Talk:Rationality

Source of ideas

I don't know where half of the stuf in this article came from. E.g., this:

In the social sciences, rationality is a complex cluster of traits that, some claim, either apply to human beings, or serve as useful approximations with which to model human behavior. A rational being, in this sense, probably

• has goals and seeks to fulfill them
• is self-interested
• is not significantly constrained/influeby social networks
• is amoral, except to the extend that morals increase "utility"
• choses courses of action based on some kind of optomization procedure (see Rational Choice Theory)

is not risk-averse. acts on the basis of the "expected value"

• deals like an economist with sunk costs.
• is omniscient regarding the future, or at least has a clearly defined and somehow "reasonable" probabilistic model of the future
• is predictible

Who has said this, other than the author of this article? --Larry Sanger

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I wrote this as filler until I can put something more intelligent. There is significant discussion in Sociology and Economics in which the term "rational" is thrown around without much clarification about what it means. Usually, though, the author has something quite particular in mind, usually one or more of the traits specified in the above points. I think a clarification, perhaps better worded and expanded, would be useful to someone examining discourse in those fields - fields which, of course, come to influence our everyday discourse as well.

Another theme to cover here is the debate between people who think "rationality" is a goodrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr thing to have in social science models (stereotypically Economists) and those who think it is a bad thing (stereotypically Sociologists).

Basically, the above is a synthesis of a few different authors I've read. If it would be better to take this content away until I can clarify exactly who said what, and provide a more in-depth analysis, that would be fine. But please don't delete the whole Rationality page without telling me; I'd like access to the page's "history". -- Ryguasu

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Okay, in the interest of not seeming a hypocrite when I make similar critiques of others' work, I'm removing the "social science" claims until I can develop them further. If anyone is curious, any work on them will probably take place at User:Ryguasu/Rationality. -- Ryguasu

announcing policy proposal of general interest

This is just to inform people that I want Wikipedia to accept a general policy that BC and AD represent a Christian Point of View and should be used only when they are appropriate, that is, in the context of expressing or providing an account of a Christian point of view. In other contexts, I argue that they violate our NPOV policy and we should use BCE and CE instead. See Wikipedia:Neutral point of view/BCE-CE Debate for the detailed proposal.Slrubenstein | Talk 20:54, 16 May 2005 (UTC)

post-rational

Does post-rational fit into the various sorts of rational in the article? Coriolise 19:34, 16 March 2006 (UTC)

Fix this mistake

"In philosophy, which rationality and reason are the key methods by which we obtain knowledge, in opposition to empiricism which states that knowledge is obtained primarily via the senses."

First we need to correct a simple mistake, a "in" as third word is missing.

"In philosophy, in which rationality and reason are the key methods by which we obtain knowledge, in opposition to empiricism which states that knowledge is obtained primarily via the senses."

This sentence is not good, as it gives the reader the impression that there is an opposition between rationality and empiricism. That you can choose between rationality and empiricism.

We need both, of course. Thinking rationally without using our senses to collect information is as useless as collecting information without thinking about the collected data in a rational way. (Roger)

Okay, I fixed it myself. (Roger)

Article standard

This article is terrible. If you are reading this talk page because you are thinking of using the ideas in the article and want some idea of the standard of those ideas, my advice is find another reference source for now. Anarchia 20:24, 9 November 2006 (UTC)

Question

Do you think rationality could be defined as not only a discrepancy between means and ends, but as a complete absence of the ends, as by a person who is consumed by emotion and thinks of nothing but his current situation, dwelling in blind emotion. AdamBiswanger1 22:54, 11 December 2006 (UTC)

I am assuming that you mean 'irrationality' rather than 'rationality'. The term 'rational' gets used in a variety of ways. 'Irrational' could be used to refer to someone who is dominated by immediate affective states, that is, someone who fails to reflect about his or her situation at all. However, more needs to be said about the person before you call them irrational. First, you need to know why the person is "consumed by emotion and thinks of nothing but his current situation". If the person is currently incapable of doing anything other than living in this way, then calling them 'irrational' seems mistaken. If the person is choosing to live in this way, then he or she might be acting irrationally, but, again, you would still need to know why. Is it, for instance, political or artistic statement (think Diogenes). If the person could conceivably determine he or she has most reason to act in another way, but it is hard to see how he or she could practically come to realise that, then it is appropriate to call the person 'objectively irrational'. (See Niko Kolodny's article in Mind 2005.) If the person could practically come to see that he or she has most reason to act in another way, but is choosing not to, then it is appropriate to call that person 'subjecively irrrational'. On the off chance that your question is due to Hume's argument - this won't work as an argument against Hume. Anarchia 19:28, 12 December 2006 (UTC)

First sentence a bit incoherent.

