The Missouri Compromise was attained through legislation passed by the 16th Congress of the United States on April 2, 1820. The measures provided for the admission of the District of Maine as a free state and the Missouri territory without restriction on slavery. In addition, it outlawed slavery north of the 36°30′ parallel within the Louisiana Purchase lands, thereby committing the largest remaining portion of the territory to free-soil. South of the parallel no slavery restrictions were imposed. President James Monroe signed the legislation on April 6, 1820.
The compromise bills served to quell the furious sectional debates that had first erupted during the final session of the 15th Congress. On February 3, 1819, Representative James Tallmadge, Jr., a Jeffersonian Republican from New York State, had submitted two amendments to Missouri's request for statehood. The first proposed to federally prohibit further slave migration into Missouri; the second would require all slave offspring, born after statehood, freed at 25 years of age. At issue among southern legislators was the encroachment by their northern free state colleagues in what they considered a purely sectional concern: slave labor.
Northern critics including Federalists and Republicans, objected to the expansion of slavery into the Louisiana Purchase territory on the Constitutional inequalities of the three-fifths rule, which conferred Southern representation in the federal government, derived from a states’ slave population. Nonetheless, the more populous North held a firm numerical advantage in the House. Jeffersonian Republicans in the North ardently maintained that a strict interpretation of the Constitution required that Congress act to limit the spread of slavery on egalitarian grounds.
The slave-holding states were acutely aware that maintaining a balance in the number of free-to-slave states was necessary to ensure political equilibrium in the US Senate. With the Senate evenly split at the opening of the debates, both sections possessing 11 states, the admission of Missouri would give the South a two-seat advantage in the upper house and diminish the Northern lower house majority. The South sought to enlist Missouri to maintain Southern political preeminence and ensure security of their institutions.
The 15th Congress ended in March 1819 with Missouri statehood deadlocked, the House sustaining its northern antislavery position, and the Senate blocking a slavery restricted statehood. Antislavery agitation grew in the North in the aftermath of the debates, leading to widespread opposition to slavery in Missouri. As the 16th Congress assembled in December 1819, the two houses were thoroughly polarized over slavery in the Louisiana Purchase territories.
When the free-soil District of Maine offered its petition for statehood, the Senate quickly linked the Maine and Missouri bills, making Maine admission a condition for Missouri entering the Union with slavery unrestricted. Senator Jesse B. Thomas of Illinois added a compromise proviso, excluding slavery from all remaining lands of the Louisiana Purchase north of the 36 30’ parallel. The combined measures passed the Senate, only to be voted down in the House by those Northern representatives who held out for a free Missouri. Speaker of the House of Representatives Henry Clay of Kentucky, in a desperate bid to break the deadlock, divided the Senate bills. Clay and his pro-compromise allies succeeded in pressuring half the anti-restrictionist House Southerners to submit to the passage of the Thomas proviso, while maneuvering a number of restrictionist House northerners to acquiesce in supporting Missouri as a slave state. This was the Missouri Compromise.
The legislation extracted by the compromisers served to effect a "brokered truce" or "armistice" rather than a genuine compromise. The crux of the Compromise was that it circumvented the growing disaffection among Jeffersonian Republicans.
The Missouri crisis would spur the formation of two powerful political organizations – the Democratic and Whig Parties – both committed to preserving the federal Union by means of sectional compromise and the suppression of the explosive pro-slavery and antislavery arguments the had surfaced over Missouri statehood. The repeal of the Missouri Compromise in the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 would hasten the growth of a mass antislavery coalition – the Republican Party –whose precepts of which were first formulated by Jeffersonian Republican restrictionists during the Missouri crisis.
