Battle of Baecula
|Battle of Baecula|
|Part of the Second Punic War|
Roman conquest of Carthaginian Spain, 210–206 BC
|Commanders and leaders|
|Scipio Africanus||Hasdrubal Barca|
30,000 Romans and Italians
|Casualties and losses|
8,000 killed (Livy)
12,000 captured (Polybius)
The Battle of Baecula was a major field battle in Iberia during the Second Punic War. Roman Republican and Spanish auxiliary forces under the command of Scipio Africanus routed the Carthaginian army of Hasdrubal Barca.
According to Polybius  after Scipio’s surprise attack and capture of Carthago Nova, the three Carthaginian armies in Iberia remained separated, and their generals at odds with each other, thus giving the Romans a chance to deal with them one by one.
Early in 208 BC, Scipio, with 30,000 Roman and Italian troops and 10,000 Spanish auxiliaries, moved against Hasdrubal Barca, whose 30,000-strong force had wintered at Baecula, on the upper reaches of the river Baetis (modern day Guadalquivir).
On learning of the Roman approach, Hasdrubal shifted his camp to a strong defensive position — a high and deep plateau south of Baecula, protected by ravines on the flanks and the river to the front and rear. Moreover, the plateau was formed into two steps, on which Hasdrubal posted his light troops on the lower one and his main camp behind.
After his arrival, Scipio was at first uncertain as to how to attack such a formidable position, but concerned that the other two Carthaginian armies might take advantage of his inaction and join with Hasdrubal, he took action on the third day.
Before his main attack, Scipio sent one detachment to block the entrance to the valley separating the two armies and one to the road leading north to Baecula, thus providing security to his main force, while harassing any Carthaginian attempt to retreat.
After these preliminary deployments were done, the Roman light troops advanced against their Carthaginian counterparts on the first step. Despite the steep slope, and under a shower of missile attack, the Romans had little difficulty driving back the Carthaginian light troops once they got into hand-to-hand combat.
After reinforcing his leading force, Scipio derived a pincer attack on the flanks of the Carthaginian main camp by ordering Gaius Laelius to lead half of the remaining heavy foot to the right of the enemy position, and he himself scaling the left.
Hasdrubal, meanwhile, was under the impression that the Roman attack was only a skirmish (Scipio had hidden his main army in camp until the final attack) and failed to properly deploy his main force, thus his ill-prepared army was caught on three sides by the Romans.
Despite being trapped, Hasdrubal was able to retreat unmolested with his elephants, main baggage train, and some of his Carthaginian troops. It appeared that his main losses in the battle were the majority of his light troops and Iberian allies. This was largely due to the legionnaries' choice to plunder the Carthaginian camp rather than pursue Hasdrubal with any earnestness.
Scipio failure to stop Hasdrubal's march to Italy was criticized by the Roman Senate. Scipio did not exploit his victory at Baecula to drive out the Carthaginians from Spain, instead choosing to withdraw to his base at Tarraco. He secured alliances with many of the Spanish tribes, who switched sides after the Roman successes at Carthago Nova and Baecula.
- Polybius; The Rise of the Roman Empire; Trans. Ian Scott-Kilvert; 1979; ISBN 0-14-044362-2
- Livy Titus Livius; "Complete Works of Livy"; DelphiClassics.com 2014 (in Latin & English)
- Hoyos, Dexter (2015). Mastering the West: Rome and Carthage at War. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-986010-4.
- Nigel Bagnall; The Punic Wars; 1990; ISBN 0-312-34214-4
- Serge Lancel; Hannibal; Trans. Antonia Nevill; 2000; ISBN 0-631-21848-3
- B.H. Liddell Hart; Scipio Africanus: Greater than Napoleon; 1926; ISBN 0-306-80583-9