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Battle of Borodino

Coordinates: 55°30.51′N 35°49.27′E / 55.50850°N 35.82117°E / 55.50850; 35.82117
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Battle of Borodino
Part of French invasion of Russia (1812)

"Battle of Moscow, 7th September 1812", 1822 by Louis Lejeune
DateSeptember 7, 1812
Location
Borodino, Russia
55°30.51′N 35°49.27′E / 55.50850°N 35.82117°E / 55.50850; 35.82117
Result

French victory;

  • Strategic withdrawal of the Russian Army;[2]
  • French strategic loss[3]
Belligerents
French Empire
Coat of arms of the Duchy of Warsaw Duchy of Warsaw		 Russian Empire[1]
Commanders and leaders
Napoleon I
Coat of arms of the Duchy of Warsaw Józef Antoni Poniatowski		 Mikhail Kutuzov
Pyotr Bagration †
Michael Andreas Barclay de Tolly
Strength
130,000 men, 587 guns[4] 120,000 men, 624 guns
Casualties and losses
~30,000–35,000 dead, wounded and captured[5]
[6](inc. 47 generals, 480 officers)		 39,000–45,000 dead, wounded and captured[7][6] (inc. 23 generals, 211 officers)

Template:Campaignbox Napoleon's invasion of Russia

The Battle of Borodino (Russian: Бородинская битва, Borodinskaya bitva; French: Bataille de la Moskowa), fought on September 7, 1812,[8] was the largest and bloodiest single-day action of the French invasion of Russia, involving more than 250,000 troops and resulting in at least 70,000 casualties. The French Grande Armée under Emperor Napoleon I attacked the Imperial Russian Army of General Mikhail Kutuzov near the village of Borodino, west of the town of Mozhaysk, and eventually captured the main positions on the battlefield, but failed to destroy the Russian army. About a third of Napoleon's soldiers were killed or wounded; Russian losses, while heavier, could be replaced due to Russia's large population, since Napoleon's campaign took place on Russian soil.

The battle itself ended with the disorganized Russian Army out of position and ripe for complete defeat. The state of exhaustion of the French forces and the lack of recognition of the state of the Russian Army led Napoleon to remain on the battlefield with his army instead of the forced pursuit that had marked other campaigns that he had conducted in the past.[9] The entirety of the Guard, however, was still available to Napoleon and in refusing to use it he lost this singular chance to destroy the Russian army.[10] The battle at Borodino was a pivotal point in the campaign, as it was the last offensive action fought by Napoleon in Russia. By withdrawing, the Russian army preserved its combat strength, eventually allowing them to force Napoleon out of the country.

Background

Napoleon's invasion of Russia

Main article: French invasion of Russia

The French Grande Armée had begun its invasion of Russia in June 1812; Emperor Alexander I proclaimed a Patriotic War in response. The Russian forces, initially massed along the Polish frontier, fell back in the face of the swift French advance. Count Michael Barclay de Tolly, the commander-in-chief of the Russian army, attempted to form a defensive line, but his efforts were thwarted by the fast-moving French.

Napoleon I on the Borodino Heights, by Vasily Vereshchagin (1897)

Napoleon advanced from Vitebsk, hoping to catch the Russian Army in the open where he could annihilate it.[11] The French army, however, was not positioned well for an extended overland campaign, as it was 925 km (575 miles) from its nearest logistic base at Kovno (Kaunas); the extended French supply lines were vulnerable to assault, causing Napoleon's forces to be seriously depleted by Russian supply raids.[12] The central French force, under Napoleon's direct command, had crossed the Niemen with 286,000 men; however, by the time of the battle, it numbered 161,475 (most had died of starvation and disease).[13] Nonetheless, the lure of a decisive battle spurred Napoleon to action, driving him further into Russia and further stretching his supply lines.

Meanwhile, political infighting between Barclay's subordinates repeatedly prevented the Russian commander from committing his forces to battle.[14] Barclay's constant retreat was perceived by both his fellow generals and the Russian court as a reluctance to fight; consequently, he was removed from command and replaced by Prince Mikhail Kutuzov on August 29, 1812.[15] The 67-year old General Kutuzov was not seen by his contemporaries as the equal of Napoleon; however, he was favoured over Barclay because he was ethnically Russian (unlike Barclay, who was of Scottish descent), because he possessed the ability to muster a good defense,[16] and because he inspired the complete loyalty of both his army and his subordinates.[17]

The new Russian commander, however, was also unable to establish a defensive position until within 125 kilometres (78 mi) of Moscow; Kutuzov ordered another retreat to Gshatsk on August 30, at which time the ratio of French to Russian forces had shrunk from 3:1 to 5:4.[18] Kutuzov established his defensive line in an eminently defensible area near the village of Borodino, the best defensive position until the Russians reached Moscow.[19] Starting on September 3, Kutuzov strengthened the line with earthworks, including the Raevski Redoubt in the center-right of the line and three open, arrow-shaped "Bagration flèches" (named after Pyotr Bagration) on the left.

