Jump to content

Talk:Philosophy of mind

Page contents not supported in other languages.
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This is an old revision of this page, as edited by Lacatosias (talk | contribs) at 16:32, 27 December 2011 (→‎What is this thing here?). The present address (URL) is a permanent link to this revision, which may differ significantly from the current revision.

Template:Spoken Wikipedia In Progress

Featured articlePhilosophy of mind is a featured article; it (or a previous version of it) has been identified as one of the best articles produced by the Wikipedia community. Even so, if you can update or improve it, please do so.
Main Page trophyThis article appeared on Wikipedia's Main Page as Today's featured article on May 17, 2006.
Article milestones
DateProcessResult
March 12, 2006Good article nomineeListed
March 17, 2006Peer reviewReviewed
March 27, 2006Featured article candidatePromoted
February 28, 2007Featured article reviewKept
Current status: Featured article

Template:V0.5

Archived discussion

Lead

Edited slightly to pack more information into the first sentence.--Levalley (talk) 23:29, 22 April 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Psychology and the mind

"Psychology is the science that investigates mental states directly" In which world can that be possible? How can you study scientifically something that isn't even material? and directly? Or either is it a science that studies behavior scientifically (and by those actions you can infer the mental states) or is it the study of the mind (when it can't possibly be scientific). WLoku (talk) 03:47, 28 May 2009 (UTC)[reply]

I agree that the wording here needs improvement. Looie496 (talk) 16:54, 31 May 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Besides that point, there are two other issues with the article. First, I think that is rather necessary to add some more references to some other monists, like Ryle in The Concept of Mind (there is a mentiont to Daniel Denett, but is rather ocasional). As a second issue, when we speak of behaviorism, we are not just "describing behavior". It do holds only to observable behavior, but it's not because "that's the only thing we can do", but because they say that all that we do is behavior. If this is an A-rated class article, we need to get some improvement here. WLoku (talk) 19:10, 1 June 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Bridging the gap between monism and dualism in solving the mind body problem

Dualists rightly state that a scientist's assertion that pain is the firing of C-Fibre neurones in the brain does not in any way explain the sensation of pain; why or how it occurs, or even what it is. This first order perception which a neuroscientist may posit is not really the consciousness, and I would go on to say rather that the consciousness is 'the perception of perception'. No matter how scientists have attempted to solve this 'perception of perception' in the past, they have utterly failed to do so by limiting themselves to the 3rd dimension, or as a dualist would say 'the physical plane'. The reason these solutions have failed is that they fail to capture the nature of the problem as miserably as my first example - that pain is a result of C-Fibre neurones firing in the brain. They will never satisfy a dualist, or indeed anyone who properly appreciates the problem by the nature of their stoic monism. I have a theory - and I am aware of the relevant articles propounding the invalidity of personal theories, by the way - which seeks to satisfy monists in terms of being strictly scientific and dualists in acknowledging a slight(if one takes the concept from a very contrived point of view) dichotomy between brain activity and consciousness. In the same way that objects represent the 3rd dimension and the passage of time the 4th dimension, I believe that the conscious phenomenon of 'feeling' is the representation of some dimension higher than 4 - lets say for arguement's sake 5 - one that, thus far, has not been visualized in any other form than in formulae relating to string theory and the like. One might then go on to argue that, if that is the case, and all objects exist in all dimensions, why don't all objects have a consciousness. And to this I say that they do, only, not the same as us. You see, we in our brains have a vast, complicated, but ultimately structured, network of thought, memory, vision and all the senses that other objects simply do not. I imagine that the 5th dimension requires a degree of structured complexity to come through as consciousness, just like particles must come together before atoms and objects can exist. Imagine the 5th dimension to be paparazzi and our chemical, 3rd dimension quantifiable sensations to be celebrities. The paparazzi require celebrities to be present in order to represent them in articles(imagine in this analogy that articles are the actual consciousness) - but the paparazzi still exist if celebrities are not present. This is the same as, for example, empty space existing without their being objects around to properly represent it, or time existing without any noticeable changes occuring in the environment. Other forms of the consciousness, different and abstract from ours, may exist, but not in inanimate objects, or artificial intelligence as I will explain later. Oh, and as for where the 3d representation of the consciousness is found, it is not in the brain. Huh? Yep. Every 'event' as we perceive it happens slightly differently to every atom: if you imagine yourself punching a wall - every atom in that wall and in your fist receives a slightly different measure of force from the one next to it, so it could actually be rationalised in this way to be several events, several million changes in the energy states of the wall atoms and your knuckle atoms. I regard the entire consciousness to be just one event(otherwise how could one facet of the consciousness, say thought, interact with another, for example memory - if it was not one event their would be no reasonable structure or, more specifically chronological consitency). So this begs the question, how can the consciousness occur inside the brain if the brain is made up of many millions of atoms? Certainly , every atom within the brain does not have the necessary structured complexity to fulfill the conditions of consciousness and the brain does not fulfill the condition of being one indevisable object for the conscious 'event' to occur - so what's up? The solution? Think Electromagnetic Field. It's shape on a moment to moment basis is determined by brain activity, and so represents the brain's complexity, but it is also one indevisable object, in fact, luckily for my theory, besides sub atomic particles it is one of the only 4 things to be fully indevisable (Gravity, EM, Weak and Strong nuclear).

