Dred Scott v. Sandford

Scott v. Sandford
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued February 11–14, 1856 Reargued December 15–18, 1856 Decided March 6, 1857
Full case name	Dred Scott v. John F. A. Sandford
Citations	60 U.S. 393 (more) 19 Howard 393; 15 L. Ed. 691; 1856 WL 8721; 1857 U.S. LEXIS 472
Case history
Prior	Judgment for defendant, C.C. Mo.
Holding
Judgment reversed and suit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 1. Persons of African descent cannot be, nor were ever intended to be, citizens under the U.S. Const. Plaintiff is without standing to file a suit. 2. The Property Clause is only applicable to lands possessed at the time of ratification (1787). As such, Congress cannot ban slavery in the territories. Missouri Compromise is unconstitutional. 3. Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the federal government from freeing slaves brought into federal territories.
Court membership
Chief Justice Roger B. Taney Associate Justices John McLean · James M. Wayne John Catron · Peter V. Daniel Samuel Nelson · Robert C. Grier Benjamin R. Curtis · John A. Campbell
Case opinions
Majority	Taney, joined by Wayne, Catron, Daniel, Nelson, Grier, Campbell
Concurrence	Wayne
Concurrence	Catron
Concurrence	Daniel
Concurrence	Nelson, joined by Grier
Concurrence	Grier
Concurrence	Campbell
Dissent	McLean
Dissent	Curtis
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amend. V; Missouri Compromise
Superseded by
U.S. Const. amends. XIII, XIV

Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), was a landmark decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in which the Court held that African Americans, whether slave or free, could not be American citizens and therefore had no standing to sue in federal court, and that the federal government had no power to regulate slavery in the federal territories acquired after the creation of the United States. Dred Scott, an African American slave who had been taken by his owners to free states and territories, attempted to sue for his freedom. In a 7–2 decision written by Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, the Court denied Scott's request. For only the second time in its history the Supreme Court ruled an Act of Congress to be unconstitutional.

Although Taney hoped that his ruling would settle the slavery question once and for all, the decision immediately spurred vehement dissent from anti-slavery elements in the North, especially Republicans. Most scholars today (and many contemporary lawyers) considered the ruling regarding slavery in the territories to be dictum, not binding precedent. The decision would prove to be an indirect catalyst for the American Civil War. It was functionally superseded by the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which gave blacks full citizenship. It is now widely regarded by scholars as the worst decision ever made by the Supreme Court.

Background

Portrait of Dred Scott

Events leading to the American Civil War

1. Northwest Ordinance
2. Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions
3. End of Atlantic slave trade
4. Missouri Compromise
5. Tariff of 1828
6. Nat Turner's Rebellion
7. Nullification crisis
8. End of slavery in British colonies
9. Texas Revolution
10. United States v. Crandall
11. Gag rule
12. Commonwealth v. Aves
13. Murder of Elijah Lovejoy
14. Burning of Pennsylvania Hall
15. American Slavery As It Is
16. United States v. The Amistad
17. Prigg v. Pennsylvania
18. Texas annexation
19. Mexican–American War
20. Wilmot Proviso
21. Nashville Convention
22. Compromise of 1850
23. Uncle Tom's Cabin
24. Recapture of Anthony Burns
25. Kansas–Nebraska Act
26. Ostend Manifesto
27. Bleeding Kansas
28. Caning of Charles Sumner
29. Dred Scott v. Sandford
30. The Impending Crisis of the South
31. Panic of 1857
32. Lincoln–Douglas debates
33. Oberlin–Wellington Rescue
34. John Brown's raid on Harpers Ferry
35. Virginia v. John Brown
36. 1860 presidential election
37. Crittenden Compromise
38. Secession of Southern states
39. Peace Conference of 1861
40. Corwin Amendment
41. Battle of Fort Sumter

Main article: Dred Scott

Not that much is known of Dred Scott's early years. He was born a slave in Virginia in 1795. In 1820, he was taken by his owner, Peter Blow, to Missouri, where he was later purchased by U.S. Army Surgeon Dr. John Emerson. After purchasing Scott, Emerson took him to Fort Armstrong, which was located in Illinois. Illinois, a free state, had been free as a territory under the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, and had prohibited slavery in its constitution in 1819 when it was admitted as a state.

