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Working Group (resistance organization)

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Bratislava Working Group
Pracovná Skupina[1]
FoundedSummer 1941
PurposeSaving European Jews, especially Slovak Jews, from being murdered in the Holocaust
Location
LeaderGisi Fleischmann
Assistant
Michael Dov Weissmandl
Treasurer
Wilhelm Fürst
Part of a series of articles on
the Holocaust
Blood for goods
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The Bratislava Working Group was an underground Jewish organization in the Axis puppet state of Slovakia during World War II. The group worked to prevent the deportation and murder of Slovak Jews during the Holocaust, in part through payment of bribes to German and Slovak officials. After transports from Slovakia were halted in October 1942, the Working Group turned its attention to an ambitious proposal, known as the Europa Plan [he], to bribe Heinrich Himmler into halting the extermination of European Jews.

Although the Europa Plan fell through in the fall of 1943, the Working Group collected and disseminated the Auschwitz Protocols in April and May 1944. For the first time, the mass murder of Jews was publicized in the Western world. Diplomatic pressure eventually forced the Hungarian regent Miklós Horthy to halt the deportation of Hungarian Jews to Auschwitz in July, saving about 200,000 lives. After the Slovak National Uprising in fall 1944, the Germans invaded Slovakia and deported most of the remaining Jews, including the Working Group's leadership.

The Working Group's leaders, Gisi Fleischmann and Rabbi Michael Dov Weissmandl, claimed that the failure of the Europa Plan was due to the indifference of mainstream Jewish organizations. Although this argument has had a profound influence on public opinion and historiography, it has been debunked by mainstream historians including Yehuda Bauer and Tuvia Friling. There is an ongoing historical debate as to the potential of Nazi-Jewish negotiations and to what extent the bribery was successful.

Background

After the Slovak Republic proclaimed its independence in March 1939 under the protection of Nazi Germany, the President Jozef Tiso, a Catholic priest, began a series of anti-Jewish measures. The Hlinka Guard began to attack Jews, and the "Jewish Code" was promulgated in September 1941.[2] Based on the Nuremberg Laws, the Code required that Jews wear a yellow armband and were banned from intermarriage and many jobs.[3] Jewish property was expropriated by members of the Hlinka Guard and the Slovak People's Party.[4] In September 1941, 10,000 Jews were expelled from the capital, Bratislava, to work in the countryside.[5]

Gisi Fleischmann, "the only woman to be a member of a major Judenrat"[6]

The leader of the Slovak Jewish Council, Arpad Sebestyen, took a position of complete cooperation with the Nazi authorities: Adolf Eichmann's representative in Slovakia, Dieter Wisliceny, and Wisliceny's lackey, Jewish Gestapo agent Karol Hochberg.[7][8] Members of the Jewish Council dissatisfied with this state of affairs gathered around Gisi Fleischmann, the Center's director of emigration,[7] in the summer of 1941 and formed an underground organization known as the Bratislava Working Group to oppose the Nazis. The Working Group included Jews of varying perspectives. Fleischmann had founded the Slovakia chapter of the Women's International Zionist Organization, while her cousin, Michael Dov Weissmandl, who joined in the summer of 1942 and took over while Fleischmann was traveling or under arrest, was an Orthodox rabbi and staunch anti-Zionist.[9][b] The Jewish community leader of Prague and elder of Theresienstadt, Jakob Edelstein, visited Bratislava in the autumn of 1941 and advised against cooperation with the German authorities.[1]

In the summer of 1941, the Germans demanded 20,000 men for labor. Slovakia did not want to send gentile Slovaks, but neither did it want to burden itself with caring for the families of deported Jews.[12] A compromise was reached in which the families of Jewish workers would be sent with them for "[resettlement] in the East," and the Slovaks would pay 500 Reichmarks per Jew deported.[13][c] Between March and October 1942, about 57,000 Jews or two-thirds of the pre-war population was deported, mostly to Auschwitz and the Lublin Reservation in occupied Poland.[15][d] Although it was known that conditions in Poland for Jews were very harsh, no one in Slovakia knew at the time that the Germans were systematically exterminating Jews.[17][6] Professor Yehuda Bauer considers it likely that the Working Group found out about the Final Solution in the summer or fall of 1942.[18]

