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Criticism of Confucius Institutes

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The Confucius Institute (CI) program, which began establishing centers for Chinese language instruction in 2004, has been the subject of controversy during its international expansion.

Much of such concerns stems from the institutes' alleged relationship to Chinese Communist Party authorities, giving rise to allegations about improper influence over academic freedom at host universities, industrial and military espionage, surveillance of Chinese students abroad, and attempts to advance the Chinese government's political agendas on controversial issues such as Tibet and Taiwan. Additional concerns have arisen over the institutes’ financial and academic viability, teaching quality, and relations with Chinese partner universities.[1] As a result of such concerns, administrators at several institutions such as the University of Melbourne and University of Chicago have opposed the establishment of a Confucius Institute.

In response, Confucius Institutes have defended their establishments, and compared such insitutes with other cultural promotion organizations such as Alliance française and Goethe-Institut.[2] Some observers have noted that such institutes are limited to teaching cultural and language programs, while largely avoiding contending with political and controversial subjects as human rights and democracy.[3]

Background

The Confucius Institute program began in 2004 and is financed by the quasi-governmental Office of Chinese Language Council International (colloquially, Hanban 汉办), which describes itself as a non-government, non-profit organization that is affiliated with the Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of China.[4] The institutes operate in co-operation with local affiliate colleges and universities around the world. The related Confucius Classroom program partners with secondary schools or school districts to provide Chinese language teachers and instructional materials.[5][6]

As of July 2010, there were 316 Confucius Institutes and 337 Confucius Classrooms in 94 countries and regions.[7]

Objectives

Confucius Institutes’ stated missions are to promote knowledge of Chinese language and culture abroad, as well as to promote commercial and trade cooperation. In the context of the Chinese Communist Party's foreign policy objectives, the institutes serve as tools of cultural diplomacy intended to bolster China’s soft power abroad, and shape perceptions of its policies.

The Economist notes that China "has been careful not to encourage these language centres to act as overt purveyors of the party’s political viewpoints, and little suggests they are doing so", but also noted the important goal of give the world a “correct” understanding of China, as well as efforts in opposing Chinese dissident groups abroad, such as Tibetan independent activists, democracy groups and the Falun Gong.[8]

Relationship to Chinese party-state

A number of the more serious concerns and controversies surrounding the Confucius Institutes stems from its relationship to the Chinese party-state. Hanban, the body which administers Confucius Institutes, states on its website that it is a non-profit, non-government organization, though it is connected with China’s Ministry of Education and has close ties to a number of senior Communist Party officials. The current chair of Hanban is Politburo member Liu Yandong,[9] former head of the United Front Work Department of the Communist Party of China.

Confucius Institutes are described in official Communist Party literature in the context of Hu Jintao’s soft power initiatives, designed to influence perceptions of China and its policies abroad. Li Changchun, the 5th-highest ranking member of the Politburo Standing Committee, was quoted in The Economist saying that the Confucius Institutes were “an important part of China’s overseas propaganda set-up”.[10]

A declassified intelligence report by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service says, "Beijing is out to win the world's hearts and minds, not just its economic markets, as a means of cementing power."[11] Stockholm's Institute for Security and Development Policy described the founding of CIs as "an image management project, the purpose of which is to promote the greatness of Chinese culture while at the same time counterattacking public opinion that maintains the presence of a 'China threat' in the international community."[12] Although the number of Indian students take Chinese language courses is on the increase, the Ministry of External Affairs rejected the idea of establishing Confucius Institutes in schools, as they were "using culture to spread propaganda and influence.".[13][14] All of the 17 CIs launched in Japan since 2005 were at private colleges as "people remain concerned by the potential ideological and cultural threat of Chinese government-run projects such as CIs."[15]

An Asian Survey article notes concerns over a "Trojan horse effect" of CIs. "The Confucius Institute project can be seen at one level as an attempt to increase Chinese language learning and an appreciation of Chinese culture, but at another level it is part of a broader soft power projection in which China is attempting to win hearts and minds for political purposes." Besides CIs, some other ways that China raises its cultural profile overseas include Chinese contemporary art exhibitions, television programs, concerts by popular singers, and translations of Chinese literature.[16]

