Air Algérie Flight 6289

Air Algérie Flight 6289

7T-VEZ, the aircraft involved in the accident, seen here on 29 August 1999
Accident
Date	6 March 2003 (2003-03-06)
Summary	Engine failure on take-off aggravated by pilot error
Site	Aguenar – Hadj Bey Akhamok Airport, Tamanrasset, Algeria 22°47′N 5°31′E
Aircraft
Aircraft type	Boeing 737-2T4
Aircraft name	Monts du Daia
Operator	Air Algérie
IATA flight No.	AH6289
ICAO flight No.	DAH6289
Call sign	AIR ALGERIE 6289
Registration	7T-VEZ
Flight origin	Aguenar – Hadj Bey Akhamok Airport, Tamanrasset, Algeria
Stopover	Noumérat – Moufdi Zakaria Airport, Ghardaia, Algeria
Destination	Houari Boumediene Airport, Algiers, Algeria
Occupants	103
Passengers	97
Crew	6
Fatalities	102
Injuries	1
Survivors	1

Air Algérie Flight 6289 (AH6289), was a domestic passenger flight which crashed on 6 March 2003, at the Aguenar – Hadj Bey Akhamok Airport in Algeria, killing all but one of the 103 people on board.

Witnesses recalled that one of its engines exploded and caught fire just seconds after takeoff. The landing gear was still extended when this happened. It then rose sharply and stalled. The final report concluded that the cause of the crash was due to engine failure on take-off.

The accident was the deadliest plane crash to occur on Algerian soil, until being surpassed by the Algerian Air Force Il-76 crash in 2018. It was also Air Algérie's deadliest plane crash, until it was surpassed 11 years later by Air Algérie Flight 5017, a McDonnel Douglas MD-83 which crashed in Mali killing all 116 people on board.

Background

Nationality	Passengers	Crew	Total
Algeria	78	6	84
Canada	5	0	5
France	9	0	9
Germany	1	0	1
Japan	1	0	1
Netherlands	2	0	2
United Kingdom	1	0	1
Total	97	6	103

Flight 6289 had been scheduled to land at Noumérat – Moufdi Zakaria Airport. The aircraft was a Boeing 737-2T4, named Monts du Daia, and was equipped with two Pratt & Whitney JT8D-17A engines. The aircraft entered service on 9 December 1983, and flew for more than 40,000 hours before the crash. The unnamed male captain, aged 48, allegedly had 10,760 hours and 10 minutes of flight experience, including 1,087 hours and 46 minutes on the Boeing 737-200 as captain. Meanwhile, Yousfi Fatima, the female first officer, aged 44, allegedly had 5,219 hours and 10 minutes of flight experience, including 1,292 hours and 42 minutes on the Boeing 737-200. Fatima was also Algeria's first female airline pilot.

The first officer was the pilot flying (PF), while the captain was the pilot not flying (PNF). Both switched roles the moment the engine failure occurred.

Timeline

At about 14:08 UTC, Air Traffic Control cleared the plane to taxi to Runway 02 and the plane left the gate.

At 14:12, Air Traffic Control cleared the plane to line up and take off on Runway 02.

At 14:13, the plane took off, and the first officer requested landing gear retraction. The request was immediately followed by a loud thumping noise recorded on the aircraft's Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR), apparently caused by the rupture of the left engine. The plane veered left, and the first officer let out a chain of exclamations.

At 14:15, the captain told the first officer that he was taking over control of the aircraft and insisted she let go of the controls so that he could control the plane. The first officer then handed the controls over to the captain and offered to retract the landing gear. The captain did not respond. The first officer alerted air traffic control about the situation, saying, "we have a small problem." The stick shaker then activated and de-activated twice. The Ground proximity warning system (GPWS) then sounded a "don't sink" alarm and was followed by the stick shaker activating a third time and continued operating until the CVR stopped recording. The GPWS then sounded a second "don't sink" alarm and the CVR stopped recording, along with the Flight Data Recorder (FDR). The aircraft was still airborne when the recordings ended. Without the landing gear being retracted, additional drag was apparently created and the plane began to lose speed at a high rate. Eventually, the plane stalled and crashed. Upon impact, fuel was spilled and ignited, causing the aircraft to burst into flames. It then skidded along the ground, striking the airport's perimeter fence, and crossing a road, before coming to a stop. Air traffic control immediately declared an emergency.