Rationality as a term is related to the idea of reason, a word which following Webster's may be derived as much from older terms referring to thinking itself as from giving an account or an explanation.

Which word may be derived as much from older terms referring to thinking itself as from giving an account or an explanation? Rationality or reason? --210.84.46.147 07:48, 2 May 2007 (UTC)

Proposed Rationality template

Template:Rationality A couple of us are proposing to do some work to sort out the tangle of articles on various aspects of rationality. A first step is to create a Template to serve as a side-box on all such articles, so the overall structure of thought in the area is clearly before the reader whatever particular aspect is under discussion. However, creating such a template is quite a tall order, since it involves (a) finding all the articles we have got in the area and (b) organising them in a sensible and helpful way, despite the fact that (c) the topic is of interest to people from many different disciplines, and the words are used in somewhat different ways by different kinds of specialists.

The help of all editors of good will is solicited to do this job. Accordingly, I suggest we call the template here on the talk page, rather than on the face of the article, until we have a reasonable first approximation. In the next couple of days I hope to do the job of collecting (most of) the relevant articles, and will set up a first draft of the template using them. I have already discussed this with Anarchia; others interested are invited to add comments here. seglea 16:27, 31 August 2007 (UTC)

I have now done a first draft of a template. NB I have NOT yet gone through looking at what articles should go into it - I am interested for the moment in getting the right headings, in the right order. I am calling it on this Talk page for now - comments (or edits, if you know how to) solicited. seglea 22:47, 3 September 2007 (UTC)

I like the draft template. What about things like reason and reasoning? Do you envisage a place for them in the box, or would that make it too large? I know you aren't that concerned about content at the moment, but I assume that akrasia, or whatever it is called in wikipedia, will go in under deviations from... Anarchia 02:05, 15 September 2007 (UTC)

H'mm, not sure, maybe that says the categories aren't right yet. Would they be "meanings of rationality" (in which case that title is perhaps not quite right yet)? Or maybe they would be an example of "rationality in philosphy" in the top part of the box? (And what about the "reasonable man" doctrine in law, too, does that belong?) seglea 23:36, 16 September 2007 (UTC)

How about "sources of rationality" or "criteria for rationality" or "requirements for rationality" (may John Broome forgive me!)? Maybe the "reasonable man" thesis could fit under one of these too? I am a little concerned about the 'people' section, because I am worried that it could get very large. I am not sure whether this is a real concern, however. Anarchia 03:55, 17 September 2007 (UTC)

Bad Analysis

There are a few problems with this quote: "All that is required for an action to be rational is that if one believes action X (which can be done) implies Y, and that Y is desirable, he or she does X."

(1) I think more is required than acting on beliefs of implication. Suppose I believe that X doesn't imply a desirable Y, it just makes Y highly probable. Can't it still be rational to do X? In fact, other things equal, shouldn't some decision theoretic condition factoring in probability and value be required? As I have understood it, the point of rationality (ration, ratio) was to be able to "weigh" estimated or known quantities, like probabilities and valuations, against each other and to assign preferences accordingly.

(2) Suppose I know that X implies a desirable Y but X* also implies Y and can be done with half the effort or risk. (For example, putting on a sweater at hand instead of getting up and going over to close a stubborn window.) Isn't it irrational to do X? Note that the requirement above would have you do both X and X* as well as any other action that implies Y even if these actions are incompatible. It is strictly an impossible requirement. The requirement above needs qualification to account for competing actions each of which implies Y.

(3) Suppose I know that X implies a desirable Y but also implies Y* which is highly undesirable, more so than Y is desirable. (Maybe closing the window will incite the anger of the heat-exhausted rugby team that's sharing the room.) Again, it's irrational to do X but the requirement would seem to have you do it. Possibly, you mean Y to be the sum of events implied by X but this is not stated. --Jcblackmon (talk) 17:13, 27 March 2008 (UTC)

That should be removed, because it's OR, and because, as you point out, it's false. X may imply Y, and Y may be good, but X may imply Z too, and Z may be bad. SlimVirgin ^talk|edits 20:48, 27 March 2008 (UTC)

Besides which, it's inaccurate to describe "practical syllogisms" such as the close-the-window example as being "logically valid." At least as we currently have it phrased, the close-the-window example isn't a logically valid syllogism at all. 65.213.77.129 (talk) 13:16, 2 September 2008 (UTC)

removed definition

I took the rather draconian measure of removing a lot of unsourced material that struck me as original research. This involved the definition. The article now lacks a clear definition/introduction. Someone might want to get on this. However, I think removing everything is preferable to having what was up there up. Maybe stick a dictionary definition up in the meanwhile? [1]. I am not sure how consistent those definitions are with this page, though. Cazort (talk) 17:02, 6 June 2009 (UTC)

lesswrong.com

Surely some of the stuff from lesswrong.com could be useful in this article?