The Battle of Shevardino Redoubt

The initial Russian disposition, which stretched south of the new Smolensk Highway (Napoleon's expected route of advance), was anchored on its left by a pentagonal earthwork redoubt erected on a mound near the village of Shevardino.[20] The construction of the redoubt and its purpose is still in dispute by historians. Kutuzov stated that the fortification was simply to delay the advance of the French forces. Historian Buturlin reports that it was used as a observation point to determine the course of advance by the French forces. Historians Witner and Ratch, and many others, reported it was used as a fortification to threaten the French right flank, despite the fact that the fortification was beyond effective reach of the guns of the period.[21] The Chief of Staff of the Russian 1st Army, Yermolov, related in his memoirs, that the Russian left was shifting position when the French Army showed up sooner than expected, thus the Battle of Shevardion became a delaying effort to shield the redeployment of the Russian left.[22]

File:Kutuzovborodino.jpg
General Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov at Borodino

The struggle opened on September 5 when Prince Joachim Murat's French forces met Konovnitzyn's Russians in a massive cavalry clash; the Russians eventually retreated to the Kolorzkoi Cloister when their flank was threatened. Fighting reopened the next day, but Konovyitzyn again retreated when Prince Eugène de Beauharnais' Fourth Corps arrived, threatening his flank. The Russians retreated to the Shevardino Redoubt, where a pitched battle occurred. Murat led Nansouty's First Cavalry Corps and Montbrun's Second Cavalry Corps, supported by Compan's Division of Louis Nicholas Davout's First Infantry Corps against the redoubt; simultaneously, Prince Josef Poniatowski's infantry attacked the position from the south. The French captured the redoubt, at the cost of 4,000–5000 French and 6,000 Russian casualties.[23] The small redoubt was destroyed and covered the dead and dying of both sides.[24]

The unexpected French advance from the west and the fall of the Shevardino redoubt threw the Russian formation into disarray. Since the left flank of their defensive position had collapsed, Russian forces withdrew to the east, constructing a makeshift position centered around the village of Utitza. The left flank of the Russian position was, therefore, hanging in the air and ripe for a flanking attack.

Opposing forces

See also: Russian Army order of battle (1812)
Battle of Borodino, by Peter von Hess, 1843

The Russian Army at Borodino was not the Russian Army of 1805–1807. Stung by the defeats of Austerlitz, Eylau, and Friedland, reforms had been enacted by the Russians; however the Russian Army had never really had a chance to stop fighting long enough to fully enact and absorb all that the reforms had intended. Three wars with France, two with Sweden, and two with the Ottoman Empire had seen to that.[25] Starting in 1802 the Russian Regiment consisted of three Battalions with each Battalion having four Companies. The Divisional system was begun on 1806, and Corps were established in 1812.[26] Prussian influence may be seen in the organizational setups. Russian forces present at the battle included 180 infantry battalions, 164 cavalry squadrons, 20 Cossack regiments, and 55 artillery batteries (637 artillery pieces). In total, the Russians fielded 155,200 troops.[27] There were 10,000 Cossacks as well as 33,000 Russian militiamen in the area who did not participate in the battle. After the battle, the militia units were broken up in order to provide reinforcements to depleted regular infantry battalions. Of the 637 Russian artillery pieces, 300 were held in reserve; many of these reserve pieces were never committed to the battle.[28]

According to Historian Alexander Mikaberidze, The French Army remained the finest army of its day by a good margin.[29] The French Army had been the legacy of the French King and its fusion with the formations of the French revolution and Napoleon's reforms had transformed it into the military machine that had dominated Europe since 1805. Each Corp of the French Army was in fact its own mini-army and capable of independent action.[30] French forces included 214 battalions of infantry, 317 squadrons of cavalry and 587 artillery pieces totaling of 128,000 troops.[31] However, the French Imperial Guard, which consisted of 30 infantry battalions, 27 cavalry squadrons and 109 artillery pieces—a total of 18,500 troops—was never committed to action.[32]

