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New eugenics

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New eugenics, also known as liberal eugenics (a term coined by bioethicist Nicholas Agar[1]), advocates enhancing human characteristics and capacities through the use of reproductive technology and human genetic engineering. Those who advocate new eugenics generally think selecting or altering embryos should be left to the preferences of parents, rather than the state.[2]. More specifically, Nicholas Agar says "While old fashioned authoritarian eugenicists sought to produce citizens out of a single centrally designed mould, the distinguishing mark of the new liberal eugenics is state neutrality. Access to information about the full range of genetic therapies will allow prospective parents to look to their own values in selecting improvements for future children. Authoritarian eugenicists would do away with ordinary procreative freedoms. Liberals instead propose radical extensions of them."

History

New eugenics is distinguished from previous versions of eugenics by its emphasis on informed parental choice rather than coercive governmental control.[3]

Eugenics is sometimes broken into the categories of positive eugenics (encouraging reproduction among the designated "fit") and negative eugenics (discouraging reproduction among those designated "unfit"). Another distinction is between coercive eugenics and non-coercive eugenics. Bioethicists generally consider coercive eugenics more difficult to justify than non-coercive eugenics, though coercive laws forbidding cousin marriage, for example, are widely considered justified. Compulsory sterilization of those deemed unfit is a form of coercive eugenics that has been overwhelmingly rejected,[4] and is illegal under many national and international laws.

New Eugenics practices

New eugenics generally supports genetic modification or genetic selection of individuals for traits that are likely to improve human welfare. The underlying idea is to improve the genetic basis of future generations and reduce incidence of genetic diseases and other undesirable traits. Some of the practices included in new eugenics are: pre-implantation diagnosis and embryo selection,[5] selective breeding,[6] and human enhancement through the use of genetic technologies,[7] such as embryo engineering or gene therapy.[8][9]

Ethics

New eugenics was founded under the liberal ethical values of respect for personal autonomy. Arguments in favor of new eugenics include that it is better to increase the chance that a child will have the best chance of the best life.[10]) Ethical arguments against new eugenics include the claim that creating designer babies is not in the best interest of society as it might increase inequality between genetically modified individuals and non-modified individuals.[11]) Most advocates of liberal eugenics, however, endorse redistribution and subsidies of genetic technology so that poor parents can access the same technology as wealthy parents.[12])

Dov Fox, a law professor at the University of San Diego, argues that new eugenics cannot be justified on the basis of the underlying liberal theory which inspires its name. He argues that heritable mental and physical capacities that are generally valued can be considered as alternative to John Rawls's social primary goods. In this case, natural primary goods. Fox suggests that reprogenetic technologies like embryo selection, cellular surgery, and human genetic engineering, which aim to enhance general purpose traits in offspring are practices a liberal government leaves to the discretion of parents than like practices the state makes compulsory.[13] Fox argues that if the liberal commitment to autonomy is important enough for the state to mandate childrearing practices such as health care and basic education, that very same interest is important enough for the state to mandate safe, effective, and functionally integrated genetic practices that act on analogous all-purpose traits such as resistance to disease and general cognitive functioning. He concludes that the liberal case for compulsory eugenics is a reductio ad absurdum against liberal theory.[13]

The United Nations International Bioethics Committee wrote that new eugenics should not be confused with the ethical problems of the 20th century eugenics movements. Regardless, they have stated that it is still problematic as it challenges the idea of human equality and opens up new ways of discrimination and stigmatization against those who do not want or cannot afford the enhancements.[14]

References

  1. ^ Agar, Nicholas (2004). Liberal Eugenics: In Defence of Human Enhancement. ISBN 1-4051-2390-7. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |name-list-format= ignored (|name-list-style= suggested) (help)
  2. ^ Anomaly, Jonathan (July 2018). "Defending eugenics: From cryptic choice to conscious selection". Monash Bioethics Review. 35 (1–4): 24–35. doi:10.1007/s40592-018-0081-2. ISSN 1321-2753. PMC 6096849. PMID 29804244.
  3. ^ Cavaliere, Giuli (2018). "Looking into the shadow: the eugenics argument in debates on reproductive technologies and practices". Monash Bioethics Review. 36: 1–22. doi:10.1007/s40592-018-0086-x.
  4. ^ Buchanan, Allen (2011). Better than Human: The Prospect and Perils of Enhancing Ourselves. p. 123. ISBN 9780190664046. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |name-list-format= ignored (|name-list-style= suggested) (help)
  5. ^ King, D. S. (1999-04-01). "Preimplantation genetic diagnosis and the 'new' eugenics". Journal of Medical Ethics. 25 (2): 176–182. doi:10.1136/jme.25.2.176. ISSN 0306-6800. PMC 479204. PMID 10226925.
  6. ^ Hoffman, Allison K (2017-12-01). "Review of The New Eugenics: Selective Breeding in an Era of Reproductive Technologies". Journal of Law and the Biosciences. 4 (3): 671–677. doi:10.1093/jlb/lsx025. ISSN 2053-9711. PMC 5965496.
  7. ^ Vizcarrondo, Felipe E. (August 2014). "Human Enhancement: The New Eugenics". The Linacre Quarterly. 81 (3): 239–243. doi:10.1179/2050854914Y.0000000021. ISSN 0024-3639. PMC 4135459. PMID 25249705.
  8. ^ King DS (April 1999). "Preimplantation genetic diagnosis and the 'new' eugenics". Journal of Medical Ethics. 25 (2): 176–82. doi:10.1136/jme.25.2.176. PMC 479204. PMID 10226925.
  9. ^ "Regulating Eugenics". Harvard Law Review. 2008. Retrieved May 2, 2015.
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  13. ^ a b Fox, Dov (2007). "The Illiberality of Liberal Eugenics". SSRN 1072104. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help); Unknown parameter |name-list-format= ignored (|name-list-style= suggested) (help)
  14. ^ "Report of the IBC on Updating Its Reflection on the Human Genome and Human Rights" (PDF). International Bioethics Committee. October 2, 2015. Retrieved October 22, 2015. The goal of enhancing individuals and the human species by engineering the genes related to some characteristics and traits is not to be confused with the barbarous projects of eugenics that planned the simple elimination of human beings considered as 'imperfect' on an ideological basis. However, it impinges upon the principle of respect for human dignity in several ways. It weakens the idea that the differences among human beings, regardless of the measure of their endowment, are exactly what the recognition of their equality presupposes and therefore protects. It introduces the risk of new forms of discrimination and stigmatization for those who cannot afford such enhancement or simply do not want to resort to it. The arguments that have been produced in favour of the so-called liberal eugenics do not trump the indication to apply the limit of medical reasons also in this case.

Further reading