Avro Canada CF-105 Arrow

Template:Infobox Aircraft The Avro CF-105 Arrow was a delta-wing interceptor aircraft, designed and built by Avro Canada in Malton, Ontario, Canada, as the culmination of a design study that began in 1953. The Arrow and its accompanying Orenda Iroquois jet engine program, was abruptly cancelled in 1959, sparking a long and bitter political debate. The five flying test models and production aircraft were then destroyed, along with blueprints and other materials, leading to the creation of a piece of Canadian mythology. The rushed destruction incited a number of conspiracy theories linking American culpability for the Arrow's demise. There remains an enduring legend that one of the prototypes was spirited away after the cancellation and remains intact, but there is no evidence to support this. Many of the Avro Canada engineering and technical staff, led by Jim Chamberlin, migrated to the United States in a massive "brain drain" to become lead engineers, program managers and heads of engineering in NASA's manned space programs - Projects Mercury, Gemini and Apollo.^[1]

Origins

In the post-World War II period, the Soviet Union began developing a fleet of long-range bombers capable of delivering nuclear weapons to North America and Europe. To counter this threat, Western countries began the development of interceptor aircraft which could engage and destroy these bombers before they reached their targets.

A. V. Roe Canada Limited had been set up as a subsidiary of Hawker Siddeley Group in 1945, initially handling repair and maintenance work for aircraft at the local Malton Airport (today known as Pearson International Airport, Toronto's main airport). The next year, however, the company began the design of Canada's first jet fighter for the Royal Canadian Air Force. The Avro CF-100 Canuck, all-weather interceptor would become one of the finest aircraft in its class, and one of the most enduring, serving into the 1980s in a variety of roles.

The CF-100 was a very conventional design, similar to most Second World War heavy fighters in layout, with the exception of the introduction of jet engines mounted close to the fuselage. This engine layout and straight-wing design produces drag in the transonic speed range, wave drag, as air "piles up" at the engines and wing leading edge. Overcoming this drag proved to be difficult in conventional designs and led to the theory of a "sound barrier."

It was not until 1953, that the Canuck entered squadron service; the long delay was not unique as similar projects around the world were suffering lengthy delays. Engineers struggled to understand the problems inherent in jet power and high-speed flight, nevertheless, a seven-year wait for any project was a worrying prospect, notably when the state of the art was progressing so rapidly. Even before the Canuck entered service, designers had moved onto a newer generation of missile-armed supersonic designs of much greater capability.

Recognizing the similar delays would likely affect the Canuck's replacement, and considering that the Soviets were working on newer jet-powered bombers, the RCAF began looking for a supersonic replacement for the Canuck even before it had entered service. In March 1952, the RCAF's Final Report of the All-Weather Interceptor Requirements Team was submitted to Avro Canada.

German research during the Second World War had identified a number of solutions to the problems associated with supersonic flight. It was known that the onset of drag was greatly reduced by using thinner airfoils with much longer chord, but these airfoils were impractical because they left little internal room in the wing for weapons or fuel. Instead, aerodynamicists employed a swept-wing design to "trick" the airflow into behaving as though it was flowing over a long, thin wing. Almost every fighter project in the post-war era immediately copied the concept, which started appearing on production fighters in the late 1940s.

Avro engineers had already explored a swept wing (and tail) modification to the CF-100- the CF-103 (proceeding to wooden mock-up stage). Although the design theoretically provided transonic speeds, the small performance gain over the CF-100, given that the CF-103 would use the same engines, was not worth the extra development costs.

Further proposals resulted in two versions of a design known as the C-104: the single engine C-104/1, and twin-engined C-104/2. The designs were otherwise similar, using a low-mounted delta-wing and powered by the new Orenda TR.9 engines. Armament featured a battery of Velvet Glove missiles, (a Canadair Aircraft design), stored in an internal bay. The mission would be crewed by a single pilot guided by a completely automatic weapons control system to track and attack the target, (similar to the system utilized in the F-86D). The primary advantages of the twin-engine /2 version was that it was larger overall, with a much larger weapons bay and provided twin-engine reliability. The proposals were submitted to the RCAF in June 1952.

Development

Intensive discussions between Avro and the RCAF examined a wide range of alternative sizes and configurations for a supersonic interceptor, culminating in RCAF Specification AIR 7-3 in April 1953.