I know this is only my theory, not significant when weighed against the heavyweights of the philosophy world, but I think it makes more sense than any alternative, and is just as worthy of a mention in the article as any other theory, despite its lack of following compared to them. People read encyclopedias to find out hard information, and if they can't get that, why put a filter on the speculative content in place in the article they are reading, because any one piece of speculation is just as likely to provide enlightenment as another, surely —Preceding unsigned comment added by Omg Pop (talkcontribs) 15:03, 24 July 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Please read WP:OR for why we cannot use that in the article. --Tryptofish (talk) 15:11, 24 July 2009 (UTC)[reply]
So what you're saying is that if went on to right a book expounding this theory, I could then cite it as a valid theory?
It's nothing personal, believe me. Those are the rules the project runs by, and I did not write them (although I agree with them). If you were to write a book, and it were published, another editor could cite it. --Tryptofish (talk) 15:16, 25 July 2009 (UTC)[reply]
You might be interested in the article on Electromagnetic theories of consciousness. Material there also needs to be based on reputable published sources, but since it is more focused on the ideas you are talking about, there is more room to go into detail. (Also, please remember to sign talk page messages by typing ~~~~ afterward.) Regards, Looie496 (talk) 14:52, 25 July 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Hi OMG Pop. Another possibility for you would be to develop your theory in the open survey topic on the best theories of consciousness at canonizer.com. The most important measure of the quality of a theory is how many people agree that it is a good theory. Publishing a book helps, but it is not absolutely necessary if lots of people agree with you (or are in your 'camp'). There is room there for all theories to stand together, as long as someone is willing to support them. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Brent Allsop (talkcontribs) 03:53, 4 August 2009 (UTC)[reply]

There's no God, and your human ideals are laughable

If such is the opinion of the "majority of modern philosophers", then I guess this article ought to cover the fact. However, I think the last part of the article pretty much gives the lie to the fact that said "modern philosophers" are those in the analytic tradition, and that everyone else doesn't count. I think this little gem says it quite well:

...while Malinowski has shown that an anthropologist can know a person's customs and habits better than the person whose customs and habits they are

Now, I am not a Post-Colonial theorist, but I can can quite clearly how such a person would respond. Something to the effect of, an anthropologist can study a person's habits and customs and come up with conclusions based on an epistemology that is inherently grounded in white, Western privilege. I personally don't hold this view, but I think there is something to be said for it. If this article remains as it is now, I think there should be some indication at the top of the page that no attempt is being made to represent the views of non Anglo-American philosophy on the matter, which the reader should only expect since this is an English Wiki. Corbmobile (talk) 15:00, 29 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