In 1836, Emerson moved with Scott from Illinois to Fort Snelling, which was located in the Wisconsin territory (in what would become the state of Minnesota). Slavery in the Wisconsin Territory (some of which, including the location of Fort Snelling, was a part of the Louisiana Purchase) was prohibited by the United States Congress under the Missouri Compromise. During his stay at Fort Snelling, Scott married Harriet Robinson, a slave who had been acquired by Emerson at the fort.

In 1837, the Army ordered Emerson to Jefferson Barracks Military Post, south of St. Louis, Missouri. Emerson left Scott and his wife at Fort Snelling, where he leased their services out for profit. By hiring Scott out in a free state, Emerson was effectively bringing the institution of slavery into a free state, which was a direct violation of the Missouri Compromise, the Northwest Ordinance, and the Wisconsin Enabling Act.

Before the end of the year, the Army reassigned Emerson to Fort Jesup in Louisiana. There Emerson married Eliza Irene Sanford in February 1838. Emerson sent for Scott and Harriet, who proceeded to Louisiana to serve their master and his wife. While en route to Louisiana, Scott's daughter Eliza was born on a steamboat underway along the Mississippi River between Iowa and Illinois. Because Eliza was born in free territory, she was technically born as a free person under both federal and state laws. Upon entering Louisiana, the Scotts could have sued for their freedom, but did not. In all likelihood, the Scotts would have been granted their freedom by a Louisiana court, as it had respected laws of free states that slaveholders forfeited their right to slaves if they brought them in for extended periods in a free state. This was Louisiana state precedent for more than 20 years.

Toward the end of 1838, the Army reassigned Emerson to Fort Snelling. By 1840, Emerson's wife Eliza returned to St. Louis with their slaves Scott and Harriet, while Emerson served in the Seminole War. While in St. Louis, she hired them out. In 1842, Emerson left the Army. After he died in the Iowa Territory in 1843, his widow Eliza inherited his estate, including the Scotts. For three years after Emerson's death, she continued to lease out the Scotts as hired slaves. In 1846, Scott attempted to purchase his and his family's freedom, but Eliza Irene Emerson refused, prompting Scott to resort to legal recourse.

Procedural history

First attempt

After failing to purchase the freedom of his family and himself, and with the help of abolitionist legal advisers, Scott sued Emerson for his freedom in a Missouri court in 1846. Scott received financial assistance for his case from the son of his previous owner, Peter Blow. Scott based his legal argument on prvghgygygecedents such as Somersett v. Stewart, Winny v. Whitesides, and Rachel v. Walker, claiming his presence and residence in free territories required his emancipation. Scott's lawyers argued the same for Scott's wife, and further claimed that Eliza Scott's birth on a steamboat between a free state and a free territory had made her free upon birth.

It was expected that the Scotts would win their freedom with relative ease since Missouri courts had previously heard over ten other cases in which they had freed slaves who had been taken into free territory. But, in June 1847, Scott's suit was dismissed on a technicality: Scott had failed to provide a witness to testify that Scott was in fact a slave belonging to Eliza Emerson.

Scott v. Emerson

At the end of 1847, the judge granted Scott a new trial. Emerson appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of Missouri, which affirmed the trial court's order in 1848.

Due to a major fire, a cholera epidemic, and two continuances, the new trial did not begin until January 1850. While the case awaited trial, Scott and his family were placed in the custody of the St. Louis County Sheriff, who had continued to rent out the services of Scott, placing the rents in escrow. Having produced a witness who testified that Emerson was the owner of Scott, the jury, following Missouri precedent, found in favor of Scott and his family. Unwilling to accept the loss of four slaves and a substantial escrow account, Emerson appealed to the Supreme Court of Missouri, although by that point she had moved to Massachusetts and transferred ownership of Scott to her brother, John F. A. Sanford.

