the Germans, or that Jutland led to the U-Boat war, which led to America joining, which led to Germany losing WWI, which led to the rise of Hitler, which led to WWII, etc. These are all really strategic considerations (or in the case of the last example, maybe geo-political considerations). When discussing the outcome of a battle from a tactical standpoint, one should consider the battle alone, and look at who won the fight, taken by itself. (Also, Simon, you must know that a tactical victory is not conferred on the basis of which side displayed the better tactics, right?)

However, at the same time that I argue for Jutland being considered a German tactical victory, I do have to stress that the battle was also clearly a British strategic victory. Cheers. Groundsquirrel13 (talk) 16:57, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

If one could separate the two segments of the battle (i.e., the runs to the south and north and the main fleet action), then yes, one could ascribe a tactical victory to the Germans for the first portion; it's much harder to make that argument for the second segment. As the German naval historian Holger Herwig pointed out, Jellicoe badly outmaneuvered Scheer twice and inflicted serious damage, particularly on SMS König and the battlecruisers. Like I said above, a straight counting of losses is far too superficial. A better (though also superficial) measure for victory is who held the "field" the following day. Scheer was forced to retreat by a superior force. According to Blablaaa's logic, the Battle of Chosin Reservoir should be labeled an "American tactical victory" because US forces inflicted, at bare minimum, double the number of casualties they sustained, despite having been forced to retreat. The Battle of Stalingrad must have been a German victory because they inflicted some 300,000 more casualties on the Soviets.

Moreover, the books that are actually about Jutland and the North Sea war as a whole (i.e., Marder, Tarrant, Herwig) call it tactically inconclusive. Books by experts on the specific topic hold more weight than general works that mention the topic in passing (for instance, the several encyclopedias and USS Yorktown at Midway). Parsecboy (talk) 18:00, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

FunnyBlablaaa (talk) 19:05, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

Your sources not even claim tactical inconclusive. Parcey what you do at the moment is defending your opinion and making OR. You try to explain me why this battle was inconclusive. This Battle, always and everywhere, was considered a german tactical victory. The only place where this is not supported is the english wiki. You not even brought sources claiming tactical incnclusive. You wrote a long text explaining me your OR and SYN why this is no german tactical victory, clearly showing that you, in compariosion to the 50 books, did not understand what tactical means. Dear parceyboy, the problem is your understanding. You dont understand what tactical means all the books do understand but you not thats why you dont agree. Your own sources dont support you they not say "tactical inconclusive". Blablaaa (talk) 19:12, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

Sorry, Parsecboy, but this seems like yet another effort to avoid having to address the battle by itself. Now the argument is that if you divided the battle up into segments, the Germans would have won one, and the British would have won the other. Why not just look at the battle as a single, discrete occurrence? I think the reason might be that if you do so, it's hard to say why the Germans shouldn't be counted the victor (tactically speaking, of course).

Also, you say that "a straight counting of losses is far too superficial" a way to judge the outcome of a battle from a tactical standpoint. I disagree with you. In a naval battle, taking or holding a particular square mile of sea is usually (but not always) of no importance at all. In general, the sea is the sea - it has no hills or crossroads or trench lines to be taken (I stress that I'm speaking only from a tactical standpoint - from a strategic perspective, holding a particular piece of sea can be very important). Thus, instead of comparing Jutland to land battles such as the Chosin Reservoir or Stalingrad, the more apposite comparison would be to a naval battle such as the Battle of the Coral Sea, where a tactical victory is traditionally ascribed to the Japanese solely because they sunk more ships.

And one more point. Take a hypothetical: pretend the Germans had attacked the Grand Fleet with a handful of torpedo boats, and that those torpedo boats sunk a few British battlecruisers before swiftly retreating back to port. Would you call that a British victory because they maintained possession of the "field"? Obviously, such an inferior force is not going to stick around to slug it out with the whole Grand Fleet, but that doesn't mean they didn't win a victory. In my opinion, what happened at Jutland is similar in character to this hypothetical. An inferior force came out, sunk a few British battlecruisers, ultimately found itself faced with overwhelming opposition, and retreated more-or-less safely. It didn't hold the field, but it still won a tactical victory. Groundsquirrel13 (talk) 19:11, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