AIR 7-3 called specifically for:

Crew of two (It was considered unlikely that even a fully automated system would reduce pilot workload enough to allow a lone pilot.)
Twin-engines (since no single engine then available could lift the fuel load needed for the long-range missions the RCAF demanded)
Range of 300 nautical miles (556 km) for a normal low-speed mission, and 200 nautical miles (370 km) for a high-speed interception mission
Mach 1.5, cruise at an altitude of 50,000 feet (15,000 m)
Maneuverability (to be able to pull 2 g in maneuvers with no loss of speed or altitude under those conditions.
The time from a signal to start the engines to the aircraft's reaching 50,000 feet (15,000 m) and Mach 1.5, was to be less than five minutes. Turn-around time on the ground was to be less than ten minutes.

An RCAF team led by Ray Footit visited US aircraft producers and concluded that no existing or planned aircraft could fulfil these requirements.

To meet the new RCAF requirements, Avro Aircraft engineers considered the delta which offers many of the same advantages (and disadvantages) as the swept wing, but is much larger, allowing for greater internal storage. Compared to the swept wing, the main downside was that a delta suffered from much greater drag at low speeds- of little consequence for an interceptor primarily flying at high altitudes and speeds.

In the words of designer James C. Floyd, "At the time we laid down the design of the CF-105, there was a somewhat emotional controversy going on in the United States on the relative merits of the delta plan form versus the straight wing for supersonic aircraft…our choice of a tailless delta was based mainly on the compromise of attempting to achieve structural and aeroelastic efficiency, with a very thin wing, and yet, at the same time, achieving the large internal fuel capacity required for the specified range." (Floyd, James, Journal of the Royal Aeronautical Society, December 1958.)

Avro submitted their modified C-105 design in May 1953, a two-man version of the C-104/2. A change to a "shoulder-mounted" delta wing allowed rapid access to the plane's internals, weapons bay, and engines. The new design also allowed the wing to be a single structure, simplifying construction and providing strength. The wing design required a long main landing gear that still had to fit within the thin delta wing — an engineering challenge. Five different wing sizes were outlined in the report, from 1,000 to 1,400 ft² (93 to 130 m²). The 1,200 ft² (111 m²) version was eventually selected. Three engines were considered as well: the Rolls-Royce RB-106, the Bristol B.0L.4 Olympus, and the Curtiss-Wright J67 (a license-built version of the Olympus) with the RB-106 selected, and the J67 as backup.

The weapons bay design was larger than the original 104/2 design, situated in a large thin box on the bottom fuselage, running from a point adjacent to the front of the wing to the middle of the fuselage. The weapon system originally selected was the Hughes MX-1179, which was a pairing of the existing MA-1 fire-control system with the AIM-4 Falcon missile of radar-guided and heat seeking variants. This system was already under development for proposed use in the USAF's WS-201 1954 Interceptor (dating from 1949, which would lead to the F-102 Delta Dagger). The Velvet Glove radar-guided missile had been under development with the RCAF for some time, but was considered unsuitable for supersonic launch, and further work on that project was cancelled in 1956.

In July 1953, the proposal was accepted and Avro was given the go-ahead to start a full design study. In December, $27 million was provided to start flight modelling. At first, the project was limited in scope, but the introduction of the Soviet Myasishchev M-4 Bison jet bomber and the Soviet Union's testing of a hydrogen bomb dramatically changed Cold-War priorities. In March 1955, the contract was upgraded to a $260 million contract for five Arrow Mark 1 flight-test aircraft, to be followed by 35 Arrow Mark 2s with production engines and fire-control systems.

Production

Where most aircraft designs undergo a slow and expensive process starting with the construction of a small number of hand-built prototypes, that are test-flown and modified, if required, before being committed to a set of jigs for production construction, the "Arrow" project, adopted the Cook-Craigie plan. Developed in the 1940s, Cook-Cragie skipped the prototype phase and built the first test airframes on the production jigs. Any changes could be incorporated into the jigs while testing continued, with production starting as soon as the test program was complete. As James C., "Jim" Floyd noted at the time, this was a risky approach, but together with the RCAF, “…it was decided to take the technical risks involved to save time on the programme…I will not pretend that this philosophy of production type build from the outset did not cause us a lot of problems in Engineering. However, it did achieve its objective..” (Floyd, Journal of the Royal Aeronautical Society, December 1958).