In November 1852, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision, effectively overturning 28 years of Missouri state precedent. It held that the Scotts were still legally slaves and that they should have sued for freedom while living in a free state. Chief Justice William Scott declared:

Times are not now as they were when the former decisions on this subject were made. Since then not only individuals but States have been possessed with a dark and fell spirit in relation to slavery, whose gratification is sought in the pursuit of measures, whose inevitable consequences must be the overthrow and destruction of our government. Under such circumstances it does not behoove the State of Missouri to show the least countenance to any measure which might gratify this spirit. She is willing to assume her full responsibility for the existence of slavery within her limits, nor does she seek to share or divide it with others.

Scott v. Sanford

In 1853, Scott again sued his current owner, John Sanford, but now in federal court. The grounds for taking the case to federal court were that Sanford was a resident of New York, having returned there in 1853, and that the federal courts could hear the case under diversity jurisdiction provided in Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution.

At trial in 1854, Judge Robert William Wells directed the jury to rely on Missouri law to settle the question of Scott's freedom. Since the Missouri Supreme Court had held that Scott remained a slave, the jury found in favor of Sanford. Scott then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Influence of President Buchanan

Historians discovered that after the Supreme Court had heard arguments in the case but before it had issued a ruling, the President-elect James Buchanan wrote to his friend, U.S. Supreme Court Associate Justice John Catron, asking whether the case would be decided by the U.S. Supreme Court before his inauguration in March 1857. Buchanan hoped the decision would quell unrest in the country over the slavery issue by issuing a ruling that put the future of slavery beyond the realm of political debate.

Buchanan later successfully pressured Associate Justice Robert Cooper Grier, a Northerner, to join the Southern majority in the Dred Scott decision to prevent the appearance that the decision was made along sectional lines. By present-day standards, such correspondence would be considered improper ex parte contact with a court.

Even under the more lenient standards of that century, Buchanan's applying such political pressure to a member of a sitting court would have been seen as improper. Republicans fueled speculation as to Buchanan's influence on the decision by publicizing that Chief Justice Roger Taney had whispered in Buchanan's ear prior to Buchanan's declaring, in his inaugural address, that the slavery question would "be speedily and finally settled" by the Supreme Court.

Decision

Cover sheet summarizing the disposition of the case

The Supreme Court ruling was handed down on March 6, 1857, just two days after Buchanan's inauguration. Chief Justice Taney delivered the opinion of the Court, with each of the concurring and dissenting Justices filing separate opinions. In total, six Justices agreed with the ruling; Samuel Nelson concurred with the ruling but not its reasoning, and Benjamin Robbins Curtis and John McLean dissented. The court misspelled Sanford's name in the decision.

Opinion of the Court

There were three questions before the Court.

The Supreme Court first had to decide whether the federal Circuit Court had jurisdiction to hear Scott's case. Chief Justice Taney began the analysis with the established principles that federal judicial power is limited and that the record must affirmatively demonstrate that a case falls within one of the categories recognized by the Constitution. Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution provides that "the judicial Power shall extend... to Controversies... between Citizens of different States..." (This particular ground is known as "diversity jurisdiction".) Scott declared he was a "citizen" of the State of Missouri and that the defendant was a citizen of the State of New York. The Court acknowledged that this prima facie established federal jurisdiction under the Diversity Clause. However, Sanford disputed the jurisdictional claim and alleged that Scott was a descendent of an imported African slave, and by reason of such fact could not be a "citizen" of any State. Scott did not dispute his ancestry, but contended other allegations in his suit made evident that he had been emancipated, and therefore could have the status of "citizen". The Court held that neither Scott nor any other person of African descent—whether or not emancipated from slavery—could be "citizen of a state", and therefore was unable to bring suit in federal court on the ground of diversity. Taney spent pages 407-421 of his decision chronicling the history of slave and negro law in the British colonies and American states. His goal was to ascertain whether, at the time the Constitution was ratified, federal law could have recognized Scott (a Negro descendant of a slave) as a citizen of any state within the meaning of Article III. Relying upon statements made by Charles Pinckney, who had claimed authorship of the Privileges and Immunities Clause during the debates over the Missouri Compromise, Taney decided: "the affirmative of these propositions cannot be maintained." According to Taney, the authors of the Constitution had viewed all blacks as "beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations, and so far inferior that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect."