At a hearing of the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Anne-Marie Brady, a University of Canterbury political science professor, testified that China considers propaganda work the "life blood of the Party-State in the current era", and promotes foreign propaganda towards the Overseas Chinese community through Confucius Institutes and activities such as "root-seeking" cultural tours.[17][18] There has also been criticism over the Communist Party’s appropriation of Confucius. Under Mao Zedong, Confucian values and teachings were perennial targets of criticism and suppression, being viewed as vestiges of feudalism. According to Asia Times Online, the Chinese Communist Party under Mao Zedong criticized Confucian teachings as "rubbish that should be thrown into the 'Ash heap of history" while the 21st-century CCP uses Confucianism as "an assistant to the Chinese god of wealth (and a representative of Chinese diplomacy), but not a tutor for Chinese soul."[19]

Comparisions with similar organizations

The establishment of Confucius Institutes has led to comparisons to similar cultural promotion organizations such as France's Alliance Française, after which it was modelled,[20] and Germany's Goethe-Institut.[21]

A China Daily editorial accused CI opponents of double standards for not calling "Goethe-Institutes, Alliance Française or Cervantes Institutes propaganda vehicles or tools of cultural invasion", noting that "China is not the first to set up such institutes nor does it have a monopoly over overseas cultural promotion."[22] Some critics note that unlike the forementioned organizations, The Confucius Institute model is to attach themselves to universities or other educational institutions, thus leading to suspicions that the institutes are "aimed less at fostering interest in China and Chinese culture itself, and more at ensuring that such interest is guided along lines approved of by the Chinese party-state."[23]

Jocelyn Chey, a former diplomat and expert in Australia-China relations, says that Confucius Institutes are more closely managed by its government compared with its French counterpart.[20] She believes that the institute's program is most valuable where it supports culture and outreach into the community.[24] Chey however states that CI is "a propaganda vehicle for the Chinese communist party, and not a counterpart to the Goethe Institute or Alliance Française",[25][26] and speculates the close links between the institutes and the Chinese Communist Party "could lead at best to a 'dumbing down' of research and at worst could produce propaganda."[24] On the other hand, The Sydney Morning Herald cites Queensland University of Technology student Falk Hartig saying in a research paper that "It would be best to understand [Confucius institutes] not as 'propaganda tools' but as 'one instrument of China's cultural diplomacy to wield and bolster Chinese soft power globally'".[21]

Financing

Confucius Institutes mostly run a small number of classes, are on a small budget. They are funded jointly by grants from China’s Ministry of Education and funds from host universities; many are struggling as at 2007, although Hanban set a financial objective for self-sufficiency within five years.[27]

Some critics have suggested that Beijing’s contributions to host universities gives Chinese authorities too much leverage over those institutions. The sizeable grants that come with the establishment of Confucius Institutes could make universities more susceptible to pressure from Beijing to exercise self-censorship, particularly on Chinese human rights issues or other politically sensitive topics.[28] The Economist points out that some Chinese language courses at Confucius Institutes are even paid for by the Pentagon under the National Security Language Initiative.[10]

Maria Wey-Shen Siow, East Asia bureau chief of Channel NewsAsia, wrote in the East-West Center’s Asia Pacific Bulletin that concerns over Confucius Institutes projecting political undertones "are not completely unfounded, but may not be totally warranted."[29]  She highlights that, for all the CI controversies, "Han Ban’s annual budget was only US$145 million in 2009 so it would be false to state that China has been spending massively on these institutes."[29]

Additional concerns center on potential for corruption and conflict of interests within Hanban, which is ostensibly a non-profit organization but operates CI-related companies for profit. In November 2009, for instance, the deputy director of Hanban established a company that won a $5 million USD bid in France to build and operate the Confucius Institutes’s website.[30]

Some critics, including within China, have expressed worry that "the government’s support for the CIs' budgets detracts from domestic spending" when the Ministry of Education "budget for domestic compulsory education remains inadequate." Swedish Parliamentarian Göran Lindblad was similarly critical of why Chinese authorities are subsidizing Western educational institutions when "China has ten million children without proper schools."[31][32]

Espionage concerns

Critics of Confucius Institutes have cited concerns that they could serve as a vehicle for industrial and military espionage, as well as for surveillance of Chinese students studying abroad. The intelligence services of several countries have pursued studies of Confucius Institutes, including the Canadian organization CSIS.[33] David Matas said that "informally [the institutes] become a vehicle that the Chinese government uses to basically intimidate the academic institutions to run according to their guise and also as a vehicle for infiltration and spying into the campuses to find out what's going on hostile to their interest."[28]