- 1 The Louisiana Purchase and Missouri Territory
- 2 The Era of Good Feelings and Political "Amalgamation"
- 3 Development in Congress
- 4 Impact on political discourse
- 5 Repeal
- 6 See also
- 7 Notes
- 8 References
- 9 Bibliography
- 10 External links
The Louisiana Purchase and Missouri Territory
The immense Louisiana Purchase territories had been acquired through federal executive action, followed by Republican legislative authorization in 1803 during the Thomas Jefferson administration. In the years following the War of 1812, Missouri territory experienced rapid settlement, led by slaveholding planters.
Prior to its purchase in 1803, the rulers of Spain and France had sanctioned slaveholding in the region. In 1812, the state of Louisiana, a major cotton-producer and the first to be carved from the Louisiana Purchase, had entered the Union as a slave state. Predictably, Missourians were adamant that slave labor should not be molested by the federal government.
Agriculturally, the lower reaches of the Missouri River had no prospects as a major cotton producer. Suited for diversified farming, the only crop regarded as promising for slave labor was hemp culture. On that basis, southern planters immigrated with their chattel to Missouri, the slave population rising from 3,000 in 1810 to 10,000 in 1820. In a total population 66,000, slaves represented about 15 percent.
By 1818, the population of Missouri territory was approaching the threshold that would qualify it for statehood. An enabling act was provided to Congress empowering territorial residents to select convention delegates and draft a state constitution.
The Era of Good Feelings and Political "Amalgamation"
The Era of Good Feelings, closely associated with the administration of President James Monroe (1817-1825), was characterized by the dissolution of national political identities. With the discredited Federalists in decline nationally, the "amalgamated" or hybridized Republicans adopted key Federalist economic programs and institutions, further erasing party identities and consolidating their victory.
The economic nationalism of the Era of Good Feelings that would authorize the Tariff of 1816 and incorporate the Second Bank of the United States portended an abandonment of the Jeffersonian political formula for strict construction of the constitution, limited central government and commitments to the primacy of Southern agrarian interests. The end of opposition parties also meant the end of party discipline and the means to suppress internecine factional animosities. Rather than produce political harmony, as President James Monroe had hoped, amalgamation had led to intense rivalries among Jeffersonian Republicans.
It was amid the "good feelings" of this period - during which Republican Party discipline was in abeyance - that the Tallmadge amendment surfaced.
Development in Congress
To balance the number of "slave states" and "free states," the northern region of what was then Massachusetts, the District of Maine, ultimately gained admission into the United States as a free state to become Maine. This only occurred as a result of a compromise involving slavery in Missouri, and in the federal territories of the American west. The admission of another slave state would increase the South's power at a time when northern politicians had already begun to regret the Constitution's Three-Fifths Compromise. Although more than 60 percent of whites in the United States lived in the North, by 1818 northern representatives held only a slim majority of congressional seats. The additional political representation allotted to the South as a result of the Three-Fifths Compromise gave southerners more seats in the House of Representatives than they would have had if the number was based on just free population. Moreover, since each state had two Senate seats, Missouri's admission as a slave state would result in more southern than northern senators. A bill to enable the people of the Missouri Territory to draft a constitution and form a government preliminary to admission into the Union came before the House of Representatives in Committee of the Whole, on February 13, 1819. James Tallmadge of New York offered an amendment, named the Tallmadge Amendment, that forbade further introduction of slaves into Missouri, and mandated that all children of slave parents born in the state after its admission should be free at the age of 25. The committee adopted the measure and incorporated it into the bill as finally passed on February 17, 1819, by the house. The United States Senate refused to concur with the amendment, and the whole measure was lost.
During the following session (1819–1820), the House passed a similar bill with an amendment, introduced on January 26, 1820, by John W. Taylor of New York, allowing Missouri into the union as a slave state. The question had been complicated by the admission in December of Alabama, a slave state, making the number of slave and free states equal. In addition, there was a bill in passage through the House (January 3, 1820) to admit Maine as a free state.