If you think something in the article needs to be changed, could you please be clearer about what it is and how it ought to be changed? Regards, Looie496 (talk) 16:18, 29 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
I believe that it should be made clear from the get-go that the "majority of modern philosophers" are monist means "the majority of modern analytic philosophers" are monist. Not near the bottom where it currently rests. Corbmobile (talk) 06:09, 30 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
I changed "the majority of" to "many" -- will that suffice? (I also did some other copy-editing of the poorly written prose in the section.) Looie496 (talk) 17:19, 30 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Well, I don't think that quite addresses the problem. In every philosophy department but a handful in America and or England, the overwhelming majority is Physicalist/Monist (or so the article from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy this article is heavily copy-pasted from says). That certainly ought not to be brushed under the rug. I just would like it to be acknowledged in the article that, while the majority of philosophers who feel that science reflects reality (namely Analytical philosophers) are Physicalists/monists/atheists or whatever you'd like to call it, there is a whole other school of philosophy which holds science (or perhaps at least theoretical science) mostly reflects scientists' biases of culture, social status, race, gender, etc., and thus find the question of whether or not there is an extra-physical mind or just the brain wholly irrelevant. Corbmobile (talk) 20:05, 30 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
The vast majority of the philosophers who work in Western universities are ontological physicalists (a.k.a. materialists). In stark contrast, the vast majority of lay-people are ontological dualists, (usually because dualism goes hand-in-hand with most religions). Thus, any reference to the "weight of numbers" is fraught with difficulties - do we refer to the dominant beliefs of the philosophers or of the general population of the world? I am not sure the "weight of numbers" is especially relevant, especially given that the vast majority of lay-people know very little about science, and the vast majority of scientists know very little about philosophy or the metaphysical problems it raises for science. If you don't believe me, try raising a few physical metaphysical problems with a boorish scientist and watch him squirm as you turn his conclusions on their head - it's easy and fun. —Preceding unsigned comment added by BlueRobe (talkcontribs) 23:20, 27 February 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Ockham's Razor

The "main argument" to support ontological dualism may be the argument, that, the dualistic conception of the non-physical mind is not occamistic while the Cartesian Ego cannot be explained in entirely physical terms. While this may not be the main argument for all philosophers of mind it does pose an intellectual challenge that occupies the intellectual dexterity of many philosophy students when they first confront the mind-body problem.

How is it possible that Wikipedia's Philosophy of Mind page has no reference to Ockham's Razor? This oversight seems extraordinary to me. —Preceding unsigned comment added by BlueRobe (talkcontribs) 06:13, 16 February 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Free will section requires update

I have recently tried to modify some original text I wrote expanding on (the critique of) the various definitions of free will provided in the free will section of this article ("Free will - updated the description of volition libertarianism"), but the change was reverted ("It is actually about the will, not the will power").

This section requires the modification of the definition of free will provided in c) "determined by indeterministic natural law in line with the will of a non physical agency". A non-physical agency having a (presumably free) will of it's own and affecting physical reality based upon this will does not deserve a separation classification - this is just a form of substance dualism and so it belongs to a) "not completely determined by natural laws and natural law is broken by dualistic sentient beings" [where definition a) is expanded to be independent of physical determinism/indeterminism - which are irrelevant constraints in substance dualism - see causation].

Case c) refers to the concept of libertarian volition which is the free will concept under non reductive physicalism (property dualism) in which non-physical ageny (subjective/non-observed) is mapped to physically indeterministic physical ageny (objective/observed brain), and provides some level of control over one or more volitions via "effort" (will power) - these may be called Self Forming Actions (SFA) - SFA involve will(s) yet these are not non-physical. (Eg Free Volition, Robert Kane (2007). Libertarianism. In John Martin Fischer (ed.), Four Views on Free Will. Blackwell Pub. [[1], page 39]).

Therefore, I changed c) to "determined by indeterministic natural law in line with the will power of a non physical agency".

Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 12:54, 2 April 2010 (UTC)[reply]

I think "will power" is a property whereas "will" expresses volition and intentionality. From a libertarian point of view, I believe it is the volition and intentionality of the non-physical agency that is important, rather than its having the property of "will power." That is why I reverted the change. If I'm mistaken, please let me know why - I would appreciate it. I'm also curious what others think about this. I also agree that the section needs to be updated. D15724C710N (talkcontribs) 09:01, 6 April 2010 (UTC)[reply]

There are Libertarian models in which non-physical agency has it's own separate will/volition/intentionality. They all fall into category a) and require substance dualism (will is stored in memory and is physical therefore break down in casual interaction is required for alignment purposes between a separate non physical will and that stored in the brain). The model being described in c) is unique in that the will(s) itself is not special, the only process which is especially linked to non-physical agency in this model are those non-deterministic events described in physics / neuroscience (assuming any exist) that correspond to SFAs. This model enables the will(s) to be free under one definition of free will - ie 1) not bound by physical determinism, and 2) controlled to some extent by non-reducible agency; it is (they are) not merely indeterministic, which is the correct scientific description. This definition of free will is proposed as being in support of a form of ultimate responsibility (UR). Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 13:37, 8 April 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Forgive me for saying so, but I believe the above passage does not argue clearly for changing "will" to "will power". Also, I see no answer to the argument I have provided for reverting the change. As it stands, I think I made the right choice for the article. D15724C710N (talkcontribs) 08:53, 9 April 2010 (UTC)[reply]

No problem - I did not directly answer your argument. This is possibly a semantics issue. I have equated 'will power' and 'effort' (see above) as all instances of will power require effort and all instances of effort require will power - but whether or not this equality is accepted, it is arguably confusing to use the phrase will power in this context because people will mistake it as a necessary property of will(s) rather than an action with respect to will(s) - which is as far as I am aware how the phrase is most commonly used in English. Suggest using 'effort' instead of 'will power' to avoid confusion (this is also what is used by Kane). Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 09:46, 9 April 2010 (UTC)[reply]

An interesting article on free will is here[2]. Should this be included? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 59.95.12.11 (talk) 16:16, 10 April 2010 (UTC)[reply]
I see no relevance to the issue we are discussing. Regarding its relevance to the issue of free will, the article is interpretive and incoherent. I do not see why (or how) this piece could be used to better any encyclopedic article. Am I perhaps missing the point? If so, please explain -- and forgive my impertinence. D15724C710N (talkcontribs) 16:27, 22 April 2010 (UTC)[reply]

The article does not specify whether physical determinism or indeterminism is accepted. Assuming physical indeterminism is accepted, then it's description of free will coincides with Libertarian Incompatibilism case b) determined by indeterministic natural law only; "Each one of us, too, lead separate lives, darting about randomly, depending on the forces acting upon us". Assuming determinism is accepted (ie, despite being chaotic, making it impossible to reverse engineer the initial conditions, it is still deterministic), then it's definition of free will formally coincides with a form of Compatibilism. Regardless, this article is most probably not appropriate for Wikipedia - it was however an interesting article. Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 12:50, 11 April 2010 (UTC)[reply]

With respect to this discussion, I have made the following modified update; "These philosophers affirm the course of the world is either a) not completely determined by natural law where natural law is intercepted by physically independent agency, or b) determined by indeterministic natural law only, or c) determined by indeterministic natural law in line with the subjective effort of physically non-reducible agency". Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 13:46, 13 April 2010 (UTC)[reply]

I have nothing more to say then regarding the issue of "will" vs. "will power." :-) Still, I think there is a lot of room for improvement in the "free will" subsection. Another day, perhaps. D15724C710N (talkcontribs) 16:40, 22 April 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Featured article

Does article with cleanup template can be featured?--Vojvodae please be free to write :) 05:02, 30 April 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Spam?