The People's Daily reports that Osaka Sangyo University, which opened a Confucius Institute and closed it after one year of operation, formally apologized for an employee who called the CI "a spy agency established to gather cultural intelligence."[34]

Political influences

Canada's Globe and Mail reported, "Despite their neutral scholarly appearance, the new network of Confucius Institutes does have a political agenda." For example, teaching with the simplified Chinese characters used in the PRC rather than the Traditional Chinese characters used in Taiwan "would help to advance Beijing’s goal of marginalizing Taiwan in the battle for global influence.”[35] An article in China Heritage Quarterly describes teaching only simplified characters in the context of Confucius Institutes as "semi-literacy in Chinese".[23] In 2011 in response to the PRC's moves, the Republic of China announced plans to establish the 'Taiwan Academy' in America, Europe, and Asia as part of its "cultural diplomacy". Taiwan's programme is designed to promote "Taiwanese-favored" Mandarin Chinese, traditional Chinese characters, and Taiwanese topics.[36]

Peng Ming-min, a Taiwan independence activist and politician, writes that although on the surface China merely demonstrates its "soft power" through CIs, "Colleges and universities where a Confucius Institute is established all have to sign a contract in which they declare their support for Beijing’s “one China” policy. As a result, both Taiwan and Tibet have become taboos at these institutes." Peng lists other examples of CI "untouchable" issues including the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, neglect of human rights, environmental pollution in China, and the imprisonment of Liu Xiaobo.[37] However, BC lawyer and China expert Clive Ansley said that there were "troubling signs of [China's] growing influence on western campuses" before Confucius Institutes were established. He saw signs that public discussions about certain human-rights issues were being self-censored, out of fear of losing out on intake of Chinese students.[28]

Michael Nylan, professor of Chinese history at the University of California at Berkeley, says CIs have become less heavy-handed in their demands, and have learned from "early missteps," such as insisting that universities adopt a policy that Taiwan is part of China. Nylan took an informal survey of faculty and administrators at fifteen universities with Confucius Institutes; "two respondents reported that institutes had exerted pressure to block guest speakers," but both events went ahead anyway.[38]

Concerns over censorship and academic freedom

While some universities have declined to host Confucius Institutes because the university’s own Chinese language instruction programs were already fulfilling the needs of their students and communities,[citation needed] there has been disquiet in academic circles in the West over the possible impact of accepting funds from a totalitarian regime on academic freedom.[39] Jonathan Lipman, a professor of Chinese history at Mount Holyoke College, expressed the dilemma of accepting CI funding thus: "By peddling a product we want, namely Chinese language study, the Confucius Institutes bring the Chinese government into the American academy in powerful ways. The general pattern is very clear. They can say, 'We'll give you this money, you'll have a Chinese program, and nobody will talk about Tibet.' In this economy, turning them down has real costs."[38] Professor Terry Russell at Manitoba University questioned the what the real motivation was. He feared the university would not be able to organise certain activities judged "sensitive" to the Chinese, such as bringing the Dalai Lama onto campus. He said that control exercised over the classroom by any foreign or domestic government would be in violation of the university's educational principles.[40][41] Glenn Anthony May, a University of Oregon history professor, was concerned that Confucius Institutes "come with visible strings attached." For instance, host institutions must sign a memorandum of understanding to support the One-China policy. "At universities, we normally have an opportunity to debate issues like that, allowing professors like me and students to take issue publicly with our government's policy. Hanban, for obvious reasons, wants no such discussion to occur."[42] Meiru Liu, director of the Confucius Institute at Portland State University, rejects May's criticisms that CIs hinder open discussions of issues such as the treatment of Liu Xiaobo. Liu explained that while Falun Gong, dissidents and 1989 Tiananmen Square protests are not topics the Confucius Institute headquarters would like to see organized by the institutes, they are "not major interest and concerns now by general public at large here in the US."[43] Fellow UO professor and CI director Bryna Goodman retorted May, noting that the local Confucius Institute hosted forums on sensitive topics such as China's internet censorship and economic regulations. He said: "We haven't gotten any topic that has been proposed to us that we have considered out of bounds."[44]

The establishment of some Confucius Institutes has been opposed or blocked by faculty members at universities. Members of the Chinese studies department at the University of Melbourne forced the institute off the main campus.[20] Faculty at the University of Manitoba also opposed establishing a CI.[40] Faculty at Stockholm University demanded the separation of the Nordic Confucius Institute from the university, but an independent assessment rejected their claims that the Chinese Embassy in Stockholm was using the CI for conducting political surveillance and inhibiting academic freedom.[1] Jonathan Zimmerman, teacher at New York University also cited Mussolini's attempts to promote Italian in American schools. He suspected that such institutes are used to "play up China's economic achievements and play down its crimes", and said that Chinese language programs should be established according to American terms.[39]