Estimates by historians

Historian French Russian Year
Butrulin 190,000 132,000 1824
Segur 130,000 120,000 1824
Chambray 133,819 130,000 1825
Fain 120,000 133,500 1827
Clausewitz 130,000 120,000 1830s
Mikhailovsky-Danilivsky 160,000 128,000 1839
Bogdanovich 130,000 120,800 1859
Marbot 140,000 160,000 1860
Burton 130,000 120,800 1914
Garniich 130,665 119,300 1956
Tarle 130,000 127,800 1962
Grunward 130,000 120,000 1963
Beskrovny 135,000 126,000 1968
Chandler 156,000 120,800 1966
Thiry 120,000 133,000 1969
Holmes 130,000 120,800 1971
Duffy 133,000 125,000 1972
Tranie 127,000 120,000 1981
Nicolson 128,000 106,000 1985
Troitsky 134,000 154,800 1988
Vasiliev 130,000 155,200 1997
Smith 133,000 120,800 1998
Zemtsov 127,000 154,000 1999
Hourtoulle 115,000 140,000 2000
Bezorosny 135,000 150,000 2004

[33]

Battle of Borodino

The position

File:Battle of Borodino map.jpg
Map of the battle

The ground taken up by the left wing present no particular advantages. Some hillocks with a gentle slope, and perhaps twenty feet high, together with strips of shrubby wood, formed so confused a whole, that it was difficult to pronounce which party would have the advantage of the ground Thus, the best side of the position, the right wing, could be of no avail to redeem the defects of the left. The whole position too strongly indicated the left flank to the French as the object of the operation, to admit to their forces being attracted to the right.

— Karl von Clausewitz, The Battle of Borodono, Mikaberidze, Alexander p.26

The Russian position at Borodino consisted of a series of disconnected earthworks running in an arc from the Moskva River on the right, along its tributary, the Kolocha (whose steep banks added to the defense), and towards the village of Utitza on the left.[34] Thick woods interspersed along the Russian left and center (on the French side of the Kolocha) made the deployment and control of French forces difficult, aiding the defenders. The Russian center was defended by the Raevsky Redoubt, a massive open-backed earthwork mounting 19 12-pounder cannons which had a clear field of fire all the way to the banks of the Kolocha stream.

Kutuzov, who was very concerned about the French taking the New Smolensk Road around the position and on to Moscow, planned a very powerful position to stop any such attempt.[35] This helped explain why the more powerful 1st Army under Barclay was placed in already strong positions on the right, which were virtually unassailable by the French. The 2nd Army, under Bagration, was expected to hold on the left; however the fall of Shevardino unanchored the Russian left flank. Despite repeated pleas of his generals to redeploy their forces, Kutuzov did nothing to change these initial dispositions. Thus, when the action began and became a defensive rather than an offensive battle for the Russians, their heavy preponderance in artillery was wasted on a right wing that would never be attacked, while the French artillery did much to help win the battle.[34] Toll and others would make attempts to cover up their mistakes in this deployment and later attempts by historians would compound the issue.[36] The Russian position then was just about 8 kilometres (5 mi) long with about 80,000 of the 1st Army there and 34,000 of the 2nd Army on the left. Indeed again Clausewitz complained about Toll's depositions being so narrow and deep that needless losses were incurred from artillery fire.[37]

Bagration's flèches

Main article: Bagration flèches
Nansouty's heavy cavalry attack squares of Russian guards-men to the left of Semyanovskaya (foreground) to support Ney's attack. Detail from the Borodino Panorama by Franz Rubo, 1912.

Napoleon, in command of the French forces, made errors similar to those of his Russian adversary, deploying his forces inefficiently and failing to exploit the weaknesses in the Russian line. Despite Marshal Davout's suggestion of a maneuver to outflank the weak Russian left, the Emperor instead ordered Davout's First Corps to move directly forward into the teeth of the defense, while the flanking maneuver was left to the weak Fifth Corps of Prince Poniatowski.[38] The initial French attack was aimed at seizing the three Russian positions collectively known as the Bagration flèches, four arrow-head shaped, open-backed earthworks which arced out to the left en échelon in front of the Kolocha stream. These positions helped support the Russian left, which had no terrain advantages. There was much to be desired in the construction of the flèches, one officer noting that the ditches were much too shallow, the embracesures open to the ground, making them easy to enter, and that they were much too wide exposing infantry inside them.[39] The flèches were supported by artillery from the village of Semyanovskaya, whose elevation dominated the other side of the Kolocha.[34] The battle began at 0600 with the opening of the 102-gun French grand battery against the Russian center.[40] Davout sent Compan's Division against the southernmost of the flèches, with Desaix's Division echeloned out to the left.[41] When Compans exited the woods on the far bank of the Kolocha, he was hit by massed Russian cannon fire; both Compans and Desaix were wounded, but the French continued their assault.[42]