The Court also presented a parade of horribles argument, based on the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, listing what the Court considered to be the inevitable and undesirable effects of granting Scott's petition:

It would give to persons of the negro race, ...the right to enter every other State whenever they pleased, ...to sojourn there as long as they pleased, to go where they pleased ...the full liberty of speech in public and in private upon all subjects upon which its own citizens might speak; to hold public meetings upon political affairs, and to keep and carry arms wherever they went.

If Scott had been a citizen according to Missouri law, then the question of whether the Circuit Court could have jurisdiction would still be an open one, because "no State can, by any act or law of its own, passed since the adoption of the Constitution, introduce a new member into the political community created by the Constitution of the United States."

Therefore, according to Taney's analysis, nothing in the nation's history or law suggests that Scott's peculiar situation would make him a citizen of the United States, eligible to sue in federal court.

Despite the conclusion that the Court lacked jurisdiction, however, it went on to decide the second question of the decision (in what Republicans would label its "obiter dictum"): the provisions of the Missouri Compromise declaring it to be free territory were beyond Congress's power to enact. The Court rested its decision on the grounds that Congress's power to acquire territories and create governments within those territories was limited solely to the Northwest Territories, not Louisiana territory, which was acquired well after the signing of the Constitution.

Parrying the Constitution's Article IV, Section 3 ("The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States"), Taney argued that the clause immediately following protected permanent states — those that eventually arose from temporary territories — from those very Rules and Regulations: "...and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State."

The Court also held that the Fifth Amendment barred any law that would deprive a slaveholder of his property, such as his slaves, upon the incidence of migration into free territory.

This was the second time in United States history that the Supreme Court had found an act of Congress to be unconstitutional. (The first time was 54 years earlier in Marbury v. Madison).

The third and last question before the Court was related and likewise evaded by the question of jurisdiction: Did Scott's residency in the free territory of modern-day Minnesota (then part of the Wisconsin Territory) make him a free man? Citing a similar case in Strader v. Graham (1851), Taney deferred to the opinion of Scott's current state's court system on the matter:

we are satisfied, upon a careful examination of all the cases decided in the State courts of Missouri referred to, that it is now firmly settled by the decisions of the highest court in the State, that Scott and his family upon their return were not free, but were, by the laws of Missouri, the property of the defendant; and that the Circuit Court of the United States had no jurisdiction, when, by the laws of the State, the plaintiff was a slave, and not a citizen.

On this point, Taney also specifically cited the Supreme Court of Missouri's denial of Dred Scott's freedom. Because the United States Circuit Court did not have jurisdiction on this matter, Taney argued, the decisions of the government of Missouri took precedence. Scott could not be a free man.

Concurrence by Justice Nelson

Technically, Nelson did not concur in the judgment of the Supreme Court, for the formal judgment of that Court was that "the judgment [of the Circuit Court] for the defendant ... be reversed, and a mandate issued directing the suit [of plaintiff Scott] to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 60 U.S. at 454", whereas Nelson would have affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court 60 U.S. at 469. However, in terms of the practical effect on Scott and his family, it was immaterial as to whether his case was to be dismissed, as ordered by the Court, or the judgment declaring on the merits that they were all still slaves be affirmed, as Nelson would have held. However, the legal theories of Nelson and the Court were very different. Nelson expressly declined to address the jurisdictional issue, but instead addressed the merits of Scott's case.

