Henry Pulleine
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Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Burmester Pulleine (12 December 1838 – 22 January 1879) was an administrator and commander in the British Army in the Cape Frontier and Anglo-Zulu Wars. He is most notable as commander of British forces at the disastrous Battle of Isandlwana in January 1879. Substantively a Major, he held the rank of Brevet Lieutenant Colonel.
| Born | 12 December 1838 Yorkshire, England |
|---|---|
| Died | 22 January 1879 (aged 41) Isandlwana, Natal, South Africa |
| Allegiance |  United Kingdom |
| Service/ | British Army |
| Years of service | 1855-1879 |
| Rank | Brevet Lieutenant Colonel |
| Battles/wars | Xhosa Wars Anglo-Zulu War |
Early Life
Pulleine was born in Yorkshire, the son of a vicar. His original commission into the British Army's 30th Regiment, was obtained without purchase in 1855 after his graduation from Sandhurst. He transferred to the brand new 2nd Battalion of the 24th in 1858 as a Lieutenant and was promoted Captain in 1861. In 1871 Pulleine bought a majority in the regiment's 1st Battalion, which was then sent to South Africa. Despite a brevet promotion to Lieutenant-Colonel in 1877 and over twenty years' service, he had no first hand combat experience.
9th Cape Frontier War
This would soon change when war broke out between the British and the Xhosa in the Eastern Cape. During British operations in the Cape Frontier, Pulleine was responsible for the formation of two forces of irregular cavalry from amongst European settlers in the area. These unites acquitted themselves well and, combined with Pulleine's work organising supply columns to besieged British garrisons, earned Pulleine a deserved reputation as an organiser and administrator. With the war over Pulliene took over as commandant of Durban-KZN, and subsequently commanded the Army's remount depot at Pietermaritzburg.
Anglo-Zulu War
When hostilities began on the 11th of January 1879 Pulleine was still in command of the Pietermaritzburg remount depot, and hurried to rejoin his regiment, arriving on the 17th. The 1st Battalion of the 24th Regiment comprised the main infantry component of Lord Chelmsford's Number 3 Column, which had crossed into Zululand on 11th January. With the 1st Battalion's commanding officer, Colonel Richard Glyn appointed by Chelmsford to command of the No. 3 Column, Pulliene would exercise field command of the battalion during its operations in Zululand.
Following a reconnaissance by Major John Dartnell and units of the column's irregular cavalry on the 21st which suggested the Zulus were present in force to the South of the camp, Chelmsford ordered an advance with approximately half the column on the morning of the 22nd. His intention was to bring the enemy to battle, ending the war quickly by destroying the Zulu force in a set-piece engagement. Chelmsford's last act regarding the defence of Isandlwana was to order up troops under Lieutenant-Colonel Anthony Durnford from Rorke's Drift. With the 1st Battalion of the 24th being left in camp, Pulleine took over command of Isandlwana on the morning of January 22nd.
Under Pulleine's command were the 416 officers and men of his own 1st Battalion of the 24th Regiment of Foot and a company of the 2nd battalion of the 24th. Also present was N Battery of the Royal Artillery's 5th Brigade, and assorted support units, including Royal Engineers, Army Service Corps and Army Hospital Corps. In addition, Pulleine had at his disposal an assortment of local forces, including four companies of the Natal Native Contingent, and European-manned units, such as the Newcastle Mounted Rifles and Natal Mounted Police.
Unknown to the British however, the Zulus were in fact in close proximity to Isandlwana, and had determined to attack the camp. Striking in the late morning, overwhelming numbers of Zulus enveloped and destroyed the British force in a period of approximately four hours. Pulleine was not among the few survivors. The Battle of Isandlwana was the worst defeat suffered by the British army in 150 years.