To be honest i see only two explanations for this 1) it is not understood what tactical means, arguments like "they retreated" indicate this 2) somebody simply dont want to hear this battle was a tactical victory for the germans. Rergarding tactical, tactical is the handling of assets in the case like jutland where both failed to achieve their objectives the one who destroys more assets of the enemy is the tactical victor. its simply the very definition of tactical victoryBlablaaa (talk) 20:07, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

Groundsquirrel, your hypothetical is completely irrelevant. You're describing a scenario where an inferior force categorically defeats a superior force in battle. Are you seriously trying to say that that is what the Germans achieved at Jutland? --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 20:32, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

Obviously, Simon, I'm not saying that my hypothetical is exactly similar to what happened at Jutland. However, I think it is fundamentally similar. In my hypothetical, an inferior force comes out, sinks some ships, and then successfully retreats in the face of overwhelming force. At Jutland, an inferior force came out, sank some ships, and then successfully retreated in the face of overwhelming force. Clearly, Jutland wasn't as clean a victory as my hypothetical (the British managed to inflict some losses as well). But it is fundamentally similar, and thus I think it was a German tactical victory (notice the emphasis on the word "tactical"). Groundsquirrel13 (talk) 21:06, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

At all participants: I searched for neutral opinions and brought this issue here : [[1]], you may want to give an opinion there, i think its allowed to do that.Blablaaa (talk) 21:22, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

German fleet attempting to break out into baltic

Just been revising the intro. It currently says Not knowing the Germans' objective, Jellicoe and his staff decided to position the fleet to head off any attempt by the Germans to enter the North Atlantic, or the Baltic through the Skagerrak, . Anyone any suggestions why Jellicoe would be trying to stop them entering the baltic which they customarily entered at will via the kiel canal? Sandpiper (talk) 13:37, 30 March 2010 (UTC)

Someone's been having a laugh, it would seem. --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 13:45, 30 March 2010 (UTC)

Entering the North Atlantic is similar nonsense. The german ships didn't have the range to do that. Threatening the convoy routes to Russia and Norway was the only thing they could do.Nevfennas (talk) 20:04, 31 March 2010 (UTC)

Port Arthur Battleship Engagement

The article's first paragraph stated that Jutland was the 4th major battleship fleet action after Port Arthur, Yellow Sea, and Tsushima in that order. Although Port Arthur was initiated as a destroyer attack with torpedoes in Port Arthur's harbor on 08 February 1904 on anchored Russian battleships; there was a very light exchange of battleship gunfire about 10 hours after the initial torpedo attack. 8 battleships, 4 Russian & 4 IJN were hit by combinations of 10 inch shore battery fire (from Port Arthur) and the guns from the battleships. Apparently 5 Russian battleships and 6 cruisers made it out of port and began cruising in three columns along the coast when they gained contact. (Ref: Forczyk p. 42, 43) —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.10.75.150 (talk) 04:56, 4 April 2010 (UTC)

Would that not count as a major fleet action since the Russian Pacific fleet clashed with the Japanese fleet?XavierGreen (talk) 23:42, 8 April 2010 (UTC)

According to the author Forczyk, it was a 20 minute sea fight, apparently counting the shore batteries; as Togo made the mistake of fighting them both at the same time (a lesson he learned the hard way; not to do that again!). So, since the Russian & IJN battleships were at sea, maneuvering, and exchanging gun fire, it was a battleship fleet fleet action. But since Togo had actually split his fire between two different enemies (another error he learned not repeat), the battleships & shore batteries; and used his secondary guns against the pre-dreadnaughts and NOT his main guns (12-inch), while choosing to fight the shore batteries with his 12-inchers, it might be generally acceptable to consider the naval battle portion of the Battle of Port Arthur to have been a battleship fleet action. But not a major battleship fleet engagement. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.10.75.150 (talk) 16:38, 10 April 2010 (UTC)

trim addition about battlecruisers being outmatched

just removed a recent addition from the battlecruiser section, posted here now in case anyone objects to just deleting it. The poster is anon or I would have mentioned it to him. 'Admiral Togo, during the Battle of Tsushima on 27 May 1905, had successfully placed two of his armored cruisers on his battle line. Post Tsushima conclusions drawn by both British and German naval officers, mistakenly believed this to have been an acceptable option. Financial restrictions and a balanced battle-line forced Admiral Togo to utilize his cruisers; he was simply lucky that he had gotten away with it! '