The Supreme Court, which addressed the merits in dictum, expressed the view that the federal statute which had prohibited slavery in the "Territory of Upper Louisiana" was unconstitutional. (At the time of Scott's sojourn this area was administered as the Wisconsin Territory. The term "Territory of Upper Louisiana" was used in Nelson's opinion and the formal Statement of the Case. However, that was the name used for the area during French administration, not the American administration.) Nelson found it unnecessary to reach this constitutional issue. To Nelson, the merits properly turned on a principle of State's rights. He assumed for purposes of argument that Scott might have been emancipated during his sojourn in Illinois and/or his sojourn in Upper Louisiana. However, in Nelson's view each State that permitted slavery had the constitutional right to determine what effect it would give to any emancipation which might have occurred elsewhere once the Negro person had returned to that State.

A State might, as the State of Louisiana did for a period by court decision, decide to honor extraterritorial emancipation; or a State might, as the State of Missouri did when its Supreme Court reversed Scott's initial victory in the Missouri court, decide to nullify any extraterritorial emancipation and revive the slave status. Since the State of Missouri had clearly determined that it considered Scott still to be a slave, irrespective of any prior emancipation, that foreclosed the issue for Nelson, and the federal Circuit Court properly found him and his family to be slaves while they were in Missouri.

Dissents by Justice Curtis and Justice McLean

Presiding Judge of the Louisiana Supreme Court George Mathews Jr. ruling in Marie Louise v. Marot (1835) was cited as precedent by dissenting Justice McLean during the Dred Scott v. Sandford case.

Curtis, in dissent, attacked much of the Court's decision as obiter dicta, on the ground that once the Court determined that it did not have jurisdiction to hear Scott's case, it must simply dismiss the action, and not pass judgment on the merits of the claims. The dissents by Curtis and McLean also attacked the Court's overturning of the Missouri Compromise on its merits, noting both that it was not necessary to decide the question, and also that none of the authors of the Constitution had ever objected on constitutional grounds to the United States Congress' adoption of the antislavery provisions of the Northwest Ordinance passed by the Continental Congress, or the subsequent acts that barred slavery north of 36°30' N.

Nor, these justices argued, was there any basis for the claim that blacks could not be citizens. At the time of the ratification of the Constitution, black men could vote in five of the thirteen states. This made them citizens not only of their states but of the United States. Therefore, Justice McLean concluded that the argument that Scott was not a citizen was "more a matter of taste than of law". In his dissent, Justice McLean cited as precedent Marie Louise v. Marot, an 1835 case in which Louisiana Supreme Court Chief Justice George Mathews Jr. ruled that "being free for one moment in [territory non-permitting of slavery], it was not in the power of [a] former owner to reduce [a slave] again to slavery."

Consequences

Economic

Perhaps the most immediate business consequence of the decision was to help trigger the Panic of 1857. Economist Charles Calomiris and historian Larry Schweikart discovered that uncertainty about whether the entire West would suddenly become either slave territory or engulfed in combat like Bleeding Kansas immediately gripped the markets. The east/west railroads collapsed immediately (although north/south-running lines were unaffected), causing, in turn, the near-collapse of several large banks and the runs that ensued. What followed these runs has been called the Panic of 1857, and it differed sharply from the Panic of 1837 in that its effects were almost exclusively confined to the North. Calomiris and Schweikart found this resulted from the South's superior system of branch banking (as opposed to the North's unit banking system), in which the transmission of the panic was minor due to the diversification of the southern branch banking systems. Information moved reliably among the branch banks, whereas in the North, the unit banks (competitors) seldom shared such vital information.

Political

The decision was hailed in Southern slaveholding society as a proper interpretation of the United States Constitution. According to Jefferson Davis, then a United States Senator from Mississippi, and later President of the Confederate States of America, the Dred Scott case was merely a question "whether Cuffee should be kept in his normal condition or not". At that time, "Cuffee" was a term commonly used to describe a black person.