Hell yes it would be, maybe one day I'll bring up in an open thread how bad the Wikipedia article on rationality is and someone will come here to do some cleanup. Of course, maybe they'd rather just focus on wiki.lesswrong . 98.225.92.63 (talk) 01:42, 29 November 2009 (UTC)

There's also now the Center For Applied Rationality (website at appliedrationality.org), which probably warrants a mention in the "practical rationality" section. 128.243.253.115 (talk) 13:38, 25 September 2012 (UTC)

Criticisms

I would be interested in a section, perhaps, on the criticisms of rationality. Endlessmug (talk) 00:38, 23 February 2010 (UTC)

horrid article as per usual wiki standards and the last paragraph about power...

which makes very little grammatical sense, is also hardly relevant for the article, but more so a plug for some guys citation... — Preceding unsigned comment added by 94.68.246.193 (talk) 00:10, 26 December 2011 (UTC)

Definition of rationality

The 28th of september, Jj1236 changed the definition of Rationality. I liked this change, however, I suspected that Jj1236 made it up her/himself, and therefore I asked on Jj1236's talkpage if it came from the referenced source cambridge dictionary. Jj1236 didn't answer me, so now I revert the edit, because it must be covered by the source. Lova Falk talk 09:44, 2 October 2012 (UTC)

The definition of rationality that is on the page is (1) not the one that appears in the 2e of the purported source (2) not congruent with http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/rational (3) of unknown origin. This is actually a fairly serious problem on Wikipedia - if a source is not readily accessible on the internet then there is a verification problem. In other words, we can have a situation where someone faithfully copies the original definition from the source (in other words, the first person to write the definition is honest) but over time, editors "tweak" the definition, like a game of telephone. Even if most of the intermediate editors are mostly honest (or at least not consciously aware of the bias they impart by their edits to the definition) there can be substantial drift. A single dishonest editor can really muck things up.

I think what has happened here is that a well-meaning editor has tried to rephrase the definition of rationality in a way that turns the definition that appears in the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (CDP) "inside out". I would say that this is well-intentioned but misguided. The CEP definition is in fact somewhat cryptic, and I'll reproduce it here for posterity:

rationality. In its primary sense, rationality is a normative concept that philosophers have gen- erally tried to characterize in such a way that, for any action, belief, or desire, if it is rational we ought to choose it. No such positive characteri- zation has achieved anything close to universal assent because, often, several competing actions, beliefs, or desires count as rational. Equating what is rational with what is rationally required eliminates the category of what is rationally allowed. Irrationality seems to be the more fun- damental normative category; for although there are conflicting substantive accounts of irrational- ity, all agree that to say of an action, belief, or desire that it is irrational is to claim that it should always be avoided.

— The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 2nd edition

The dictionary definitions (common definitions) of rationality are in fact completely different...::facepalm::...they draw a direct link from "rationality" to "rational" and from there to "reason". So when we say "A and A->B implies B" modus ponens it is difficult to isolate where rationality comes in to play because the whole enterprise seems so obvious and pedantic. But when we say "A and A->B implies not Z" (and there are many more variations on this "clearly wrong" theme) this is irrational or simply "wrong". So one could make the argument that "irrational" is a synonym for "wrong" or "in violation of a rule, either implicit or explicit". So CEP says rational means "normative"-ey or "that which ought to be done", and reference.com says rational means "agreeable to a basis". So it would seem that there is a bit of conflict over whether or not "rational" includes the moral/ethical/normative dimension or not. And then there is the relative dimension: we cannot say that a particular action is "rational" without also saying who or what is to perform the action. What may be rational for the president may be utterly irrational for a common man.

In any case, I'll work on the definition a bit. If you really want to go down the rabbit hole we can imagine psychologists discussing particular pathologies of reason related to impaired executive functions such as autism. In this case we can theorize as to what is rational for someone who lacks the ability to engage in rational thought. Apparently Searle has weighed in on this subject as well (Rationality in Action, 2001) and at least one source (http://www.csom.umn.edu/assets/71708.pdf) suggests that his definition is intimately tied to free will. Which is another can of worms. 173.239.78.54 (talk) 19:44, 6 May 2013 (UTC)