Activities

Initial efforts

Freight car used to deport Slovak Jews

Desperate to stop the transports, the Working Group sponsored labor camps in Slovakia—Sereď, Nováky, and Vyhne—in order to convince the Slovak government that Jews were essential to the economy.[19] The Working Group sent members of banned Zionist youth movements to warn Jews to hide or flee.[6] Despite fears of reprisal against their families, over the course of the deportations many Jews decided to flee.[6] Aided by the Working Group, 7,000-8,000 Jews had fled to Hungary in the spring of 1942, or about 9% of the population.[6][20] The Working Group focused its efforts on Polish Jews who had escaped into Slovakia, who lacked citizenship and were therefore most vulnerable to deportation.[21] Widespread resistance necessitated that the Hlinka Guard forcibly round up Jews to fill transports and to deport Jews in labor camps who had been promised immunity.[22]

The Working Group also begged the Vatican to intercede on humanitarian grounds; the Vatican responded with a 14 March letter protesting the deportations.[22] In April, the papal chargé d'affaires, Giuseppe Burzio, condemned the deportations in strong language; in response, the Slovak bishops issued a statement accusing the Jews of deicide.[15] Tiso insisted that the treatment of Jews was consistent with Christian values,[23][e] and refused to interfere.[25]

The Working Group collected information on the destination of deportees from Slovak railway officials who accompanied the transports. Using various couriers, smugglers, and non-Jewish observers, it tried to ascertain the fate of the deportees, deliver money, and smuggle letters back to Slovakia.[26][27] It also interviewed escapees, including Dionýz Lénard, who escaped from Majdanek in July 1942 and reported on the high death rate and hunger for Jews in Lublin, but not on the Final Solution.[28] Other Slovak Jews managed to escape from ghettos in Opole Lubelskie, Łuków, and Lubartów. By the end of the summer, the only location that the Working Group had not established contact with was Auschwitz-Birkenau.[27] In November, the Working Group learned of mass executions at Bełżec using poison gas.[29] They passed this information on to Jewish groups in Switzerland and Hungary, and to foreign powers who they hoped might intervene or protest.[19][29] Part of the Working Group's funds went to sending parcels to Jews in ghettos and concentration camps[26] at a rate of 100 per week through 1944. They coordinated their efforts with the Red Cross.[30]

Slovakia Plan

At Weissmandl's initiative, the Working Group opened negotiations with SS official Dieter Wisliceny in the summer of 1942, via Hochberg.[31] Weissmandl forged letters from a fictional Swiss official named "Ferdinand Roth" in order that the money would seem to be coming from outside Slovakia,[32] and to convince Wisliceny that the Working Group had the support of international Jewish organizations.[8] Wisliceny demanded between $40,000 and $50,000, to be paid in two installments.[32] While the Working Group tried to raise the remaining money from abroad, it contacted Slovak officials responsible for coordinating deportations and bribed them to add more names to the list of Jews deemed essential to the economy and thus exempt from deportation.[33] Among the officials bribed were Anton Vašek, head of the department within the Ministry of the Interior that controlled Jewish affairs;[8] Isidor Koso, head of the prime minister's office and the one who had initially proposed the deportation of Jews;[5] Gisi Medricky, the finance minister; and Alois Pecuch, director of labor camps.[8] Deportations were halted from 1 August to 28 September; the Working Group assumed that its ransom operations had borne fruit.[34]

Saly Mayer [de; he], the Joint Distribution Committee representative in Switzerland, was unable to contribute. The JDC in Switzerland was hamstrung by restrictions in sending currency to Switzerland; it had to employ dubious smugglers to illegally bring funds into Nazi-occupied Europe. Although Mayer was sometimes able to borrow money in Swiss francs against a postwar payment, he was completely unable to send the dollars that Wisliceny demanded.[35] According to Weissmandl, the remaining $20,000 was eventually paid by his Orthodox contacts in Hungary.[36] Wisliceny's superiors must have known about the ransom effort, as he forwarded at least $20,000 to the SS Main Economic and Administrative Office.[37] When the transports were in fact halted again in October, the Working Group assumed that the bribe had been successful, but there was no definitive evidence that this was the case.[37] Also, it is probable that Hochberg embezzled much of the money that had supposedly been paid to Wisliceny.[38]