A major concern of Confucius Institutes is their response of politically sensitive and controversial material such as human rights and Taiwan. Meiru Liu, director of the Confucius Institute at Portland State University, states that the local institute had sponsored lectures on Tibet, China's economic development, currency, and US-China relations. Mary E. Gallagher, director of the Center for Chinese Studies at the University of Michigan, said that the institutes has been free in covering 'that are controversial and sensitive in China'".[45] In particular, the Confucius Institute in Edinburgh promoted a talk by a dissident Chinese author whose works are banned in China.[46]

USA

Columbia University received $1 million in Hanban funds over five years, to begin a CI. Professor Robert Barnett, the director of the Modern Tibetan Studies Program, expressed concerns of self-censorship when he described a "strange silence about Tibet and other sensitive issues when it comes to Columbia, academics, and talks of China." Barnett said the main issue was that "it wants to have a presence in the campus and ... in the faculty and in teaching departments." Lening Liu, director of the Confucius Institute at Columbia stressed that Columbia’s CI was "committed to academic integrity and that it would reject any attempt by Hanban to censor its research."[47] Other academics have questioned how universities should respond when foreign governments limit academic freedom abroad. Since the 2001 publication of Columbia University professor Andrew J. Nathan's Tiananmen Papers, he and several other faculty members have been denied visas to China, and the Chinese government shut down the Modern Tibetan Studies Program's study abroad program in Tibet.[47]

Over 170 University of Chicago faculty members petitioned president Robert Zimmer against the establishment, without a vote of the full faculty", of a CI as well as a 'Milton Friedman Institute for Research in Economics'. Petitioners said the University risked having its own reputation used to "legitimate the spread" of Confucius Institutes in the USA and around the world.[48]

According to a Chronicle of Higher Education article, since the first Confucius Institute in the USA was established at the University of Maryland in 2004, "there have been no complaints of the institutes' getting in the way of academic freedom on American campuses".[49] The same article however goes on to write that the Institutes are "distinct in the degree to which they were financed and managed by a foreign government."[49]

Stanford University was initially offered $4 million to host a CI and endow a Confucius Institute Professorship in Sinology. The Dean for Humanities said the Chinese were concerned at being embarrassed and thus attached a caveat that the professor could not discuss delicate issues like Tibet. On Stanford's refusal based on academic freedom grounds, Hanban relented. Standford plans to use the money for a professorship in classical Chinese poetry.[38]

In 2009, the North Carolina State University cancelled a planned appearance by the Dalai Lama to speak on its Raleigh campus, citing concerns about a Chinese backlash and a shortage of time and resources. Provost Warwick Arden noted that China's economic significance for North Carolina, raising concerns Confucius Institute would present "an opportunity for subtle pressure and conflict."[50] However, in 2010, the Dalai Lama spoke at Stanford University and Miami University, Ohio – both institutions have Confucius Institutes.[38]

Israel

In 2008, Tel Aviv University officials shut down a student art exhibition depicting the "oppression of Falun Gong" in China. A Tel Aviv District Court judge subsequently ruled the university "violated freedom of expression and succumbed to pressure from the Chinese Embassy."[51] The judge noted the dean of students "feared that the art exhibit would jeopardize Chinese support for its Confucius Institute and other educational activities."[49]

Australia

New South Wales Greens MP John Kaye said that teaching of Chinese language and culture should be part of "a balanced curriculum that explores controversial issues, such as human rights violations and Taiwan" Fellow Greens MP Jamie Parker organized a petition with more than 10,000 signatures, calling for the removal of the Confucius Classroom Program from local schools.[52] NSW Minister for Education Adrian Piccoli defended the classes, and noted that the Chinese language syllabuses did not include the study of political content.[53] Shuangyuan Shi, director of Confucius Institute in Sydney, noted the institutes primarily focuses on language, and teachers are not there to draw up conclusions for students in regards to controversial subjects.[54] Senior Department of Education officials acknowledge that the institutes play an important role in fostering greater literacy in Asian languages, they admit to concerns about China's influence over the program's content. They view that dealing with "sensitive topics" such as human rights record is usually well handled by teachers. Furthermore, the staff at the Sydney institutes noted that Beijing never threatened their academic freedom.[55]