Davout, seeing the confusion, personally led his 57th Brigade forward until he had his horse shot from under him; he fell so hard that General Sorbier reported him as dead. General Rapp arrived to replace him, only to find Davout alive and leading the 57th forward again. Rapp then led the 61st Brigade forward when he was wounded (for the 22nd time in his career). By 07:30, Davout had gained control of the three flèches. Prince Bagration quickly led a counterattack that threw the French out of the positions, only to have Marshal Michel Ney lead a charge by the 24th Regiment that retook them.[42] Although not enamoured of Barclay, Bagration turned to him for aid, ignoring Kutuzov altogether; Barclay, to his credit, responded quickly, sending three guard regiments, eight grenadier battalions, and twenty-four 12-pounder cannon at their best pace to bolster Semyаnovskaya.[43] Prince Bagration, was wounded here as early as 0930 hours[44] while Colonel Toll, and Kutuzov moved the Guard Reserve units forward as early as 0900 hours.[45]

Ney's infantry push Russian grenadiers back from the flèches (which can be seen from the rear in the background). Detail from the Borodino Panorama.

During the confused fighting, French and Russian units moved forward into impenetrable smoke and were smashed by artillery and musketry fire that was horrendous even by Napoleonic standards. Infantry and cavalrymen had difficulty maneuvering over the heaps of corpses and masses of wounded. Prince Murat advanced with his cavalry around the flèches to attack Bagration's infantry, but was confronted by Duka's 2nd Cuirassier Division supported by Neverovsky's infantry. This counterpunch drove Murat to seek the cover of allied Württemberger Infantry. Barclay's reinforcements, however, were sent into the fray only to be torn to pieces by French artillery, leaving Friant's Division in control of the Russian forward position at 11:30. Dust, smoke, confusion, and exhaustion all combined to keep the French commanders on the field (Davout, Ney, and Murat) from comprehending that all the Russians before them had fallen back, were in confusion, and ripe for the taking. Napoleon, who had been sick with a cold and was too far from the action to really observe what was going on, refused to send his subordinates reinforcements; he was hesitant to release his last reserve, the Imperial Guard, so far from France.[46]

Struggle for the Raevsky redoubt

Saxon cuirassiers and Polish lancers of Latour-Maubourg's cavalry corps clash with Russian cuirassiers. The rise of Raevsky redoubt is on right, the steeple of Borodino church in the background. Detail from the Borodino Panorama.

Prince Eugène de Beauharnais advanced his corps against Borodino, rushing the village and capturing it from the Russian Guard Jäger. However, the advancing columns rapidly lost their cohesion; shortly after clearing Borodino, they faced fresh Russian assault columns and retreated back to the village. General Delzons was posted to Borodino to prevent the Russians retaking it.[47] Morand's division then crossed to the north side of the Semyenovka Stream, while the remainder of Eugene's forces crossed three bridges across the Kalocha to the south, placing them on the same side of the stream as the Russians. He then deployed most of his artillery and began to push the Russians back toward the Raevsky redoubt. Broussier and Morand's divisions then advanced together with furious artillery support. The redoubt changed hands as Barclay was forced to personally rally Paskevitch's routed regiment.[48] Kutuzov then ordered Yermolov to take action; the general brought forward three horse artillery batteries that began to blast the open-ended redoubt, while the 3rd Battalion of the Ufa Regiment and two Jäger regiments brought up by Barclay rushed in with the bayonet to eliminate Bonami's Brigade.[49] The Russian reinforcements' assault returned the redoubt to Russian control.

File:Raevsky battery.jpg
French and Russian cavalry clash behind the Raevsky redoubt. Details from Roubaud's panoramic painting.