Someone has just done a succession of edits that look like spam to me... but I'm no philosopher. Anthony (talk) 10:48, 15 May 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Casual Reducibility versus Ontological Reducibility

I recently made some clarifications to the Non-reductive Physicalism section [3][4][5]. The following is with respect to a change which keeps coming up [removal of all instances of the word "casual"]. I have kept reverting this change immediately as it results in some serious errors to the text;

  1. causally reducible - results in an incorrect link
  2. Although mental properties form a separate ontological class to physical properties, and mental states (such as qualia) are not reducible to physical states, they are however causally reducible to physical states - this makes no sense
  3. Davidson's uses the thesis of supervenience: mental states supervene on physical states, but are not reducible to them. "Supervenience" therefore describes a functional dependence: there can be no change in the mental without some change in the physical - causal reducibility between the mental and physical without ontological reducibility - this makes no sense (it removes the explanation of the type of reducibility)
  4. Because causally reducible nonreductive physicalist theories attempt to - this makes no sense
  5. both ontologically and causally irreducible to physical states - this makes no sense

Non-reductive physicalists maintain ontological non-reducibility, but they generally do not claim casual non-reducibility.

The word 'casual' has at least two meanings;

  1. it may indeed mean informal, careless, accidental, incidental, etc
  2. in the scientific world it often refers to two events occurring at the same time (or in close proximity) as a result of one event causing another event (ie, "they are casually related"). In the philosophical world, it may have similar connotations.

One state (A) may cause another state (B) [eg in Epiphenomenalism, the existence of a physical state may cause the existence of a mental state], but this does not necessarily (by itself) imply casual reducibility. Casual reducibility requires state A to cause B, and state B to cause state A (ie, their occurrences are mapped together one-to-one). These states therefore occur at the same time, and can be reduced to (encapsulate) a single temporal state (ie, "they are casually reducible"). Note, the word temporal means "in time", not "temporary". Casual reducibility is therefore reducibility in terms of two states occurring simultaneously, and only occurring simultaneously. Although non-reductive physicalism generally asserts casual reducibility (except for Epiphenomenalism - if it is classed as non-reductive physicalism), it will still maintain that the two states are not ontologically reducible, claiming they are of a different nature (or order of nature); subjective and objective - observer and observed.

I don't mind replacing the word 'casual' with another word to explain this type of reducibility - however; a) I believe it is correct as stands, and b) I am not aware of a better word for it's replacement. Please advise if otherwise.

Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 13:21, 2 June 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Your statement

in the scientific world [casual] often refers to two events occurring at the same time (or in close proximity) as a result of one event causing another event (ie, "they are casually related"). In the philosophical world, it may have similar connotations.

appears to be a misuse of the word casual. It is certainly not the usage in science that I have ever seen. Do you have a dictionary source for this? I can't find this definition or use in Wiktionary or Merriam-Webster. According to the latter, the two words have different Latin sources: casus (chance) and causa (cause). Do you have a scholarly source that uses casual in this way? --EPadmirateur (talk) 19:44, 2 June 2010 (UTC)[reply]

I am sorry the correct phrase is "causally related" - this is a serious mistake of semantics; and I apologise - the intended meaning remains the same as stated above however. Hopefully we will be able to resolve this issue soon. Note again, I don't mind changing the phrase "causally reducible" if someone can come up with a better way of describing the difference between non-reductive physicalism which claims a mapping between physical states and mental states (such as Anomalous monism) and Epiphenomenalism which claims a one-way relationship (byproducts) where one or more mental states have no physical consequences. This problem would not exist of course if Epiphenomenalism never wished to be called non-reductive physicalism; no harm is intended - I only wish to remove contradictions from Wikipedia (that would otherwise exist) and clarify the positions recorded. Thanks for picking up this error. Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 15:55, 3 June 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Casual versus causal

Casual means informal, happening by chance, careless. So "casually irreducible" means "informally irreducible".

Causal means causing or relating to the cause of something. So "causally irreducible" means "the causes are irreducible".

