Epicurean paradox
The Epicurus paradox is a logical dilemma about the problem of evil attributed to the Greek philosopher Epicurus who argues against the existence of a god who is at the same time omniscient, omnipotent and benevolent.
The Paradox
The logic of the paradox proposed by Epicurus takes three characteristics of the Jewish god, omnipotence, omniscience and omnibenevolence as, if true in pairs, excluding a third. That is, if two of them are true, they automatically exclude the other. It is, therefore, a trilemma. This is relevant because, if it is illogical for one of these characteristics to be true, then it cannot be the case that a god with all three exists. [1]
- While omniscient and omnipotent, he has knowledge of all evil and the power to put an end to it. But he doesn't. So it's not omnibenevolent.
- As omnipotent and omnibenevolent, then it has the power to extinguish evil and wants to do so, because it is good. But he doesn't do it, because he doesn't know how much evil there is and where the evil is. So he is not omniscient.
- While omniscient and omnibenevolent, then he knows of all the evil that exists and wants to change it. But he doesn't, because he isn't capable. So he is not omnipotent.
God in Epicureanism
Epicurus was not an atheist, he just rejected the idea of a god concerned with human affairs. Both the master and the followers of Epicureanism denied the idea that there was no god. While the conception of the supreme, happy and blessed god was the most popular, Epicurus rejected such a notion as he considered it too heavy a burden to have to worry about all the problems in the world. For this reason, the gods would not have any special affection for human beings, they would not even know of their existence, serving only as moral ideals that humanity could try to get closer to.[2] It was precisely through observing the problem of evil, that is, the presence of suffering on earth that Epicurus came to the conclusion that the gods could not be concerned with the well-being of humanity.
Attribution and variations
There is no text by Epicurus that confirms his authorship of the argument.[3]Therefore, although it was popular with the skeptical school of Greek philosophy, it is possible that Epicurus' paradox was wrongly attributed to him by Lactantius who, from his Christian perspective, while attacking the problem proposed by the Greek, would have considered him an atheist. There is a suggestion that it was in fact the work of a skeptical philosopher who preceded Epicurus, possibly Carneades. According to German scholar Reinhold F. Glei, it is clear that the theodicy argument is from a non-Epicurean, but perhaps even anti-Epicurean, academic source.[4] The oldest preserved version of this trilemma appears in the writings of the skeptic Sextus Empiricus.
Charles Bray, in his book The Philosophy of Necessity of 1863, quotes Epicurus without mentioning his source as the author of the following excerpt:
Would God be willing to prevent evil but unable? Therefore he is not omnipotent. Would he be capable, but without desire? So he is malevolent. Would he be both capable and willing? So why is there evil?
N. A. Nicholson, in his Philosophical Papers of 1864, attributes "the famous inquiries" to Epicurus, using words previously phrased by Hume. Hume's phrase occurs in the tenth book of his acclaimed Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, published posthumously in 1779. The character Philo begins his speech by saying "Epicurus' ancient questions remain unanswered". Hume's quote comes from Pierre Bayle's influential Dictionnaire Historique et Critique, which quotes Lactantius attributing the questions to Epicurus. This attribution occurs in chapter 13 of Lactantius's "De Ira Dei", which provides no sources.
Hume postulates:
[God's] power is infinite: whatever he desires is executed. But neither man nor any other animal is happy. Therefore he does not want your happiness. His wisdom is infinite: he never errs in choosing the means to any end: but the course of nature tends to be contrary to any human or animal happiness: therefore it is not established for such a purpose. Throughout the entire history of human knowledge, there are no more certain and infallible inferences than these. In what point, therefore, do your benevolence and mercy remind you of the benevolence and mercy of men?
See also
References
- ↑ Mark Joseph Larrimore, (2001), The Problem of Evil, pp. xix-xxi. Wiley-Blackwell
- ↑ Mark Joseph Larrimore, The Problem of Evil: a reader, Blackwell (2001), pp. xx.
- ↑ Reinhold F. Glei, Et invidus et inbecillus. Das angebliche Epikurfragment bei Laktanz, De ira dei 13,20-21, in: Vigiliae Christianae 42 (1988), pp. 47-58
- ↑ Sexto Empírico, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 175: "those who firmly maintain that god exists will be forced into impiety; for if they say that he [god] takes care of everything, they will be saying that god is the cause of evils, while if they say that he takes care of some things only or even nothing, they will be forced to say that he is either malevolent or weak"
- ↑ Lucius Caecilius Firmianus Lactantius (1532). Divinae institutiones. VII. [S.l.: s.n.]
External links
- ^ Tooley, Michael (2021), Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), "The Problem of Evil", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2021 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, retrieved 2023-12-11
- ^ "Epicurus | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy". Retrieved 2023-12-11.
- ^ P. McBrayer, Justin (2013). The Blackwell companion to the problem of evil. Malden, MA: Wiley Blackwell.
- ^ www.semanticscholar.org https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Et-invidus-et-inbecillus.-Das-angebliche-bei-De-ira-Glei/2b3385e4c5e71e696464b8c40d6deeca3355aa33. Retrieved 2023-12-11.
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