In order to mitigate the risks, a massive testing program was started, and, by mid-1954, the first production drawings were issued and wind tunnel work began. In another program, nine instrumented free-flight models were mounted on solid fuel Nike rocket boosters and launched over Lake Ontario while two additional models were launched from Wallops Island, USA, over the Atlantic Ocean. These models were for aerodynamic drag and stability testing, flown to a maximum speed of Mach 1.7+ before intentionally crashing into the water. Ongoing efforts have been made to search for the models in Lake Ontario, and, to date, two have reputedly been found, along with a Nike booster and a booster for a Velvet Glove.

Experiments showed the need for only a small number of changes to the design, mostly involving changes to the wing profile and positioning. In order to improve high-alpha performance, the front of the wing was drooped, especially on the outer sections, a dog-tooth was introduced to control spanwise flow, and the whole wing was given a slight negative camber which helped control trim drag and pitch-up.

The area rule principle was also applied to the design. This resulted in several changes including the addition of a tailcone, sharpening the radar nose, thinning the intake lips and reducing the cross-sectional area of the fuselage below the canopy. (James Floyd, Royal Aeronautical Journal.)

The aircraft used a large measure of magnesium and titanium in the fuselage, the latter limited largely to the area around the engines and to fasteners. Titanium was still expensive and not widely used because it was difficult to machine. The construction of the airframe itself was fairly conventional, however, with a semi-monocoque frame and multi-spar wing.

The Arrow's thin wing demanded aviation's first 4000 lb/in² (28 MPa) hydraulic system that could supply enough power while using small actuators and piping. Use of a rudimentary fly-by-wire system resulted in the problem of the lack of control "feel" for the pilot, and to solve this, the control stick input was "disconnected" from the hydraulic system. The pilot's input was sensed by a series of force transducers in the stick, and their signal was sent to an electronic control servo that operated the valves on the hydraulic system to move the various flight controls. In addition, the same box fed pressure back into actuators in the stick itself, making it move. This happened quickly enough that it appeared as if the pilot were moving the stick directly. An advanced stability augmentation system was added as well, as long, "thin" aircraft have a number of coupling modes that can lead to departure from controlled flight if not damped out quickly. Since the centre of lift moved with speed, the flight control system also assisted stability and manoeuvre.

In 1954, the RB.106 program was cancelled, so plans were made to use the backup J67 instead. In 1955, this engine was also cancelled, leaving the design with no engine. At this point, the Pratt & Whitney J75 was selected for the initial test-flight models, while the new TR.13 (soon PS-13 Iroquois) engine was developed at Orenda for the production Mk.2s. Eventually, it was only the rejected Bristol Olympus design that would actually go into production.

In 1956, the RCAF demanded an additional change, the use of the advanced RCA-Victor Astra fire-control system in place of the MX-1179, firing the equally advanced US Navy Sparrow II in place of the Falcon. Avro objected to this choice on the grounds that neither of these were even in testing at that point, whereas, both the MX-1179 and Falcon were almost ready for production. The RCAF planners felt that the greatly improved performance of the Sparrow was worth the gamble.

The Astra proved to be a serious problem in the Arrow design. The system ran into a lengthy period of delays, and the United States Navy eventually cancelled all work on the Sparrow II in 1956. Canadair was quickly brought in to continue the Sparrow program in Canada, but they expressed their concerns about the project as well.

A rushed study looked at alternatives, including resurrecting the Velvet Glove for use with the Astra, or the use of the original MX-1179 system with its Falcons. Even the MX-1179 had run into difficulties, and the F-102 eventually settled on the older MG-1 system originally used in the F-86D. Work was continuing on the MX, however, as it was planned to be used in the upgraded F-102B (later renamed the F-106 Delta Dart), so this system was selected for the Arrow, as well.

Variants and design stages

Mark 1

Go-ahead on the production was given in 1955, and the rollout of the first prototype, RL-201, took place 4 October 1957, quite an achievement for a company that had never built a supersonic aircraft. Unfortunately, the media and public attention for the Arrow roll-out was dwarfed by the launch of Sputnik on the same day.

The J75 engine was slightly heavier than the PS-13, and therefore required ballast to be placed in the nose to move the centre of gravity back to the correct position. In addition, the Astra fire-control system was not ready, and it too, was replaced by ballast. The otherwise unused weapons bay was loaded with test equipment.