The Senate decided to connect the two measures. It passed a bill for the admission of Maine with an amendment enabling the people of Missouri to form a state constitution. Before the bill was returned to the House, a second amendment was adopted on the motion of Jesse B. Thomas of Illinois, excluding slavery from the Louisiana Territory north of the parallel 36°30′ north (the southern boundary of Missouri), except within the limits of the proposed state of Missouri.
The vote in the Senate was 24 for the compromise, to 20 against. The amendment and the bill passed in the Senate on February 17 and February 18, 1820. The House then approved the Senate compromise amendment, on a vote of 90 to 87, with those 87 votes coming from free state representatives opposed to slavery in the new state of Missouri. The House then approved the whole bill, 134 to 42 (the latter votes being from southern states).
Second Missouri Compromise
The two houses were at odds not only on the issue of the legality of slavery, but also on the parliamentary question of the inclusion of Maine and Missouri within the same bill. The committee recommended the enactment of two laws, one for the admission of Maine, the other an enabling act for Missouri. They recommended against having restrictions on slavery but for including the Thomas amendment. Both houses agreed, and the measures were passed on March 5, 1820, and were signed by President James Monroe on March 6.
The question of the final admission of Missouri came up during the session of 1820–1821. The struggle was revived over a clause in Missouri's new constitution (written in 1820) requiring the exclusion of "free negroes and mulattoes" from the state. Through the influence of Kentucky Senator Henry Clay "The Great Compromiser", an act of admission was finally passed, upon the condition that the exclusionary clause of the Missouri constitution should "never be construed to authorize the passage of any law" impairing the privileges and immunities of any U.S. citizen. This deliberately ambiguous provision is sometimes known as the Second Missouri Compromise.
Impact on political discourse
During the decades following 1820, Americans hailed the 1820 agreement as an essential compromise almost on the sacred level of the Constitution itself. Although the Civil War broke out in 1861, historians often say the Compromise helped postpone the war.
These disputes involved the competition between the southern and northern states for power in Congress and for control over future territories. There were also the same factions emerging as the Democratic-Republican party began to lose its coherence.
...but this momentous question, like a fire bell in the night, awakened and filled me with terror. I considered it at once as the knell of the Union. it is hushed indeed for the moment. but this is a reprieve only, not a final sentence. A geographical line, coinciding with a marked principle, moral and political, once conceived and held up to the angry passions of men, will never be obliterated; and every new irritation will mark it deeper and deeper.
Congress' consideration of Missouri's admission also raised the issue of sectional balance, for the country was equally divided between slave and free states with eleven each. To admit Missouri as a slave state would tip the balance in the Senate (made up of two senators per state) in favor of the slave states. For this reason, northern states wanted Maine admitted as a free state.
The Compromise was deeply disappointing to African-Americans in both the North and South. It stopped the southern progression of gradual emancipation at Missouri's southern border and legitimized slavery as a southern institution.
The provisions of the Missouri Compromise forbidding slavery in the former Louisiana Territory north of the parallel 36°30′ north were effectively repealed by Stephen A. Douglas's Kansas–Nebraska Act of 1854. The repeal of the Compromise caused outrage in the North and sparked the return to politics of Abraham Lincoln, who excoriated Douglas's act in his "Peoria Speech" (October 16, 1854).
- Compromise of 1790
- Compromise of 1850
- Kansas–Nebraska Act
- Origins of the American Civil War
- Royal Colonial Boundary of 1665
- Tallmadge Amendment
- Slave Trade Acts
- Dangerfield, 1965. p. 125
Wilentz, 2004. p. 382
- Dangerfield, 1965. p. 107
Ammons, 1971. p. 449: "The bill itself was harmless, but not the amendment of Representative James Tallmadge, of New York, who proposed to alter the Missouri bill to require the emancipation of all slaves at the age of twenty-five and to forbid the further introduction of slavery. This measure reflected the antislavery sentiments of Northern Republicans, was unacceptable to [territorial] Missourians, who were deeply committed to the slave economy, as well as to Southerners, who saw their fundamental interests subject to direct attack. When the session ended, the issue, which had been only briefly discussed, was left unsettled. The House had approved the Tallmadge amendment by a slight majority, but the Senate had refused to accept any measurer imposing conditions on the admission of Missouri."