Death
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It has never been established where and when on the battlefield Pulleine died, as his body was never positively identified. An unknown source indicated that he died 'early' in the fighting. This would explain Coghill's later comment that Pulleine was 'already dead,' and the inability of Durnford to locate him once his force returned to the camp during the height of the battle. It would also explain Teignmouth Melvill's apparent dereliction of duty in abandoning his men without an order from Pulleine.
It is also equally possible that Pulleine survived the British collapse only to be killed in one of the desperate last stands which took place after it became obvious the British were doomed. However, in his book A Lost Legionary in South Africa, Commandant George Hamilton Browne describes coming across, and saluting Pulleine's corpse on his way back from visiting his tent on the morning of the 23rd. As Browne was commandant of the 1st/3rd NNC, whose tents were at the extreme left of the camp, Hamilton-Browne's account suggests Pulleine was killed in the camp, and not in one of the last stands.
Analysis
- Pulleine is often portrayed, including in the 1979 film Zulu Dawn (by British character actor Denholm Elliott), as an administrator with no real knowledge of battlefield command.
- Others say that his service in the Cape Frontier demonstrates that this was not the case - and he was commended for this war service as well as being praised for his administrative work in the 1860s.
- He is also often criticised for the way he deployed his troops before the attack on the camp.
- His supporters say that this cannot be blamed entirely on Pulleine. Accepted thinking at the time was that the Martini-Henry Rifle the British were armed with was best deployed in a firing line such as the one Pulleine created. In addition the terrain shielded the movements of the Zulu army from the view of the British. Critically short of reliable scouts Pulleine was effectively blind beyond the cavalry vedettes he had placed around the camp. Consequently Pulleine could have had no idea of the location or the strength of the Zulu force or its possible intentions and, as a result could not deploy his troops effectively.
- Despite this Pulleine had received orders from Chelmsford to pull in his infantry close to the camp, which was in accordance with Chelmsford's own standing orders for units in camp in enemy territory. Pulleine did not do this or, as was also mentioned in the standing orders, laager his wagons or entrench his position, all things Pulleine had time to do before he was attacked.
- One possible reason that such preparations were not undertaken was that Chelmsford had made it clear to Pulleine that the Isandlwana encampment was only a temporary position, pending orders for those left at the camp to join the commander's advanced division. In fact, Chelmsford left no specific instructions to fortify the Isandlwana position, but on the contrary had sent Pulleine the expected order on the morning of the battle (arriving at about the time Pulleine received a warning from one of Durnford's men of the impending Zulu attack) to break camp and move his division to join that of Chelmsford.
- Another possible explanation for this is that Pulleine's command structure was interfered with by the arrival of Durnford. Durnford's orders, as given to him by Chelmsford's secretary Crealock, were ambiguous and led to confusion as to who was actually in charge of the camp, as well as what, if any, specific actions Durnford was to take beyond moving his troops to Isandlwana. As Durnford was a full Lieutenant-Colonel rather than a brevet he should have taken command but did not, preferring instead to remain with his own troops. This dual command structure meant that Pulleine may have felt he should defer to Durnford's request that the 24th support him and therefore deploy his companies far away from the camp. It could also explain Pulleine's hesitation at vital moments.
- Pulleine, like almost all other officers at the time, seriously underestimated the calibre of his enemy, believing that they would wilt under rifle fire as native armies had in the recent Cape Frontier war. However the Zulu warriors were far more durable than the British believed and had a far more aggressive military philosophy. As a result they would attack as soon as it became possible with the aim of enveloping and wiping out the enemy. Pulleine was caught off balance by this all-out attacking strategy, potentially explaining his deployments away from the camp.
- Finally Pulleine had spent so much time away from his regiment that he did not know many of the junior officers of the 24th as well as some of the more senior commanders. This made communication difficult and may have hampered the efficiency with which Pulleine's orders were carried out.
Sources
- 'Zulu,' Saul David, Penguin 2005
'A Lost Legionary in South Africa', Col G Hamilton Browne. T, Werner Laurie. 1912.