Eugene's artillery continued to pound Russian support columns, while Marshals Ney and Davout set up a crossfire with artillery on the Semenovskoya heights.[50] Barclay countered by moving the Russian General Eugene over to the right to support Miloradovitch in his defense of the redoubt.[51] When Barclay brought up troops against an attacking French brigade, he described it as "A walk into Hell".[50] During the height of the battle, Kutuzov's subordinates were making all of the decisions for him; according to Colonel Karl von Clausewitz of On War fame, the Russian commander "seemed to be in a trance."[51] With the death of General Kutaisov, Chief of Artillery, most of the Russian cannon sat useless on the heights to the rear and were never ordered into battle, while the French artillery wreaked havoc on the Russians.[52]

French cuirassiers charge into the Raevsky redoubt.

At 14:00, Napoleon renewed the assault against the redoubt, as Broussier's, Morand's, and Gerard's divisions launched a massive frontal attack, with Chastel's light cavalry division on their left and the II Reserve Cavalry Corps on their right;[51] General Caulaincourt ordered Wathier's cuirassier division to lead the assault. Barclay watched Eugene's assault preparations and countered it, moving his forces against it. The French artillery, however, began bombarding the assembling force even as it gathered. Caulaincourt led the attack of Wathier's cuirassiers into the opening at the back of the redoubt and met his death as the charge was stopped cold by Russian musketry.[53] General Thielemann then led eight Saxon and two Polish cavalry squadrons against the back of the redoubt, while officers and sergeants of his command actually forced their horses through the redoubt's embrasures, sowing confusion and allowing the French cavalry and infantry to take the position. The battle had all but ended, with both sides so exhausted that only the artillery was still at work.[54] Napoleon once again refused to release the Guard; the battle concluded at approximately 16:00.[55]

Utiza

The 3rd area of operations was around the village of Utiza. Poniatowski and the Polish contingent contested for the village of Utiza effecting its capture with his 1st attempt. General Tutshkov had ejected the French forces by 08:00. Gen. Junot led the Westphalian's to join the attack and again captured Utiza. The heavy under-growth greatly hindered Poniatowski's efforts but eventually Tutshkov was battling to avoid being cut off from the rest of the Russian forces.[56] General Barclay sent help in the form of Baggehuffwudt (known as Bagavout in English literature) to the rescue along with Konovnitzyn in support.[56]

End of the battle

Napoleon went forward to see the situation from the former Russian front lines shortly after the redoubts had been taken. The Russians had moved to the next ridge-line in much disarray, however that disarray was not seen from that distance with the dust and haze raised by an army on the move. Kutuzov ordered the Russian Guard to hold the line and so it did. Not all the artillery that the French army had was enough to move it. Those compact squares made wonderful artillery targets and the heroism of the Russian Guard was all too evident that day.[57] All he could see were masses of troops in the distance and thus nothing more was attempted. Neither the attack, which relied on brute force, nor the refusal to use the Guard to finish the day's work showed any brilliance on Napoleon's part.[58] Only the misplacement of Russian forces by Kutuzov over both Bagration's and Barclay's protest prevented the ruin of the French army that day. Barclay communicated with Kutuzov in order to receive further instructions. According to Wolzogen (in an account dripping with sarcasm), the commander was found a half-hour away on the road to Moscow, encamped with an entourage of young nobles and grandly pronouncing he would drive Napoleon off the next day.[59] Despite his bluster, Kutuzov knew from dispatches that his army had been too badly hurt to fight a continuing action the following day. He knew exactly what he was doing: by fighting the pitched battle, he could now retreat with the Russian army still intact, lead its recovery, and force the weakened French forces to move even further from their bases of supply. The dénouement became a textbook example of what a hold logistics placed upon an army far from its center of supply.[60] On September 8, the Russian army moved away from the battlefield in twin columns to Semolino, allowing Napoleon to occupy Moscow and await for 5 weeks a Russian surrender that would never come.[17]