The Working Group's contacts at the Slovak railway informed them that deportations would not resume until the spring. The Working Group contacted Wisliceny about the evacuation of Slovak Jewish children deported to Lublin to Switzerland or Palestine.[39] Due to the intervention of Eichmann, a single transport of 1,260[40] children from Białystok Ghetto was eventually sent to Theresienstadt in August 1943.[41] However, the Grand Mufti Mohammad Amin al-Husseini intervened to prevent the departure of the children, since he did not want them to go to Palestine. On October 5, the children were sent to Auschwitz and gassed on arrival.[40][42]

Europa Plan

File:Majdanek - Aktion Erntefest (1943).jpg
Mass grave of Jews murdered in Operation Harvest Festival, in which the remaining Jews in the Lublin Ghetto were shot, 3-4 November 1943

The Working Group then embarked on negotiations for the more ambitious Europa Plan [he] to halt transports of all European Jews to the death camps. The group was in fact divided on this plan, as only Fleischmann, Weissmandl, and Neumann thought it was likely enough to be worth pursuing.[43][44] In November 1942, Wisliceny told the Working Group that Heinrich Himmler, head of the Reich Main Security Office, had agreed to halt deportations to the General Government in exchange for $3 million.[34] Hochberg was soon arrested for bribery and corruption, allowing the Working Group to deal directly with Wisliceny.[39]

However, the Working Group was unable to raise the money.[37] Mayer's superiors believed that the negotiations were a trick. Mayer disobeyed and funneled money to the Working Group for this project, but his assistance was vastly insufficient. He also tried to convince the Red Cross to send a representative to the Slovak Jews.[45] The Hungarian Jewish community was either unable or unwilling to help.[45] The Working Group also contacted Abraham Silberschein, a representative of the World Jewish Congress, and Nathan Schwalb [de; he] of Hehalutz.[34] Schwalb, who became a committed supported of the plan, contacted Palestine directly, repeating the Working Group's impression that Wisliceny had kept his promises.[46]

Due to miscommunications, it was not until a March 1943 visit by Eliezer Kaplan, treasurer of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, that the scale of the Europa Plan was understood by leaders in Palestine.[47] Kaplan believed that the plan was impossible, but he relayed more optimistic opinions from some of his colleagues in Istanbul.[48] The Yishuv expressed willingness to help fund the plan,[49] even though Kaplan, David Ben-Gurion, Apolinary Hartglas, and other leaders of the Jewish Agency and the Yishuv, suspected that Wisliceny's offer was insincere extortion.[50][51] In the meantime, Wisliceny had departed Slovakia to supervise the deportation and murder of Thessaloniki Jews.[52][f]

The attention of the Working Group was diverted by the threat of resumed transports from Slovakia, due to begin in April 1943.[52] As the deadline approached, Fleischmann and Weissmandl became even more militant in their promotion of the plan to Jewish leaders. They insisted that the plans were feasible, that the Nazis could be bribed, and that the laws on currency transfer could be bypassed. In the end, they received only $36,000 by April.[48] However, deportations from Slovakia did not resume.[52][53] Fleischmann met with Wisliceny, who told her that deportations would be halted if the Nazis were paid a $200,000 down payment by June.[53] The Yishuv managed to transfer about half this sum to the Working Group, probably by laundering contributions of overseas Jewish organizations and smuggling diamonds into Turkey.[54] Higher-ups in the JDC, the WJC, and other organizations believed that the Nazi promises were empty,[55] blocking the distribution of funds to Mayer and to the Yishuv, and the Swiss government obstructed currency transfers on the required scale.[56] Mayer helped to the best of his ability but was only able to smuggle $42,000 to the Working Group by June and a further $53,000 in August and September.[56] In other words, the Working Group finally had the down payment in September.[57]