- Brown, 1966. p. 22: "The insistence that slavery was uniquely a Southern concern, not to be touched by outsiders, had been from the outset a sine qua non for Southern participation in national politics. It underlay the Constitution and its creation of a government of limited powers, without which Southern participation would have been unthinkable."
Wilentz, 2004. p. 379: "Missouri was…to be the second state carved out of the Louisiana Purchase [the cotton producing slave state of Louisiana was admitted in 1812] – and the precedent for Purchase land, although small, was proslavery."
Ellis, 1996. p. 267: "[T]he debate [about Missouri] represented a violation of the sectional understanding" [that free-state leadership would maintain] "the vow of silence…In that sense, the real revolutionary legacy on the slavery question was not a belief in emancipation but rather a common commitment to delay and a common trust that northerners would not interfere with southern leadership in effecting a gradual policy of emancipation."
- Howe, 2004. p. 150: "Despite the three-fifths rule, the northern majority in the House increased with every census reapportionment."
Wilentz, 2016. p. 47: "[Critics of slavery] objected above all to the increasingly notorious three-fifths clause [which] inflated representation of the Southern states in Congress and the Electoral College"
Malone: 1969: p. 418-419: "The free states were now forging ahead in total population and were gaining even faster in the House of Representatives, where they now had a definite majority. On the other hand, the delegation from the South was disproportionate to its free population, and the region actually [was awarded] representation for its slave population. This situation perplexed the Northerners, especially the New Englanders, who had suffered from political frustration since the Louisiana Purchase and who especially resented the rule of the Virginia Dynasty. Meanwhile, the admission of new free states and new slave states had been so timed that the balance between the North and the South had been maintained in the United States Senate."
Dangerfield, 1965. p. 108-109: "[The North and East] had never been happy with the federal ratio…and it hardly agreed with their various interests for this apportionment to move across the Mississippi."
- Wilentz, 2004. p. 387: "[Northern] Republicans rooted their antislavery arguments, not on expediency, but in egalitarian morality" and p. 389: "The Constitution, [said northern Jeffersonians] strictly interpreted, gave the sons of the founding generation the legal tools to hasten [the] removal [of slavery], including the refusal to admit additional slave states."
- Wilentz, 2004. P. 379: "At stake were the terms of admission to the Union of the newest state, Missouri. The main issue seemed simple enough, but the ramifications were not. Since 1815, in a flurry of state admissions, the numbers of new slave and free states had been equal, leaving the balance of slave and free states nationwide and in the Senate equal. The balance was deceptive. In 1818, when Illinois gained admission to the Union, antislavery forces won a state constitution that formally barred slavery but included a fierce legal code that regulated free blacks and permitted the election of two Southern-born senators. In practical terms, were Missouri admitted as a slave state, the Southern bloc in the Senate might enjoy a four-vote, not a two-vote, majority.
- Dangerfield, 1965: p. 110: "[T]he slaveholding states, in terms of population, were already in the minority [compared to free soil states]…and it became a matter of deep concern that Missouri should enter the Union as one of the slaveholding sisterhood. In that case, her [state] legislature would elect proslavery [US] Senators, and free-soil-slave soil equilibrium in the Senate would be maintained."
- Dangerfield, 1965. p. 110-111: "The debate which followed was relatively brief…On February 16, 1819, the Committee of the Whole, by a vote of 79 to 67, included the Tallmadge amendment in the enabling bill [for Missouri statehood]"…After some fiery and even bloodthirsty exchanges, the House passed the amendment: by a vote of 87-76 (on the first part, prohibiting the further introduction of slavery), and by a vote of 82-78 (on the second part, freeing all children born after the states admission)." And p. 111: "In the Senate, the first part was stricken out by a vote of 22 to 16, and the second by a vote of 31 to 7. The Fifteenth Congress had only two more days to live; the House refused to concur in the Senate's action; the Senate remained obdurate. Thus on March 4, 1819, the Missouri question was temporarily put to rest."