Prior to Dred Scott, Democratic Party politicians had sought repeal of the Missouri Compromise, and were finally successful in 1854 with the passage of the Kansas–Nebraska Act. This act permitted each newly admitted state south of the 40th parallel to decide whether to be a slave state or free state. Now, with Dred Scott, the Supreme Court under Taney sought to permit the unhindered expansion of slavery into the territories.

The Dred Scott decision, then, represented a culmination of what many at that time considered a push to expand slavery. Southerners at the time, who had grown uncomfortable with the Kansas-Nebraska Act, argued that they had a right, under the federal constitution, to bring slaves into the territories, regardless of any decision by a territorial legislature on the subject. The Dred Scott decision seemed to endorse that view. The expansion of the territories and resulting admission of new states would mean a loss of political power for the North, as many of the new states would be admitted as slave states, and counting slaves as three-fifths of a person would add to the slave holding states' political representation in Congress.

Although Taney believed that the decision represented a compromise that would settle the slavery question once and for all by transforming a contested political issue into a matter of settled law, it produced the opposite result. It strengthened Northern slavery opposition, divided the Democratic Party on sectional lines, encouraged secessionist elements among Southern supporters of slavery to make bolder demands, and strengthened the Republican Party.

Reaction

Opponents of slavery fiercely attacked the Dred Scott decision. The Evening Journal of Albany, New York, combined two themes and denounced the decision as both an offense to the principles of liberty on which the nation was founded, and a victory for slave states over the free states:

The three hundred and forty-seven thousand five hundred and twenty-five Slaveholders in the Republic, accomplished day before yesterday a great success — as shallow men estimate success. They converted the Supreme Court of Law and Equity of the United States of America into a propagandist of human Slavery. Fatal day for a judiciary made reputable throughout the world, and reliable to all in this nation, by the learning and the virtues of Jay, Rutledge, Ellsworth, Marshall and Story!

The conspiracy is nearly completed. The Legislation of the Republic is in the hands of this handful of Slaveholders. The United States Senate assures it to them. The Executive power of the Government is theirs. Buchanan took the oath of fealty to them on the steps of the Capitol last Wednesday. The body which gives the supreme law of the land, has just acceded to their demands, and dared to declare that under the charter of the Nation, men of African descent are not citizens of the United States and can not be — that the Ordinance of 1787 was void — that human Slavery is not a local thing, but pursues its victims to free soil, clings to them wherever they go, and returns with them — that the American Congress has no power to prevent the enslavement of men in the National Territories — that the inhabitants themselves of the Territories have no power to exclude human bondage from their midst — and that men of color can not be suitors for justice in the Courts of the United States!

That editorial ended on a martial note:

...All who love Republican institutions and who hate Aristocracy, compact yourselves together for the struggle which threatens your liberty and will test your manhood!

Many abolitionists and some supporters of slavery believed that Taney was prepared to rule, as soon as the issue was presented in a subsequent case, as for instance, Lemmon v. New York, that the states had no power to prohibit slavery within their borders and that state laws providing for the emancipation of slaves brought into their territory or forbidding the institution of slavery were likewise unconstitutional. Abraham Lincoln stressed this danger during his famous "House Divided" speech at Springfield, Illinois, on June 16, 1858:

Put this and that together, and we have another nice little niche, which we may, ere long, see filled with another Supreme Court decision, declaring that the Constitution of the United States does not permit a State to exclude slavery from its limits. ...We shall lie down pleasantly dreaming that the people of Missouri are on the verge of making their State free, and we shall awake to the reality instead, that the Supreme Court has made Illinois a slave State.

That fear of the next Dred Scott decision shocked many in the North who had been content to accept slavery as long as it was confined within its present borders. It also put the Northern Democrats, such as Stephen A. Douglas, in a difficult position. The Northern wing of the Democratic Party had supported the Kansas–Nebraska Act of 1854 under the banner of popular sovereignty. They argued that even if Congress did not bar the expansion of slavery into those territories, the residents of those territories could prohibit it by territorial legislation. The Dred Scott decision squarely stated that they could not exercise such prohibition, even though, strictly speaking, that issue was not before the Court.