On 2 September, Wisliceny met with Working Group leaders and announced that the plan had been shelved,[58] because the delay in payment had caused the Nazis to doubt "Ferdinand Roth"'s reliability.[59] Although Wisliceny left open the prospect of reopening negotiations,[59] the fact that the murder of Jews continued apace made it obvious to the Jewish leaders that the Nazis were negotiating in bad faith.[60] By mid-October, it was clear to the international Jewish leaders that the Nazis had definitively abandoned the plan.[61]

Auschwitz Protocols

Main articles: Auschwitz Protocols and Vrba-Wetzler report
Aerial photograph of Auschwitz in 1944

The Working Group played a central role in the distribution of the Auschwitz Protocols in spring 1944. The most important part of the Protocols was the Vrba-Wetzler Report written by escaped Auschwitz inmates Rudolf Vrba and Alfred Wetzler. After the Working Group heard of Vrba and Wetzler's escape, Neumann was dispatched to interview them.[62] At 40 pages, the report contained more detail on gassing operations at Auschwitz than earlier reports.[63] The Working Group sent an abridged 5-page version, translated into German, to all of its contacts, including Jewish organizations, the Catholic Church, and the Slovak government.[64] Weissmandl appended an emotional plea for help and a detailed plan of steps that the Allies could take to mitigate the disaster. Among his suggestions was bombing the rails leading to Auschwitz.[65][66] Bauer writes that the mention of bombing may have influenced Hungary's Fascist regent Miklós Horthy into believing that the Jews had more international support than was the case.[66] Weissmandl sent a copy of the report to the Judenrat of Ungvar, Carpathian Ruthenia, but the Judenrat suppressed the information and the Jews did not act on the report.[67]

The report was smuggled to diplomat George Mantello in Switzerland, who published it immediately after receiving it on 21 June.[68] Disclosure of the Nazi genocide against the Jews triggered a major grassroots protest in the Swiss press, churches and streets.[69] Because of the publicity, Allied leaders including US President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill threatened Horthy with a war crimes trial if he did not stop the transports. Pope Pius XII and Gustav V of Sweden also made appeals.[70] Due to the mounting international pressure, Horthy offered to allow 10,000 Jewish children to leave Hungary and unofficially halted deportations.[69] At the time 12,000 Jews a day were transported to Auschwitz.[71]

Dissolution

Jews from Carpathian Ruthenia arrive at Auschwitz, May 1944

During the Slovak National Uprising against the Axis between August and October 1944, the Germans invaded Slovakia. The Working Group ignored the warnings of the SS not to negotiate with Alois Brunner, the SS officer who Eichmann sent with Einsatzgruppe H (cs, sk) to deport or murder Slovakia's remaining Jews in cooperation with the Hlinka Guard Emergency Divisions. Instead of warning the Jews of Bratislava to flee to partisan-controlled areas, the Working Group attempted to negotiate with the German military authorities. When this failed, the Working Group told the Jews to submit to the roundups.[72]

A massive roundup on the night of 28 September[3] caught 1,800 Jews in Bratislava, including most of the Working Group's leadership.[72] Fleischmann was allowed to remain in Bratislava, but when she refused to betray Jews in hiding, she was deported on the last transport to Auschwitz on 17 October. Designated "return unwanted," she was led away by SS guards and never seen again.[31][72] According to Bauer, the Working Group's failure to resist the Nazis in September 1944 "cast a dark shadow over all of them" even though "it would have made no difference in any case."[73]

