Battle of Lava

Battle of Lava
Part of the Russo-Swedish War (1656–1658)
Date 11 August, 1657 Location Lava ostrog, near Nöteborg, Swedish Empire (present-day Russia) Result Disputed, see result
Belligerents
Swedish Empire	Tsardom of Russia
Commanders and leaders
Gustav Evertsson Horn Bernhard von Vietinghoff Johan Bäck Berendt Gröön Arvid Gyldenär	Alexandr Potyomkin
Units involved
Viborg cavalry Regiment Vietinghoff's dragoons	Lava regiment
Strength
1,700 men	1,300 men 2 guns
Casualties and losses
5 killed	13 killed One standard captured

The Battle of Lava (Swedish: Striden vid Lava; Russian: Битва за лаву) occurred on 11 August, 1657, when a Swedish force, under the command of Gustav Evertsson Horn, attacked a Russian ostrog at Lava. Horn, who had not been notified that Carl Gustaf Wrangel would not be able to support him, was not able to dislodge the Russians.

Background

In order to raise confidence and restore morale in his men, Horn decided to engage in a decisive battle and capture Potyomkin's redoubt at Lava. In order to achieve this, he began planning a two-pronged offensive from both land and water. Carl Gustaf Wrangel, who was commanding a fleet in the Gulf of Bothnia, would attack across the nearby lake with his entire squadron, which consisted of some 30 smaller vessels. He would land at the rear of Lava in order to cut communications between Ladoga and Lava, the former being further to the east. Meanwhile, Horn would march forward by land and assault Lava. He would bring seven companies from the Viborg Cavalry Regiment, five companies from Christopher Burmeister's Cavalry Regiment, both companies of the retinue of nobles of Finland, consisting of some 200 infantry, and last 400 dragoons from multiple regiments under Lieutenant Colonel Bernhard von Vietinghoff. In total, Horn had some 1,700 men at his disposal, and the operation was intended as a pincer attack.

Prelude

In early August, Horn set out, and closed in on Lava late at night. When there was a lack of a Russian response, he entrenched himself on a hill behind a clearing, with the terrain being unsuitable for cavalry movements, consisting of marshlands and thick forests. Simultaneously, Wrangel began enacting his part of the plan. On the same day as Horn reached Lava, Wrangel encountered a squadron of Russian vessels off the coast of Lava. A two-hour-long battle ensued, but there is a lack of details surrounding it, with no Swedish reports from the Swedes surviving. However, based from Russian accounts, Wrangel's squadron would disengage, and would continue further eastwards, pursued by Russian units on the shore. Wrangels squadron apparently camped on the shore some 20 kilometers away from the River Volkhov, which was also around 60 kilometers east of Lava.

On the next day, Wrangel returned, trying to land his men near Kobona, just north of Lava. However, Russian units along with shallow water, and the lack of suitable harbours prevented the landing. Wrangel's squadron only carried wooden anchors, while Lake Ladoga was the largest lake in Europe and was so big that made weather conditions as dangerous as they were on the open water if a storm struck. After the failed landing, Wrangel would go back to Shlisselburg, only managing to divide Potyomkin's forces, which helped Horn, but he had nontheless failed to carry out his share of the plan.

Battle

On 11 August, the same day that Wrangel attempted his landing at Kobona, Horn attacked Lava, unaware that Wrangel's part of the plan had failed. Since the Russians had shown no signs of noticing the preparations and arrival by the Swedes, Horn sent out 15 scouts on horseback to do reconaissance. The scouts rode up to the walls of the Lava redoubt, but ther was no reaction. No Russians could be seen, not even on the walls. Only when the leader of the scouts fired his pistol at the redoubt did the gate open, with the Russians emerging from it, forcing the Swedes to retreat before the overwhelming response. Despite his silence, Potyomkin knew of Horn's forces. He now marched his entire force out, consisting of some two companies of cavalry, 425 Don and other Cossacks, 300 streltsy, two Dragoon companies, and one infantry company, in total some 1,300 men along with two cannons.

Horn had entrenched himself on the hill with 200 infantry, Vietinghoff's dragoons, the regimental guns, and the two companies of the retinue of nobles, most likely acting as a reserve. Despite the forest, he positioned his remaining cavalry in two wings in the traditional way, with one on the left and another on the right. In a clearing infront of the hill, Horn deployed an advance guard of some 208 men, taken from the Viborg cavalry Regiment, commanded by the Major Johan Bäck from the retinue of nobles. Bäck had 107 cavalry in a second line of the guard, while he deployed the remaining 100 cavalrymen in the friont, under the command of the captains Berendt Gröön and Arvid Gyldenär.