Progression of the historiography

As with all things in this battle, the end of the battle changed with both time and the succession of historians that came with the political scenario surrounding them. Kutuzov would proclaim a victory both to the army and to Emperor Alexander. While many a general throughout history would claim victory out of defeats (Ramses II of Egypt did so) in this case it came with many reasons. Kutuzov was the singular man to whom the entirety of the Russian Army could give its allegiance and further it was not an army that, despite huge losses, considered itself defeated. Announcing a defeat would have removed Kutuzov from his command, and hit hard at a army that had endured much and still stood proud. While Alexander was not deceived by the announcements, it gave him the cover needed to allow Kutuzov to march his army off to rebuild the Russian forces and complete the near utter destruction of the French army.[61] As such what was said by Kutuzov and those supporting his views was allowed to pass into the histories of the time unchecked and unfettered. Histories during the Soviet era raised the engagement to a mythic battle with serious political overtones, and had Kutuzov as the master tactician on the battlefield directing every move with the precision of a ballet master directing his troupe.[62] It should be noted that Kutuzov's abilities on the battlefield were, in the eyes of his contemporaneous counterparts and fellow Russian generals, far more complex and often less than complimentary. Noted author and historian Chandler echoes this view in more than a few ways: Chandler notes that General Kutuzov remained in control of the battle throughout, ordering counter-moves to Napoleon's tactics rather than Bagration and Barclay laying down differences and cooperating to overcome the deposition mistakes of the Russian Army. Neither is the tent scene played out and instead has Kutuzov remaining with the army. Chandler also has the Russian army in much better shape moving to secondary prepared positions and seriously considering attacking the next day.[63] Chandler's book on the subject was printed in 1966. Later historians Riehn and Mikaberidze have Kutuzov leaving most of the battle to Bagration and Barclay de Tolly,[64] and leaving early in the afternoon and relaying orders from his camp 30 minutes from the front.[65] His depositions for the battle are described as a clear mistake leaving the right far too strong and the left much too weak. Only the fact that Bagration and Barclay were to cooperate fully saved the Russian army and did much to mitigate a bad positioning of the available forces.[66] Nothing would be more damning than 300 artillery pieces standing silent on the Russian right.[28]

Casualties

With both sides evenly matched and Napoleon unimaginatively content to launch his troops straight into the teeth of prepared positions, the battle was destined to be a costly and exhausting stalemate.

The casualties of the battle were staggering: according to French General Staff Inspector P. Denniee, the Grand Army lost approximately 28,000 soldiers: 6,562 (including 269 officers) were reported as dead, 21,450 as wounded.[67] But according to French historian Aristid Martinien,[68] at least 460 French officers (known by name) were killed in battle. In total, the Grand Army lost 1,928 officers dead and wounded, including 49 generals.[68] Suffering a wound on the Borodino battlefield was effectively a death sentence, as French forces did not possess enough food for the healthy, much less the sick; consequently, equal numbers of wounded soldiers starved to death, died of their injuries, or perished through neglect.[69] It should be noted that the casualties were for a single day of battle while the Russian figures are for the 5th and the 7th, combined. Using the same accounting method for both armies brings the actual French Army casualty count to 34,000–35,000.[70]

Some 52,000 Russian troops were reported as dead, wounded or missing, including 1,000 prisoners, some 8,000 men were separated from their units and returned over the next few days bringing the total Russian losses to 44,000.[71] Twenty two Russian generals were killed or wounded, including Prince Bagration, who died of his wounds on September 24.[6]

Taken as a one day battle in the scope of the Napoleonic conflict, this was the bloodiest battle of this series of conflicts. Taken as a single day battle, the combined casualties range to 64,000~65,000. The next nearest battle would be Waterloo at about 55,000 for the day.[72]

In the historiography of this battle it will be noted that the figures would be deliberately inflated or underplayed by the generals of both sides attempting to lessen the impact the figures would have on public opinion both during aftermath of the battle or, for political reasons, later during the Soviet period.[73]

Aftermath and legacy

While Napoleon won the battle of Borodino, some scholars and contemporaries described Borodino as a Pyrrhic victory.[74] This victory ultimately cost him his army, as it allowed the French emperor to believe that the campaign was winnable, exhausting his forces as he went on to Moscow to await a surrender that would never come. Historian Rhiem notes that the Borodino victory allowed Napoleon to move on to Moscow, where—even allowing for the arrival of reinforcements—the French Army could only possess a maximum of 95,000 men, who would be ill equipped to win a battle due to a lack of supplies and ammunition. The Grande Armée suffered 66% of its casualties by the time of the Moscow retreat; snow, starvation, and typhus ensured that only 23,000 men crossed the Russian border alive. Furthermore, while the Russian army suffered heavy casualties in the battle, they had fully recovered by the time of Napoleon's retreat from Moscow; consequently, they immediately began to interfere with the French withdrawal, costing Napoleon much of his surviving army. Napoleon's own account of the battle gives a good understanding of it: "Of the fifty battles I have fought, the most terrible was that before Moscow. The French showed themselves to be worthy victors, and the Russians can rightly call themselves invincible."[75]

Legacy

1987 Soviet commemorative coin, reverse

Poet Mikhail Lermontov romanticised the battle in his poem Borodino.[76] The battle was famously described by Count Leo Tolstoy in his novel War and Peace as "a continuous slaughter which could be of no avail either to the French or the Russians". A huge panorama representing the battle was painted by Franz Roubaud for the centenary of Borodino and installed on the Poklonnaya Hill in Moscow to mark the 150th anniversary of the event. Pyotr Ilyich Tchaikovsky also composed his 1812 Overture to commemorate the battle.