Assessment

Allegations of Zionist indifference

Weissmandl and Fleischmann believed that the Europa Plan failed because too little money was provided too late and that this was due to the indifference of mainstream Jewish organizations. Perhaps influenced by antisemitic conspiracy theories exaggerating the wealth and power of "World Jewry," Fleischmann and Weissmandl believed that the international Jewish community had millions of dollars instantly available.[51] Both had complete faith in Wisliceny's willingness and ability to stop the transports, if only the money had been provided in time.[74][g] An extreme anti-Zionist before the war, Weissmandl was overtly hostile to the liberal Jewish establishment—in Bauer's words, "his accusations against the Zionists and against the JDC know no bounds."[58] Quoting a letter from memory, Weissmandl claimed that Mayer was prejudiced against "Ostjuden" (Orthodox Jews from Eastern Europe, which included most Slovak Jews), but Bauer thought that this was extremely unlikely, not least because Mayer was a traditionally observant Jew.[76] According to Bauer, "the effect of this false rendition of events on Jewish historical consciousness after the Holocaust was enormous, because it implied that the outside Jewish world, nonbelievers in the non-Zionist and Zionist camps alike, had betrayed European—in this case Slovak—Jewry by not sending the money in time."[38]

The narrative of Zionist indifference was fueled by the secrecy with which Ben-Gurion and the Yishuv had to conduct their illegal rescue and ransom operations.[77] Because the Allies were firmly opposed to any dealing with the enemy,[78] the Jewish Agency was under constant surveillance by Allied intelligence, which suspected it of currency trading with the Axis.[79] Ben-Gurion was willing to endure significant criticism for his supposed inaction in order to keep the Jewish Agency's plans from being discovered and foiled.[77] Ben-Gurion worked hard to raise money, but even when that failed, the cash-strapped Yishuv was still committed to not giving up on any rescue operations for lack of funds.[77] Ben-Gurion, Kaplan, and other Yishuv leaders supported the Europa Plan despite their conviction that it was hopeless.[78][77] Bauer proposes that they were trying to avoid postwar accusations of indifference to the plight of European Jews.[78] According to Friling, the Yishuv leaders were determined to fire an “arrow in the dark” and follow up on any leads to rescue Jews, even if it were only a one-in-a-million chance.[80]

Effectiveness of bribes

According to Friling and Bauer, the bribes were not the key factor in stopping the deportations; the lobbying the Catholic Church and sympathetic Slovak officials was more effective.[81][34] By 1 August 1942, most of the Jews not exempt from deportation had already been deported or fled into Hungary. The halt in deportations on 1 August 1942 came shortly after several Slovak officials including Morávek had accepted bribes from the Working Group, while Wisliceny did not receive a bribe until 17 August.[82] In addition, Jozef Sivák, Imrich Karvaš, and other members of the cabinet passed information to the Working Group and advocated behind the scenes for the Jews without accepting bribes.[82] In Wisliceny's postwar testimony, he claimed that he first heard about the plan to kill all Jews at the beginning of August and Bauer alleges that this may have influenced his behavior.[38] Emerging rumors of Nazi genocide in the General Government also prompted Slovak Prime Minister Vojtech Tuka to request that Slovak observers be sent to monitor the conditions that the deported Slovak Jews were being held in.[34] However, Bauer acknowledges that the bribing of Wisliceny may "have helped to solidify an already existing tendency."[38]

According to Friling, Wisliceny withheld information and manipulated the Working Group into believing that the halts in transports was due to his intervention, and that the resumption on 28 September was not his fault.[34] Friling attributes the fact that transports were not resumed in April 1943 to the intercession of Kaplan and the Working Group with the Catholic Church, which increased the moral pressure on Tiso.[11] Gila Fatran has a similar analysis as Friling and Bauer, citing the rumors of the Final Solution and pressure from the Catholic Church, although she credits the activity of the Working Group with a secondary role.[83] In contrast, Professor Peter Longerich does not mention the Working Group in his study of the Holocaust and credits Tiso with halting the transports from Slovakia.[84]

Feasibility of the Europa Plan

It is unlikely that the Nazis would have been willing to compromise on the implementation of the Final Solution for any sum that the Jews could raise and illegally transfer. Friling and Bauer agree that the Nazis were willing to temporarily spare some 24,000 Slovak Jews in 1942 because there were other populations of Jews that could be exterminated with fewer political repercussions.[38][85][h] However, Friling expresses doubt that a larger-scale ransom effort could have been successful. As a personal bribe to Himmler or other Nazi officials, it would be difficult to see how it could have much affect on the complicated bureaucracy of the Nazi murder apparatus. In addition, the Europa Plan's cost per head was orders of magnitude lower than other Jewish ransom efforts occurring simultaneously in Transnistria, making it a bad deal from the Nazi perspective. To pay $400 per head, as was paid in Transnistria, would have cost on the order of $1 trillion when scaled up to the number of surviving Jews in occupied Europe. Despite the potential for financial gain, the Nazis actively sabotaged offers of ransom in Transnistria and for Jewish children in the Balkans.[85]