RL-201 first flew on 25 March 1958 with Chief Development Test Pilot S/L Janusz Zurakowski at the controls. Four more J75-powered Mk.1s were delivered in the next 18 months. The test flights went surprisingly well; the aircraft demonstrated excellent handling throughout the flight envelope. Much of this was due to the natural qualities of the delta-wing, but an equal amount can be attributed to the Arrow's stability augmentation system. The aircraft flew supersonically on only its third flight and, on its seventh flight, achieved a speed of over 1,000 miles per hour at 50,000 feet, while climbing and still accelerating. A top speed of Mach 1.98 would eventually be reached at three quarters throttle.

No major problems were encountered during the testing phase. There were some issues with the landing gear, flight control system, and the stability augmentation system needed considerable tuning.

The former problem was partly due to the tandem main landing gear (two wheels and tires: one in front of and one behind the gear leg) being very narrow, in order to fit into the wings. The leg shortened in length and rotated as it was stowed. During one landing incident, the chain mechanism used in the Mark 1 gear jammed, resulting in incomplete rotation of the gear. In a second incident, the flight control system commanded elevons full down at landing, resulting in substantial weight placed on the main landing gears, ultimately resulting in brake lockup and gear collapse.

The stability augmentation system was a matter of tuning, tuning and more tuning. Although the CF-105 was not the first aircraft to use such a system – the Arrow used this system for all three axes, other aircraft did not – the system was one of the first of its kind, consequently, the concept had not yet developed into the science it is today. By February 1959, the five aircraft had completed the majority of the company test program and were progressing to the RCAF acceptance trials.

Mark 2

The Mk.2 version was to be fitted with the Iroquois engine. The Astra/Sparrow fire control system had been terminated by the government in September 1958 with all aircraft to employ the Hughes/Falcon duo. At the time of cancellation of the entire program, the first Arrow Mk.2, RL-206, was nearly complete. It was expected to break the world speed record but never had the chance.

Top speed would have been limited by frictional heating but as Jim Floyd has said, “The aluminum alloy structure which we favoured was good for speeds greater than a Mach number of 2…” (Floyd, Journal of the Royal Aeronautical Society, December 1958).

Other versions

Avro Canada had a wide range of Arrow derivatives under development at the time of project cancellation. Frequent mention is made of an Arrow that could have been capable of Mach 3, similar to the Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-25 – this was not the production version, but one of the design studies, and would have been a greatly modified version of the Arrow Mk.2, featuring revised engine inlets and extensive use of stainless steel or titanium to withstand airframe heating.

Trouble arising

Until 1955, the Arrow project had been quite cost effective. Only $27 million had been earmarked for the studies, with $260 million for initial production. However, in September 1955, Avro informed the Canadian Cabinet that an additional $59 million was required to keep the program on schedule. In December 1955, Cabinet limited Avro to 11 aircraft and put a spending cap on the overall program of $170 million over three years. In February 1957, the Cabinet ordered the spending cap increased to $216 million. There is some evidence that the Liberals were losing faith in the project although no formal reviews were carried out.

In June 1957, the Liberals lost the election, and a Progressive Conservative government under John Diefenbaker took power. Diefenbaker, from the Canadian west, had campaigned on a platform of reigning in what they claimed was "rampant Liberal spending." Much of this was posed as an east/west divide, with eastern Canada using money from across the country to fund their "industrial welfare" projects. The Arrow was not the only major industrial project targeted during the campaign, others such as the "million dollar monster" postal sorting computer from Ferranti Canada were singled out for additional scorn.

In August 1957, Diefenbaker signed the NORAD (North American Air Defence) agreement with the United States, which required the subordination of the RCAF Air Defence Command to American command and control. The USAF was in the process of completely automating their air defence system with the SAGE project, and insisted that the RCAF had to use it as well. One aspect of the SAGE system was the BOMARC nuclear-tipped anti-aircraft missile, which when intercepting bombers over Ontario and Quebec would be exploding right over major Canadian cities. This led to studies on basing BOMARCs in Canada in order to push the line further north, away from the cities.