Does that make it clearer? --EPadmirateur (talk) 12:44, 2 June 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Wow. Way to make a mountain out of a typo. BlueRobe (talk) 08:21, 11 June 2010 (UTC)[reply]

I believe this is an incorrect interpretation - see above - Casual Reducibility versus Ontological Reducibility. Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 13:24, 2 June 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Wikipedia's articles should aim to make contact with a broad group of readers, especially articles such as this one. The fraction of readers who will understand this usage of "casual" is tiny, so it would be far better to use different wording. That's regardless of the correctness of the argument, which I don't want to judge. Looie496 (talk) 16:19, 2 June 2010 (UTC)[reply]
Richard, when you changed the illustration[6] you didn't cite a source for the extra form of dualism you added.
I've looked but came up with nothing.
Google Scholar results:
Google book results:
so, for now I have replaced the old image.
At this edit you changed

Non-reductive Physicalism is the view that mental properties form a separate ontological class to physical properties: mental states (such as qualia)are not reducible to physical states.

to

Alternatively, it is stated that all mental states are casually reducible to physical states. Although mental properties form a separate ontological class to physical properties, and mental states (such as qualia) are not reducible to physical states, they are however casually reducible to physical states.

which is a significant shift in meaning, without providing a source. I'm reverting it for now. Please provide a reliable source that says what the reverted text and image say. Anthony (talk) 20:14, 2 June 2010 (UTC)[reply]

I agree with Looie in principle (see above - Casual Reducibility versus Ontological Reducibility) - lets find a way of describing this distinction to the reader.

Anthony - thanks for performing this analysis. The phrase was not derived from the literature and has been used to describe a distinction between two versions of non-reductive physicalism defined in wikipedia (see above).

taken in context (it reads after a description of Epiphenomenalism) there is no intended change of meaning (let alone significant change in meaning) in the example provided. The meaning however is again subject to the interpretation of the phrase 'causally reducible' - an issue which must be resolved.

Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 16:10, 3 June 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Dear EPadmirateur,

"Causally irreducible" means "the causes are irreducible" - this is correct - I did not read your comment properly. I thought that all instances of the word were being removed, when they were actually being replaced. I misinterpreted the red text in the comparison, and failed to visually see the distinction between the words "casual" and "causal" used in multiple comments in the talk and history section, if not every comment. (This is on top of failing to recognise the distinction between these words in general, as outlined above).

Causally reducible means reducible via it's causes - they have the same causes as implication of the fact they are mapped together one-to-one. There is no other interpretation that has been proposed. They also occur simultaneously and only simultaneously - which would provide another way of describing the same scenario if there were actually a word in the dictionary for this.

Again, I apologise for the inconvenience caused by this misunderstanding.

Richardbrucebaxter (talk) —Preceding undated comment added 11:17, 4 June 2010 (UTC).[reply]

Anthony, please note that the changes introduced by the edit [7] seem to defeat the purpose of the original revision process;

  1. by restoring the old image and the old caption where epiphenomenalism is illustrated as separate from property dualism ("... Property dualism and Occasionalism are not shown"), epiphenomenalism can no longer be classified as a form of property dualism
  2. by restoring the description of property dualism, where non-reductive physicalism is listed as separate from epiphenomenalism, epiphenomenalism can no longer be classified as a form of nonreductive physicalism

Personally, I really don't mind what the truth of the classification is. I personally like the way it was originally classified on this page, as I mentioned earlier, and therefore don't mind the changes you have made in principle. The classification as implied above however has been contradicted by other members of the Wikipedia community (see Heligan, [8]), and how it has therefore been classified elsewhere on Wikipedia.

I suggest that either a) these changes are reverted now that the spelling has been corrected in DualismCausationViews2.svg [9], b) additional changes are applied to re-remove one or more of the above one or more contradictions (1. , 2.), or c) someone finds a reference to confirm the position that no form of Epiphenomenalism can be classified as either nonreductive physicalism or property dualism.

Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 17:26, 4 June 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Man, I've been brawling with Christians and am all tuckered out. If you want to restore this to coherence that aligns with some authoritative secondary sources, I'd be thrilled. I'm very conscious of the featured article status of this essay, which means every assertion should be based on the words of some generally recognized authority. I find this very useful for generating citations. Just enter the ISBN and hit go. Cheers. Anthony (talk) 22:38, 4 June 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Understood - I found references to support the claim that the original (and restored) classifications on this page are contested.

Epiphenomenalism may be classified as non-reductive physicalism; [1]

This classification is under serious contention. Traditionally Epiphenomenalism (causally irreducible mental states) has not been classed as non-reductive physicalism (causally reducible mental states), but these two views have been equated at times, in favour of both causally reducible mental states [2][3], and causally irreducible mental states (see review of Kim Jaegwon's 'Physicalism, or something near enough' [4]).