Bauer points out that the Nazis explicitly defined the war as a "race war"; to halt the war of extermination for practical reasons would remove their casus bellum.[86] In Friling's words, compromise on the Final Solution "totally contradicted Nazi ideology."[85] Friling instead suggests that it is most likely that Wisliceny devised the scheme purely for the purpose of extorting money from the Jews, and that he never had any intention of keeping his side of the deal.[87] Bauer argues that Himmler approved the opening of negotiations in November 1942 but that the negotiations "lacked a concrete basis" because Wisliceny did not receive any more instructions.[44] According to Bauer, Himmler's goal was to negotiate with the Americans through the Jews.[44]

References

Notes

  1. ^ Mentioned on the plaque, in order, Gisi Fleischmann, Tibor Kováč, Armin Frieder, Andrej Steiner, Oskar Neumann, Wilhelm Fürst, and Chaim Michael Dov Weissmandl
  2. ^ The other members of the group were Oskar Neumann, Tibor Kováč, Armin Frieder, Wilhelm Fürst, and Andrej Steiner.[10] Neumann was the leader of the World Zionist Organization in Slovakia;[11] Kováč, an assimilationist; Frieder, the leading Neolog rabbi in Slovakia; and Steiner was a "non-ideological" engineer.[1] Other than Weissmandl, all were members or employees of the Jewish Council.[6]
  3. ^ Slovakia was the only Axis country to pay for the deportation of its Jewish population.[14]
  4. ^ Of Slovak Jews deported in 1942, more than 99% perished.[16]
  5. ^ In a speech at a Catholic festival, Tiso said: "Self-love is God’s command and this self-love commands me to get rid of everything which hurts me, which endangers my life... It would have been much worse had we not risen in time, had we not purged ourselves of them. And we have done this by God’s command: Slovak, get rid of your evil-doer, throw him off!"[24]
  6. ^ In his postwar testimony, Wisliceny blamed the Greek Jews for not bribing him generously enough.[52]
  7. ^ Bauer writes, "What is amazing is that the highly intelligent Slovak Jewish leaders believed [Wisliceny] and trusted him more than they did their colleagues outside the Nazi empire, and none more so than Weissmandel. He did not trust Schwalb or Mayer, but he did trust a Nazi."[75]
  8. ^ This analysis is supported by a Nazi missive in summer 1942 advising against insisting upon the deportation of the remaining Slovak Jews.[44]