In Russia, the Battle of Borodino is reenacted yearly on August 26. On the battlefield itself, the Bagration flèches are still preserved; a modest monument has been constructed in honor of the French soldiers who fell in the battle. There are also remnants of trenches from the seven-day battle fought at the same battlefield in 1941 between the Soviet and German forces (which took fewer human lives than the one of 1812).

A commemorative 1-ruble coin was released in the Soviet Union in 1987 to commemorate the 175th anniversary of the Battle of Borodino, and four million of them were minted.[77] A minor planet 3544 Borodino, discovered by Soviet astronomer Nikolai Stepanovich Chernykh in 1977 was named after the village Borodino.[78]

Historiography

It is not unusual for a pivotal battle in this time range to have a difficult history in attempting to document it and bring it forth to the public. The Battle of Waterloo is another example as is the entirety of the American War of 1812. Few events have suffered a more tortured history than that of the Battle of Borodino.[79] Both the politics of the time and stresses in the Russian command changes, which were very high due to acute ethnic tensions between Russian nobility and 2nd and 3rd generations Russians of German descent, conspired to lead to self-magnified participation or exaggerations of non-participation.[80] So not only does a historian have to deal with the normal problem of a veteran looking back over years or decades and recall events as he or she would have liked them to have been, but in some cases there was outright malice involved. Nor was this strictly a Russian event, as bickering and sabotage was not in the least unknown to the French Marshals and their reporting Generals. To lie like a bulletin was not just a French affair either, with Kutuzov in particular doing an early form of misinformation that has propagated to this day.[79] Further distortions occurred during the Soviet years, when an adherence to a "formula" was the expectation during the Stalin years and for some time after that.[79] The over-reliance of western histories on French sources has been noted as well.[79]