Storms of Controversy revealed a top secret brief prepared for George Pearkes, then Minister of National Defence, for his July 1958 meeting with officials from the US. From the brief, "The introduction of SAGE in Canada will cost in the neighborhood of $107 million. Further improvements are required in the radar… NORAD has also recommended the introduction of the BOMARC missile… will be a further commitment of $164 million… All these commitments coming at this particular time… will tend to increase our defence budget by as much as 25 to 30%…"

Pearkes was also concerned about funding a defence against ballistic missiles. The onset of Sputnik had also raised the spectre of attack from space, and, as the year wore on, word of a "missile gap" began spreading. From an American brief of the meeting with Pearkes, "He [Pearkes] stated that the problem of developing a defence against missiles while at the same time completing and rounding out defence measures against manned bombers posed a serious problem for Canada from the point of view of expense…" Eisenhower Library, File: DDE Trip to Canada, Memcons, 8 -11, July 1958, Canada-U.S. Defence Problems. In a document written after the cancellation, Pearkes noted "We did not cancel the CF-105 because there was no bomber threat, but because there was a lesser threat and we got the Bomarc in lieu of more airplanes to look after this." Department of National Defence, Directorate of History, File 79/469 Folder 19.

In a later interview in the 1990s, Pearkes discussed these problems and then revealed that he was advised by an American official, while en route to Colorado, that Canada did not need to build aircraft because the US had plenty and could make them available at any time. Pearkes states that this is when he made his decision to cancel the Arrow. His dilemma was how to fill in the defence gap from cancellation of the Arrow to the time when Bomarc bases would be operational. He revealed that he struck a deal to allow American training in Goose Bay (Labrador) and Cold Lake (Alberta) in exchange for protection.

By 11 August 1958, Pearkes requested cancellation of the Arrow, but the Cabinet Defence Committee refused. He tabled it again in September, and recommended installation of the Bomarc missile system. The latter was accepted, but, again, the CDC refused to cancel the entire Arrow program. The CDC wanted to wait until a major review in 31 March 1959, to better examine world conditions. They did, however, cancel the Sparrow/Astra system in September 1958. Efforts to "save" the program through cost-sharing with other countries were then explored.

Foreign interest

Canada tried to sell the Arrow aircraft to the US and Britain but had no takers. It appears that the USAF was concerned about the effect the cancellation would have on Canada's defence industry. Lieutenant General Donald Putt of the AFRDC wanted to purchase the Arrow for the American inventory, but the Secretary of the Air Force said no, as did John Foster Dulles at the Paris summit in 1958.

From 1955 onwards, the UK had shown considerable interest in the Arrow; in April 1956, the UK's Air Council recommended a purchase of 144 Arrows for the RAF to serve alongside the Saunders-Roe SR.177s, instead of the "thin-wing" Gloster Javelin then under study. The CF-105 would serve as a stopgap until the UK's F.155 project came to fruition. However with the F.155 due in 1963 and the Arrow not likely to reach the RAF before 1962, there was little point in proceeding, even if the costs of acquisition had not been so high. The infamous 1957 Defence White Paper, prompted by a general lack of funds, foretold an end to manned fighters and completely curtailed any likelihood of a purchase. In January 1959, the UK's final answer was no- with an offer to sell Canada the English Electric P.1 (the aircraft that would become the English Electric Lightning). The French government was prepared to buy some 200 Iroquois engines, but cancelled their order in 1958, being advised by persons unknown, that the Arrow was going to be cancelled.

Cancellation: "Black Friday"

On 20 February 1959, known as "Black Friday" at the Avro plants, Diefenbaker announced to the Canadian House of Commons that the Arrow and Iroquois programs were to be immediately cancelled, subsequently, telegrams sent to Avro stated that all work should stop on reception. Due to contract obligations with the unions at Avro, the Avro management had no choice but to immediately lay off some 14,000 workers at Avro and Orenda plants. Avro engineer John Hodge later recalled that in his plant the announcement about the lay-offs was made over the public address system.^[2] In total, an estimated 30,000 employees or more were laid off due to cancellations of contracts with various subcontractors.

Following the Canadian government's cancellation of the Avro Arrow project in 1959, CF-105 Chief Aerodynamist Jim Chamberlin led a team of 25 engineers to NASA's Space Task Group. This team would eventually grow to 32 Avro engineers and technicians, and become emblematic of what many Canadians viewed as a brain drain to the U.S. Many other engineers, including Jim Floyd, found work abroad in either the U.K. or the United States.

Declassified records show Avro management was caught unprepared by the suddenness of the announcement by the government. While executives were aware that the program was in jeopardy, they expected it to continue at least until the March review. It was widely believed that during this lead-up to the review, the first Arrow Mk.2, RL-206, would be prepared for an attempt at both World Speed and Altitude records.