Aftermath

96 of the 97 passengers and all of the six crew members perished, a total of 102 people. The sole survivor of the accident was 28-year-old Youcef Djillali, an Algerian soldier. He was seated in the last row with his seat belt unfastened (as indicated in his statement), and was ejected from the plane upon impact, escaping from the accident. Djillali was found in a coma with multiple injuries. However, he regained consciousness the next day. Doctors said that his injuries were not life-threatening.

Investigation

Before the accident flight, the aircraft's weight and balance and fuel load were both examined and no problems were reported.

Two of the witnesses, a ground engineer who worked on the accident aircraft, and an air traffic controller who was in the tower at the time of the accident gave statements to the investigators. The ground engineer said:

"I was on the parking lot and I saw the plane take off on runway 02. Just after take-off, the aircraft swerved slightly to the left, then righted itself on the track and at that moment I noticed that the aircraft was losing speed and altitude, still with its landing gear down, until the moment of the crash, when there was a total explosion."

The air traffic controller stated:

"DAH [6389 [sic] B732 IMMAT: 7T-VEZ asked to be cleared for take off 1402 GMT. At 1405 GMT, it was cleared for take off with a temperature of 23°, QNH: 1019. Cleared by ALGER CCR to [an] initial [flight level] FL280, just after the takeoff from runway 02 (1405) a kind of explosion was heard, the alarm was immediately activated, the pilot said [']we have a small problem[']. . . the plane began to fall and crashed near the threshold of runway 20; the emergency plan was immediately activated as planned. 1) Aerodrome rescue services at 1415. 2) Civil services at 1416. 3) Hospital just afterwards. Then the rest of the services mentioned in the emergency plan."

The flight instruments and flight recorders were investigated in the BEA laboratory in Paris, France. The aircraft's engines were sent to Belgium for investigation. The last FDR parameters indicated that the aircraft was 335 feet (102 m) above ground level (AGL) and was traveling at a speed of 126 knots (233 km/h; 145 mph). Investigators determined that the left engine's HP (high pressure) turbine had ruptured, damaging the LP (low pressure) turbine in the process. This caused a drop in power to the engine, though it did not shut down completely according to the flight recorders.

Crew resource management

The engine failiure suddenly created a heavy workload for the flight crew. The captain took control only of the aircraft eight seconds after the engine failed. As he had done this at a critical phase, the captain could not initiate any emergency procedures. In addition, he used non-standard terminology. The first officer failed to properly perform her PNF duties, and even had her hands on the controls when the stall warning sounded, indicated by the captain saying telling her to let go of "let go" and "take your hand off". The "gear up" callout is supposed to be made by the PF, and carried out by the PNF. While still the PF, first officer made the "gear up" callout as required, but after becoming PNF, the first officer continued to ask the captain if the landing gear should be retracted and could even have performed the action herself because of the transfer of control, however the first officer did not retract the gear as captain did not respond to her request, presumably because he had a heavier workload as he was now the PF. The first officer had also failed to monitor the speed. The aircraft crashed into the ground tail-first. The flight crew's actions following the engine failure were informal, did not adhere to standard operating procedures (SOP), and did not utilize crew resource management (CRM).

Conclusion

The final report was published with the following:

"The accident was caused by the loss of an engine during a critical phase of flight, the non-retraction of the landing gear after the engine failure, and the Captain, the PNF, taking over control of the airplane before having clearly identified the problem.

The following factors probably contributed to the accident:

• the perfunctory flight preparation, which meant that the crew were not equipped to face the situation that occurred at a critical moment of the flight;
• the coincidence between the moment the failure occurred and the request to retract the landing gear;
• the speed of the event that left the crew little time to recover the situation;
• maintaining an inappropriate rate of climb, taking into account the failure of one engine;
• the absence of any teamwork after the engine failure, which led to a failure to detect and correct parameters related to the conduct of the flight (speed, rate of climb, configuration, etc.);
• the takeoff weight being close to the maximum with a high aerodrome altitude and high temperature;
• the rocky environment around the aerodrome, unsuitable for an emergency landing."

See also

• Centurion Air Cargo Flight 164
• List of accidents and incidents involving commercial aircraft
• List of sole survivors of airline accidents or incidents
• LOT Polish Airlines Flight 7
• LOT Polish Airlines Flight 5055
• United Airlines Flight 232

External links

• Accident description at the Aviation Safety Network
• Algerian Ministry of Transport
  • Official Accident Report info page (Archive)
    • Full official report – PDF version (Archive)
  • Official Accident Report info page (in French) (Archive) – The French version is the original version
    • Full official report (in French) (Archive)