Barisan Revolusi Nasional
|Patani Malayu National Revolutionary Front|
Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani
Flag of the Patani Malayu National Revolutionary Front [note 1]
|Leader(s)||Hassan Taib, Masae Useng, Sapaeng Basoe, Abdullah Munir, Dulloh Waeman (Ustadz Loh), Abroseh Parehruepoh, Abdulkanin Kalupang, Isma-ae Toyalong, Arduenan Mama, Bororting Binbuerheng and Yusuf Rayalong (Ustadz Ismae-ae), among others.|
|Active region(s)||Pattani region, Thailand|
|Ideology||Pattani separatism (formerly)|
|Notable attacks||South Thailand insurgency|
The Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani, also known by the shorter form Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), meaning "National Revolutionary Front", is a Patani independence movement in northern Malaysia and Patani, southern Thailand. As of 2017, it is the most powerful rebel group in the region.
Originally the BRN was established as a roughly territorial organisation, prioritizing Pattani secessionism. Since 2001, however, the BRN-C (BRN-Coordinasi) has become its most active wing, leading the south Thailand insurgency and imposing extreme religious values on the local society.
The BRN-C, through its "Pejuang Kemerdekaan Patani" paramilitary wing, is the main group behind the murder of teachers in the Southern Border Provinces.
The BRN-Coordinate or BRN-C (BRN-Koordinasi) is currently the largest, most active and best organised of the BRN subgroups. Rejecting the Pan-Arab socialist thought that influenced the early BRN, it favours Salafist ideology and is involved in political activism in the mosques and indoctrination at Islamic schools. The main recruiting unit of the BRN-C is the Pemuda (youth) student group and its leaders are mainly Islamic religious teachers, including veterans of the Soviet–Afghan War.
The BRN-Koordinasi is acknowledged as the group currently spearheading the insurgency in southern Thailand and is at the origin of the group known as Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK) to which most violent attacks have been attributed in the last decade.
The BRN-C sees no reason for negotiations and is against talks with other insurgent groups. The BRN-C has the vision of becoming a mass-organisation. It has as its immediate aim to make southern Thailand ungovernable, having largely been successful at it.
The Pejuang Kemerdekaan Patani (Patani Independence Fighters) are the paramilitary wing of the BRN-C. These militant units operate in the rural areas of southern Thailand working along with the BRN-Coordinate leadership in a loosely organised strictly clandestine cell system dependent on hard-line religious leaders for direction. These armed groups of youth have routinely intimidated and terrorised local Buddhists, as well as local Muslims who don't share the extreme ideologies of the BRN. They are also behind the attacks on schoolteachers.
- BRN-Congress or BRN-K (BRN-Kongres), led by Rosa Burako, has been pursuing a military struggle but is currently less active.
- BRN-Ulama. There is little information about this subgroup.
The group's violent separatist insurgency began in 2004, with tactics such as setting two bombs at one location, with the second designed to kill and injure those attending the aftermath of the first. In total, the southern insurgency has killed more than 6,000 people.
In the past decade the BRN-C has been involved in numerous arson, bombing, and murder attacks to create an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty in the three southern provinces of Thailand. Thai military observers believe that the attacks are mostly carried out by its loosely affiliated and clandestine RKK outfit.
On 1 May 2013 insurgents attacked a restaurant in the Pattani Region. The perpetrators, armed with machine guns, killed six people including a two-year-old child. The act was an act of revenge, that appeared twelve hours following the action in the three predominantly Muslim provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani and Yala.
Use of children
In 2013 and 2014, the UN received reports that the BRN and other armed groups had recruited boys and girls from the age of 14; children were given military training and assigned as combatants, informants and scouts. No such reports were recorded by the UN in 2015 or 2016.
- Currently the use of the black flag of Jihad by BRN-C affiliated groups has largely replaced the former BRN flag.
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- United Nations Secretary-General (2015). "Report of the Secretary-General: Children and armed conflict, 2015". www.un.org. Retrieved 2018-01-24.
- United Nations Secretary-General (2016). "Report of the Secretary-General: Children and armed conflict, 2016". www.un.org. Retrieved 2018-01-24.
- United Nations Secretary-General (2017). "Report of the Secretary-General: Children and armed conflict, 2017". www.un.org. Retrieved 2018-01-24.