Last, Horn placed a cavalry unit with 50 men under a certain Lieutenant Berg, inbetween the advance guard and the hill. Horn's plan might have been for Bäck to hold the Russians back and delay they as they charged, allowing the two cavalry wings to execute a flank manouver across the open ground in the clearing.

With some 1,700 Swedes against 1,300 Russians, the battle would turn into the greatest battle fought in Ladoga during the war. However, less is known about Potyomkin's deployment than Horn. Despite this, it is clear that Potyomkin sent forward an advance guard of cavalry. Upon seeing Gröön and Gyldenär's units in the clearing, the Russian vanguard stopped while in the forest, awaiting reinforcements. After this, Gröön and Gyldenär charged at the Russians, who retreated in slight disorder, taking cover behind their infantry which advanced from their rear. Gröön even managed to captured a Russian standard. However, the combat along with the dense cover caused disorder in the Swedish troops aswell. They retreated back into the clearing to re-organize their lines.

Then, something unexpected unfolded. Major Bäck, who under normal circumstances should have covered the Swedish retreat, opened fire on them instead, after which he turned his cavalry around and fled from the clearing. In the ensuing chaos, his own cavalry as well those under Lieutenant Berg followed after him. While the cavalrymen took cover among the infantry stationed on the hill, Bäck rejoined his own troops, the retinue of nobles, where he fired two cannons and allegedly had a nervous breakdown.

Potyomkin, taking advantage of the opportunity given to him by Bäck's breakdown, sent his entire force against Gröön and Gyldenär. Being driven up the hill, there was little the Swedes could do, despite Gyldenär managing to prevent the Russians from retrieving their captured standard. Vietinghoff's dragoons were pushed back as well, being forced to abandon their positions, until Horn led his 200 infantrymen in a counterattack, after executing previously captured Russian prisoners of war, which was a common habit in the theatrre when a retreat was likely.

At this point, some of the cavalry from Viborg and other dragoons rallied, joining Horn's attack. After half an hour of fighting, the Russians retreated. However, the retreat was in good order, not allowing the Swedes to go into action, and the Russians returned to the redoubt.

Aftermath

After estimates had been made, the Swedish casualties were claimed to have been only 5 men, although it is possible that it was more, since the losses of other units was not known yet. On the contrary, Potyomkin reported losses of three officers and 10 soldiers.

What happened to Bäck during the battle is debated among historians. However, after the battle, Bäck's behaviour resulted in many complaints, ultimately leading to a court-martial. It turned out that Bäck most likely suffered from what would today be known as PTSD (Post-traumatic stress disorder). Before the battle began, Bäck had requested to be released from duty by Horn. However, PTSD was not yet something the Swedish army regarded as a valid cause for recuperation, which possibly led to Horn assigning Bäck the command of the advance guard in order for him to prove himself, possibly thinking that a position of responsibility would cure Bäck of his worries.

The court-martial of Bäck lasted for a considrable amount of time, however, several officers displayed a degree of understanding for Bäck, which led to the proceedings ending with a technical reprimand, being forced to apologize to Horn.

After the battle, Horn may have pondered on whether or not to continue his offensive. He was not yet aware that Wrangel had failed to land his troops, nor that Wrangel had returned to Nöteborg after his failed landing. However, already in the evening, Russian troops began burning crops in the area, and since Horn had been forced to rely on taking food from Russian territory, and this becoming impossible, he ordered a retreat.

Result

The exact result of the battle is disputed. Some historians, Like Michael Fredholm von Essen, view the battle as inconclusive, while others like Ulf Sundberg view it as a Russian victory, Russian historian Oleg Kurbatov shares this opinion, mentioning that the battle disrupted all the strategic plans of the Swedes for the campaign in Ingria.

Works cited

• Kurbatov, Oleg (2018). Русско-Шведская война 1656-1658 [Russo-Swedish War of 1656-1658] (in Russian).
• Lappalainen, Jussi T. (1979). Stade, Arne (ed.). Kriget på östfronten [The War on the Eastern Front] (in Swedish). Militärhistoriska förlaget. pp. 134–137. ISBN 9789185266098.
• Essen, Michael Fredholm von (2023). Charles X's Wars: Volume 3 - The Danish Wars, 1657-1660. Helion & Company. pp. 228–231. ISBN 9781915113603.
• Sundberg, Ulf (2010). Sveriges krig 1630-1814 [Swedens wars 1630-1814] (in Swedish). Svenskt militärhistoriskt bibliotek. p. 142. ISBN 9789185789634.