Footnotes

  1. ^ Note that although no official flag existed during this period, the tricolour represents the officer sash colours and the Double Eagle represents the Tsar's official state symbol
  2. ^ Owen Connelly. Blundering to glory: Napoleon's military campaigns. Rowman & Littlefield, 2006, ISBN 0742553183, 9780742553187, p. 178.
  3. ^ Riehn, Richard K. Napoleon's Russian Campaign, John Wiley & Sons, 2005. ISBN 978-0-471-54302-2 p.285-288
  4. ^ Richard K. Riehn, Napoleon's Russian Campaign, John Wiley & Sons, 2005, p. 479.
  5. ^ Herman Lindqvist. Napoleon. Page 368, chapter 20, 'The battle of Borodino, the bloodiest of them all'
  6. ^ a b c Riehn, p. 255.
  7. ^ Smith, p. 392
  8. ^ August 26 in the Julian calendar then used in Russia.
  9. ^ Riehn, P.253
  10. ^ Riehn, P.255-256
  11. ^ Riehn, p. 229.
  12. ^ Riehn, p. 230.
  13. ^ Riehn, p. 231.
  14. ^ Riehn, p. 234.
  15. ^ Riehn, p. 237.
  16. ^ Riehn, p. 235.
  17. ^ a b Riehn, p. 236.
  18. ^ Riehn, pp. 237–8.
  19. ^ Riehn, p. 238.
  20. ^ Mikaberidze, p. 33
  21. ^ Mikaberidze, p.33
  22. ^ Mikaberidze, p. 34
  23. ^ Mikaberidze, p. 47.
  24. ^ Mikaberidze, p. 45
  25. ^ Mikaberidze p. 57.
  26. ^ Mikaberidze p. 63.
  27. ^ Mikaberidze p. 52.
  28. ^ a b Smith, p. 392.
  29. ^ Mikaberidze, p.53
  30. ^ Mikaberidze, p.53
  31. ^ Riehn, p. 479.
  32. ^ Mikaberidze p. 52.
  33. ^ Mikaberidze, p.50
  34. ^ a b c Riehn, p. 244.
  35. ^ Mikaberidze, p.26, p.75-76
  36. ^ Mikaberidze, p.77-78
  37. ^ Mikaberidze, p.79
  38. ^ Riehn, pp. 243–5.
  39. ^ Mikaberidze, p.81
  40. ^ Riehn, p. 245
  41. ^ Riehn, p. 243.
  42. ^ a b Riehn, p. 246.
  43. ^ Riehn, pp. 246–8.
  44. ^ Mikaberidze, p.117
  45. ^ Mikaberidze, p.107
  46. ^ Riehn, p. 247.
  47. ^ Riehn, p. 248
  48. ^ Riehn, p. 249.
  49. ^ Riehn, pp. 249–50.
  50. ^ a b Riehn, p. 250.
  51. ^ a b c Riehn, p. 251.
  52. ^ Riehn, pp. 250, 251.
  53. ^ Riehn, p. 252.
  54. ^ Riehn, p. 253.
  55. ^ Riehn, pp. 254–5.
  56. ^ a b Riehn, pp. 254
  57. ^ Mikaberidze, p.224-225
  58. ^ Riehn, pp. 256
  59. ^ Riehn, pp. 253–4.
  60. ^ Riehn, p. 260.
  61. ^ Mikaberidze, p.201-202
  62. ^ Mikaberidze, p.xi-xii
  63. ^ The Campaigns of Napoleon, Volume 1 By David G. Chandler, p.806-807
  64. ^ Mikaberidze, p.224-225
  65. ^ Mikaberidze, p.198
  66. ^ Mikaberidze, p.224-225
  67. ^ P. Denniee. Itineraire de l'Empereur Napoleon. Paris, 1842
  68. ^ a b Martinien A. Tableaux par corps et par batailles des officiers tues et blesses pendant les guerres de l'Empire (1805–1815). P., 1899;
  69. ^ Riehn, p. 261.
  70. ^ Mikaberidze, p.209
  71. ^ Riehn, P.255
  72. ^ Mikaberidze P.217
  73. ^ Mikaberidze, p.208
  74. ^ Andrew Roberts. Napoleon and Wellington: the Battle of Waterloo and the great commanders who fought it. Simon and Schuster, 2001 ISBN 978-0-7432-2832-9, 9780743228329, p. 254; Theodore Ayrault Dodge. Napoleon; a History of the Art of War: From the beginning of the Peninsular war to the end of the Russian campaign, with a detailed account of the Napoleonic wars. Volume 3 of Napoleon; a History of the Art of War, Great captains Houghton, Mifflin and company, 1907, p. 583; David Avrom Bell. The first total war: Napoleon's Europe and the birth of warfare as we know it. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2007, ISBN 978-0-618-34965-4, 9780618349654, p. 295; Alistair Horne. How Far from Austerlitz?: Napoleon 1805–1815. Macmillan, 1998. ISBN 978-0-312-18724-8, 9780312187248, p. 316.
  75. ^ Borodino, Napoleon.org.
  76. ^ Text of Borodino in Russian
  77. ^ Добро пожаловать на сервер "Монетный двор"
  78. ^ Schmadel, Lutz D. (2003). Dictionary of Minor Planet Names (5th ed.). New York: Springer Verlag. p. 298. ISBN 978-3-540-00238-3.
  79. ^ a b c d Mikaberidze, p.xi-xii
  80. ^ Mikaberidze, p.13

References

  • Chandler, David G. Dictionary of the Napoleonic Wars London: Wordsworth editions Ltd., 1999.
  • Chandler, David G. The Campaigns of Napoleon. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995. ISBN 978-0-02-523660-8
  • Duffy, Christopher, Borodino and the War of 1812. London: Cassell & Company, 1972.
  • Hourtoulle, F.G. Borodino/The Moskova: The Battle for the Redoubts. Paris: Histoire & Collections, 2000.
  • Mikaberidze, Alexander. The Battle of Borodino: Napoleon Against Kutuzov. London: Pen & Sword, 2007.
  • Markham, David. Napoleon for Dummies New York: Wiley Pub Inc., 2005.
  • Nafziger, George F. Napoleon's Invasion of Russia. Novato CA: Presidio Press, 1988.
  • Riehn, Richard K. Napoleon's Russian Campaign, John Wiley & Sons, 2005.
  • Smith, Digby G. The Greenhill Napoleonic Wars Data Book. London: Greenhill Books, 1998.
  • Template:Ru icon Troitsky, Nikolai Фельдмаршал Кутузов: Мифы и Факты. (Field Marshal Kutuzov: Myths and Facts) Moscow: Центрполиграф, 2003.
  • Template:Ru icon "История военного искусства" (History of Military Art), Moscow: Воениздат, 1966.

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