Reply: Recommend that sentence (or paragraph) concerning Togo's cruisers should be returned, as it explains why the British Navy put their cruisers on the battleline to begin with. Naval officers studied the Tsushima battle as part of their profession (it was the only modern naval battle to study at that time-being separated by only 11 years from WWI). The short answer (or stated another way): The British might not have utilized their battlecruisers the way they did, if Togo hadn't got away with it at Tsushima 11 years earlier. The reference book for that entry should also be returned; readers need to know where that information came from. Professional fighting men (used to) always try to remember the old axiom, "it's the man behind the gun that counts, not the gun." Translation: it was Togo's and the British use of battlecruisers that counted...not the cruisers themselves. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 75.107.96.58 (talk) 18:27, 25 June 2010 (UTC)

Ive removed it because it doesnt advance the argument. The battlecruisers did not sink because they were outmatched and fighting battleships. Ours were sunk by other comparable ships. Theirs did pretty well against all comers. We only mention the concept to immediately dismiss it, so no need to expand the point.Sandpiper (talk) 21:44, 20 May 2010 (UTC)

The Battle-cruisers were lost because of 1. lack of horizontal protection 2. lack of flash tight fittings 3. because of the mistake of using cordite as a propellant. Every navy that used cordite had spontaneous detonation of magazines through out the history of battleships and that alone should have moved the RN away from it. Later versions of cordite were based on German RP propellants.Tirronan (talk) 22:21, 30 May 2010 (UTC)

The main problem with the British propellant was that it didn't contain a stabilizer for the nitrocellulose, which became unstable as it decomposed. The German RP did - which was a lesson from the ammunition fire aboard the cruiser SMS Vineta in 1907 or so. Horizontal protection was not much of an issue; none of the major ships sunk were lost as a result of insufficient armor (i.e, too many shell holes below the waterline). They were all sunk by magazine explosions. Both SMS Seydlitz and SMS Derfflinger had turrets and barbettes penetrated by shells; if they had been carrying British-type propellant they both would have blown up. You're right about the flash-tight fittings; Lion was saved in part because her magazine doors were shut when her Q turret was penetrated. Parsecboy (talk) 01:17, 31 May 2010 (UTC)

with the exception of USS Nevada none of the ships of this era carried enough horizontal armor to prevent plunging fire from taking a toll, turret roofs were pierced and that is a failure of the armor system. Fire control outran old armor designs and FC could be retrofit-ed fairly easily while reworking armor was almost impossible in wartime.Tirronan (talk) 22:51, 6 June 2010 (UTC)

Lion's turret was penetrated through the front vertical plate, though towards the top edge so it might have been weaker than the centre of the plate. If there was a weakness which could have been helped by more armour, it was to make the turrets thicker to resist shell strikes. This was the critical weakness. The geometry of the shell trajectories means that incoming shells did not plunge, hence the design of relatively thin horizontal armour (I have read several descriptions of misses bouncing off the water, like stones thrown to skip). Horizontal armour was blamed for penetration by shells, but I havnt seen any evidence to support it. It was just assumed by the official enquiries, and i think probably to disguise the real issue, which was inflammable ammunition and its storage. These ships and their guns were designed to fire shells at elevations of maximum 10-20%. (The ships which survived into WW2 had their elevating equipment changed to allow higher shots and more range.) The shells were intended to fly very fast on flat trajectories and arrive with maximum kinetic energy.

Incidentally, when I read a description of Tsushima it didnt really support the conclusion made about it. It may have demonstrated to those who analysed it, or were there watching, that certain things were bad ideas, but the outcome of the battle was the result of the usual muddle, luck and incompetence. Likewise here, if Beatty had approached the battle differently, would he have done better?Sandpiper (talk) 13:58, 20 June 2010 (UTC)