Epiphenomenalism may be classified as property dualism; [5]

The diagram [10] includes the causal interactions asserted by the dominant though non-exclusive form of property dualism where in causally reducible mental states are maintained (orthodox non-reductive physicalism) [6]. As illustrated in the diagram, non-reductive physicalism is subject to critiques regarding overdetermination, especially when viewed in it's most simple form (instead of the more advanced forms of supervenience involving coarse-grained scenarios where events each have multiple properties; adding explanatory significance to mental properties if nothing else). [7]. Epiphenomenalism is subject to similar critiques. As the diagram stands, it makes no judgements as to the classification of Epiphenomenalism (although this was not the case originally; see [11][12]).

Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 14:08, 5 June 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Epiphenomenalism is not generally classified as non-reductive physicalism, and I have reverted all changes which were made to allow for this possibility (see my contributions; 'Reverting previous changes regarding classification of epiphenomenalism - See Property Dualism Talk Page' [13]).

This means that the changes I made which Anthony has already reverted regarding "2. epiphenomenalism can no longer be classified as a form of nonreductive physicalism" were incorrect. The additional reversions applied however (replacing the diagram and caption added 26 April 2009) I believe are not required and restore an old problem ("1. epiphenomenalism can no longer be classified as a form of property dualism").

Thanks for your support in picking up this additional error - note I do believe I posted a notice on multiple Talk pages asking for feedback on this question last year (adding links to "Is Epiphenomenalism Non-reductive physicalism?" [14]) - but in retrospect the safest method was to research the answer myself.

Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 03:33, 6 June 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Richardbrucebaxter, for the love of God, please learn to format properly. Your failure to use colons properly is making these threads very confusing. Or are you under the impression that this talk page revolves around you? BlueRobe (talk) 08:51, 19 August 2010 (UTC)[reply]
this was a complete oversight, I have never been comfortable with colons having to add them to individual paragraphs. I guess my subconscious might have also wanted to bend the indenting rules for consecutive reposts, or based on some function of the user post ratio. I appreciate your re-reading of the threads (which were posted simultaneously). Note, I viewed your original analysis as correct, regarding the typo, although I believe this incident has led to a number of valuable corrections and improvements ([15], [16], [17]). Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 14:33, 19 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]

The mind body problem is the problem of trying to understand how a mind can arise from the physical, biological, stuff in the brain. As is mentioned in the article. This is an important problem. Why, then, does it link to the unrelated article on mind-body dichotomy? Which says that "The mind-body dichotomy is the view that "mental" phenomena are, in some respects, "non-physical" (distinct from the body)". Surely the article on the 'mind-body dichotomy' is the exact opposite of what the mind-body problem is all about? In other words, the "mind-body problem" is about figuring out how minds arise from the body, where as the "mind-body dichotomy" is about saying that minds DONT arise from the body. The two are most assuredly not the same thing, and that the 'mind-body dichotomy' is the main article for the mind-body problem is crazy. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 188.141.75.182 (talk) 13:08, 30 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]

I thus deleted the link to the 'mind-body dichotomy' as the main article, as this philosophy of mind one is clearly much more about the 'mind-body problem' than the 'dichotomy' article is. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 188.141.75.182 (talk) 13:12, 30 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Article structure and Mind Body problem

The current article essentially splits an explanation of the MBP into two: a rather brief description under the heading "mind body problem" and a fuller one half way down the article, under "Problems with naturalism". This wouldn't be so bad if the article were structured historically into an "old" and "new" MBP, but it isn't. The MBP has changed over time: Descartes' concerns that matter was incapable of thought has been removed by advances in AI and neuroscience. What I am calling for is a single section on the MBP, that covers its history and all aspects of the modern MBP: experience/qualia; intentionality/content; volition/mental causation; the self. Part of my concern is the present article on the Mind body problem, which is currently too thin to be much use. 13:09, 1 January 2011 (UTC)

removing new material

I am removing the following material that was just added to the article by Alengleman2 (talk · contribs), for the following reasons: (1) it is incomprehensible; (2) it is not neutrally worded; (3) based on user name the editor who added it is the author of the book being cited, so it constitutes a conflict of interest; (4) the book does not meet our criteria for usable sources, as specified in WP:RS.