An attempt was made to provide the completed Arrows to the National Research Council of Canada. The latter refused, noting that without sufficient spare parts and maintenance, as well as qualified pilots, the NRC could make no use of them. A similar project initiated by the Royal Aircraft Establishment (Boscombe Down) had resulted in Avro Vice-President (Engineering) Jim Floyd, preparing a transatlantic ferry operation. This proposal, like others from the United States, were never realized.

**Avro CF-105 Arrow** nose section on display at the Canada Aviation Museum

Within two months, all aircraft and engines, production tooling and technical data, were ordered scrapped. This was partly in response to RCMP fears that a Soviet "mole" had infiltrated Avro, later confirmed to some degree in the Mitrokhin archives. Officially, the reason given for the destruction order from Cabinet and the Chiefs of Staff was to destroy classified and "secret" materials utilized in the Arrow/Iroquois programs. Although almost everything connected to the programs was destroyed, the forward fuselage and nose gear of RL-206, the first Mk. 2 Arrow and some sections of the wings (of RL-203) were saved and are on display at the Canada Aviation Museum in Ottawa, alongside an Orenda Iroquois engine.

In 1961, the RCAF obtained 66 CF-101 Voodoo aircraft to serve in the role originally intended to be filled by the Arrow. The controversy surrounding this acquisition, and Canada's acquiring nuclear weapons for the Voodoos and Bomarcs eventually led to the collapse of the Diefenbaker government in 1963.

CBC Docu-drama

In 1997, the CBC broadcast the two-part mini-series, The Arrow about the Arrow program, which remains one of the most-watched television programs in Canadian history. [[1]]

The production used a combination of archival film, remote-control flying models and computer animation for the flying and sequences. The flying models were built by Doug Hyslip of Calgary, but a full-scale replica of the Arrow was used in ground scenes.

Critics forced the CBC to reclassify the mini-series as a "docu-drama," [[2]]The Arrow was subsequently advertised as entertainment rather than literal history.

Avro Arrow replicas

Allan Jackson of Wetaskiwin was the original designer of the replica used in the CBC docu-drama. As a hobby, he began building a full-scale replica of the Arrow in 1989. Years later, in 1996, when the producers of the Arrow miniseries learned of Jackson's replica, then about 70% complete, an offer was made to complete the construction if the replica could be used for the production. After use on the mini-series, and several public appearances at air shows, the Jackson replica was donated to the Reynolds-Alberta Museum in Wetaskiwin. While on display in a temporary outdoor collection, the replica was damaged in a wind storm and is presently being stored after a recent repair, and readied for future display.

The Avro Museum of Calgary began a Replica Arrow Project. Theirs is a 0.6-scale piloted replica aircraft being built for public flight demonstration — construction started in Sept/05 following eight years of research. Built of modern-day composite materials under Canadian Recreational Aircraft Legislation, construction is expected to take five years of volunteer labour and cost a half-million dollars in materials and parts.

The Toronto Aerospace Museum, located at the former CFB Downsview features a full-size replica Arrow built by volunteers with assistance from local aerospace firms. With a metal structure, the replica features many authentic-looking components including landing gear constructed by Dowty-Messier (the original Arrow sub-contractor). Painted in the colours of Arrow 25203, the Arrow replica was rolled out for a media event on 28 September 2006 and was on public display on 8-9 October 2006 to commemorate the original aircraft's rollout in 1957. It will be permanently displayed beside an Avro Lancaster bomber(currently under restoration) built at the same Malton plant that produced the Arrow. The museum ultimately hopes to acquire an Avro CF-100 and obtain the first Avro VZ-9-AV Avrocar (the company's last aviation project) on a long-term loan from the National Air and Space Museum, in Washington, D.C., to be exhibited alongside the Arrow replica and Avro Lancaster.

Specifications (Arrow Mk.1)

Data from The Great Book of Fighters^[3]

General characteristics

Crew: 2
Airfoil: NACA 0003.5 mod root, NACA 0003.8 tip

Performance

Thrust/weight: 0.439

Armament (projected)

Rockets: 1-2× AIR-2 Genie unguided nuclear rockets
Missiles: 4× AIM-4 Falcon

Avionics

Hughes MX-1179 fire control system

References

^ Floyd, Jim. "Canada's Gift to NASA". Canada Heirloom Series. Government of Canada. Retrieved 2006-07-13.
^ "Hodge, John D." (Template:PDFlink). NASA Johnson Space Center Oral History Project. April 10 1999. Retrieved 2006-10-31. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
^ Green, W (2001). The great book of fighters. MBI Publishing. ISBN 0-7603-1194-3. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)