Lion's armor wasn't very thick to begin with, second, the roof armor was just 1" thick if memory serves so if the hit was near the roof there would be a loss of support to the armor. While the BC exchanges were made at 16k yards and therefore not all that much of a threat visa vie the horizontal armor issue that wasn't the only fire taking place. We have discussed this before, German ammo did cook off during penetration of the turrets in fact almost every time, so did the Brits, they were under fire from the 5th BS which was at or near max range and therefore was plunging fire. The difference was that cordite can and will explode the German RP wouldn't. The US didn't use cordite either but Japan did. Do a bit of research and you will find a surprising correlation between self detonation in battleship magazines and cordite. The US wouldn't use it, nor Germany there was a reason for that. Much has been made of the difference in storage but that just doesn't stand up either. Again all that is in the archive.Tirronan (talk) 23:26, 10 July 2010 (UTC)

Yes, this has been discussed before. I dont accept that a shell coming in at 20 degrees or so is 'plunging'. It is much closer to the horizontal than the vertical. Analysis of the path of the shells shows it is pretty symmetrical because they are travelling very fast and come down at much the same angle they go up. It might be the case that the deck armour was more at risk from shells exploding upon it than from the penetrating power of the armour piercing warhead. I did look up what angle the 5BS shells would be coming down at but I forget now, but it isnt very great. The guns were modified before WW2 for greater elevation. In any case the 5BS was shooting at German ships, so it isnt an issue re the british deck armour, and at max range for the 5BS, the germans were certainly not shooting back at all. There is a picture of the turret roof from Lion lying on the deck. I take it that it was was bolted or riveted in place and probably relatively weak against a force pushing it out rather than one trying to push it in, so it popped off relatively easily. If the idea was to vent any blast inside, this might even be a design feature! Cordite seems to deteriorate with age, with the nitroglycerine separating out, which made it unstable. Lion had new charges, I have no idea what was on the lost ships. Sandpiper (talk) 21:56, 11 July 2010 (UTC)

24k yards I believe, and I don't know the ranges that every turret was pierced at but there is at least one passage talking about hits admidship in the boiler room from an over head shell so I don't at all agree with you at all.Tirronan (talk) 23:18, 11 July 2010 (UTC)

I have read reports of shells which hit something and ricoched down, and of shells exploding with bits going down. Which might argue for better horizontal armour, but doesnt mean the shells were 'plunging'. I dont know if there is an official definition of the angle required to 'plunge', but these guns were massive so as to fire horizontally! It was originally thought pointless to be able to elevate them significantly. This just isn't 'arrows raining down from the sky'. Sandpiper (talk) 22:56, 17 July 2010 (UTC)

outdent, there was plunging fire as well however that wasn't what doomed the 3 British BC's, I believe that in every case it was fire from German BC's at close range, here it is lack of vertical armor and cordite as well as the probability of bad ammo handling procedures. Also none the less, there was longer range fire taking place also.Tirronan (talk) 04:13, 18 July 2010 (UTC)

Studying History

Returned the armored cruisers justification to the battle-line; since it's known that naval/military officers traditionally study past wars and battles prior to fighting the next one. As was the case for Jutland, even if sometimes they draw the wrong conclusions. Or, unlucky enough for that "conclusion" to not work for them. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 75.105.32.38 (talk) 05:38, 28 June 2010 (UTC)

Perhaps you can provide an exact quote from Forchyk's book which you cite so we can see exactly what he has to say about this? In the case of tsushima I take it he is talking about outclassed ships (cruisers) being included in a battle line against more powerful vessels. In the case of Beatty's battlecruisers they were fighting a similar group of ships with similar capabilities when two were lost. I doubt very much that the british navy drew the conclusion from tsushima that a larger group of british warships should choose not to engage a smaller group of similar enemy ships, and I doubt that the British navy should have drawn this conclusion. I dont see how tsushima is relevant to this? As to the issue of whether battlecruisers should have been included in the british battleship line, well, they weren't. They were used as fast armoured scouts. The Germans used them for a hit and run attack against battleships, but I dont think Sheer did this because he thought it brilliant, but out of desperation. So what is the evidence that british/Germans had drawn mistaken conclusions from Tsushima, and if they had that it affected the battlecruisers at Jutland?