It must be said, compatabilists notwithstanding, that the "self" must be viewed as Expressional, when one rejects the strict Solophist oneness, and includes "Self" with the old philosophic "Being", then the best an emergentist can hope for is Self-Being, which Expressional Emergentists like AL Engleman, call Self-Working Energy, or just "I AM". So philosophical 'Selfness" is Matter and Energy trying to get back to their original oneness, which is synonymous with selfness, while "being" represents the dispersal Energy that is still Expanding the Universe, which we see as Time. In this view, The "I" of Self equals the expanding dispersal of "Being" ("I"equals"Being")so as to combine into the more Holistic "I AM", and which finally, we hope, to get to "I Love".<ref>{{cite book | author=Engleman AL | title=Expressions: A Philosophy of Mind | publisher=Cafe Press USA | year=2005 }}</ref>

Note that since this is a featured article, the standards for adding material need to be enforced pretty strictly. Looie496 (talk) 19:33, 6 March 2011 (UTC)[reply]


Yes, this article is riddled with add-on mentions and references to authors of questionable general notability. Surely the motive for this is self-promotion, or promotion of own's friends, associates, former teachers. It's pretty disgusting that anyone with pretensions of being a scholar or academic interested in philosophy would engage in this kind of behaviour. Wouldn't they be more likely to find a calling in the advertising or marketing industry? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 118.12.9.239 (talk) 00:22, 16 June 2011 (UTC)[reply]

Explanation of revert

I have just undone an edit that added a line saying, The way that this is understood is that "Growth then is a series of changes in Outlook" and these propositions are axioms. I removed it because (a) I don't understand what it means and I doubt that other readers will either, and (b) it places a phrase in quotation marks without any evidence that anybody actually used exactly those words. Looie496 (talk) 16:27, 2 April 2011 (UTC)[reply]

What is this thing here?

The Argument from Reason holds that if, as monism implies, all of our thoughts are the effects of physical causes, then we have no reason for assuming that they are also the consequent of a reasonable ground. Knowledge, however, is apprehended by reasoning from ground to consequent. Therefore, if monism is correct, there would be no way of knowing this—or anything else not the direct result of a physical cause—and we could not even suppose it, except by a fluke.

As far as I know, there are no physicalist philosophers who assume that all of our "thoughts", or even many of them, are the consequences of an inference. A thought is generally, though not universally, characterized in the lit. as an occurrent belief. How the devil does any of the rest follow? --Francesco Franco (talk) 16:29, 27 December 2011 (UTC)[reply]

This is a bizarre argument and not at all common in the literature.. Moreover, there is no citation and it links back to an article about the existence of god.

  1. ^ Kim, Jaegwon (2005). Physicalism, or something near enough. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-11375-0.
  2. ^ Campbell, N. (2001). "[What Was Huxley{\textquoteright}s Epiphenomenalism?]". Biology and Philosophy. 16 (3): 357–375. {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
  3. ^ Dennett, Daniel Clement (1991). Consciousness explained. Boston: Little, Brown and Co. ISBN 0-316-18065-3.
  4. ^ Sven Walter (2008). "[Physicalism, Or Something Near Enough, by Jaegwon Kim]". European Journal of Philosophy. 16 (1): 157–161.
  5. ^ Robinson, Howard (2003-08-19). "Dualism". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2003 Edition). Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University. Retrieved 2006-09-25. {{cite web}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
  6. ^ Sven Walter (2008). "[Physicalism, Or Something Near Enough, by Jaegwon Kim]". European Journal of Philosophy. 16 (1): 159.
  7. ^ Paul Raymont (2003). Sven Walter and Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (ed.). Physicalism and Mental Causation (Kim on Overdetermination, Exclusion, and Nonreductive Physicalism). Imprint Academic.