Ammons, 1971. p. 449: "The House had approved the Tallmadge amendment by a slight majority, but the Senate had refused to accept any measurer imposing conditions on the admission of Missouri."
- Wilentz, 2004. p. 380: "Instead of soothing passions, the ensuing nine-month recess aggravated them , as antislavery Northerners took their cause to the people Beginning in August, "free Missouri" meetings assembled in major town and cities from Maine to New Jersey and as far west as Illinois.
- Ammons, 1971. p. 450: "By the end of 1819 the Tallmadge amendment had taken on a much more threatening aspect in the wake of the massive propaganda campaign and the innumerable public meetings organized in the Northern states by antislavery groups. The Southerners, naturally, replied in kind. Thus when Congress met in December of 1819, it was apparent that the deadlock of the previous session still existed but in a far more dangerous form. The national had split into two sectional blocks…In the House, the restrictionists had a ten-vote edge, whereas in the Senate the proslavery forces [remained] securely in command."
- Wilentz, 2004. p. 380: "By a twelve-vote margin, the House re-approved Tallmadge's proposals, killing the statehood bill and handing the crisis over the Sixteenth Congress…Instead of soothing sectional passions, the ensuing nine-month recess aggravated them, as antislavery Northerners took their cause to the people [to oppose an further extension of slavery]"
Howe, 2004. p. 151: "The opponents of slavery extension now took their case to the people. They organized antislavery demonstrations in northern states…"
Ammons, 1971. p. 450: "By the end of 1819, the Tallmadge amendment had taken on a much more threatening aspect in the wake of the massive propaganda campaign and the innumerable public meetings organized in the Northern states by antislavery groups. The southerners naturally responded in kind. Thus when Congress met in December, it was apparent that the deadlock of the previous session still existed by in a far more dangerous form."
- Brown, 1966. p. 25: "[Henry Clay], who managed to bring up the separate parts of the compromise separately in the House, enabling the Old Republicans [in the South] to provide him with a margin of victory on the closely contested Missouri [statehood] bill while saved their pride by voting against the Thomas Proviso."
- Wilentz, 2004. p. 381: "A new Maine statehood bill passed the House after a bruising debate, but the Senate Judiciary committee added an amendment admitting Missouri without restriction of slavery. After uniting the Maine and Missouri statehood bills, the Senate then heard an amendment from Jesse B. Thomas, an Illinois anti-restrictionist that provided a germ of a compromise. As amended, the Senate bill would admit Maine as a free state and Missouri as a slave state, and bar slavery from all additional states carved out of the Louisiana Purchase territory that lay north of latitude 36 30’. Sectional balance would be sustained; the North would concede the admission of Missouri as a slave state; and Southerners would give way on the principle, which they had upheld since the ratification of the Constitution, that Congress lacked authority to regulate slavery in entering the territories…but the antislavery dominated House, voting once again on sectional lines, dismissed the Senates proposals." And p. 389: "In the House, Clay proved an effective broker for sectional armistice, mobilizing one coalition to pass one half of the compromise, and a very different coalition to pass the other…"
- Howe, 2004. p. 155: "What the Missouri Compromise really prevented was not the rebirth of the Federalist Party but the breakup of the Republican Party along sectional lines."