Reply: The quote is referenced on pages 76-77. The book is in the possession of another military officer (Naval Officer; with a fascination for tumblehome battleships). —Preceding unsigned comment added by 75.105.32.38 (talk) 07:59, 12 July 2010 (UTC)

Well maybe you can at least give some idea of what it actually said? if not, then theres not much point including it. At the moment it seems suspiciously like advertising.Sandpiper (talk) 22:46, 17 July 2010 (UTC)

I would agree with you that it was crass stupidity for Arbuthnot's armoured cruisers (very much inferior ships) to become involved in the batlleship exchanges during the main fleet action, but that is not the engagement under discussion (section you edited is about battlecruiser losses). In the case of Arbuthnot, he wasnt supposed to be there and was a very aggresive officer, whose instincts got the better of him. He mistakenly thought he saw an opportunity, caused trouble for the battlecruisers which had to dodge around him and ended up under big enemy guns he hadnt realised were there. His ships were also not in a 'line of battle'.

The section originally mentioned the fact that battlescruises were not designed to be used as battleships, but indeed there was a tendency to think of them as such, but it didnt affect the battle and was not why they were lost.Sandpiper (talk) 08:01, 4 July 2010 (UTC)

What is the rationale for the statement that Arbuthnot "wasnt [sic] supposed to be there"? --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 08:40, 4 July 2010 (UTC)

I dont believe any britsh commander then or now is supposed to place his ship in a position of extreme jeopardy for negligible gain. Fisher said 'a glorious but not a justifiable death'. He had no business cutting across the battlecruisers. I dont know what his orders said about where he was supposed to be, but I doubt it was sailing up and down between the two fleets? The comment about cruisers not being ships of the line was entirely appropriate if talking about arbuthnots ships, but I would expect the british battlecruisers present at jutland would handily sink the japanese battleships at Tsushima which were significantly inferior to the German battlecruisers he did take on. Its all relative: the same names are used but the ships change completely over the years. Sandpiper (talk) 22:20, 4 July 2010 (UTC)

And how do you know that Arbuthnot's position was one of "extreme jeopardy for negligable gain" when he deployed his squadron? Being wise after the event ... --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 07:04, 5 July 2010 (UTC)

Sound of guns going off from the battlecruisers he nearly collided with and direction said guns were pointing? Sandpiper (talk)

Chatfield's memoirs give some details of a conversation with Arbuthnot about what he would do in a battle . Tale told is that Arbuthnot's armoured cruisers were supposed to be ahead (on one of the wings) of the Battle Fleet during approach to battle, but after BF deployment in line of battle they should take station to the rear of the line. How they got there was not specified; they could either go down the disengaged side of the BF, or between the BF and the enemy. Arbuthnot - according to Chatfield - thought it would be less dull to go between, rather than behind; Chatfield gave good reasons why the excitement should be foregone, but A pooh-poohed them. That doesn't fully explain what he did, but it would seem sufficient to show that he should not have been there (both in the sense that his orders did not require him to be there, and in the sense that in the absence of specific orders even without hindsight other commanders would not have put their ships where A put his. (I think I recall from reading Marder (gulp) 40 years ago an anecdote of the commander (Tug Wilson ?) of one of the LCSs visiting the wardroom of one of his cruisers, finding that it had prominently displayed a nicely framed Nelson quote to the effect that 'I cannot conceive any captain to be far wrong who lays his ship alongside the enemy' and insisting that it be taken down at once: 'We'll have none of that nonsense here; we have a job to do and it's not that' . I would take the same point to apply to A's ships)) Rjccumbria (talk) 23:33, 7 July 2010 (UTC)

@Sandpiper, what would you say about Beatty leading the B.C.F. across the middle of the Battle Fleet then? All Arbuthnot would have been aware of were the BCs which Beatty was engaging. As to intentions, this Marine officer's account from the I.W.M. is more plausible than Chatfield's excuse, which even Gordon says doesn't ring true:

Admiral Arbuthnot had made it abundantly clear in a series of addresses to the ships' companies of the vessels under his command, that when he encountered the enemy he would close to the rather meagre range of our guns and engage remorselessly. In the action he put his precepts into practice, but the old ships of the 1st Cruiser Squadron were no match for the German battlecruisers. --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 01:00, 8 July 2010 (UTC)