Citations

  1. ^ a b c Bauer 1994, p. 74.
  2. ^ Morley 1980, p. 75.
  3. ^ a b Fatran, Gila. "Slovak Righteous Among the Nations". Yad Vashem. Retrieved 18 July 2018.
  4. ^ Bauer 1994, p. 64.
  5. ^ a b Bauer 1994, p. 65.
  6. ^ a b c d e f Bauer 2002, p. 177.
  7. ^ a b Bauer 1994, p. 70.
  8. ^ a b c d Friling 2005, p. 213.
  9. ^ "Prominent Members of the Working Group". Yad Vashem. Retrieved 17 July 2018.
  10. ^ Bauer 2002, p. 178.
  11. ^ a b Friling 2005, p. 225.
  12. ^ Bauer 2002, pp. 176–177.
  13. ^ Bauer 1994, pp. 66–7.
  14. ^ "Around the Jewish World: Slovak Jews Get German Hearing to Reclaim Stolen Wartime Money". Jewish Telegraphic Agency. Retrieved 19 July 2018.
  15. ^ a b Bauer 1994, p. 69.
  16. ^ "The Holocaust in Slovakia". www.ushmm.org. Retrieved 17 July 2018.
  17. ^ Bauer 1994, pp. 67, 70–71.
  18. ^ Bauer 1994, pp. 71–72.
  19. ^ a b "The Working Group". Yad Vashem. Retrieved 17 July 2018.
  20. ^ Bauer 1994, pp. 73–74.
  21. ^ Bauer 1994, pp. 72–73.
  22. ^ a b Bauer 1994, p. 72.
  23. ^ Pawlikowski 2014, pp. 340–342.
  24. ^ Fiamová 2015, p. 75.
  25. ^ Bauer 1994, p. 68.
  26. ^ a b Bauer 2002, p. 180.
  27. ^ a b Büchler, Yehoshua. ""Certificates" for Auschwitz" (PDF). Yad Vashem.
  28. ^ Bauer 1994, p. 71.
  29. ^ a b Hradská 2015, p. 82.
  30. ^ Hradská 2015, p. 84-85.
  31. ^ a b "Gisi Fleischmann". Jewish Women's Archive. Retrieved 18 July 2018.
  32. ^ a b Bauer 1994, p. 75.
  33. ^ Bauer 1994, pp. 75–76.
  34. ^ a b c d e f Friling 2005, p. 214.
  35. ^ Bauer 1994, pp. 76–77.
  36. ^ Bauer 1994, p. 78.
  37. ^ a b c Fischel 1999, p. 213.
  38. ^ a b c d e Bauer 1994, p. 98.
  39. ^ a b Bauer 1994, p. 80.
  40. ^ a b Bender 2008, p. 272.
  41. ^ Bauer 1994, pp. 80, 99.
  42. ^ Bauer 1994, pp. 99–100.
  43. ^ Bauer 1994, p. 79.
  44. ^ a b c d Bauer 2002, p. 181.
  45. ^ a b Bauer 1994, p. 81.
  46. ^ Friling 2005, pp. 215, 219.
  47. ^ Friling 2005, pp. 218–219.
  48. ^ a b Friling 2005, p. 219.
  49. ^ Friling 2005, p. 215.
  50. ^ Friling 2005, pp. 219–221.
  51. ^ a b Bauer 1994, p. 85.
  52. ^ a b c d Bauer 1994, pp. 86–87.
  53. ^ a b Friling 2005, p. 221.
  54. ^ Friling 2005, p. 226.
  55. ^ Bauer 1994, p. 87.
  56. ^ a b Friling 2005, p. 231.
  57. ^ Friling 2005, p. 229.
  58. ^ a b Bauer 1994, p. 89.
  59. ^ a b Friling 2005, p. 234.
  60. ^ Bauer 1994, p. 88.
  61. ^ Friling 2005, p. 235.
  62. ^ Fleming 2014, p. 230.
  63. ^ Fleming 2014, pp. 258–260.
  64. ^ "Michael Dov Weissmandl" (PDF). Yad Vashem. Retrieved 18 July 2018.
  65. ^ Kranzler 2000, p. 70.
  66. ^ a b Bauer 2002, p. 238.
  67. ^ Bauer 2002, p. 237.
  68. ^ Kranzler 2000, p. 87.
  69. ^ a b Kranzler 2000, p. 125.
  70. ^ Kranzler 2000, p. xviii.
  71. ^ Kranzler 2000, p. xvii.
  72. ^ a b c Bauer 2002, p. 183.
  73. ^ Bauer 2002, p. 184.
  74. ^ Bauer 1994, pp. 89–90.
  75. ^ Bauer 1994, p. 100.
  76. ^ Bauer 1994, p. 77.
  77. ^ a b c d Friling 2005, pp. 232–233.
  78. ^ a b c Bauer 1994, p. 90.
  79. ^ Friling 2005, p. 201.
  80. ^ Friling 2005, p. 207.
  81. ^ Bauer 1994, p. 86.
  82. ^ a b Bauer 1994, p. 97.
  83. ^ Fatran & Greenwood 1994, p. 191-193.
  84. ^ Longerich 2010, p. 405.
  85. ^ a b c Friling 2005, p. 236.
  86. ^ Bauer 1994, p. 83.
  87. ^ Friling 2005, p. 237.

Bibliography

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