- Wilentz, 2004. p. 392-393: "The Missouri Crisis deepened sectional divisions. Clay's bargain may have purchased temporary national political peace, but it was not an authentic compromise, in which both sides agreed to make sacrifices for the common good. By pushing the two halves of the Compromise through the House on separate votes, Clay helped to create an exaggerated appearance of sectional amity. In fact, many Southerners rejected the Compromise's assumptions about federal power in the territories, and either voiced or supported pro-slavery state rights doctrines that eventually informed Southern secession. An even larger proportion of Northerners opposed the expansion of slavery into Missouri and backed anti-slavery Jeffersonian doctrines that became basic principles of the Liberty, Free Soil, and Republican parties. Jefferson's "fire bell" had alarmed mainstream political leaders like Henry Clay and Martin Van Buren. But their responses and the subsequent rise of the intersectional Democratic and Whig parties could not forever suppress the anti-slavery Jeffersonianism and the southern hardline pro-slavery arguments that arose so forcefully in 1819. Once the Missouri Compromise is understood as a brokered truce patched together by leaders frightened by the depth of sectional antagonisms, and not as a "doughface" capitulation to the slaveholders, the story of Jacksonian politics changes, and the instability of the Compromise and of the Jackson-era parties becomes much clearer.
- Wilentz, 2004. P. 394: "Many antislavery Republicans…became national Republicans and later Whigs…others…became Jacksonian Democrats. But the submergence of Jeffersonian antislavery in the new intersectional parties did not last long…In 1854, following the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, they formed the Republican Party – recreating, in a new mass form, the Northern coalition of 1819 and 1820."
- Dangerfield, 1965. p. 36
Ammons, 1971. p. 206
Ellis, 1996. p. 266: "Jefferson had in fact worried out loud that the constitutional precedent he was setting with the acquisition of Louisiana in 1803. In that sense his worries proved to be warranted. The entire congressional debate of 1819-1820 over the Missouri Question turned on the question of federal versus state sovereignty, essentially a constitutional conflict in which Jefferson's long-standing opposition to federal power was clear and unequivocal, the Louisiana Purchase being the one exception that was now coming back to haunt him. But just as the constitutional character of the congressional debate served only to mask the deeper moral and ideological issues at stake, Jefferson's own sense of regret at his complicity in providing the constitutional precedent for the Tallmadge amendment merely scratched that surface of his despair."
- Malone, 1969. p.419: "After 1815, settlers had poured across the Mississippi…Several thousand planters took their slaves in the area…"
- Malone, 1960. p. 419: "[S]everal thousand planters took their slaves into the area believing that Congress would do nothing to disturb the institution, which had enjoyed legal protection in the territory of the Louisiana Purchase under its former French and Spanish rulers."
- Dangerfield, 1966. p. 109
Wilentz, 2004. P. 379: "Missouri, unlike Louisiana, was not suited to cotton, but slavery had been established in the western portions, which were especially promising for growing hemp, a crop so taxing to cultivate that is was deemed fit only for slave labor. Southerners worried that a ban on slavery in Missouri, already home to 10,000 slaves – roughly fifteen percent of its total population [85% whites] – would create a precedent for doing so in all the entering states from the trans-Mississippi West, thereby establishing congressional powers that slaveholders denied existed
- Howe, 2004, p. 147: "By 1819, enough settlers had crossed the Mississippi River that Missouri Territory could meet the usual population criterion for admission to the Union." And "an ‘enabling act’ was presented to Congress [for Missouri statehood]."
Malone, 1960. p. 419: "[S]ettlement had reached the point where Missouri, the next state [after Louisiana state] to be carved out of the Louisiana Purchase, straddled the line between the free and slave states."
- Ammons, 1971. p. 449: "Certainly no one guessed in February 1819 the extent to which passions would be stirred by the introduction of a bill to permit Missouri to organize a state government."
- Wilentz, 2004. p. 379: "When the territorial residents of Missouri applied for admission to the Union, most Southerners—and, probably, at first, most Northerners—assumed slavery would be allowed. All were in for a shock."
Dangerfield, 1965. p. 107: Prior to the Tallmadge debates, the 15th Congress there had been "certain arguments or warnings concerning congressional powers in the territories; none the less… [Tallmadge's amendment] caught the House off its guard."