I think Id say he was a bloody fool and should not have been in command (arbuthnot). It is not the job of any military officer to be a hero but to fight effectively. Arbuthnots actions were exactly the kind of thing Tirpitz was counting on to win with fewer ships in a fight against the british. Beatty had the same idea of closing and shooting irrespective of the design limitations/advantages of his ships that his guns had longer range than the germans. War is best conducted as a turkey shoot, not a fair fight. Beatty was present at the battle of Omdurman (yes, commanding a ship) which was conducted in classic style of overwhelming superiority of force, but didnt manage to apply this himself at Jutland. He was grossly overconfident. I've read several comments about smaller ships steaming up and down between the fleets being a bloody nuisance because of the smoke they were making. Crossing the line of the fleet is hardly desireable, but it rather depends on outcome whether its justified. I only vaguely remember when you are talking about re Beatty, but its interesting not least because im also interested in the Victoria/camperdown collision and sinking, where had Markham crossed Tryon's line he might have performed a very pretty maneuvre instead of a nasty sinking. Sandpiper (talk) 08:12, 8 July 2010 (UTC)

You still haven't explained why Arbuthnot was out of line for following the letter of the Grand Fleet Battle Orders (something missing from Chatfield's little story) and using his squadron aggressively at the van of the fleet. I'd say that Arbuthnot and Defence and Warrior were the victims of sheer bad luck, just like Indefatigable, Queen Mary and Invincible. I was always under the impression that what Tirpitz wanted was to overwhelm isolated portions of the Royal Navy's newest and most powerful warships, such as could conceivably been achieved with Beatty's force.

As to Victoria and the Camperdown, until the day you or anyone else finds themselves in Markham's shoes I wouldn't pass comment as to what he should have done. In the meantime, a re-reading of the minutes of the Court-Martial would surely be in order. --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 08:51, 8 July 2010 (UTC)

I did get a copy and went through it, and mean to make notes when I get time. I think Tryon was blamed for giving impossible orders which were precisely obeyed, whereas in fact he gave doable orders which were disobeyed, but I dont know if there is evidence for or against it in the minutes. Tirpitz hoped to win by having better officers and better ships, because he knew he could never win on numbers. In this context a bad officer is one who loses ships for no gain, such as arbuthnot, or Craddock at Coronel. I am not convinced about whether it made a difference, but Beatty also used his ships wrongly and not as they were designed. That is the wrong kind of officer. Jellicoe was criticised, not least by the aggresive Beatty supporters, for being too cautious. The sort of cautious which might have saved a couple of battlecruisers and left the Germans just as badly off. If Goodenough had commanded arbuthnot's ships and had been in his place, what would he have done? Then again, to get back to what I think was my point originally, these armoured cruisers had a dismal record, at Coronel, here, or the 'live bait squadron'. They had no business in the line of battle anywhere. Sandpiper (talk) 23:35, 8 July 2010 (UTC)

I get a distinct feeling I have strayed into a big ship action and should rapidly disappear to the disengaged side, but before I do so, can I just point out that I was refering to Chatfield, not to give a reason for what Arbuthnot did (I fully take on board Gordon's criticism that the conversation was not directly relevant to the situation at Jutland) but to give a reason for believing that Arbuthnot should not have been that close to enemy capital ships (Gordon does not criticise that aspect of Chatfield's account - but then he doesn't half have a go at Arbuthnot). And the fate of armoured cruisers against even battle cruisers was surely not entirely hindsight after Falklands and Dogger Bank (even if in 1916 it wasn't quite so accepted that German ships were not quite as fragile as the British) Rjccumbria (talk) 18:32, 11 July 2010 (UTC)

ammunition

is there some space in the article for used ammunition and hits ? Blablaaa (talk) 06:04, 10 July 2010 (UTC)

Campbell wrote a whole book about it. If you wanted to get serious on the subject it could fill an entire sub article with details of which ship hit which as the battle progressed. (so thats a vote for such a sub article, assuming there isnt something somewhere already?) Sandpiper (talk) 06:36, 10 July 2010 (UTC)

Germany and the Emporor

I did not try to hard to find a more suitable heading, so my apologies. If Germany's Navy campaigns became more consolidated, then it may be described as a long term victory for Germany, but what is long term? Germany was then a Monarchy, so if Germany had any type of victory, it must have been of benefit to the Emporor. Where is the German Monarchy now?--83.108.30.141 (talk) 21:36, 22 July 2010 (UTC)