Hiring policies

Teachers provided by Hanban have in some cases been described as inadequate and inexperienced in providing second-language instruction.[citation needed] In 2011, a controversy erupted over the instructor hiring policies posted publicly on Hanban’s website that stated that candidates for teaching positions should be "aged between 22 to 60, physical and mental [sic] healthy, no record of participation in Falun Gong and other illegal organizations, and no criminal record".[56] North America representative for Hanban acknowledges that Falun Gong practitioners are excluded because Confucius Institutes must follow Chinese as well as US law.[38] However, the CI director for the Chicago Public Schools was quoted in Asia Times as saying "Confucius Institutes have total autonomy in their course materials and teachers" and that Hanban are "among the most modern, forward-thinking group of people in China."[57]

References

  1. ^ a b Starr, Don "Chinese Language Education in Europe: the Confucius Institutes", European Journal of Education (2009). Volume 44, Issue 1, pages 78–79.
  2. ^ Justin Norrie (2011), Confucius says school's in, but don't mention democracy, The Sydney Morning Herald, 20 February 2011.
  3. ^ Ulara Nakagawa (2011), Confucius Controversy, The Diplomat, 7 March 2011. " ‘The Chinese are going to avoid contentious areas such as human rights and democracies and those kinds of things,’ he notes"
  4. ^ "The Office of Chinese Language Council International (Hanban)". University of Sydney Confucius Institute. Retrieved 2 July 2011.
  5. ^ "Introduction to the Confucius Institutes". Retrieved 2 July 2011.
  6. ^ Jianguo Chen, Chuang Wang, Jinfa Cai (2010). institute&f=false Teaching and learning Chinese: issues and perspectives. IAP. pp. xix. {{cite book}}: Check |url= value (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  7. ^ 316 Confucius Institutes established worldwide, Xinhua, 2010-07-1.
  8. ^ The Economist, China’s Confucius Institutes: Rectification of statues, "Asia Banyan", 20 January 2011.
  9. ^ Hanban News, 'Madame Liu Yandong, State Councilor and Chair of the Confucius Institute Headquarters Delivers a New Year’s Address to Confucius Institutes Overseas', 1 March 2010. Accessed 7 September 2011.
  10. ^ a b A message from Confucius; New ways of projecting soft power, The Economist. 22 October 2009.
  11. ^ "CSIS say: Confucius part of Chinese bid to win over western hearts", The Chronicle, 27 May 2007.
  12. ^ Xiaolin Guo (2008), Repackaging Confucius, Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm, Sweden, July 2008.
  13. ^ No Chinese in India, says government news, Domain-b, 8 Oct 2009.
  14. ^ How to be a cultural superpower, Times of India, 22 Nov 2009.
  15. ^ Ren Zhe (2010).
  16. ^ James F. Paradise (2009), China and International Harmony: The Role of Confucius Institutes in Bolstering Beijing's Soft Power, Asian Survey 49.4: 648–649.
  17. ^ Testimony of Associate-Professor Anne-Marie Brady
  18. ^ China’s Propaganda and Influence Operations, Its Intelligence Activities that Target the United States, and the Resulting Impacts on U.S. National Security, U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission.
  19. ^ Confucianism a vital string in China's bow, Jian Junbo, Asia Times , 9 October 2009.
  20. ^ a b c Geoff Maslen (2007), Warning – be wary of Confucius institutes University World News, 2 December 2007.
  21. ^ a b Justin Norrie (2011), Confucius says school's in, but don't mention democracy, The Sydney Morning Herald, 20 February 2011.
  22. ^ Chang, Liu (12 August 2010). "No need to fuss over Confucius Institutes". China Daily. Xinhua. Retrieved 14 August 2010.
  23. ^ a b Michael Churchman (2011), Confucius Institutes and Controlling Chinese Languages, China Heritage Quarterly 26, The Australian National University.
  24. ^ a b Harriet Alexander (2008), Sydney is China's new friend, Higher Education Reporter, Sydney Morning Herald, 18 June 2008.