- Ammon, 1958, p. 4: "The phrase ‘Era of Good Feelings’, so inextricably associated with the administration of James Monroe...
- Brown, 1966. p. 23: "So long as the Federalists remained an effective opposition, Jefferson's party worked as a party should. It maintained its identity in relation to the opposition by a moderate and pragmatic advocacy of strict construction of the Constitution. Because it had competition, it could maintain discipline. It responded to its constituent elements because it depended on them for support. But eventually, its very success was its undoing. After 1815, stirred by the nationalism of the postwar era, and with the Federals in decline, the Republicans took up Federalist positions on a number of the great public issues of the day, sweeping all before then as they did. The Federalists gave up the ghost. In the Era of Good Feelings which followed, everybody began to call himself a Republican, and a new theory of party amalgamation preached the doctrine that party division was bad and that a one-party system best served the national interest. Only gradually did it become apparent that in victory the Republicans party had lost its identity - and its usefulness. As the party of the whole nation it ceased to be responsive to any particular elements in its constituency. It ceased to be responsive to the South...When it did [become unresponsive], and because it did, it invited the Missouri crisis of 1819-1820..."
- Ammon, 1958, p. 5: "Most Republicans like former President [James] Madison readily acknowledged the shift that had taken place within the Republican party towards Federalist principles and viewed the process without qualms. And p. 4: "…The Republicans had taken over (as they saw it) that which was of permanent value in the Federal program." And p. 10: "…Federalists had vanished" from national politics.
- Brown, 1966, p. 23: "…a new theory of party amalgamation preached the doctrine that party division was bad and that a one-party system best served the national interest" and "After 1815, stirred by the nationalism of the post-war era, and with the Federalists in decline, the Republicans took up the Federalist positions on a number of the great public issues of the day, sweeping all before them as they did. The Federalists gave up the ghost."
- Brown, 1966, p. 22: "The insistence(FILL)…outside the South" and p. 23: The amalgamated Republicans, "as a party of the whole nation…ceased to be responsive to any particular elements in its constituency. It ceased to be responsive to the South." And "The insistence that slavery was uniquely a Southern concern, not to be touched by outsiders, had been from the outset a sine qua non for Southern participation in national politics. It underlay the Constitution and its creation of a government of limited powers…"
Brown, 1966, p. 24: "Not only did the Missouri crisis make these matters clear [the need to revive strict constructionist principles and quiet anti-slavery agitation], but "it gave marked impetus to a reaction against nationalism and amalgamation of postwar Republicanism" and the rise of the Old Republicans.
- Ammon, 1971 (James Monroe bio) p. 463: "The problems presented by the [consequences of promoting Federalist economic nationalism] gave an opportunity to the older, more conservative [Old] Republicans to reassert themselves by attributing the economic dislocation to a departure from the principles of the Jeffersonian era."
- Parsons, 2009, p. 56: "Animosity between Federalists and Republicans had been replaced by animosity between Republicans themselves, often over the same issues that had once separated them from the Federalists."
- Brown, 1966, p.28: "…amalgamation had destroyed the levers which made party discipline possible."
- Dixon, 1899 p. 184
- White, Deborah Gray (2013). Freedom On My Mind: A History of African Americans. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's. p. 215.
- Dixon, 1899 pp. 49–51
- Forbes, 1899 pp. 36–38
- Dixon, 1899 pp. 58–59
- Greeley, Horace. A History of the Struggle for Slavery Extension Or Restriction in the United States, p. 28 (Dix, Edwards & Co. 1856, reprinted by Applewood Books 2001).
- Dixon, 1899 pp. 116–117
- Paul Finkelman (2011). Millard Fillmore: The 13th President, 1850–1853. Henry Holt. p. 39.
- Leslie Alexander (2010). Encyclopedia of African American History. ABC-CLIO. p. 340.
- Brown, 1964 p.69
- Peterson, 1960 p.189
- "Thomas Jefferson to John Holmes". April 22, 1820. Retrieved 2012-11-18.