Without challenging the Court's decision directly, Douglas attempted to overcome that obstacle by creating his Freeport Doctrine. Douglas insisted that, even if a territory could not bar slavery outright, the institution could not take root without local police regulations to protect it and a territory could refuse to pass such local support.

This doctrine was wholly unacceptable to Southern Democrats, who reached a different conclusion from the same premise. They argued that if hostile territorial governments could obstruct their right to bring their slaves into a territory by refusing to protect that right, then Congress must intervene to pass a federal slave code for all the territories. They often coupled this position with threats to secede if Congress did not comply.

At the same time, Democrats characterized Republicans as lawless rebels, provoking disunion by their unwillingness to accept the Supreme Court's decision as the law of the land. Many Northern opponents of slavery offered a legalistic argument for refusing to recognize the Dred Scott decision as binding. As they noted, the Court's decision began with the proposition that the federal courts did not have jurisdiction to hear Scott's case because he was not a citizen of the State of Missouri. Therefore, so the opponents argued, the remainder of the decision concerning the Missouri Compromise was unnecessary (i.e., beyond the Court's power to decide) and therefore a passing remark rather than an authoritative interpretation of the law (i.e., obiter dictum). Douglas attacked this position in the Lincoln–Douglas debates:

Mr. Lincoln goes for a warfare upon the Supreme Court of the United States, because of their judicial decision in the Dred Scott case. I yield obedience to the decisions in that court—to the final determination of the highest judicial tribunal known to our constitution.

Southern supporters of slavery claimed that the Dred Scott decision was essential to the preservation of the union. As the Richmond Enquirer stated:

Thus has a politico-legal question, involving others of deep import, been decided emphatically in favor of the advocates and supporters of the Constitution and the Union, the equality of the States and the rights of the South, in contradistinction to and in repudiation of the diabolical doctrines inculcated by factionists and fanatics; and that too by a tribunal of jurists, as learned, impartial and unprejudiced as perhaps the world has ever seen. A prize, for which the athletes of the nation have often wrestled in the halls of Congress, has been awarded at last, by the proper umpire, to those who have justly won it. The "nation" has achieved a triumph, "sectionalism" has been rebuked, and abolitionism has been staggered and stunned. Another supporting pillar has been added to our institutions; the assailants of the South and enemies of the Union have been driven from their point d'appui; a patriotic principle has been pronounced; a great, national, conservative, union saving sentiment has been proclaimed.

While some supporters of slavery treated the decision as a vindication of their rights within the union, others treated it as merely a step to spreading slavery throughout the nation, as the Republicans claimed. Convinced that any restrictions on their right to own slaves and to take them anywhere they chose were unlawful, they boasted that the coming decade would see slave auctions on Boston Common. These Southern radicals were ready to split the Democratic Party and — as events showed — the nation on that principle.

Frederick Douglass, a prominent African-American abolitionist who thought the decision unconstitutional and the Chief Justice's reasoning inapposite to the founders' vision, prophesied that political conflict could not be avoided.

The highest authority has spoken. The voice of the Supreme Court has gone out over the troubled waves of the National Conscience.... [But] my hopes were never brighter than now. I have no fear that the National Conscience will be put to sleep by such an open, glaring, and scandalous tissue of lies....

The Scott family's fate

The sons of Peter Blow, Scott's first owner, purchased emancipation for Scott and his family on May 26, 1857. Their gaining freedom was national news and celebrated in northern cities.

Scott worked in a hotel in St. Louis, where he was considered a local celebrity. He died of tuberculosis only 18 months later, on November 7, 1858. Harriet died on June 17, 1876.

Later references

Justice John Marshall Harlan was the lone dissenting vote in the 1896 Supreme Court Plessy v. Ferguson, which legalized racial segregation and created the concept of "separate but equal". In his dissent, Harlan wrote that the majority's opinion would "prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal in the Dred Scott case."