  25. ^ "Confucius deal close despite concerns", The Australian, 22 August 2007.
  26. ^ Jocelyn Chey (2008), "Chinese 'Soft Power' – Diplomacy and The Confucius Institute podcast, Sydney Papers Vol. 20 No. 1, pp. 33–48.
  27. ^ The language of Chinese soft power in the US. Will Watcher, pg 1. Asia Times.
  28. ^ a b c Janet Steffenhagen, 'Has BCIT sold out to Chinese propaganda?', Vancouver Sun, 2 April 2008.
  29. ^ a b Maria Wey-Shen Siow (2011), "China’s Confucius Institutes: Crossing the River by Feeling the Stone," Asia Pacific Bulletin, No. 91.
  30. ^ Ren Zhe (2010), Confucius Institutes: China's Soft Power?, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, June 2010.
  31. ^ Starr (2009), p. 6.
  32. ^ "i Kina är tio miljoner barn utan en ordentlig skola" Riksdagens snabbprotokoll 2007/08:46 (in Swedish)
  33. ^ Fabrice de Pierrebourg and Michel Juneau-Katsuya, “Nest of Spies: the starting truth about foreign agents at work within Canada’s borders,” HarperCollins Canada, 2009. pp 160 – 162
  34. ^ Japanese university apologizes for calling Confucius Institute spy agency, People's Daily, 12 June 2010.
  35. ^ Geoffrey York (2005), "Beijing uses Confucius to lead charm offensive” The Globe and Mail, 9 September 2005. Quoted by Sheng Ding and Robert A. Saunders (2006), "Talking up China: An analysis of China’s rising cultural power and global promotion of the Chinese language," East Asia, 23.2, p. 21.
  36. ^ Soft Power Smackdown! Confucius Institute vs. Taiwan Academy, The Wall Street Journal 12 August 2001.
  37. ^ Peng Ming-min 彭明敏 (31 May 2011), "China picks pockets of academics worldwide", Taipei Times, p. 8.
  38. ^ a b c d e Golden, Daniel (2 November 2011), China Says No Talking Tibet as Confucius Funds U.S. Universities, Bloomberg News.
  39. ^ a b Zimmerman, Jonathan (6 September 2006). Beware China's role in US Chinese classes. Christian Science Monitor.
  40. ^ a b Nick Martin (27 April 2011), Manitoba Profs Wary Chinese Could Start Spying on Campus, Ottawa Citizen, 27 April 2011.
  41. ^ Profs worry China preparing to spy on students, Macleans.
  42. ^ Glenn Anthony May (2011), Confucius on the Campus, Asia Sentinel, 4 March 2011.
  43. ^ Oregon Pacific Rim roundup: Beijing moves into U.S. campuses, OregonLive, 8 March 2011.
  44. ^ Oregon Pacific Rim roundup: Beijing moves into U.S. campuses, OregonLive, 8 March 2011.
  45. ^ Schmidt, Peter (17 September 2010), At U.S. Colleges, Chinese-Financed Centers Prompt Worries About Academic Freedom, The Chronicle of Higher Education.
  46. ^ A message from Confucius; New ways of projecting soft power, The Economist. 22 October 2009.
  47. ^ a b von Mayrhauser, Melissa (11 November 2011), China-funded institute tests Columbia's commitment to academic integrity, Columbia Spectator.
  48. ^ Peter Schmidt (2010a), U. of Chicago's Plans for Milton Friedman Institute Stir Outrage on the Faculty, The Chronicle of Higher Education, 1 June 2010.
  49. ^ a b c Peter Schmidt (2010b), At U.S. Colleges, Chinese-Financed Centers Prompt Worries About Academic Freedom, The Chronicle of Higher Education, 17 September 2010. mirror for Schmidt (2010b)
  50. ^ Golden (2011).
  51. ^ Abe Selig (2009), Court backs students in TAU row over Falun Gong exhibit the university removed, Jerusalem Post 1 October 2009.
  52. ^ Tyson Butson, Greens want to axe Chinese cultural classes, Inner West Courier 13 October 2011.
  53. ^ Anna Patty, Call to scrap 'biased' Chinese culture classes, The Sydney Morning Herald, 13 July 2011.
  54. ^ Tyson Butson, Greens want to axe Chinese cultural classes, Inner West Courier 13 October 2011.
  55. ^ Norrie, Justin (20 February 2011). "Confucius says school's in, but don't mention democracy", The Sydney Morning Herald.
  56. ^ Hanban, ‘Overseas Volunteer Chinese Teacher Program’, Hanban. Archived from the original on 10 January 2012.
  57. ^ The language of Chinese soft power in the US. Will Watcher, pg 2. Asia Times.
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