- "Maine Becomes a State". Library of Congress. March 15, 1820. Retrieved 2012-11-18.
- "Missouri Becomes a State". Library of Congress. August 10, 1821. Retrieved 2012-11-18.
- "Arkansas Becomes a State". Library of Congress. Retrieved 2012-11-18.
- White, Deborah Gray (2013). Freedom On My Mind: A History of African Americans. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's. pp. 215–216.
- "Lincoln at Peoria". Retrieved 2012-11-18.
Cited in footnotes
- Brown, Richard H. 1966. Missouri Crisis, Slavery, and the Politics of Jacksonianism in South Atlantic Quarterly. LXV (Winter 1966) pp. 5–72 in Essays on Jacksonian America, Ed. Frank Otto Gatell. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. New York. 1970.
- Dangerfield, George. 1965. The Awakening of American Nationalism: 1815-1828. Harper & Row. New York. ISBN 9780881338232
- Ellis, Joseph A. 1996. American sphinx: the character of Thomas Jefferson. Alfred A. Knopf. New York ISBN 978-0679764410
- Howe, Daniel W. 2007. What hath God wrought: the transformation of America, 1815-1848. Oxford University Press. New York. ISBN 978-0195392432
- Malone, Dumas and Rauch, Basil. 1960. Empire for Liberty: The Genesis and Growth of the United States of America. Appleton-Century Crofts, Inc. New York.
- Staloff, Darren. 2005. Hamilton, Adams, Jefferson: The Politics of Enlightenment and the American Founding. Hill and Wang, New York. ISBN 0-8090-7784-1
- Varon, Elizabeth R.. 2008. Disunion! The Coming of the American Civil War, 1789–1859. University of North Carolina Press. Chapel Hill, NC ISBN 978-0-8078-3232-5
- Wilentz, Sean. 2004. Jeffersonian Democracy and the Origins of Political Antislavery in the United States: The Missouri Crisis Revisited in The Journal of the Historical Society IV: 3 Fall 2004
- Wilentz, Sean. 2016. The Politicians & the Egalitarians: The Hidden History of American Politics. W.W. Norton & Company. New York. ISBN 978-0-393-28502-4
- Dixon, Mrs. Archibald (1899). The true history of the Missouri compromise and its repeal. The Robert Clarke Company. p. 623.
- Forbes, Robert Pierce (2007). The Missouri Compromise and Its Aftermath: Slavery and the Meaning of America. Univ of North Carolina Press. p. 369. ISBN 9780807831052.
- Howe, Daniel Walker. (2010). "Missouri, Slave Or Free?" American Heritage, :Vol. 60 Issue 2, pp. 21–23 [online]
- Peterson, Merrill D. (1960). The Jefferson Image in the American Mind. University of Virginia Press. p. 548. ISBN 0-8139-1851-0.
- Wilentz, Sean. (2004).Jeffersonian Democracy and the Origins of Political Antislavery in the United States: The Missouri Crisis Revisited, Journal of the Historical Society, Vol. 4 Issue 3, pp 375–401
- Humphrey, Rev. Heman, D.D (1854). THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE. Reed, Hull & Peirson, Pittsfield. p. 32.
- White, Deborah Gray, Freedom On My Mind: A History of African Americans (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2013), pp. 215–216
- Gilman, D. C.; Thurston, H. T.; Colby, F. M., eds. (1905). "Missouri Compromise". New International Encyclopedia (1st ed.). New York: Dodd, Mead.
- Brown, Richard Holbrook. (1964). The Missouri compromise: political statesmanship or unwise evasion?,
- Heath, p. 85, Url
- Moore, Glover. (1967). The Missouri controversy, 1819–1821,
- University of Kentucky Press (Original from Indiana University), p. 383, Url
- Woodburn, James Albert. (1894). The historical significance of the Missouri compromise,
- Government Printing Office, Washington DC, p. 297, Url
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