Charles Evans Hughes, writing in 1927 on the Supreme Court's history, described Dred Scott v. Sandford as a "self-inflicted wound" from which the court would not recover for over a decade.

In a memo to Justice Robert H. Jackson in 1952 (for whom he was clerking at the time) on the subject of Brown v. Board of Education, future Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote that "Scott v. Sandford was the result of Taney's effort to protect slaveholders from legislative interference."

Justice Antonin Scalia made the comparison between Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) and Dred Scott in an effort to see Roe v. Wade overturned:

[D]red Scott...rested upon the concept of "substantive due process" that the Court praises and employs today. Indeed, Dred Scott was very possibly the first application of substantive due process in the Supreme Court, the original precedent for...Roe v. Wade.

Scalia noted that the Dred Scott decision, written and championed by Roger B. Taney, left the justice's reputation irrevocably tarnished. Taney, while attempting to end the disruptive question of the future of slavery, wrote a decision that aggravated sectional tensions and was considered to contribute to the American Civil War.

Legacy

• 1977, the Scotts' great-grandson, John A. Madison, Jr., an attorney, gave the invocation at the ceremony at the Old Courthouse (St. Louis, Missouri), a National Historic Landmark, for the dedication of a National Historic Marker commemorating the Scotts' case tried there.
• 2000, Harriet and Dred Scott's petition papers in their freedom suit were displayed at the main branch of the St. Louis Public Library, following discovery of more than 300 freedom suits in the archives of the US circuit court.
• 2006, a new historic plaque was erected at the Old Courthouse to honor the active roles of both Dred and Harriet Scott in their freedom suit and the case's significance in US history.

See also

• List of United States Supreme Court cases, volume 60
• List of United States Supreme Court cases
• Origins of the American Civil War
• Timeline of the American Civil Rights Movement

Further reading

• Fehrenbacher, Don E. Slavery, Law, and Politics: The Dred Scott Case in Historical Perspective (1981)
• Konig, David Thomas, Paul Finkelman, and Christopher Alan Bracey, eds. The "Dred Scott" Case: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives on Race and Law (Ohio University Press; 2010) 272 pages; essays by scholars on the history of the case and its afterlife in American law and society.
• Potter, David M. The Impending Crisis, 1848-1861 (1976) pp 267–96
• VanderVelde, Lea. Mrs. Dred Scott: A Life on Slavery's Frontier (Oxford University press, 2009) 480 pp.
• Swain, Gwenyth (2004). Dred and Harriet Scott: A Family's Struggle for Freedom. Saint Paul, MN: Borealis Books. ISBN 978-0-87351-482-8. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
• Tushnet, Mark (2008). I dissent: Great Opposing Opinions in Landmark Supreme Court Cases. Boston: Beacon Press. pp. 31–44. ISBN 978-0-8070-0036-6. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)

External links

• Texts on Wikisource:
  • Dred Scott v. Sandford
  • Gilman, D. C.; Peck, H. T.; Colby, F. M., eds. (1905). New International Encyclopedia (1st ed.). New York: Dodd, Mead. {{cite encyclopedia}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  • Reynolds, Francis J., ed. (1921). "Dred Scott Case". Collier's New Encyclopedia. New York: P. F. Collier & Son Company.
• Text of Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856) is available from: Findlaw Justia LII
• Primary documents and bibliography about the Dred Scott case, from the Library of Congress
• Summary of the case from OYEZ
• "Dred Scott decision", Encyclopædia Britannica 2006. Encyclopædia Britannica Online. 17 December 2006. www.yowebsite.com
• Gregory J. Wallance, "Dred Scott Decision: The Lawsuit That Started The Civil War", History.net, originally in Civil War Times Magazine, March/April 2006
• Jefferson National Expansion Memorial, National Park Service
• Infography about the Dred Scott Case
• The Dred Scott Case Collection, Washington University in St. Louis
• Report of the Brown University Steering Committee on Slavery and Justice
• Dred Scott case articles from William Lloyd Garrison's abolitionist newspaper The Liberator