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Second Barbary War

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Second Barbary War
Part of the Barbary Wars

Decatur's Squadron off Algiers.
Date1815
Location
Result American victory
Belligerents
 United States Ottoman Algeria
Commanders and leaders
United States Stephen Decatur, Jr.
United States William Bainbridge
Dey of Algiers
Strength
10 United States Ships Numerous ships of the Algerian corsairs
Casualties and losses
4 killed
10 wounded
53 killed
486 captured

Template:Nineteenth century Atlantic/Mediterranean conflicts involving the United States

The Second Barbary War (1815), also known as the Algerine or Algerian War, was the second of two wars fought between the United States and the Ottoman Empire's North African regencies of Tripoli, Tunis, and Algeria known collectively as the Barbary states. The war between the Barbary States and the U.S. ended in 1815; the international dispute would effectively be ended the following year by the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. The war brought an end to the American practice of paying tribute to Algeria and helped mark the beginning of the end of privateering in that region, which had been rampant in the days of Ottoman domination (16th–18th centuries). Within decades, European powers built ever more sophisticated and expensive ships which the Algerian Corsairs could not match in numbers or technology. [1]

Background

After its victory in the First Barbary War (1801–1805), the U.S. found its attention diverted to its worsening relationship with the United Kingdom over trade with France, which culminated in the War of 1812. The Barbary pirate states took this opportunity to return to their practice of attacking American, as well as European merchant vessels in the Mediterranean Sea and holding their crews and officers for ransom.

At the same time, the major European powers were still involved in the Napoleonic Wars which did not fully end until 1815.

The expulsion of American vessels from the Mediterranean during the War of 1812 by the British navy further emboldened North African states in their attacks on U.S.-flagged vessels. Omar ben Muhammad, Dey of Algiers, the "Omar Bashaw" of the 1815 treaty, expelled the US consul general Tobias Lear and declared war on the U.S. for failing to pay its required tribute.[citation needed]

United States' response

At the conclusion of the War of 1812, however, America could once again turn its sights on North Africa. On March 3, 1815, the U.S. Congress authorized deployment of naval power against Algiers, and a force of ten ships was dispatched under the command of Commodores Stephen Decatur, Jr. and William Bainbridge, both veterans of the First Barbary War. Decatur's squadron departed for the Mediterranean on May 20. Bainbridge's command was still assembling, and did not depart until July 1, thereby missing the military and diplomatic initiatives which Decatur swiftly and decisively handled. [2]

Negotiations

Shortly after departing Gibraltar en route to Algiers, Decatur's squadron encountered the Algerian flagship Meshuda, and, in a battle off Cape Gata, captured it. Not long afterward, the American squadron likewise off Cape Palos captured the Algerian brig Estedio. By the final week of June, the squadron had reached Algiers and had initiated negotiations with the Dey. After persistent demands for recompensation mingled with threats of destruction, the Dey capitulated. By terms of the treaty signed aboard the Guerriere in the Bay of Algiers, 3 July 1815, Decatur agreed to return the captured Meshuda and Estedio while the Algerians returned all American captives, estimated to be about 10, and a significant group of European captives[citation needed] were exchanged for about 500 subjects of the Dey[3] along with $10,000 in payment for seized shipping. The treaty guaranteed no further tributes[4] and granted the United States full shipping rights.

Decatur's Squadron in the Second Barbary War

Immediately following the United States declaration of war against Algiers two squadrons were assembled and readied for war. The squadron under the command of Commodore William Bainbridge was ported in Boston while Decatur's squadron was at New York. Deactur's squadron was ready to set sail first and departed May 20,1815. It comprised the frigates Guerriere, the flag ship, with 44 guns, commanded by Captain William Lewis; Constellation, with 36 guns, commanded by Captain Charles Gordon, and Macedonian with 38 guns, under the command of Captain Jacob Jones; the sloops-of-War Eperyie, commanded by Captain John Downes, and Ontario with 16 guns, commanded by Captain Jesse D. Elliott; the brigs Firefly. Spark, and Flambeau, each with 14 guns, commanded by Lieutenants George W. Kodgers, Thomas Gamble, and John B. Nicholson; and the schooners Torch and Spitfire,both with 12 guns, commanded by Lieutenants Wolcott Chauncey and Alexander J. Dallas. Mr. William Shaler. [5]

Aftermath

Shortly after Decatur set off for Tunis to negotiate a similar agreement with the Bey of Tunis and enforce prior agreements with the Pasha of Tripoli, the Dey of Algiers repudiated the treaty.

In early 1816, Britain undertook a diplomatic mission, backed by a small squadron of ships of the line to Tunis, Tripoli, and Algiers to convince the Deys to stop their piracy and free the Christian slaves. The beys of Tunis and Tripoli agreed without any resistance, but the Dey of Algiers was more recalcitrant and the negotiations were stormy. The leader of the diplomatic mission Edward Pellew, 1st Viscount Exmouth, believed that he had managed to negotiate a treaty to stop the slavery of Christians and returned to England. However, due to confused orders, Algerian troops massacred 200 Corsican, Sicilian and Sardinian fishermen who were under British protection just after the treaty was signed. This caused outrage in Britain and Europe and Exmouth's negotiations were seen as a failure.

As a result, Exmouth was ordered to sea again to complete the job and punish the Algerians. He gathered a squadron of five ships of the line, reinforced by a number of frigates, later reinforced by a flotilla of six Dutch ships.

On 27 August 1816, following a round of failed negotiations, the fleet delivered a punishing nine-hour bombardment of Algiers. The attack immobilized many of the Dey's corsairs and shore batteries, forcing him to accept a peace offer of the same terms as he had rejected the day before. Exmouth warned that if they were not accepted he would continue the action. The Dey accepted the terms, not realising that they were a bluff as the fleet had already fired off all of its ammunition.

A treaty was signed on September 24, 1816. 1,083 Christian slaves and the British Consul were freed and the U.S. ransom money repaid.

After the First Barbary War, the European nations had been engaged in warfare with one another (and the U.S. with the British). However, in the years immediately following the Second Barbary War, there was no general European war. This allowed the Europeans to build up their resources and challenge Barbary power in the Mediterranean without distraction. Over the following century, Algiers and Tunis became colonies of France in 1830 and 1881 respectively, while Tripoli returned to the control of the Ottoman Empire in 1835. In 1911, taking advantage of the power vacuum left by the fading Ottoman Empire, Italy assumed control of Tripoli. Europeans remained in control of the government in eastern North Africa until the mid-20th century. By then the iron-clad warships of the late 19th century and dreadnoughts of the early 20th century ensured European dominance of the Mediterranean sea.

See also

References

  1. ^ Leiner, Frederic C. (2007). The End of Barbary Terror, America's 1815 War against the Pirates of North Africa. Oxford University Press, 2007. pp. 39–50. ISBN 9780195325409.
  2. ^ Allen, Gardner Weld (1905). Our Navy and the Barbary Corsairs. Boston, New York and Chicago: Houghton Mifflin & Co. p. 281.
  3. ^ "the United States according to the usages of civilized nations requiring no ransom for the excess of prisoners in their favor." Article3.
  4. ^ "It is distinctly understood between the Contracting parties, that no tribute either as biennial presents, or under any other form or name whatever, shall ever be required by the Dey and Regency of Algiers from the United States of America on any pretext whatever." Article 2.
  5. ^ Allen, Gardner Weld (1905). Our Navy and the Barbary Corsairs. Boston, New York and Chicago: Houghton Mifflin & Co. p. 281.

Sources